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ABSTRACT 
Most export meat markets have some restrictions 
and political decisions rather than simple market 
forces often set the tone of the market. 
The meat industry is New Zealand's largest export 
sector. With the majority of meat exported world 
priCes set the price level and not the domestic 
market. 
New Zealand's competitive advantage to convert 
pasture to meat remains limited without reforms 
to liberalise world trade. 
Changes to export slaughter capacity and factors 
driving farm supply are also discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The outlook for the meat industp' is one of challenges and opportunities in a 
fast changing world. The most significant changes of rec:Ot times that will 
continue to shape the outlook for meat markets are: 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the impact of political reforms 
in Eastern Europe 
the green movement and its influence on attitudes to 
production and consumption of agricultural products 
increasing competition from alternative products 
an ageing population in the developed world 
perceptions about foods that are "healthy" 
convenient food products 
technological change (i.e., genetic engineering) 
agreement under GATT to liberalise international trade 
All of these factors will impact on export meat market prospects over the 
next decade. 
Few markets that import meat are genuinely free. Most overseas markets 
have some restrictions and political decisions rather than simple market forces 
often set the tone of the market. For example, the subsidies and protection 
provided under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has moved the EC from 
being a net importer of beef prior to 1975 to become the world's second 
largest exporter of beef. 
The growth in beef production stimulated by the CAP plus a recent shift to 
lower demand has resulted in EC beef stocks increasing to 850,000 tonnes, 50 
per cent up on the previous year. 
hoth within the EC and world wide; 
This beef stockpile overhangs the market 
Ultimately the sell down of these beef 
stocks will compete with other beef and red meat products lowering market 
prices. Political decisions made within regulated markets continue to be very 
influential on New Zealand's export success. 
On a world scale New Zealand's meat industry is small but to New Zealand it 
is the largest single export sector. In 1990-91 meat and associated 
hy-products earned $3.25 billion in export receipts. This made up 21 per cent 
of total receipts from merchandise trade. 
N.z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
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The meat industry is complex and has four distinct areas of activity. These 
are marketing, transport, processing and farm supply. Each of these areas are 
critically dependent on each other for their own success and for the industry 
as a whole. For this reason it is difficult to discuss one area of the industry 
In isolation as any conclusions impact on other links in the chain. Getting the 
correct tension in the chain without slack from pasture to dinner plate is the 
constant challenge. 
The meat industry exis'ts In New Zealand to capitalise on the competitive 
advantage of growing pasture to convert to meat for export. This advantage is 
totally dependent on technical, management and marketing skills at all levels 
from farm to customer. 
MARKETING 
2.1 Global Context 
In an international context the New Zealand meat industry Is unique as the 
majority of production is exported. This Is the exact opposite to the major 
meat producing nations who first and foremost supply their own domestic 
. markets. For this reason it Is overseas market prices that set the price level 
for meat production in New Zealand and not the domestic market as is the 
case in mos~ other countries. The importance of export markets for the New 
Zealand meat industry is clearly shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
N.Z. MEAT PRODUCTION 
% Exported 
Lamb 
Mutton 
Beef 
95% 
55% 
75% 
Source: N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
In comparison Australia, the largest exporter of beef, has a domestic market 
consuming 44 per cent of its beef production and 60 per cent of sheep meat. 
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2.2. Market Access 
One of the industry's opportunities is the potential gains that can be achieved 
in a freer trading environment. Currently, many markets are not free and are 
subjected to volume quotas and political decisions on access. Even with access 
the industry has to often compete with subsidised production surpluses. Any 
changes from GAIT to bring about reforms to liberalise international trade will 
be extremely important to exploit New Zealand's competitive advantage in 
agricultural production. 
Even so, when gains are made reforming trade there are no guarantees of long 
lasting benefits. The adjustment process to freer trade in the longer run will 
require investment and joint ventures to develop and maintain market shares in 
a more open competitive world. Without liberalisation the competitive 
advantage for our pastoral production is clearly limited. 
Table 2 summarises the current restrictions that apply to our major meat 
markets. 
TABLE 2 
Lamb & Mutton 
Beef 
MEAT MARKET CONDITIONS AND EXPORTS 1989-90 
(September year) 
Market % of Exports Importing Country Conditions 
EC 52 
Iran 3' 
japan 132 
Saudi Arabia 3 
Canada 3 
USA 
Canada 
japan 
South Korea 
76 
9 
3 
N.Z. Export Ceiling 205,000 
tonnes. 
Single buyer, Halal slaughter 
No restrictions, development 
market 
Halal slaughter, Arabic labelling 
No restrictions 
Meat import law annual ceiling 
Meat Import Act - scope for 
quota. 
Tariff 70% from 1 April 
1991. 
Minimum global quota, tariff 20%. 
Low purchases in example year. Purchases in previous years were around 
17 per cent of shipments. 
2 Includes South Korea where imports are processed and re-exported 
mainly to japan. 
Source: N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
--- N.Z. Meat Producers Board 
2.3 
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World Supply Situatioo 
On a world scale New Zealand forms only a small part of the global. supply for 
meat protein products. World protein production from meat, including fish, 
totals 267 million tonnes. Of this global total New Zealand's red meat 
production contributes 1.0 million tonnes (0.4%). See Figure 1. 
Of the world meat protein supply, fish provide the largest share (37%), pork 
(25%), beef (19%), and poultry (14%). Lamb, mutton and goat meat supply a 
minor 3 per cent of the total. The residual 2 per cent is made up from horse, 
rabbit, camel and game meats. 
Of the world meat protein supply listed above, red meat (beef, lamb, mutton 
and goat) makes up 22.5 per cent (60.0 million tonnes) of the total with New 
Zealand producing slightly less than 2 per cent of this red meat total. 
Focusing further on the scale of New Zealand's meat exports, the annual world 
beef supply is in the order of 49.5 million tonnes. Of this 4.1 million tonnes 
(8.4%) is traded internationally of which New Zealand's share Is 6.8 per cent. 
Excluded from this is trade within the EC which accounts for a further 1.4 
million tonnes of beef. See Figure 2. 
Similarly, of the world's sheepmeat production (Iamb and mutton) 13 per cent 
(0.8 million tonnes) is traded internationally of which New Zealand has a 
significant 50 per cent of the trade. See Figure 3. 
Of the world red meat production, beef has expanded at an average rate of 1.2 
per cent per year since the 1980s. Most of this growth has occurred in Asia 
and the Soviet Union while EC and North American production has remained 
relatively stable. 
Pork production has grown at just over 3 per cent per year and poultry 
production 4.3 per cent per year since 1980. In the U.S. alone pOUltry 
production since 1980 has increased at an annual rate of over 5.0 per cent. 
Meat Industry Out/ook 
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2.4. Market Outlook 
Beef 
Moving from the global situation the largest market for New Zealand beef is 
the United States. The second largest market is our own domestic market 
taking 23 per cent of total beef production. 
Around 48 per cent of New Zealand's export beef by weight is graded prime 
and the remainder manufacturing. 
Most of the beef exported to the United States is destined for grinding 
particularly because of its leanness and suitability to this end use In 
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demand for lean beef. For this specialised market the US is estimated to be 
able to supply only 43 per cent of its requirements. 
Of the total beef consumed in the United States, New Zealand supplies around 
2.5 per cent on a carcase weight equivalent basis. 
Since 1 April 1991 japan has become a non-quota market. With the quota 
removed a 70 per cent tariff applies that is programmed to reduce to 50 per 
cent by April 1993 and further over time. With the quota removed imports 
are estimated to fall slightly (-4%) while the current level of stocks are run 
down. Stocks in japan built up in response to expectations of higher prices 
under the 70 per cent tariff regime. 
manufactured beef products. Forecasts are for japan to increase global beef imports from around 500,000 
tonnes (CW) to 660,000 tonnes by the turn of the century (LIPC) or 720,000 to 
Though a large proportion of high priced beef consumed in the world is grain 
fed, New Zealand does not have a Significant grain feed industry and is 
appropriately a specialist in grass fed beef production. This distinction is 
important to understand when considering market development and the potential 
positioning of our beef products in world markets. While boned out and 
trimmed grass fed beef is lean, grain fed beef is higher in fat content. For 
example, trimmings from N.Z. grass fed beef are packed at 70 to 75 per cent 
chemical lean (CL). Comparable U.S. grain fed trimmings are packed at 50 to 
55 per cent CL. At the other extreme N.Z. bull beef is packed at 95 per 
cent CL. 
In terms of price the outlook the United States market prospect has been 
bolstered by the recent successful introduction of McDonalds McLean Delux 
burger. This is a totally new product appealing to health conscious consumers 
with potential to lift consumption of lean beef in the U.S. and Canadian 
markets. 
This new product contains beef that is 90 to 95 per cent chemical lean (CLl 
mixed with recently developed natural binders rather than fat. Most of New 
Zealand's grass fed manufacturing beef is 90 per cent CL or better. The 
traditional hamburger is in the 70 to 80 per cent lean category with domestic 
fat trimmings blended with lean beef. Though McDonalds has a policy to use 
only "All American beef" other competing chains emulating this development 
along with traditional users of manufacturing beef will 'increase the total 
Meat Industry Outlook 
I million tonnes (USDA). The japanese preference is for grain fed beef and 
the United States is the major supplier of this beef. However, expectations 
are that as beef consumption increases in this market there will be increasing 
opportunities for New Zealand grass fed beef particularly as tariffs lower. 
Around 15 per cent of Australian beef exports to japan are grain fed. 
Australia dominates this market supplying around 53 per cent of imports and 
the United States 43 per cent. 
New Zealand exports beef to japan, excluding Okinawa, in recent years have 
been in the range of 6,000 to 10,000 tonnes which is around 2 per cent of beef 
exports. 
The outlook is also positive for South Korea increasing consumption of imported 
beef as well as developments in Taiwan. In general, consumers in North Asian 
markets have a preference for beef as a meat and consumption is expected to 
continue to grow in this region. 
The outlook for beef is positive in terms of increasing demand in the markets 
discussed. The outlook is also firm in terms of price. However, there is 
price pressure from competing substitute products particularly chicken and pig 
meat constraining upward price movements. This substitution factor has 
lowered the beef cycles talked of 15 to 20 years ago in the United States. (In 
the US, poultry consumption is now similar to that for beef at 45 kilograms 
per head). 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
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There are also low volwne specialised markets that New Zealand companies are 
continuing to develop which are important at the margin. 
The uncertainty of the EC beef stock pile and its ultimate disposal both 
directly and indirectly adversely Influence N.Z. red meat market prospects 
particularly in Middle East and North African markets. 
Lamb 
The major export market for lamb is the EC. This market is important as it 
takes 61 per cent of lamb exports by volume and provides 70 per cent of lamb 
F.O.B. receipts. Fifty per cent of exports· to the EC is carcase lamb and the 
remainder is further processed product. This is a big difference from 25 years 
ago when 90 per cent of all lamb shipped went to the U.K. as carcase meat. 
Growth in EC sheep numbers has leveJled off and per capita consumption of 
sheep meat has been rising. 
In the short run there are weak prices being generated by a very competitive 
situation in the United Kingdom. These price pressures from supermarket 
chains have also been noted by competing suppliers of pork and pOUltry. 
The United Kingdom situation has potential to show improvement after 1 
January 1992 when the variable premium for sheep meat is removed. This 
change though partly compensated for by a devaluation of the green ,pound. will 
most likely return domestic U.K. production to a more seasonal pattern which 
fits with New Zealand supply. The change will also make it more profitable 
for the U.K. to export live or fresh lamb to other EC markets. Removal of 
the variable premium subsidy has the potential to be pOSitive for prices in the 
U.K. which is an important market taking 35 per cent of New Zealand's lamb 
exports. 
Iran remains a specialised market niche in terms of requirements and is 
controlled by a single government purchasing agent. 
Japan is important for its consistent purchases of lamb with slow but steady 
growth for this product as a table meat. However. growth is likely to be 
constrained by the fast developing beef market. 
Meat Industry Outlook 
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The Middle East is a large market with potential and a population that is 
accustomed to eating sheep meat. For the region as a whole around 45 per 
cent of the population of 309 million is under the age of 14. The population 
is growing rapidly and there are sophisticated and wealthy market segments in 
this region. 
The outlook for lamb is for a continuation of the trend to develop markets for 
cuts and boneless product. For the 1990-91 September export year it is 
estimated that 55 per cent of products shipped will be in further processed 
form. 
Short term price prospects are weak but are expected to improve in 1992 as 
EC supplies come into more balance with the U.K. variable premium on sheep 
meat removed. Increased EC per capita consumption is positive as is the 
potential for further development of Middle Eastern markets. 
Mutton 
Mutton is essentially a by-product of lamb and wool production. End uses for 
this product range from institutional catering meats to ingredients for 
processed meat products. 
Mutton exports are relatively low in dollar receipt terms and made up 6 per 
cent ($168 million) of meat export receipts in 1990-91. 
Major markets for mutton are the EC and Japan/Korea each taking around 30 
per cent of shipments. However. Iiberalisation of the Japanese beef market is--
expected to weaken demand for mutton. 
By-Products 
By-products in terms of lamb and sheep skins. hides, edible offal and inedible 
products consistently make up 20 to 25 per cent of the industry's export 
receipts and totalled $643 million in 1990-91. 
Lamb skin and hide markets in particular follow fashion trends and in turn 
world economic activity. For the 1990-91 season hide and skin prices were 
depressed and significantly lowered the per head farm gate payments for lamb 
and sheep. The outlook for these products is dependent on economic growth 
increasing in the developed world. 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
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The largest market for offal is the EC taking around 65 per cent of shipments. 
The current pattern of trade in these products is expected to continue with a 
generally wide spread among other markets. 
3. TRANSPORT 
4. 
All export sectors have benefited from increased efficiency of port reforms 
that took place in recent years. Recent developments in shipping have seen 
the introduction of non container ships Into the North American trade that was 
previously only container ships. This recent development applied to beef 
exports and resulted in significant freight savings from increased competition. 
There has also been savings with less internal transport as conventional ships 
load at non container ports. The general outlook is for a further review of 
this situation for the sheep meat trade to Europe. 
PROCESSING SECTOR 
4.1 Macro Economic Environment 
The outlook for the processing industry is ultimately driven by the consumer 
price returned from world markets and converted to New Zealand dollars. This 
revenue stream determines profitability and investment in the industry. 
With restructuring of the economy in the latter half of the 1980s the impact 
was traumatic for the meat industry at both the farm level and for export 
processors. 
The two greatest structural changes to the economy in 1984-85 were the 
freeing up of financial markets with the consequent rise in interest rates and 
the floating of the kiwi dollar and its subsequent appreciation. 
These two factors impacted heavily on the farm sector cutting profits, 
investment, stock numbers and the supply of export slaughter stock. 
4.2 Slaughter Numbers 
Table 3 shows the trend in export slaughter stock since 1982-83. 
Meat Industry Outlook 
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TABLE 3 
EXPORT SLAUGHTER STOCK 
Lamb Sheep Cattle Comment 
(m) (m) (m) 
1982-83 31.1 6.1 1.6 Lamb and mutton supplemented. 
1983-84 35.0 7.0 1.6 
1984-85 39.2 8.3 1.5 Supplements cease. 
1988-89 29.1 6.8 1.8 Drought slaughter. 
1989-90 24.2 5.2 1.5 Drought recovery. 
1990-91p 26.1 5.1 1.7 "Normal" year. 
% Change 
1982 to 1991 -16% -16% +6% 
p provisional 
Source: N.Z. Meat Producers Board 
--- N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
Of note the lamb slaughterings reached a peak in 1984-85 as a result of a 
record lamb crop and advance notice that the price support mechanisms would 
terminate at the end of the season. The decline in lamb and sheep slaughter 
availability shown in Table 3 matched the corresponding run down in sheep 
numbers. Beef cattle slaughterings during the period remained more stable 
apart from a high slaughter due to drought in 1988-89. 
Processing Facilities 
The meat industry was deregulated in 1981 allowing free entry to build new 
processing plants. Table 4 summarises the changes in the meat industry 
processing sector between 1982 and July 1991. The July 1991 data include the 
restructuring closures announced by Alliance on 26 July 1991. 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
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TABLE 4 
EXPORT SLAUGHTER FACILITIES 
1982 1991 
No. Companies 17 23 
N.Z. owned 10 17 
Overseas owned 3 2 
Co-op 4 4 
No. Slaughter Houses 42 52 
No. Sheep Chains 110 82 
daily capacity 370,000 273,025 
No. Beef Chains 32 42 
daily capacity 20,000 14,850 
No. Employees 34,000 20,100e 
e estimate 
Source: N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
N.Z. Meat Industry Association 
% 
Change 
35 
70 
-66 
o 
+24 
-25 
-26 
+31 
-26 
-41 
During the decade to July 1991 the trend was for older plants to close and 
small single chain stand alone plants to open particularly for beef processing. 
This fact is shown in Table 4 by the number of companies increasing from 17 
to 23 and the number of export slaughter plants increasing from 42 to 52. 
The most dramatic change in Table 4 is the reduction in the number of people 
employed in the meat processing sector declining by 41 per cent (13,900) over 
the decade. 
Within this structural change the output of the processing sector has changed 
significantly. In 1982-83 20 per cent of the export lamb crop was shipped as 
bone-in or boneless products. Eight years later in 1990-91 with 41 per cent 
fewer people employed in the industry processed lamb exports increased to an 
estimated 55 per cent of shipments. Over the last 20 years virtually all beef 
shipped has been processed boneless product. 
Meat Industry Outlook 
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Using July 1991 full daily capacity utilisation rates shown in Table 4 it would 
have taken 119 days to slaughter the lambs and sheep supplied in 1990-91 and 
115 days to slaughter the beef cattle supplied. For comparison the 1982-83 
lamb and sheep slaughter shown in Table 3 at full utilisation rates for 1982-83 
could have been processed in 114 days and the lower beef slaughter in 80 days. 
On the above basis there is clearly spare capacity in the industry even after 
the recent closures in the procesSing sector. However, to be realistic the 
seasonal nature of the industry does not allow processing plants to. run 
continually at full capacity. Further, the capacity utilisation figures are to 
some extent academic as it only takes a company to extend its daily work 
hours to increase the stated available capacity. 
The outlook is that available slaughter capacity is more than adequate for the 
existing supply of slaughter stock and could easily handle supply increases. 
The trend to further processing of lamb beyond the carcase stage is likely to 
continue. However, some markets such as Iran, and some market segments will 
remain as carcase markets. 
SUPPLY - FARM PRODUCTION 
Since 1984-85 the restructuring process of the economy has impacted severely 
on the sheep and beef farm sector. This is graphically summarised in Figure 
4 which shows the trend in farm profit before tax in constant 1990-91 dollars 
since 1970-71. 
In constant dollars from 1985-86 through to 1990-91 farm profit before tax 
was on average half the level of profitability for the decade 1975-76 to 
1984-85. As a result of low profitability there has been little investment and 
fertiliser usage has been halved during this period. 
To balance low fertiliser usage capital stock numbers have been reduced so 
that on a livestock unit basiS all of the growth of the 1970s and early 1980s 
has dissipated. Sheep and beef livestock units at June 1991 were back to a 
level similar to that for June 1967 (See Figure 5). 
Relative profitabilities between sheep and cattle have dictated that this decline 
in stock units has entirely come from reducing sheep numbers with only some 
offset from increasing cattle numbers. (See Figure 6). 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
Page 14 
Beef cattle nwnbers, apart from a set-back from the severe 1989 drought, 
have been on the increase. A major proportion of this growth has been 
derived from calves retained from the dairy herd for beef production which are 
low cost relative to building nwnbers from the traditional beef herd. 
The outlook for livestock nwnbers is that overall nwnbers are unlikely to 
increase at the current level of low sheep and beef farm profitability. 
At the margin the trend to increasing beef cattle nwnbers is likely to continue 
but slow with sheep nwnbers levelling off from their recent rates of decline. 
Land that is expensive to maintain will continue to slowly revert from 
production also constraining the ability to increase livestock nwnbers. 
To restore farm profitability higher priCes for wool and sale stock are needed 
at the farm gate. 
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CONCLUSION 
The outlook for the meat industry starts at the market place off-shore. In 
relation to competing meat industries and substitute products, New Zealand's 
place is clearly to supply specialist niches that we have created. Off-shore 
there is clearly a need for continual market development to ensure market 
share and to capture Increased returns back to New Zealand. 
The industry has plenty of capacity to slaughter stock and needs to build on 
efficiencies gained in recent years. 
Getting the industry right has a large pay-off. In this context reforms under 
GATT are of key importance to New Zealand for the medium term. 
While in today's deregulated environment a simple devaluation is not an option, 
a 10 per cent lift in F.O.B. prices from off-shore would have the same effect. 
Such a lift would bring in another $325 million to boost profitability and 
investment in the sector with considerable flow on benefits to the economy. 
The economic restructuring of our domestic economy has forced efficiencies 
and enormous change in the meat industry and on farms. The situation is now 
that profits and Investment will only come from higher export prices. Nothing 
else has the capacity to inject confidence into the sector. 
APPENDIX I 
MEAT INDUSTRY F.O.B. RECEIPTS 1990-91 JUNE YEAR 
($ Million) 
Lamb 
Mutton 
Beef 
Other 
Percentage 
of Total 
Meat 
977.3 
168.5 
1,283.9 
94.2 
2,523.9 
77.6 
Hides & 
Skins 
209.7 
80.3 
92.8 
-li 
386.5 
11.9 
Other1 
340.9 
340.9 
10.5 
Total 
1,187.0 
248.8 
1,376.7 
438.8 
3,251.3 
100 
Other includes tallow, offal and crude animal materials 
not allocated by meat type. 
Source: Department of Statistics 
N.z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
% Change 
Previous 
Year 
-1.5 
-5.5 
+14.5 
+5.9 
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I: The Characteristics of International Dairy Trade 
Providing an accurate forecast let alone some general price trends of world dairy ~rices 
is an extremely' difficult, if not impossible, task. So difficult in fact that the NZ DaIry 
Board itselfWlll rarely be drawn on any price-punts more than 6-12 months ahead. 
The major reason for this is not fluctuating demand or rapidly changing markets but 
instead the existence of protected markets, government intervention and subsidised 
production. This has lead to an industry characterised by false price signals and:over-
production. In fact, NZ remains the only non-subsidised dairy product 
producer/exporter in the world. 
The resulting market in which NZ must compete is thus characterised as follows: 
* Only 5% of world dairy production is traded internationally, meaning price volatility is 
a long-term feature. 
• Most international dairy trade is in commodity based products meaning price is the 
major determinant of trade. 
• Many of the markets have a small number of large buyers, or a single government 
purchasing agent, making it difficult to generate high premiums. 
• The EC, who provide roughly 50% of the world's dairy exports, largely determine 
world dairy prices. 
• EC production and prices, in turn, are determined by internal subsidy and stockpile 
levels. . 
• US dairy production, which is also subsidised, also affects world dairy prices but to a 
lesser extent. '. 
• Surpluses of international dairy products are difficult to clear due to the low price 
elasticity of dairy consumption. That is, large price declines are necessary when 
stod.-piles exist. 
• Similarly, if surpluses exist dairy prices become very sensitive to production changes in 
more marginal markets. 
Hence NZ is in a unique, but unenviable, position in the world dairy market. For 
eX3lDple, despite producing less than 2% of the world's milk, NZ supplies roughly 20% 
of world dairy exports. This is acheived by exporting 85% of NZ's daIry production, 
constituting roughly 20% of NZ's export earnings. However, NZ is denied access to over 
90% of the world's dairy markets. 
Importantly, NZ farmers remain the only group to receive world export prices. It is 
these prices which continue to be weakened by global over-producuon, largely resulting 
from EC (and to.a lesser extent US) subsidies. 
II: The 1990/91 NZ Season in Review 
International dairy prices declined throughout the 1990/91 season. The final NZ 
average milkfat (mt) payout, including company top-ups, ended around $4.25/kg mf 
compared to S6.30/kg last season. 
Fiture 1: HZ Final YUkfa! Payout 
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This implies an approximate $40,000 decline in the average gross dairy farm revenue, 
with profits (before drawings, tax and debt repayment) falling to around $23,000 from 
$58,000 last season. Fortunately the farm profits are net of interest payments therefore, 
despite a major decline in profits, wide-scale bankruptcy is not ineVltable. 
The poor payout resulted from international dairy prices delining throughout the 
1990/91 season. Some dairy products (milk powder, cheese) did perform relatively 
better than others (butter, casein) however, NZ dairy export prices fell 15% in total for 
the year to June 1991. 
This decline was again a result of global over-production, primarily due to EC subsidies. 
EC export restitutions increased twice during 1990 consolIdating weak dairy prices on 
export markets and raising stockpiles. 
Weak demand (especially for butter) was also a significant feature of the 1990/91 
season. The Gulf war and changes in East Europe resulted in a difficult trading 
environment.. For example, NZ was forced to sell 100,000 tonnes of butter at below the 
GAIT minimum price levels to the USSR in order to complete the season in a sold-up 
position. 
Fiture Z: HZ Dairy Export Prices 
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The financial woes of dairy farmers caused by reduced milkfat payouts will not be fully 
realised until well into the 1991/92 season. Fortunately, farm incomes over the 1990/91 
season were supplemented by an 83c/kg rnf deferred payment from the previous season. 
The low 1990/91 payout will result in a very small 1992 deferred payout however, 
meaning financial problems are inevitable. 
Dairy farmers will have to cut back on expenditure with debt repayment taking a back 
seat. The low payout has already been reflected into stock prices although farm prices 
have beenslower to adjust. Those farmers who bought herds in 1989/90 will be facing a 
capital loss at present. 
Return on equity 
The dairy farmer's lot is best illustrated by their return on equity. Figure 3 graphs the 
average dairy and sheep farmer's return on equity as well as the yield on 5 year 
government stock (the risk-free rate of return). This was acheived using MAF's dairy 
farm "all classes average cash budget". The 425c/kg 1991 milkfat payout implies a 63% 
return on dairy farm equity. This compares to a return of 4.5% for the average sheep 
and beef farm and 11.8% for 5 year government stock. 
Figure 3: Return on Dairy Farm Equity 
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The average dairy farmer was marginally better-off than the average sheep and beef 
farmer during the 1990/91 season. However, neither farm type received a return on the 
"risk" associated with farming. That is, both farming activities yielded less than the risk-
free rate of return. 
Importantly, it must be remembered these fi~es are industry averages. That is, those 
farms with higher than average debt levels Wlllbe facing far lower returns given the 
debt servicing requirements. Currently the dairy industry average debt-equity split is 
roughly 30-70. Using MAPs figures and adjusting debt servicing levels, ceteris paribus, 
farmers with a debt-equity ratio of70-30 or greater would have received a zero or 
negative return on theIr capital in the 1990/91 season. 
Macroeconomic consequences 
Perhaps of more interest to a macroeconomist is the effect of reduced dairy farm 
incomes on the performance of the economy as a whole. Given that dairy exports 
constitute roughly 20% of NZ's export earmngs, a dramatic decline in prices received 
will undoubtedly lower the growth performance of the NZ economy. For example, lower 
export returns will have a direct impact through a larger current account deficit (with its 
financial implications) as well as indirectly through lower incomes and hence 
consumption, saving and investment 
In order to capture the long-run effects of lower international dairy prices it is necessary 
to quantify the dynamic response of variables such as employment, output, consumption 
and investment to these changes. This has been achieved by estimating a reduced-form 
vector autoregressive (V AR) model of the NZ economy, similar to that used by Wells 
and Evans (1983)~ The V AR model presented here has been estimated over the period 
1965-1989 using quarterly data. The model is estimated using the current period and 
two lags of each variable. The variables in the model include - real GDP, Import and 
export voIiimes and prices, real private investment and consumption and, pnvate 
employment. 
By "shocking" the export price series comensurate to the 15% price decline in dairy 
export prices (which equates to a 2.8% decline in total export prices) the V AR model 
allows us to track the cumulative response of some key economic variables. 
The most significant result from this exercise is the 1.6% long-run decline in the growth 
of real investment. That is, a 15% decline in dairy export prices leads to a 1.6% decline 
in real investment. This highlights the vulnerabihty of NZ's investment growth to 
changes in profitability. 
Fiture 4: Cumulltive eblDte in Prinle Inreslment 
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Fortunately the effect of the export price decline is less significant to the long-run 
growth in employment and consumption, which decline 0.1% and 0.2% respectively. 
This may be a reflection of the relatively small labour force (compared to domestic 
service industries) involved in the dairy sector. Remember however, private 
consumption accounts for over 50% of total GDP. 
1 Wells.G and L.Evans (1983) "The Impact of Traded Goads 
Prices on the New Zealand Economy" The Economic Record. 
In this paper they take the view that, if traded goods prices 
are exogonous, and if shifts in world demand for exports are 
fully reflected in export price changes, then a reduced-form 
model will provide useful information on the dynamic response 
to price shocks in traded goods (e.g. dairy products). 
Importantly, since such a model has no underlying structure 
the results can be consistent with a variety of structural 
formulations. 
Ii(UJt 5: CUmuhtm IhInIc iI1lmplG]mmt I Cansumpliom 
~r, ______ ~Q=~~~~I=~~~==~m~~~~~=· 
Ie 
~ 
~ 
~ 
!;; 
~ 
f\~ , U:~"'" 
..... 
... 
• , ! , I , ••• I I ' I • , I 
'II'UUDH~~ 
QIlImi 
-t-lIIIpIoJmcIIt _CODl1IIDptiGu 
Finally, the total long-run effect of the 15% decline in dairy export prices is a 0.6% 
reduction in the growth rate of NZ's GDP. Given that the NZ economy is struggling to 
reach even 1 % growth, the net effect is not trivial. 
Fiture 6: Cumulatin ehlDte in Real COP nnsfli 
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III: The Short-Term Outlook 
Enough said about the negative effects of past price declines. What does the future hold 
for NZ's dairy farmers? In general the outlook for dairy prices depends on: 
• EC and US production (Le. protection and stock) levels, 
• USSR demand and its ability to pay, 
• OPEC oil revenue which largely determines the Middle East·demand, and 
• the completion of the GAIT round. 
Currently none of the above variables appear relatively positive over the next 12 
months, indicating another year of poor returns for NZ dairy farmers. For ~ample: 
• Stocks of butter and milkpowder exist in the EC and US and will most likely continue 
to grow. 
• The proposed 2% decline in EC production quotas in 1991/92 is insufficient to reduce 
the current stockpiles. 
• The real threat of East European production growth exists. 
• EC butter consumption contInues to decline. 
• Oil prices remain moderate, tempering Middle East demand. 
• The USSR economy remains extremely volatile, poised between complete collapse 
and a slow recovery. 
• Finally the GAIT round, arguably the single greatest hope for NZ's primary 
producers, is unlikely to be resolved within the next 6-12 months; ignoring the delay 
between policy decisions and implementation. 
Ironically one of the brighter notes for the NZ dairy industry is the large cost of EC 
subsidies. In order to reduce the annual CAP bill there has been talk of targetting 
subsidies directed at low income farmers and reducing total quotas. This was occurring 
outside of GAIT negotiations. 
r-
In summary, supply factors dominate the international dairy markets. These factors are 
well outside of the influence of NZ's dairy famers, who instead must remain content 
being "price-takers". .. 
On the demand side their is little one can say ~iven the politicised nature of supply. 
That is, supply considerations will often outweIgh demand growth. Having said this, 
increasing demand for NZ's dairy products is one of the few aspects of the dairy industry 
NZ could exercise some control over. If NZ wishes to secure more certain returns then 
it must have as wide a sales base as possible. 
Table 1 outlines NZ's major markets, ranked by both their volume and value growth for 
the 1990 June year. The table highlights one of the major weakenesses of NZ's dairy 
export returns. That is, over 50% of NZ's dairy exports (both volume and value) are 
destined for only 6 markets. Within these markets; the UK is subject to a special trade 
agreement with NZ, which is due for renegotiation next year; and the USSR is suffering 
from major foreign exchan~e shortages and declining economic growth. Of the 
remaining 24 markets detailed in Table I, 5 are Middle East countries, suffering from 
lower world oil prices and the aftermath of the Gulf war. This has made sales extremely 
difficult. 
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On a more positive note, S.E Asian countries make up a further 6 of the 24 markets 
(18% of total sales). These are developing markets in areas where per-capita income 
growth remains strong. However, these markets themselves represent some of the most 
highly protected agricultural markets in the world. 
Looking briefly at the major products exported by the NZ Dairy Board (see Table 2), 
inunediately one sees that butter continues to be a major export product (30% of total 
dairy exports). This is concerning given that: EC butter consumption is declining; butter 
is one of the easiest stockpiled commodities and; NZ is dependent on 2 main markets -
the UK and USSR who account for 55% and 18% of NZ's butter respectively. 
fable 2: NZ Dairy Exports by-Conmoduy 8S X of Totat 
$value SUTTER CHEESE Iot4P SHP CASEIN 
1986 33X 16X 19% 15X 17X 
1987 30X 16X 20X 15X 18X 
1988 30% 17X 18X 16X 19% 
,...1989 28X 15X 22% 19% 16X 
1990 29% 14X 18% 22% 18X 
volune BUTTER CHEESE Iot4P SHP CASEIN 
1986 29% 13X 23X 24X 12X 
1987 23% 15X 24% 27X 12% 
1988 24X 16X 24X 26X lOX 
1989 28;( 14X 27X 24X 7X 
1990 28X 14X 21X 27X 9X 
Perhaps more worrying is the lack of change in each product mix over the last 5 years. 
That is, it remains very difficult for the dairy industry to switch supply according to 
demand and price trends. Hence, despite WMP amd SMP price increasing 65% and 
100% on average respectively between 1989-1990, their share of total export volumes 
has hardly changed. 
Price Forecasts 
From the discussion above it appears NZ dairy farm incomes will remain relatively 
constant from 1990/91 levels over the current season. However, given the forecast 
recovery in the international economy (see Table 3) some moderate increase in price is 
expected from 1992 onward. Nevertheless, as long as most of the trade remains in bulk 
commodities Drice volatility will remain. .. 
Table 3: Forecast Real Growth Rates "ajor 
Trading partners (annual avg X change) 
1991 1992 1993 
---------------------_ . 
USA CoosUfllt i on 0.6 1.7 2.7 
GOP 0.1 3.0 3.5 
UK cons~tion 0.3 2.1 2.4 
GOP -1.3 2.9 2.5 
Japan Conswpt i on 2.8 3.1 3.8 
Q)P 3.3 4.5 4.8 
Austral Consurpt j on 1.2 2.2 3.5 
GOP 0.6 2.5 3.9 
Sf Asia GOP avg 1980·90 1991·93 
S.Korea 9.7 6.8 
Malaysia 5.6 8.7'-
Phillipenes 1.0 4.1 
Taiwan 8.7 7.2 
Thailand 6.7 8.3 
Indonesia 5.2 6.1 
Hong Kong 6.9 5.0 
Singapore 7.3 5.6 
China 9.7 6.3 
Railierti:ianguessfuiii~ediiliY-pri-;;;s-~yselifhave taken the "soft option" and used an 
average miIkfat price forecast gained from NZ's major forecasting groups (i.e. MAF, 
NZIER, RBNZ, BERL and Infometrics). The result is a forecast miIkfat payout of 
$435c/kg mf for the 1991/92 SeasOIL This equates to a 7% return on farm equity, still 
some 20/0-3% below the government stock yield, but up on 1990/91. As a reference 
point, the breakeven milkfat price, (when the return on equity after all outgoings and 
drawings is zero) equals $3.45c/kg mf. 
The average forecasts for future years were $4.65c/kg in 1992/93 and $5.30/kg in 
1993/94. The forecasting groups were unaminous In the price trend, only differing on 
the magnitudes. Importantly, none of the forecast groups assumed large dramatic 
change in the GAIT negotiations. Instead the forecasts imply slowly declining world 
stock levels and moderate growth in demand. 
Running the $4.35/kg 1991/92 milkfat payout through the VAR model and comparing 
it to the 1990/91 $4.25/kg does not produce significant results for the NZ economy. The 
forecast 2:3% increase in dairy prices implies a 0.3% rise in total export prices. This in 
tum increases long-run investment growth by 0.2% and real GDP by 0.1 %. 
IV: The Medium-Tenn Outlook and Industry Strategy 
Rather than continuing to guess at possible outcomes of GAIT negotiations and world 
economic growth, it would perhaps be more useful to discuss the dairy industry structure 
and suggest some means of maximising future dairy farm returns. 
Undoubtedly the NZ dairy industry is on the right path in terms of their goals. That is, 
they are attemptin~ to reduce the dairy payout volatility through increased value-added 
production, accessmg new markets and selling via brand. Despite this over 50% of its 
output is still sold as bulk product with minimal price premium. It is this issue which 
needs to be addressed and changed as soon as possible. So, what can a macroeconomist 
possibly add to this already well known fact? 
First a digression on some general points: 
• Recent research (Meads and Orr 1991) has shown that productivity growth 
determines export growth in NZ, not vice-versa. That is, increasing exports for their 
own sake will not increase NZ's productivity growth rate. Hence, policies such as 
currency devaluations and export subsidies are not only inefficent, but also 
ineffecttve, in promoting productivity (and hence long-run economic) growth. 
• Following from this, although declining world rates of agricultural protection will 
increase NZ's exports, it will not increase NZ's rate of productivity (and hence long-
run economic) growth rate. That is, do not expect a GAIT solution to be the 
panacea to NZ's problents. 
Accepting the above results, how can productivity (and hence export and economic 
growth) be acheived in an efficient and sustainable manner? Again economic theory 
and empirical results teach us: 
• Market entry (competition), R&D and innovation are all positively correlated. 
• R&D expenditure IS not a positive function of industry concentratIOn. 
* Efficiency, not the level of industry concentration, ulttmately determines 
profitability. 
• The diversification of previously regulated industries promotes R&D and 
innovation. 
These general results indicate a competitive industry structure is central to R&D and 
innovation growth. In tum innovation is the major determinant of productivity (and 
hence export and economic) ~owth. Economic policy should therefore be fgcussed on 
removing any remaining bamers to competition and supporting training and R&D. 
The Role of Producer Boards 
The above discussion is very relevant to the NZ dairy industry due to the existence of 
the NZ Dairy Board. Currently their stated function is to ensure producer control of the 
exporting and marketing of pnmary commodities with the aim of maximiSing producer 
(fanner) returns. The Dairy Board attempts to acheive this through their single-desk 
exporting operations.2 It is this activity which violates most of the economic principles 
discussed above. 
Leading from this is the debate surrounding the future role (if any) Producer Boards 
have to play. This has been spurred recently by the Porter Project. Unfortunately the 
debate continues to fall flat, given that opponents to Producer Boards lack any counter-
factual evidence. Instead they have had to rely on economic theory and near-examples. 
In brief a ;.ummary of the arguments are as follows: 
The most common argument used in support of Producer Boards is the that the best 
way to maximise returns for growers is to avoid weak-selling. This occurs when domestic 
producers compete against one another in the same protected market, undercutting 
total returns. 
Other arguments in favour of Producer Boards include: 
• increased economies of scale, which enable the development of new markets and 
avoid free-riding by other producers; 
• they enable quota allocation or single-desk selling in markets which are protected; 
• and, they provide bargaining power when dealing in single-buyer markets. 
However, critics of Producer Boards' argue that restricting producers to one avenue of 
final sale will hinder competition. From the discussion above, the net result is lower 
returns to the industry. 
These arguments can be summarised as follows: 
• Producer Boards remove the stimulus of competition which, in tum, stifles 
innovation and efficiency gains at both the producer and marketing levels. 
How? New entrants will be discouraged since Producer Boards only represent those 
currently in the industry. Similarly, marketing drives will favour existing products 
thereby slowing product development. 
• Since Producer Boards have a regulatory as well as a commercial role, the potential 
for a conflict of interest exists. Regulations may be set purely to enhance commercial 
~oals, further discouraging new entrants to the industry. When? If the Dairy Board is 
In control of issuing export licenses. Remember, only the perception of conflict is 
necessary to deter investment. 
• Single-desk selling is likely to be less market sensitive than a competitive system 
since Producer Boards are producer rather than consumer driven. This can result in 
false price signals being sent to the farmer. 
• Producer Boards, due to their ownership structure, have accountability problems. 
In theory producers own the Producer Boards. In practice producers do not have the 
rights of conventional company ownership. 
Why? For example, the only way a dairy farmer can sell his share of the Dairy Board 
assets is through selling the farm. 
It appears then the existence of Producer Boards can result in false price signals, a 
slu~h supply response, low investment levels and a lack of profitability. All factors 
which are counter to promoting prodUctivity (and hence export and economic) growth. 
What then could be done to appease this situation without disrupting farmers incomes 
and/or loosing the very substantial strengths of the current system? 
2 The Dairy Board has the right, but not the obligation, to 
acquire all produce intended for export. 
One common suggestion is to introduce tradeable shares in Producer Boards. Many of 
the above criticisms could be alleviated without loosing the benefits of the Dairy Board. 
For example, tradeable shares would: 
• remove the incentive to over-produce as a result of false price signals being sent to 
the farmer; 3 
• reduce the barriers to entry since farm prices would no longer be implicitly inflated 
by the value of Producer Board assets; 
• farmers would no longer be the forced suppliers of capital when Producer Boards 
wish toeXpand activity; 
• and, the Producer Boards would have wider access to capital markets through share 
issues. 
The fears surrounding the introduction of tradeable shares are that; they would result in 
non-producer control and, the Producer Boards would be forced to maximise their 
income rather than producers' returns. 
However, these arguments appear more emotive than economic since: 
• farmers would not be forced to sell their shares, . 
• some offshore ownership may be desirable since this is where the major markets 
are, 
• producer control could still be maintained by issuing two types of shares, one of 
which is a majority voting share which could be held in trusf for producers, 
• and, if the new Producer Board company did maximise profits, rather than payouts, 
then it would remain in the farmers' interest to retain his shares; the resulting 
dividends would offset his lower farm income. 
Conclusions 
From the above discussion it appears that dairy farmers are in for another tough 
financial season. It is also obvious that even if dairy prices do rise, milkfat payouts will· 
enivitably remain volatile - making financial planning very difficult. 
The return on dairy farm equity is currently inadequate. However, dairy farmers can 
only compare the Dairy Board's performance against either; other types of farming, 
returns from different co-operatIves (processing efficiency) or, speeches from the Dairy 
Board management - which focus more on turnover than profitabilty. 
Similarly, dairy farmers must decide whether to increase their output at the mar~n (e.g. 
add another cow) on the basis of an average return (the rnilkfat payout). This pnce 
includes a host of other revenues and costs which are unrelated to the price of dairy 
products, rendering the price signal almost useless. 
Finally, simply sitting around in the hope of a succesful GAIT round is pointless. A 
reduction in world tariffs would undoubtedly improve dairy farmers returns but, it 
would not increase the Dairy Board's productivity - thereby reducing rnilkfat payout 
variability. 
NZ producers/marketers can do something about their difficult position of being a 
price-taker. However, the debate as to whether the Dairy Boards' role and structure 
should be chan~ed is difficult to resolve since there is no counter-factual evidence. This 
makes the conunuallisting of Dairy Board product innovations futile. Just because the 
Dairy Board has been succesful in the past does not mean there is no room for change. 
3 Currently farmers receive only one price signal, the milkfat 
payout. This price includes not only the returns from dairy 
product sales but also a return from the Dairy Board assets 
and, income from all other Dairy Board activity. 
For example, it is interesting to note that most productivity gains in the indus!IY have 
occurred at the farm level, with the output/cow increasin~ 15% since 1976. This is the 
only level at which the dairy farmer has any influence. ThIS growth occurred despite the 
real milkfat payout consistently declining (remember this is the only indicator of the 
Dairy Board's efficiency). 
In summary it appears some changes are necessary to consolidate returns from dairy 
farming. These can be achieved without major disruption to farmer incomes or the 
dismantling of the Dairy Board. Instead, simply allowing some competition in final 
export sales and, providing better price information to farmers (possibly through 
tradeable shares) would be a positive first step. It is only once competition is allowed 
into the dairy industry that increased innovation and value-added production will be 
ensured. 
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE NZ DAIRY INDUSTRY 
by Mark HorsneU. NZ Dairy Board 
(Comments on Paper Prepared for the 
Australian Agriculture Economics Society by Adrian Orr) 
INTRODUcnON 
We are pleased to have the opportunity to comment on this paper. This is particularly 
so because we believe Mr Orr has gone astray on some points. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL DAIRY TRADE 
The above comment does not apply to the first section in Mr Orr's paper which we 
believe is a very good one summing up the essential character of international dairy 
trade. This is that international dairy markets do not function freely with supply and 
demand interacting to set prices. Rather, they are distorted with prices rigged by the 
import protection and export subsidy policies of the major northern hemisphere dairy 
producing countries. This means that conventional approaches to the analysis of 
market developments and trends is of limited value only. 
It is difficult to over emphasise this point. Mr Orr notes that only five percent of world 
dairy production is traded internationally. He could have added that at least 40 percent 
of this trade is controlled by bilateral market access or other special arrangements 
meaning that the market open to competitive supply is only somewhere around three 
percent of total world milk production. Moreover, prices in this very limited market are 
set essentially by the export subsidies fixed administratively by governments elsewhere, 
especially by the E.C. These subsidies are massive, typically equal to several times the 
actual selling prices of the products concerned. 
In these circumstances the market price signals which New Zealand faces are not so 
much "false" (Mr Orr's term) as artificial. It is in this environment which the New 
Zealand dairy industry must operate. We have to constantly review current and future 
pricing developments and plan for these but, as Mr Orr points out, we avoid making 
specific price projections first, because they are I)ot very meaningful by themselves and 
second, because it amounts to projecting industry and farmer income with a degree of 
precision which simply cannot be attained. 
THE 1990/91 SEASON 
Mr Orr's commentary on this is also sound. The industry experienced last season one 
of the biggest drops ever in the payment to farmers for milk. The weighted average 
of company payouts for this season has now been calculated as $4.23/kg milkfat 
compared with $6.30/kg milkfat in 1989/90. 
The reasons for this are widely known and have been discussed in detail both within and 
outside the industry. The re-emergence of surplus da,iry production in Europe and the 
application of higher export subsidies by the European Community was, and remains, our 
most fundamental problem. The season was however also complicated by events such 
as the war in the Middle East and political and economic instability in the USSR. Mr 
Orr has covered all of these points. 
Farm incomes are down, to subsistence levels in many cases. Many farmers are 
struggling to survive. The period immediately ahead will be an especially lean time until 
payments for new season's production begin to make some impression on bank 
overdrafts. 
The wider repercussions for the economy of the downturn in dairying is discussed in 
some detail by Mr Orr. Some useful insights are provided. There is not, we think, 
sufficient understanding of such multiplier effects on the wider economy of variations in 
the fortunes of core industries such as the dairy industry. Measures such as the share 
of gross domestic product seem to be too simple, and certainly inadequate. 
SHORT TERM OUTLOOK 
There is much in Mr Orr's analysis of the short term outlook which we would also 
endorse. We would be inclined to be modestly more optimistic than he has been but 
agree that, as always, supply side factors will be the dominant influence on market 
fortunes. 
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In this regard, we are now seeing a significant tightening up in the availability of surplus 
dairy products in the European Community. This is a reflection of seasonal conditions 
but also of recent decisions to make further cuts in milk production quotas. It is worth 
making the point that in the European Community it is not just control on production 
which is crucial to achieving a better market balance but the maintenance of 
consumption, much of which is heavily subsidised. In this regard, there are encouraging 
signs that the decline we have seen in recent years in butter consumption in the 
European Community is now beginning to level off. 
Elsewhere, milk production has also been falling, notably in the United States but also 
in Eastern Europe. Economic restructuring there over the last 12 months has caused 
major dislocations to production patterns and we have seen milk supply in countries such 
as Poland plummet dramatically. Consumption too has been reduced but, taken 
together, supplies of dairy product exports from Eastern Europe are likely to be less of 
a problem this season than last. 
As far as demand is concerned, the USSR position obviously is surrounded by many 
question marks. It is pertinent to record however that trade with the Soviet Union has 
for some time been based on special arrangements developed in league with other 
suppliers in the GAIT to take account of the special circumstances we confront there. 
In other words, though the USSR position is very important, it needs to be treated and 
examined as a special case. 
plants being commissioned in the industry this season. But, there are limits. Making 
more whole milk powder means making less skimmilk powder and casein (the same milk 
can't be processed twice). And, if favourable seasonal conditions are experienced and 
more milk is produced than is expected, some of it will be used in butter and casein 
manufacture. 
MEDIUM TERM OUTLOOK AND INDUSTRY STRATEGY 
This is the section in which our views and those of Mr Orr part company. 
It is not very clear what the aim of the section is. The material it contains is largely a 
presentation of points which have been made earlier and elsewhere by a number of 
commentators, and which have already been subject to quite lengthy debate and scrutiny. 
The response given here takes account of these earlier considerations and therefore 
passes over many assertions which have been shown to have limited validity, or to be of 
no real use in coming to grips with the problems of the dairy industry and with its future. 
There are some general points to make first: 
1. It is a basic mistake to lump all producer boards together for the purpose of 
constructive analysis. They all represent producers but their structures and 
functions are vastly different. 
2. It is not clear what Mr Orr intends with his digression on productivity growth and 
Mr Orr's comments about the mlx of our export production is of an area where a more the link \vith increasing exports, currency devaluations and export subsidies. 
detailed examination of information on the industry could have cleared up a Suffice it to say growth in the New Zealand economy must come primarily from 
misunderstanding. Production data shows that the industry is very responsive in terms the export sector and exporting is intimately connected to the exchange value of 
of product mix in maximising benefits from changing market opportunities. This is the New Zealand dollar. 
obscured in highly aggregated export statistics which, because of stock lags and other 
factors; do not reveal the constant adjustments which are being made. Strategically, the 
industry is directing an increasing proportion of milk into products such as cheese and 
whole milk powder (away from butter) \vith, for example, two new wholemilk powder 
3. Few would disagree that the GAIT will not be a panacea to New Zealand's 
problems. It is clear however that reduced agricultural protectionism and the 
reduction of export subsidy distortions will increase New Zealand's exports, and 
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that this will be more in value terms than volume. In other words, we should get 
more out for the same input which surely is what productivity growth is all about. 
Turning more specifically to the comments on the NZ Dairy Board structure, it is 
unfortunate that Mr Orr has shared the mistake' of other commentators in overlooking 
the fundamental points made so well at the beginning of his paper on the character of 
international dairy markets in which the New Zealand dairy industry operates. It is this, 
which explains why the New Zealand dairy industry is structured in the way it is. It may 
involve some compromises of micro economic theory on market organisations but that is 
because the international dairy market is so far removed from such theory. 
The paper raises a whole host of points and issues which could be, and mostly already 
have been, debated at length. Points to keep in mind however include: 
1. The suggestion that the Board is some all powerful, remote monopoly "violating 
economic principles" unfortunately misunderstands the nature of the dairy 
industry. Contrary to what Mr Orr says in a footnote, the Dairy Board certainly 
does have the obligation to acquire all product intended for export or to 
otherwise control exports. It is a legal obligation. But it is not the law which 
counts. The Board is just one part of a fully integrated co-operate system which 
brings together farmers, manufacturing dairy companies in New Zealand and 
marketing companies internationally into a strong cohesive whole. The Board 
is the means by which this integration is achieved. 
2. The Board is a single exporter but emphatically not a monopoly. It competes on 
the international market against many other exporters. It is not involved on the 
local market where individual dairy companies compete openly with each other 
and, something which is frequently overlooked, against the potential for imports 
in a completely open market with zero tariffs. 
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3. There is no lack of competition stifling innovation and efficiency. Individual 
dairy companies in New Zealand compete fiercely with each other to maximise 
returns to their farmers as anybody with the briefest acquaintance with the 
industry will appreciate. 
4. Nor is there no basic conflict of interest. The aim is to maximise returns to 
farmers incorporating the risk investment they have made in their dairy 
companies and in the marketing structure which the industry has built. It is an 
integrated whole. The investment made in a dairy factory or in a market 
development company is akin to the investment a farmer makes in his milking 
shed. Each is an extension of the other and segregating the returns from each 
investment has limited value. 
5. The suggestion that farmers receive false pricing signals because returns from 
dairy product sales are not segregated from returns from Dairy Board assets and 
other investments is highly exaggerated. The investments the Board has made 
relative to returns from product sales is still very small so that even if asset 
returns were separated out, they would amount to one or two percent only of the 
return paid to farmers for milk. 
6. The idea for tradeable shares in producer boards has been propounded before 
and responded to at length. The benefits ascribed to such a system are perceived 
by those with interests in the dairy industry to be extremely dubious to say the 
least. The industry is operated in the interests of dairy farmer supplier 
shareholders. The Dairy Board and dairy companies are directly accountable to 
these shareholders through the co-operative industry structure. 
CONCLUSION 
The NZ Dairy Board is not sitting around waiting for a successful GATT round to solve 
its problems and those of the New Zealand economy. The industry faces an immensely 
difficult international marketing environment, and has done so for many years. The 
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current structure of co-operatively owned manufacturing dairy companies and the 
centrally organised export marketing function represented by the New Zealand Dairy 
Board has been developed and has evolved in response to this environment. 
There is room for change and improvement as the industry seeks to do things better. 
But as Mr Orr has acknowledged, the current system has very substantial strengths. It 
is vitally important that these strengths are not undermined. The dairy industry's most 
basic problems are not domestic and not structural. They are international and market 
related. 
------------------ -... -----------..... -
AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT ROUND 
PAPER PRESENTED TO THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS SOCIETY 
(NEW ZEALAND BRANCH) 
CONFERENCE 27 AUGUST 1991, 
AGRICULTURE POLICY SESSION, ROOM 52 9.45AM 
LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, CANTERBURY 
JOHN PRYDE, WELLINGTON 
(Note· The Author Is Expressing His Personal Views) 
Traditionally over the last 5 years at these Conferences reports have been given reviewing 
the Agricultural Committee's negotiations at the Uruguay Round of the multilateral Trade 
Negotiations in the GATT. 
Today the task of the reporter is simple because progress at these talks has been 'nil'. In 
lieu of a progress report it is proposed that we look at some of the major reasons for the 
failure so far and consider the future of achieving liberalisation in agricultural trade. 
At the outset it is relevant to refer again to the agriculture section of the Ministerial 
Declaration on the Uruguay Round which incidentally proclaimed that the talks would be 
concluded within four years. The Section on Agriculture is contained in Appendix 'A'. It is 
true the clauses are vague and general but it was assumed they envisaged reductions in the 
vast and complex systems of agricultural protectionism practised by the member countries. 
Fortunately for agriculture, the Trade Ministers agreed that for the Round to be completed, 
agreement had to be achieved in every one of the 14 Committees. Without this clause the 
Round would have concluded many months ago with agriculture being once again left 
behind to wallow in its self-imposed and pathetically tangled web of problems. 
The GATT Secretary-General has stated that the Uruguay Round negotiations have been 
'·bedevilled by accusations, self-righteousness, mutual misunderstandings and inability to 
distinguish special-interest pleading from the public good as seems possible." Arthur 
Dunkel may well be right but there have been other obstacles just as potent. In my view it's 
important that agricultural economists are made aware of these. Even if some of the blocks 
are overcome in the final stage of the Round they will continue to plague agriculture policy 
every time change is sought. 
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Wherever one looks to find the cause of the problems encountered by the Agriculture 
Negotiating Committee almost invariably the major factor is identified as the EC. At the 
outset it has to be conceded that the Community was ambivalent about the negotiations. 
The Political will to effect change in their own Common Agricultural Policy seemed to be 
seriously lacking. After all, when they have established a system that forces tax-payers and 
consumers to contribute such a vast amount of funds to their farmers, who, except a 
perceptive urban politician as a representative of the affected groups, would want change? 
(Appendix 'B' sets out the latest authoritative estimates by the OECD). 
Although the ministerial meeting to launch the Uruguay Round was held in 1986 the level of 
subsidisation of EC farmers has escalated very much since then - 'standstill' obligations 
notwithstanding. In view of the dramatic rise in the cost of support in the CAP it is even more 
disturbing to note that the EC has the gall to argue for a 'rebalancing' of protection in some 
areas. 
To explore the obstacles inherent in and associated with, the CAP would require many 
volumes. In this Paper it is proposed to touch briefly on a few of them. By so doing it is 
hoped to illustrate some of the reasons why the Agriculture Committee's progress has been 
nil. The headings to be briefly touched on include the nature of the Rome Treaty, the 
autonomy of agricultural policy decisions in the CAP, the influence of EC farm organisations, 
the complexities of the CAP, the lack of democracy in decision-making, the significant 
vested interests, the huge bureaucracy in Brussels and the critical lack of leadership within 
the EC. 
The Nature of the Rome Treaty 
The history of this Treaty is well-known but in the passage of time since it was first launched 
in 1958 memories have dimmed. 
The Treaty arose from the ruins of a Europe suffering from the after-math of world-war II 
when food was scarce and the agriculture industry was severely run down. Starry-eyed 
reformers were in the mood to ignore world trade issues and were happy to pursue policies 
of self-sufficiency. The Treaty's clauses were very sympathetic to the agricultural sector, 
conceded without the realisation that one day the promises would have to be honoured. 
The agricultural clauses of the Treaty made no mention of self-sufficiency as a goal yet even 
a fool would have said they were impliCit in the promises made. Goals sought were 
incompatible - especially assurances of high incomes for farmers and fair and reasonable 
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prices for consumers. The cost of the assurances were not seriously considered nor were 
the interests of the non-farming sector. 
Many of the assurances were written into the Treaty. To-day the farming pressure groups 
constantly remind critics of this fact and even go further - they claim they are now imbedded 
in concrete, forgetting of course that the Berlin wall was also of this material. 
Autonomy of Agriculture 
The errors committed in the Rome Treaty's agricultural clauses were multiplied by giving 
virtual autonomy to the farm sector in setting price and support levels. This was an act of 
pOlitical irresponsibility which would have few parallels. Naturally this gave Farm Ministers 
and those close to them, the farm organisations, immense power. They became 
answerable to no-one but themselves and their farming constituents. Prices could, in their 
mythology, only go one way - upwards. Finding the cash resources needed to finance their 
decisions was not their responsibility. 
Another grave error was committed by establishing the supreme Council of Ministers on a 
'musical-chairs' basis. The attendance of Ministers in the Council depends on the policy 
under discussion. Thus although there is only one Council, in practice it meets in different 
compositions. It's a system that leads to decisions in one area of policy (eg agriculture) 
being made in isolation from others. 
The Council's embodiment as several separate councils has drawn much criticism for its 
inconclusiveness and lack of practicality; independent research organisations have 
assessed the system as one that contributes to institutional imbalance and irresponsibility. 
The 'Agricultural' Council in particular has taken little account of non-agricultural sectors and 
has acted with greater autonomy than have other Councils of Ministers. 
The Influence of EC Farm Organisations 
In the light of the above deciSion - making structure it's little wonder that EC farm 
organisations use every resource they can muster to defend the status-quo. Who wouldn't? 
It could be described as a farm lobby's paradise! 
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Thus the farm organisations with their Farm Ministers control the operations of the CAP and 
occupy key positions in the important committee structure of the Directorate General VI -
Agriculture. As one study commented "The availability of a wide range of expertise within 
the DGVI enables it to work virtually in isolation from the others, despite the fact that other 
policies (such as budgetary matters, external relations and trade policy, consumer or 
environmental affairs, social and regional policy) may be directly affected by decisions in the 
agriculture sector: 
The EC farm organisations formed a strong body to negotiate on their behalf. Its called 
COPA which of all the pressure groups in Brussels is said to have the greatest array of 
resources available to ensure that their pOlicies are implemented in the CAP. In addition the 
individl!al farm organisations are also very active in Brussels as well as in their own country. 
It's long been recognized that agricultural protectionism becomes addictive to the recipients. 
It then leads to demands for still more protection. This is best illustrated by citing the Irish 
farmers who lapped up the most generous EC sheep subsidies. They now like them so 
much they have resolved to fight to stop New Zealand sheepmeat entering the EC. They 
see such imports as a threat to their ..aopian existence. 
Each farm organisation has a publicity machine that expounds the virtues of self-sufficient 
food policies and attacks anyone who dares to question the economic wisdom and fairness 
of such policies. A relatively few academics have dared to criticise the CAP and found that 
their research grants have been withdrawn by the Agriculture Ministries. Other academics 
with whom the writer has spoken have expressed trenchant criticism of the CAP labelling it 
as a form of 'economic madness!' But when asked why they have not expressed public 
opposition they have replied ·why bite the hand that feeds you?" 
The moral of this experience is that the academic sector, if it is to retain its freedom to speak 
the truth, should be made independent of conditional hand-outs. 
The Complexity of the CAP 
One of the difficulties of solving the problems created by the CAP is its sheer complexity. 
The unsuspecting analyst might comment that this is inevitable in a programme that 
attempts to deal collectively with such a huge range of issues. But the informed analyst 
would comment that the Farm Ministers and the farm organisations did a very successful job 
in creating such a complex system that is difficult to unscramble; its intricate operations are 
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very complex for any pOlitician, tax-payer or consumer to reform, let alone understand. This 
has helped assure the CAP's permanence - hence the analogy with concrete. 
Well-meaning agricultural economists and statesmen put some ideas together in the 1950's 
to help formulate the original CAP. Uttle did they realise it would later be taken over 
by bureaucrats and made into one of the biggest examples of State Collectivisim in the 20th 
Century. Today the pOlicies are run largely by administrators whose task is to try and 
control the mammoth operation. Anyone who thinks irs an example of economic wisdom 
should take the trouble to view the BBC satire on the CAP, appropriately entitled "The Gravy 
Train". 
The writer spent most of 1990 in Europe observing the operations and effects of the CAP. 
He was astounded when he witnessed the movement of multitudes of so-called "business 
experts" setting out for Eastern Europe to praise the Eastern Europeans on their decision to 
over-throw the Socialist and Communist Regimes. They also went East to offer them advice 
on new agricultural policy arrangements. Some wiser East Europeans suggested they 
should have first demolished their own Socialist monster, the CAP, before they left home. 
Recently some of the East European countries decided to make a tentative application to 
join the EC. They have been given the message that membership for them would not be 
likely "because their agricultural industry has a comparative advantage!" 
A Lack of Democratic Decision Making 
In the Rome Treaty reference is made to the interests of consumers. Yet consumers have 
had shabby treatment from the operations of the CAP. In her foreword to the study, 
"Consumers and the Common Agricultural Policy" the Chairman of the UK National 
Consumer Council said "The common agricultural policy exploits consumers. The average 
family of four in the United Kingdom and throughout Europe is paying some nine pounds a 
week more than they need for food - and we pay over half as much again as tax-payers. 
Choice is more restricted than it would otherwise be. The intervention system turns large 
amounts of good food into poor food. The subsidy system encourages production 
regardless of modern nutritional advice, although market forces often dictate otherwise. 
''The task is urgent. In the new Europe we need a new way of dealing with agriculture and 
food. The day of the dinosaur is past.· 
- 6-
It is generally agreed that on agricultural advisory committees consumer views are virtually 
ignored. Because of the committees' composition, producers hold the presidencies and the 
majority of seats and can control the agendas. Consumer representptives often find it 
difficult to get items included on the agenda. Producer representatives also have much 
better access to information. Practical matters of market administration are discussed: 
when consumer representatives attempt to bring up matters of principle or issues such as 
prices, quality, import duties or waste there is a tendency for the chairman to indicate it is 
not the place for much discussions or for pressure from the producer representatives to 
stine discussion. 
In the European Parliament that meets in Strassbourg it is significant that farmers are 
proportionately represented far beyond their actual numbers in the EC. This is not 
surprising as the same over-representation of farmers applies in all Community countries' 
parliaments. In the European Parliament, because agricultural policy is such a complex area 
there has been a tendency for non-agriculturalists to avoid being involved in it. In the words 
of one Member of the European Parliament, the Parliament in Strassbourg was "the farm 
lobby in lounge suits'. 
The UK National Consumer Councils' research report stated:-
"The members of the European Parliament (MEP's) are drawn from the various member 
states in proportion to size of population and are directly elected for a period of five years. It 
is possible to be a member of a national parliament at the same time as being a member of 
the European Parliament. The MEP's do not have to declare their interests, financial or 
otherwise. 
Only about 100 of the 518 members actively participate in the work of the Parliament; and 
another 200 attend meetings. This tends to mean that the same members are lobbied by all 
interests, and that they get spread too thinly over a large number of areas. The implication 
is that those who have a clear "brief", such as agriculture, can be well informed and 
concentrate on single issues, whereas someone who attempts to deal with broader areas 
could have difficulty. The oft-quoted example of the latter is consumer affairs". 
With some notable exceptions, few MEP's have been critical of the CAP - one of the 
exceptions has been the UK members of the socialist group who have taken a much more 
critical stance on CAP principles and have take up consumers' interests. 
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Despite the various ways by which consumer representation has been ignored by the 
community they have not succeeded in Silencing consumer spokes-person. The world's two 
leading federations of consumer unions have joined together to call for urgent action in 
rOiling bank protectionism. The consortium of Consumer Organisations in the EC, the 
BEUC while recognizing the community is concerned about its responsibilities to its 10 
million farmers asserted that it also has responsibilities to its 320 million consumers. It 
contended that "it is unacceptable that they should be responsible for protecting all farmers 
through continued high prices - am extremely inefficient form of support which should be 
replaced by selective assistance to the individuals and regions most strongly affected." 
The National Farmers Union of England and Wales used to have a credo "never let 
democracy interfere with efficiency." An Up-dated version of this would be "never let 
democracy interfere with the massive handouts we receive from consumers and tax-
payers!" 
Vested Interests 
Reference has already been made to some of the vested interests who "Drink at the huge 
subsidy trough." Others would of course be the large-scale farmers who dominate and 
occupy the top positions in their farm organisations. Their positioning in such places is 
understandable when it is realised that 80 per cent of the subsidies end up in the pockets of 
20 per cent of the farmers - the large-scale ones. 
Other vested interests include the EC bureaucrats who have resigned from positions in their 
own country to take up life-time careers in the Commission. Any fundamental reform of the 
CAP would threaten the lucrative jobs of many officials. DGVI is one of the largest 
directorates. The precise number of persons involved in DGVI is not known nor is the total 
staff employed by the Commission. The London Economist once sought details of total staff 
numbers. The response from the Commission was that they did not know! Some years ago 
there was an estimate of 13,000 plus a few thousand of part-time and advisory. staff. 
Another vested interest group is of course the agri-business sector in the EC but there are 
indications from time to time that there is by no means a united view on the virtues of the 
CAP. 
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leadership in the EC 
Those of you who are interested in negotiating and bargaining principles will be aware of the 
importance of certain rules. For instance, before entering into negotiations it is crucial that 
you know as much as possible about the organisation or person you are to negotiate with. 
At the outset you have to know whether your opponent has authority to negotiate, his 
motives, his situation, his characteristics and his deadlines. 
In the case of the Uruguay Round Agricultural Committee it was essential that the 
negotiators have power to negotiate (subject of course to final approval from their 
Government). But the talks over the last 4 years of the GATT Round have revealed a serious 
flaw. The Representatives of the EC had too little delegated authority to hold meaningful 
talks with the United States or the Cairns Group of Countries. This is the view of our own 
Trade Negotiating Minister the Hon Philip Burdon. He is to be praised for perceiving this 
serious weakness in these negotiations. 
"What we are seeing is a Community that is lacking a firm sense of direction because no one 
is giving it the appropriate leadership. The Community must now establish a structure that 
enables us to negotiate,· said Mr Burdon. 
These are very important views that confirm what many of us have also held over the last 
few wasted years of negotiation, breakdowns and obstacles. 
The current spectacle in the Community of the UK and French Farm Ministers expressing 
total opposition to constructive proposals put forward by the EC Farm Commissioner is 
another cfassic example of leadership failure in the EC and the shambolic state of affairs that 
has developed. 
It used to be said that the South African Prime Minister would never be able to create a 
negotiating framework to deal with the political and other problems in his country. He has in 
fact demonstrated that negotiation with the Black Racial Groups is possible. Yet in the GATT 
Round, to the major negotiating parties the EC is anarchic with so many of its leaders 
contradicting each other and refusing to reach a negotiating stance. After what has been 
stated already in this paper about the decision-making process in the EC is it any wonder 
that it has been discovered that a framework for making agricultural policy decisions in the 
EC does not exist to resolve the breakdown in the GATT Round? 
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Cynics will say that the anarchy in the EC negotiating process is deliberating contrived to 
prevent the talks succeeding or to enable the EC to so demoralise the other negotiating 
parties that the Community has to yield only a token concession. This may be a correct 
viewpoint but it will hardly satisfy the US or Cairns group negotiators. At least we hope it will 
not! 
There have been fears that the EC will use the Russian anti-constitution crisis as yet another 
excuse for stalling the GATT negotiations. For the sake of world trade it is to be fervently 
hoped that the EC will not resort to this tactic. Fortunately the,G7 members have given 
personal assurances that they are determined that the negotiations will be concluded 
successfully. 
The Prospects 
After all these months of almost useless negotiating it is dangerous to make a prediction. 
But one can say that any settlement will not now be based on the future best interests of 
agricultural trade. Rather, a settlement will be reached because of the imperative to not 
undermine non-agricultural trade - the concerns of the other GATT committees. This is a 
very negative and regrettable reaction, but an understandable one. It will be an outcome for 
which the economics profession must bear some responsibility along with the politicians. 
For too long we have neglected to concentrate on the realities or implications of what has 
been happening in agriculture protectionism. 
The Future - Post Uruguay Round 
Before this Paper is concluded it may be appropriate to make a plea to agricultural 
economists to, in the future, undertake less studies on farmers and their incomes, and more 
on the agricultural industry, its efficiency and role in international trade. Studies of European 
agriculture demonstrate that the CAP_ was 'captured' by farmers, their organisations and 
politicians to the great disadvantage of farming as an industry, consumers, taxpayers and 
their economies which were supposed t6 have benefited. In turn the agricultural exporting 
nations have suffered including the so called developing nations. Agricultural economists 
should aim to wrest the power from the bureaucrats into whose hands the operation of the 
CAP has fallen. 
- 10-
Agricultural economists should link up Wjt):! tl10se groups who represent those who have to 
bear the enormous cost of the CAP. These include in particular the Consumer 
Organisations and the Tax-payer Associations that are becoming increasingly active in the 
EC. They need data and assistance to fight the battle on behalf of their members, the 
consumers and tax-payers. 
Financial institutions that have incurred massive losses as a result of developing nations 
defaulting on their borrowings through their inability to sell their products in the EC should 
be mobilised on the side of liberalising the CAP. The Governor of the Bank of England, in 
calling for reform of the CAP stated "There can hardly be any other system in the Community 
which so comprehensively undermines the community's credentials as an open and free 
market. Indeed, as a farmer oj many years standing, I find it strange in my role as a Central 
Bank Governor that in all our discussions of monetary union and of economic convergence 
in the Community, in all the talks about capital movements and free markets, common or 
simple currencies, no-one has mentioned reforming the "green" "exchange rate". 
The Industrial sector from whom so many resources are being diverted to prop up European 
agriculture is at last waking up to an awareness of one of the major causes of their loss of 
export competitiveness. They could become strong supporters of reform of the CAP. As an 
outspoken German Federal Minister for Economic Affairs stated last year. "I believe that 
something has gone badly wrong with EC agricultural polices when 
- agriculture costs our economy more than it contributes to the national income. 
- it is more lucrative not to produce than to produce. 
- subsidies are paid to produce surpluses which are than pushed on to the world market 
with more subsidies. 
- farm subsidies rise with turnover so that large-scale farmers receive greater benefits 
than small family farms. 
- a large proportion of subsidies never reaches the farmers but disappears on the way. 
.... We need Gatt as a decisive instrument to preserve the freedom of world trade and 
unrestricted access to world markets. In my position as Economics Minister I am 
particularly committed to turning the EC into a successful model of liberal world-wide 
economic co-operation. 
- 11 -
The basis for this is the Uruguayan Agreement within GAlT. We need its success. This is 
very much in our own interest. Germany is No.1 in world exports. If we do not have an 
interest in a free world trade, who does?" 
Can we imagine an EC Farm Minister having the courage and wisdom to make such a 
statement? Should not agricultural economists cultivate closer relations with Ministries of 
Economics and Finance rather than confining themselves to inward looking agricultural 
Ministries? 
The Environmental Groups have been making a significant protest against the operations of 
the CAP. The former Permanent Head of the UK Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 
paid them a compliment when he stated "Until recent years farmers have had few detractors 
and certainly none who are vocal and well organised. However, this has now changed. The 
environmentalist lobby has tended to be anti-farmers, criticising the ruthless grubbing-up of 
hedges, the indiscriminate effects of chemicals, the destruction of favoured habitats and the 
pollution of the water supply. Farming circles have rightly devoted efforts to mollifying the 
environmentalists and to stressing the positive role of farmers in conservation. But the 
environmentalists - now a powerful lobby in their own right - currently constitute the greatest 
threat to public support for farming, and have probably done more than the decline in the 
agricultural population to weaken the political influence of the industry. Thus the farming 
industry is vulnerable. It was noteworthy how a spate of incidents over straw burning in 
1983 caused a sharp change in public attitudes in the UK. It could happen again. The spell 
has been broken. Farmers have had, and will continue to have, a disproportionate influence 
on policy, but they can no longer assume the public will back them." 
It is true that some of the policies of the "Greenies" are not acceptable to agricultural 
economists but in certain aspects they can be our allies. We should fraternise with them. 
The Cairns Group, post GAlT, should not be allowed to disband. It can be given new and 
significant functions in the continuing battle to achieve a liberalisation of agricultural policies 
not only in the EC but also in Japan and the USA. Perhaps it's not inappropriate to suggest 
that academics in member countries of the Cairns Group should be enlisted to assist in an 
international educational campaign to achieve reductions in agricultural protectionist 
pOlicies. 
- 12-
Over the longer-term, questions are now being asked about the future of the GATT. 
Changes are obviously needed to enable the Organisation to adapt to the international trade 
needs of today and tomorrow. Given the political will the current Round could provide the 
blueprint for the amendments that are necessary. An alternative is the proliferation of new 
trading blocs. Small countries such as ours would not gain from such developments but we 
will have to give further thought to such alternatives if the Uruguay Round negotiations 
collapse. 
My personal view is that whatever happens GATT should be relocated to a country more 
sympathetic to liberal trade principles. Every time I visit Switzerland I cringe when I observe 
such a massively - protected farming sector in an economy that is the world's wealthiest. 
Secondly, I would have to say that I think the GATT organisation needs an injection of new 
life and vitality. Thirdly, in the future, Trrade Ministers of member countries should be 
compelled to participate more in the negotiations. In this way we would achieve greater 
action and less of the agonising delays that seem so typical of any GATT negotiation. 
The 'battle' against protectionist forces will not be won without an over-all team-work 
approach. It will require the wise and vigorous efforts of Politicians and civil servants in 
agricultural exporting countries; farming organisations whose members are adversely 
affected by the protectionist policies and thirdly non-farm sectors whose level of business 
with the EC for instance is dependant on expanding the access for agricultural products. 
Agricultural economists willi hope offer their support especially to the non-farm business 
sector whom I believe could make an immense contribution. 
A pious hope, some may say? Perhaps. But certainly if the battle for substantial reduction 
in agricultural protectionism is not won in the EC, Japan and the US, agricultural economists 
in a hundred years time will still be discussing this same topic at their annual conference. 
But I venture to suggest that meeting will not be held in New Zealand - by then this nation will 
have sunk to the level of a peasant economy if agricultural protection is not drastically 
reduced. Un coin University will have become a museum. The students will have departed 
and the space will be occupied by displays and relics of an agricultural exporting economy 
that used to be. 
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APPENDIX 8 
Extract from Ministerial Declaration agreed at Punta del Este, Uruguay, September, 1986 
AGRICULTURE 
Contracting parties agree that there is an urgent need to bring more discipline and 
predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and 
distortions including those related to structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, 
imbalances and instability in world agricultural markets. 
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agricultural and bring all 
measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more 
operationally effective GATf rules and disciplines, taking into account the general principles 
governing the negotiations, by: 
(i) improving market access through, inter alia, the reduction of import barriers; 
(ii) improving the competitive environment by increasing discipline on the use of 
all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or 
indirectly agricultural trade, including the phased reduction of their negative. 
effects and dealing with their causes; 
(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations 
and barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking into account the relevant 
international agreements. 
In order to achieve the above objectives, the negotiating group having primary responsibility 
for all aspects of agriculture will use the Recommendations adopted by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES at their Fortieth Session, which were developed in accordance wit/:! the GATf 1982 
Ministerial Programme and take account of the approaches suggested in the work of the 
Committee on Trade in Agriculture without prejudice to other alternatives that might achieve 
the objectives of the negotiations. 
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ABSTRACT 
A number of different arrangements are available in New Zealand for the selling and marketing of 
New Zealand goods and services in overseas markets. These range from purely private enterprise 
activities, ego NZ Forest Products, through "quasi Government" influenced sectors, ego the NZ Meat 
Industry, to fully Government supported arrangements, e.g. the NZ Dairy Board, The NZ Kiwifruit 
Marketing Board, The NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board. Over recent years, concern has been 
expressed by some commentators with respect to the degree of "accountability" and "transparency·' 
associated with the operation of organisations which are not considered to be subject to the "normal" 
private sector environment of competition and share price monitoring. 
This paper attempts to provide some insight to the operation of the NZ Dairy Board with respect to 
the translation of international dairy product prices into payments to NZ dairy companies. The 
information used in the analysis has been drawn from published sources and therefore represents 
material available to those who might wish to examine the operations of "government endowed 
monopolies". 
It is suggested that, in general, payments to NZ dairy companies have reflected international price 
movements for dairy products. In some years, there are variations from this position which have been 
caused by stock changes and the generation of reserves and investments by the Dairy Board. An 
analysis of the relationship between an index of export values for butter, cheese, whole milk powder 
and skim milk powder and payments to dairy companies (after adjusting for stock changes and capital 
transactions) indicates a close relationship, with the exception of the 1990/91 year, where export values 
are seen to be significantly higher than the prices paid to dairy companies. The cause of this 
discrepancy is not inunediately apparent The publication of the NZ Dairy Board accounts for 1990/91 
may shed more light on the matter. 
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L INTRODUcnON 
The New Zealand dairy industry is characterised by the presence of a relatively large number of dairy 
farmers, grazing cows on pasture, supplying milk on a seasonal basis to a limited number of 
processing factories (organised as co-operatives) which place their product in the hands of a monopoly 
export seller/marketer, the New Zealand Dairy Board. The Board operates under its own statute and 
has exclusive right to the export of dairy products. 
The Board does not have any capital ownership structure in terms of shares issued to shareholders; 
rather the Board exists as a form of "Trust", the control of the "Trust" being in the hands of the elected 
and appointed Board members. It is often said that NZ dairy farmers have "a stake" in the Board 
which is worth an average of $15,000 per dairy farm. However, there is no documented share holding 
or trust document which establishes such ownership rights for dairy farmers. 
Given this type of structure, it is often stated by "free market commentators" that there is no real 
control of the Board by those it purports to represent. There is no opportunity for farmers (and 
others) to express their opinion of the Board's operations through buying and selling of shares which 
set a share price and therefore a value of the Board. There is no "market value" attached to the Board; 
there is therefore no ·yardstick" against which the Board's operation can be measured; no share capital 
base against which returns can be measured. 
In addition, as the Board operates as a monopoly through statutory rights (a parastatal organisation), 
there are no competing organisations with which the Board can be compared with respect to its market 
operations, its profitability, its efficiency and its consequent returns to farmers. 
This raises the question as to how the performance of such an organisation can be assessed. Attempts 
have been made to compare the Board with dairy operations in other countries, particularly Australia. 
These attempts rely on the demonstration of the decline in dairying in Australia compared to New 
ZeaJand in terms of the number of dairy farmers and the output of dairy products. This tends to 
show that the NZ Dairy Board has been very effective in protecting the NZ dairy industry from 
competing industries in that returns to dairy farming in NZ have at least matched or exceeded those 
available from other forms of farming in NZ. In Australia, other forms of farming have provided a 
better return than dairy farming and so farmers have moved to those options. This type of 
comparison says very little about the comparative performance of the Dairy Board; for instance, it may 
be that the competing forms of farming in Australia were better suited to the land use than was 
dairying and so the move out of dairying was entirely appropriate; it may be that the Australian 
national return from other forms of farming are greater than those available from dairy farming and 
the freedom to change land use was in the national interest. It is interesting to note that a recent 
study (Zwart and Moore, 1990) shows that for butter, cheese and milk powder, the FOB returns 
(expressed in $US/kg) were higher for Australian exports (1%1 to 1987 and 1983 to 1987) than those 
recorded for New Zealand. Perhaps this indicates that the real issues with respect to a comparison 
with the Australian dairy industry decline were related to internal structures and not export marketing 
arrangements? 
Other attempts to evaluate the performance of the NZ Dairy Board have concentrated on the 
comparison of the dairy industry with the "private sector" meat industry. It is claimed that the 
centralised monopoly operation of the Dairy Board has resulted in a growing industry during a time 
when the NZ meat industry has struggled to maintain profitability and has been experiencing major 
difficulties. This comparison purports to show that the Dairy Board operation is a superior type of 
structure with better long term prospects for farmers than the type of structure evident in the meat 
industry. While this may be so, there are few people who would defend the meat industry structure 
as ideal and a favourable comparison with this industry could hardly be taken as necessarily proving 
that a statutory monopoly is the best form of structure for farmers. There are many farmers within 
the meat industry whose private sector arrangements with particular companies are likely to at least 
equal if not exceed the benefits that might be gained from participation in a statutory monopoly. 
Against this background, a method was sought which might have the potential to throw some light 
on the performance of the Dairy Board with respect to at least part of the operation of this 
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organisation. As it is necessary to use information from independent sources in order to monitor the 
operations of any organisation, it was decided that a comparison might be possible between the prices 
available in export markets for a range of dairy products and the prices paid to NZ dairy companies 
by the Board as a reflection of those export prices. This comparison was intended to indicate the 
extent to which "world prices" are reflected in prices paid in NZ (to dairy companies) and the 
influence of the Board on the translation of world prices into local payouts. 
No attempt was made to assess the influence of the Board on world prices. It is possible that such 
influence might be significant as the proportion of world trade provided by NZ is significant. 
However, it is also probable that any influence would be small as the price setting operations of the 
European Community and the USA will significantly diminish the possibility of New Zealand having 
a significant role in dairy product price establishment, especially for commodity type products. 
2. THE ANALYSIS· 1981182 to 1989190 
The procedure foUowed involved the identification of a limited number of products which would 
broadly represent the New Zealand dairy product export sector. The choice of products was limited 
by the availability of information on world prices for those products and the need to have products 
which were broadly consistent in their nature, i.e. could be classed as commodities. 
Based on these criteria, butter, cheese, skim milk powder and whole milk powder were selected as the 
indicator products. These products comprise approximately 80 per cent of total NZ dairy exports 
(Table 1) and the prices for these major conunodities will have a very significant effect on the revenue 
received by the Dairy Board and the payouts made to NZ dairy companies. 
Year 
(ending Butter 
30 June) 
1981/82 556.4 
1982/83 657.7 
1983/84 562.4 
1984/85 636.5 
1985/86 538.7 
1986/87 510.1 
1987/88 524.3 
1988/89 609.1 
1989/90 710.5 
1990/91 464.9 
(11 mths) 
TABLE 1 
Dairy Export Values (FOB) 
($mi11ion) 
Cheese SMP WMP 
181.5 178.9 211.0 
193.5 191.2 226.0 
235.9 184.1 211.0 
256.8 271.5 233.9 
267.1 236.6 304.5 
276.6 260.8 334.4 
286.1 280.1 313.6 
319.8 416.9 487.0 
340.9 534.4 443.8 
322.3 346.9 616.1 
Total 
1127.7 
1268.3 
1193.3 
1398.7 
1346.9 
1381.9 
1404.2 
1832.7 
2029.6 
1750.2 
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Four 
Total as % 
Dairy of 
Total 
Dairy 
1321.9 85.3 
1496.0 84.8 
1422.3 83.9 
1700.2 82.3 
1640.3 82.1 
1698.4 81.4 
1736.9 80.8 
2216.2 82.7 
2506.0 81.0 
2202.4 79.5 
2.1 World PrIce! d NZ FOB PrIces 
An objective of the analysis was the identification of the relationship between world prices and those 
declared at FOB in New Zealand. An examination of this would reveal the extent to which the Dairy 
Board prices (at FOB) move with respect to international prices. 
Two sources of international (world prices) were used in the analysis. The Policy Services section of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and F15heries maintains a series of world prices. Over recent years, this 
has been available on a monthly basis. The "world price" is quoted at FOB. In addition, price 
Information is available from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAm office in Geneva. 
Price quotations from this source were used to confirm the validity of the price series made available 
by MAF. As the MAF series was consistently available over the period we wished to study, and the 
prices were confirmed by the GATT quotations, the MAF series was used as the "World Price" for each 
of the four commodities. The world prices are quoted in $US and these were converted to $NZ using 
the appropriate exchange rates. 
New Zea1and FOB prices were derived from the information supplied by the New Zealand 
Department of Statistics. Export volumes and values were coUected and the value divided by the 
volume to yield a unit price. 
Table 2 provides the data which was used in the comparative analysis. 
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 provide a graphical comparison of the New Zealand and World prices . 
. DveI' the period from 1983 to 1990, NZ butter prices were consistently higher than world prices 
(Figure 1), reflecting the premium position which NZ butter has on world markets, particularly in the 
United Kingdom. New Zealand cheese prices were also higher than world prices (Figure 2), again 
reflecting a superior position compared to bulk cheese commodity prices. 
Year Butter 
Ending 
Dec. NZ 
Price 
1983 3029 
1984 3004 
1985 2692 
1986 2408 
1987 2395 
1988 2371 
1989 3352 
1990 3224 
~------- '-----
TABLE 2 
New Zealand and World Dairy Commodity Prices 
($NZFOB) 
Cheese Whole Milk 
Powder 
World NZ World NZ World 
Price Price Price Price Price 
2951 2523 2378 1935 1806 
2870 2618 2389 1888 1842 
2453 3064 2546 2141 1965 
2038 2741 2082 2004 1923 
1779 2703 2091 1950 1662 
1965 2933 2821 2300 2679 
3284 3809 3199 3161 3199 
2400 3669 2840 3078 2550 
---
____ L 
Skim Milk 
Powder 
NZ World 
Price' Price 
1255 1254 
1323 1312 
1365 1444 
1370 1571 
1471 1488 
2008 2604 
3152 3199 
2838 2690 
NZ milk powder prices remained very similar to world prices from 1983 through 1987 (Figures 3 and 
4) before slipping below world prices in 1988, catching up again in 1989 and moving ahead of world 
prices in 1990 (particuJarly for Whole Milk Powder), 
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The more important aspect of these comparisons is, however, the similarity in the price movements. 
With the exception of mille powders in 1988, the NZ price movements were very similar to the world 
price movements, reflecting a close relationship between NZ prices and world prices. 
It can therefore be concluded that the prices received at FOB for these major NZ dairy product exports 
closely reflect world prices; the NZ Dairy Board can therefore be seen to be achieving prices at least 
as high as those prevailing in world markets and can also be seen to have achieved higher prices for 
butter and cheese over the period examined. 
2.2 FOB Prices d NZ Dairy Board Payouts to Dairy Companies 
The seamd stage of the project was to compare the prices paid by the NZ Dairy Board with the prices 
received for exported product. In order to do this, it was necessary to construct an index of export 
prices which would reflect the value of the various components of the export mix as one set of data. 
This was done in a simple way by calculating a weighted average price for the four main export 
products. The process involved the addition of the tonnes of each product exported to arrive at a total 
tonnes of exports, the addition of the dollar values of those exports (at FOB) and the calculation of a 
weighted average price by dividing the total doIlars by the total tonnes. This was done on an annual 
basis for the period from 1981/82 to 1989/90 on a June year basis. 
This export price index can then be compared with the payouts to the dairy companies as announced 
by the NZ Dairy Board for each year. It should be noted that this price is not necessariIy that received 
by fanners because each dairy company adds to or subtracts from the Dairy Board price according to 
the profitability of each dairy company. 
Table 3 provides the export price index (based on a year ending 30 June) and the payout to dairy 
company amounts (based on a year ending 31 May). 
TABLE 3 
Comparison of Export Price Index and 
NZ Dairy Board Payouts to Dairy Companies 
Year Export Price Index Payouts to Dairy 
Companies 
($/kg) 
1981/82 2.18 3.33 
1982/83 232 3.60 
1983/84 2.25 350 
1984/85 237 3.96 
1985/86 2.19 4.00 
1986/87 2.06 3.20 
1987/88 2.12 3.60 ! 
1988/89 2.81 530 
1989/90 332 5.80 
Figure 5 provides a graphical image of the two price series. From this it can be seen that the export 
price index remained reasonably stable from 1981/82 through to 1984185 before declining through 
1985/86 to 1987/88 and then increasing again through 1988/89 and 1989/90. However, the price paid 
by the NZ Dairy Board to the dairy companies foIlowed an increasing path from 1981/82 through 
1985/86, sharply declined in 1986/87, increased slightly in 1987/88 and increased sharply in 1988/89. 
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The price paid to dairy companies does of course contain additional elements apart from those 
resulting from the sale of the four major products which make up the export index. Apart from 
revenue earned from the sale of other products, the price includes transactions on the stabilisation 
acoount (which operated until 1987 188), allowances for transfers into and out of Dairy Board reserves 
and other capital transactions, and the accumulation and disposal of stocks, the level of which would 
vary from one year end to the next. (It must be noted that the price paid to dairy companies is for 
all the milkfat received each year, not necessarily sold. Therefore, an increase in Dairy Board stock 
should result in a lower per kilogram of milkfat payout to dairy companies as the revenue earned is 
from less milkfat than was received. In contrast, a decrease in Dairy Board stock should result in a 
higher payout as more milkfat was sold than was received.) 
2.2.1 Adjustments for Capital Transactions 
As described above, in order for a reasonably accurate comparison of payouts to dairy companies with 
the export price index to be made, the payouts have to be adjusted to allow for capital transactions 
and stabilisation account deposits and withdrawals, i.e. transactions which have been made by the 
Dairy Board which either do not relate directly to export returns or which adjust the returns. 
Table 4 provides some details of the transactions which have been identified. TIlls information has 
been drawn from the NZ Dairy Board Annual Reports for the years concerned. 
TABLE 4 
Adjustments to the Dairy Board Payouts -
Capital Transactions and Stabilisation Account Movements 
Year Transfers Stabilisation Total Milk Price Adjusted 
To/{From) Account "Capital" Fat Adjustment Payment 
Reserves Movements - Transactions Produced Required' ($) 
($m) Incr/{Decr) ($m) (OOO kg) +/{-) 
($m) ($) 
1981182 60.2 137.8 198.0 309,000 0.64 3.97 
1982/83 103.2 124.2 227.4 316,400 0.72 4.32 
, 
1983/84 73.4 (16.1) 57.3 352.000 0.16 3.66 I 
1984/85 141.6 46.2 187.8 362.000 052 4.48 
1985/86 (46.7) (507.7) (554.4) 378,000 (l.46) 253 
1986/87 25.6 23.6 492 334,000 0.14 3.34 
1987/88 96.3 24.8 121.1 365,000 0.33 3.93 
1988/89 48.1 
-
48.1 345.000 0.14 5.44 
1989/90 28.4 
-
28.4 365,000 0.07 5.87 
The adjustment has been calculated by dividing the capital transactions by the amount of milk 
fat produced in each year. 
In 1981182 and 1982/83, this includes $15.0 million transfered directly to the capital account 
and $60.0 million loaned to the Board. 
The adjustments displayed in Table 4 indicate that for all the years included (except 1985/86) there 
has been an accumulation of reserves by the Dairy Board. With the exception of 1983/84 and 1985/86, 
payments have been made into the stabilisation account. TIlls means that for all years (except 
1985/86) the export equivalent price available to the dairy companies could have been higher than was 
actually paid out by the Dairy Board. The amount of increase that could have been paid varied from 
$0.72 (l982/83) to $0.07 (l989/9O). In net terms over the nine year period, the price that could have 
been paid to dairy companies could have been higher by $1.26/kg (after allowing for the $1.46 extra 
payout in 1985/86) (no allowance has been made for inf1ation). In some ways, therefore, this "lost" 
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amount could be considered a cost of having the Dairy Board operate on behalf of the industry. 
However, it must be noted that any alternative organisation selling dairy products may also have 
accumulated reserves and therefore this "cost" may not be any different between different types of 
organisations. 
The key point of this analysis is that the adjustment of the price paid to dairy companies to provide 
for transactions unrelated to export prices should bring the adjusted price closer to that which would 
have resulted if there had been direct translation of export returns into dairy company payouts. 
2.2.2 Adjustments for Stock Changes 
Further adjustments to the price paid to dairy companies to allow for changes in year end stocks must 
be made. As the Dairy Board generates revenue from sales of product, this revenue must be 
translated into a payment for milk fat received. Changes in stock levels from one year end to the next 
will affect the relationship between the export prices received and the payments available to dairy 
companies. Where stock levels increase, less is available to pay to dairy companies than would have 
been available if stock levels had not altered. In the same way, a decrease in stock levels will yield 
more revenue as more product has been sold than has been produced by that year's production. TIlls 
means that the price paid to dairy companies will be higher than would have been the case if stock 
levels had been maintained. 
Stock change information is not readily available as the Dairy Board classifies this information as 
commercially sensitive. Therefore, an alternative proxy had to be created. 
Information on the tonnes of rnilkfat produced each season was made available by the Dairy Board 
until the 1986/87 season. From then on, the information provided for rnilkfat processed was used to 
produce a figure for rnilkfat produced by assuming that the milkfat processed was 90 per cent of the 
milkfat produced. TIlls proportion was based on the evidence of preceding years when data on both 
areas was available. 
The volume of milkfat produced was then compared with the volume of product exported as butter, 
cheese, whole milk powder and skim milk powder (the tonnage used to calculate the export price 
index). It was hypothesised that the ratio between the two series should be reasonably consistent. 
Where there was inconsistency, it was suggested that this relates to an increase or decrease in Dairy 
Board stocks. Table 5 provides a comparison of the two series and the ratio of the export volume to 
the volume produced. 
Year 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
TABLE 5 
Comparison of Milkfat Produced with Volume Exported 
(OOO tonnes) 
Milkfat Produced Volume Exported 
309 516 
316 547 
352 530 
362 590 
378 615 
334 669 
365 662 
345 652 
365 612 
DAtRY PRICE COMPARISONS -10 OF 21 
Ratio 
1.66 
1.73 
150 
1.62 
1.62 
2.00 
1.81 
1.88 
1.67 
From observation of the ratios, it is apparent that in 1983/84 there was a significant decline in the 
ratio, indicating an increase in stocks. In 1986/87 the ratio increased sharply indicating a disposal of 
stocks and in 1989/90, the decrease in the ratio indicates a possible build up of stocks. However, as 
prices were higher during 1989/90, a further build-up in stocks was wilikely and a more feasible 
explanation would be that stocks were in fact being disposed of during 1987/88 and 1988/89 (leading 
to the higher ratios of 1.81 and 1.88 respectively) with the 1.67 ratio of 1989/90 being a return to a full 
production disposal level. 
If the conclusions drawn from the above analysis are considered valid, then it follows that the prices 
paid in 1986/87, 1987/88 and 1988/89 should have been higher than they might otherwise have been 
as a result of the generation of extra revenue through the sale of stocks, i.e. product sourced from 
previous years milk production. 
This analysis therefore indicates that the price paid to the dairy companies in 1983/84 could be 
adjusted upwards and the prices paid to dairy companies in 1986/87, 1987/88 and 1988/89 should 
be adjusted downwards to more accurately reflect world prices for dairy products in those years. The 
adjustment has been carried out by calculating an average level for the ratio (excluding the years in 
question), and applying the calculated ratio to the volume of production to arrive at an estimate of 
the equivalent volume available for export from that year's production. The difference between this 
estimate and the actual level of exports was expressed as a percentage. The price paid to dairy 
companies (after adjustment for capital transactions, stabilisation deposits, etc.) was then adjusted by 
that percentage to yield an export equivalent of the price paid to the dairy companies. 
For 1983/84, the ratio was adjusted from I.SO to 1.65 (being the average ratio over 1981/82 to 1985/86, 
excluding 1983/84). This led to a calculation of product available for export of 580,800 tonnes, up by 
SO,800 tonnes from the actual level of exports (of the four main products). This is an increase of 9584 
per cent over the actual exports which when applied to the adjusted price (from Table 4) yields an 
increase of $O.35/kg leading to an export equivalent price of $4.01/kg. 
Adjustments were calculated in a similar way for 1986/87,1987/88 and 1988/89. The production to 
product available for sale ratio of 1.65 was used for the three years resulting in adjustments in the 
prices of $(059), $(035) and $(0.69) respectively. The export equivalent prices for the three years are 
therefore $2.75/kg, $358/kg and $4.75/kg for 1986/87, 1987/88 and 1988/89 respectively. 
2.2.3 Summary of Adjustments 
Table 6 presents a summary of the price adjustments resulting from allowance for capital, stabilisation 
and stock change transactions. 
Figure 6 provides a graphical comparison of the FOB price series and the adjusted payments to dairy 
companies (export equivalent price). This comparison indicates that the adjustments made have 
confinned the "fit" of the payout prices to the export prices with the exception of 1985/86. This was 
the year when there was a major withdrawal from the stabilisation account to compensate for the 
"severe drop in world prices". In fact, the data indicate that world prices did not drop as much as is 
implied by the level of withdrawal from the stabilisation account. While world prices did decline a 
little, the price actually paid to the dairy companies increased slightly. Adjusting this price by the full 
amount of the withdrawal from the stabilisation account is clearly not appropriate as this over 
emphasises the extent of the world price decline. As a result of this "discovery", further investigation 
of the Dairy Board accounts was warranted. This revealed that liabilities, in particular, long term 
liabilities, had been reduced in 1985/86 by $233 million. As this transaction should not be identified 
with the export return for that year, this amount was added back to the export equivalent price. The 
addition was worth $O.60/kg of butterfat produced in 1985/86 (bringing the adjusted export 
equivalent price for 1985/86 up to $3.13 per kg of butterfat produced). It could be concluded that the 
Dairy Board took the opportunity of a perceived down tum in world prices to use funds from the 
stabilisation account to repay this long term liability. Correction for this transaction results in the 
graph shown as Figure 7 where all adjustments have been taken into account before comparing the 
export price index with the export equivalent of payments to the dairy companies. 
DAlRY PRICE COMPARISONS -11 OF 21 
> 
...... 
::J 
tJ' 
I:J.1 
--~ 
o 
0. 
>< 
I:J.1 
Ul 
<1> 
...... 
,:: 
o 
0. 
S 
o 
U 
o 
-- > 
-0 .= 
<1> 0 t;Q 
0.0 S-
0-0 U'S 
><P-. 
<1> til 
-0<1> 
,:: .~ 
- ~ 
_P-. 
~ 0-
0. 0 
>< 
I:J.1 
~ , 
~ 
... 
~ 
~ 
o 
()o 
" ()o 
<0 
()o 
()o 
<0 
" <0 <0 
()o 
<0 
<0 
" .... <0 
()o 
.... >-~ tj 
~::E 
-~ 
:'0 ~ Q) 
~'O 
- ~ 
." 
<0 
" .. 
<0 
2; 
.. 
CD 
" 
.., 
<0 
()o 
.., 
<0 
" ... 
'" ()o 
~ 
M 
tj 
~ 
~l \ \, 1; 
0000000000000 
10010010010010010010 
<)<)lOlOoqooqo('t)('t)NN-
DAIRY PRICE COMPARISONS· U OF 21 
1:1 
II 
'0 
>-
::J 
17 
~ 
.. 
o 
Q, 
M 
~ 
t 
M 
II 
'0 
1:1 
.. 
o 
Q, 
M 
loa 
H 
«l 
'Ij 
c:: 
... 
.2 
«l 
c:: 
~ ....... 
""10 
OlD 
C') .... 
'Ij.Q 
o()c::~ 
ID ~ ... 
..... ID ~t:I-~:Sl~ 
p.,. '-' 
Year 
1981/82 
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TABLE 6 
Prices Paid to Dairy Companies 
Adjusted to Reflect the Export Equivalent 
($/kg) 
Price Paid Reserves and Stock Change 
Stabilisation Adjustments 
Adjustments 
3.30 0.64 -
3.60 0.72 
-
3.50 0.16 0.35 
3.96 0.52 
-
4.00 (1.46) 
-
3.20 0.14 (0.59) 
3.60 0.33 (0.35) 
5.30 0.14 (0.69) 
5.80 0.07 
-
--------
~-~.---.--
Export 
Equivalent 
Price 
3.94 
4.32 
4.01 
4.48 
2.54 
2.75 
3.58 
4.75 
5.87 
- -- ---
Figure 7 indicates a reasonable correlation between the two price series, indicating that the adjustments 
made were appropriate and that export prices have been reasonably reflected in prices paid to dairy 
companies (with the exception of 1985/86). 
2.2.4 Derivation of "Mathematical Relationship" 
Given the assumption that export prices should be closely related to prices payable to dairy companies 
and the adjustments made (above) in order to diminish the influence of "other" factors, it should be 
possible to construct a mathematical relationship between the two price series. TIlls relationship 
would be expected to have a positive slope, i.e. the proportion of the export return available for 
payment to the dairy companies should increase as the export price level increases. Over the range 
of production involved in the analysis, the costs of the Dairy Board should remain (close to) constant, 
i.e. "fixed", with some costs rising with rising prices, e.g. insurance and interest. TIlls means that a 
large proportion of increases in prices should be available for payment to dairy companies. 
In order to test this proposition, an ordinary least squares regression analysiS was undertaken. The 
proposition was expressed as follows: 
where 
Dp = F(Ep,k) 
Dp = Dairy Company Price, 
Ep = Export Price Index, and 
k = Constant (proxy for costs). 
The function was expressed in a linear form as follows: 
where 
Dp = a.Ep - k 
a = Constant. 
From this analysis, some information is available about the level of costs involved in handling the 
volumes of product within the range of 309,000 to 378,000 tonnes of milk fat (the range of annual 
volumes produced over the period of the analysis). Where the relationship results in a zero payout 
available to dairy companies (i.e Dp = Ol,the level of the export price index (Ep) provides an estimate 
of the measure of the price level necessary to generate enough funds to cover the Dairy Board costs. 
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Estimation of the function resulted in the following equation: 
Dp = 2.045Ep - 0.818 
Standard Error of Dp Estimate = 0.4196 
Standard Error of "a" = 0.3638 
R2 = 81.9% 
Number of Observations = 9 
Degrees of Freedom = 7 
Table 7 provides the export index, the fully adjusted export equivalent price and the calculated export 
equivalent price (using the above equation). 
TABLE 7 
Export Index and Export Equivalent Prices 
Year Export Index Observed Calculated 
Export Equivalent Export Equivalent 
Price ($/kg) Price ($/kg) 
1981/82 2.18 3.94 3.64 
1982/83 232 432 3.93 
1983/84 225 4.01 3.78 
1984/85 237 4.48 4.03 
1985/86 2.19 3.14 3.66 
1986/87 2.06 2.75 339 
1987/88 2.12 3.58 3.52 
1988/89 2.81 4.75 4.93 
1989/90 332 5.87 5.97 
The Export Equivalent Price series (observed and calculated) are presented in Figure 8. 
The equation implies that an export index of 0.40 would be associated with a zero payout to dairy 
companies (i.e. Dp = 0). 
3. THE ANALYSIS - 1990/91 
For the 1990/91 year, the NZ Dairy Board reported a major drop in world prices for dairy products 
and, as a oonsequence, a major decline in payments to dairy companies. This resulted in a fall from 
$5.80/kg of milk fat for 1989/90 to a price of $3.70/kg of milk fat for the 1990/91 year, a decline in 
price of 36.2 per cenL 
In order to understand the changes which were reported, an analysis of the NZ export prices and 
world prices over the period from January 1988 to May 1991 was carried oUL This analysis was 
completed on a monthly basis 90 that the price movements during the period could be observed more 
clearly. Figures 9 and 10 provide the infonnation on New Zealand export prices for the four main 
products on a monthly basis from January 1988 to May 1991. These clearly demonstrate the rise in 
prices through to July/August 1989 and the gradual fall since that time. Figures 11, 12, 13 and 14 
present the comparison between world prices and NZ export prices for the four commodities over the 
period from June 1989 to May 1991. A close relationship between the world prices and NZ export 
prices can be observed with a generally declining price trend during the first half of 1990 (a little later 
for SMP) and a levelling off of prices during the Ialter half of 1990 through into 1991. 
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Table 8 presents data for the calculation of the export price index for 1990/91. This indicates an export 
price index of 2.98. Insertion of this index number in the equation leads to an implied export 
equivalent price available for payment to dairy companies of $5.27. The actual payout price for 
1990/91 was $3.70/kg (this corresponds to an export price index of 221). Figure 15 demonstrates the 
price relationships. The major difference of $1.57/kg between the two prices requires some attempt 
at explanation. 
The first possible cause of a significant difference could be a build up of stocks as the Dairy Board 
attempted to hold prices at a higher level through the restricting of product supply to the market 
Some assessment of this can be made through a comparison of the production level implied by the 
volume of exports of the four major products. Total tonnes of product exported were 656,400 tonnes. 
Using the "nonnal" relationship between the export volume and the production level (a factor of 1.65), 
an implied production volume of 397,800 tonnes of milk fat is arrived at. This is conSiderably higher 
than for previous years (viz, 365,000 tonnes in 1989/90, 345,000 tonnes in 1988/89) and leads to the 
conclusion that a build up of stock was not undertaken during 1990/91. (Even allowing for some 
inaccuracy in the ratio of production to export volume, i.e. using an ratio of 1.80, the implied 
production volume is still 364,600 tonnes of milk fat which is in line with recent production levels.) 
Butter 
Cheese 
SMP 
WMP 
TarAL 
TABLE 8 
1990/91 Export Volumes and Value -
Butter, Oteese, WMP and SMP 
Volume Value 
(000 tonnes) ($ 000) 
168.5 526,704 
100.1 350,660 
158.9 403,847 
228.9 672,534 
656.4 1,953,746 
Value 
($/kg) 
3.12 
350 
2.54 
2.94 
2.98 
Therefore, alternative explanations for the major difference between export prices and dairy company 
payout must be sought. There are two possible explanations which could be applicable. One is to 
assume that there has been a major increase in Dairy Board costs which have been incurred in 
attempting to sell product in a declining market. However, this would be unlikely as in fact the 
market during most of 1990/91 was reasonably stable; the significant price declines had occurred in 
the latter part of 1989/90. 
The second possible reason for the difference is a decision by the Dairy Board to accumulate reserves 
from the export revenue received and payout only a proportion of the revenue to the dairy 
companies. The price difference (j.e. $157/kg of milk fat) implies a very substantial increase in 
reserves. On the assumption that 397,800 tonnes of milk fat were produced, the price difference 
equates to a sum of $624.5 million (even if only 364,600 tonnes of milk fat were produced, the price 
difference equates to $572.4 million). A sum of around $600 million would establish a significant 
stabilisation reserve, if this was the intention of the Dairy Board, or allow the repayment of a 
significant amount of debt. The withholding of such an amount from the dairy companies would also 
certainly assist in constraining potential increases in production of dairy products and assist the Board 
to maintain its marketing programmes. 
However, the disposition of the funds withheld by the Board will not become apparent until the NZ 
Dairy Board accounts are published. Inspection of the capital movements for the 1990/91 year should 
provide evidence of the areas of increased holdings. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
The analysis has indicated that the NZ Dairy Board has been achieving prices in line with world 
market returns for the four major indicator products which have been used in this study. The 
comparison of NZ FOB prices with world FOB prices shows a strong similarity of movement between 
the two series and the absolute relationships between the price series are consistent. 
However, the translation of the international prices (NZ FOB prices) into payouts to dairy companies 
demonstrates a significant Dairy Board influence. This influence has occurred through the 
accumulation of capital reserves, the payment of supplementary amounts from the stabilisation 
account and through the accumulation and disposal of stocks. Such actions tend to interfere with the 
translation of market returns into dairy company (and farmer) price information. To some extent, this 
Dairy Board activity will influence the decisions made by dairy companies and farmers with respect 
to future production levels. A5 the product is relatively uniform, i.e. milk fat, product differentiation 
decisions within the dairy industry are not made by farmers. Product decisions made by the dairy 
companies will however be affected by the information made available by the Board and through the 
prices paid by the Board for the products received from the companies . 
While farmer decisions with respect to the production of different types of dairy products will not be 
affected by pricing information supplied by the Board, the total output of dairy products will be 
significantly affected. For example, Board statements which indicate that the market for dairy 
products is collapsing and that, as a consequence, farmer prices will be low, are likely to lead to dairy 
farmers seeking other production alternatives and so reducing the volume of milk available for 
processing. Where the Dairy Board chooses to over emphasise the decline in the market situation, 
for example, in 1985/86 and 1990/91, farmers will make decisions based on this and may choose to 
leave dairy farming or at leats reduce investment and hence future production. This will reduce the 
amount of product which the Board is required to deal with below that which would have occurred 
had the "true" information been made available. This will be to the advantage of the Board in 
enabling the Board to secure better market prices through less product being available and through 
reducing the effort required to market effectively the product coming forward. 
While it could be suggested that the Board is acting responsibly in prOviding cautious signals to 
farmers with respect to prices, it could also be suggested that ultimate wisdom may not rest with the 
Board and that farmers should be able to make decisions about their investments based on the "true" 
market situation information, rather than the "interpreted" information made available by the Board. 
A clear example of this type of activity is the situation revealed for the 1990/91 season. While 
international prices f~r dairy products did fall substantially from their peak in 1989, the fall was not 
nearly as great as was promoted by the Board. Skim Milk Powder, Whole Milk Powder and Cheese 
prices were still well above historical levels (pre 1988) by the end of the 1990/91 season (see Figures 
9 and 10) while Butter prices were similar to those achieved in 1983 and 1984 (prior to the slump 
through to 1988). Absolute disaster did not descend on the international dairy market during 1990/91. 
This situation is in contrast to the pronouncements of the Board at the time where it was claimed that 
prices were falling rapidly (by as much as 30 per cent) and that a very low payout to dairy companies 
was inevitable. This was followed up by a substantial reduction in prices paid to dairy companies 
(from $5.80 to $3.70, a decline of $2.1O/kg of milk fat). The evidence suggests that such a reduction 
was not justified by the market conditions or by the prices received by the Dairy Board; indeed a price 
to dairy companies of around $5.27/kg of milk fat (a reduction of $053 from the 1989/90 season) 
would appear to have been justified. 
While prices for the major products did fall by about 30 per cent from the high points they had 
reached, this fall did not reflect the change in price from the average of one season to the average of 
the next. This fall was in fact around 10 per cent (as reflected in the change in the export index from 
332 in 1989/90 to 2.98 in 1990/91). The reason for this is that NZ export prices rose and fell during 
the 1989/90 season and the price paid to dairy companies (of $5.80/kg) reflected the total results for 
the season, not the payout price which would have been equivalent to the price peaks achieved during 
the season. Therefore, the fall in returns for the 1990/91 season has to be seen in relation to the total 
(or average) returns for the 1989/90 season, rather than being judged against the peak returns 
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achieved in the 1989/90 year. Thus, while the faU in prices from the peak to the lowest point was 
around 30 per cent, the fall from one season to the next was only 10 per cent. 
Another way of looking at the situation is to calculate what the indicated payout to dairy companies 
would have been for the 1989/90 season had the peak prices been obtained throughout the season. 
From the export statistics, the peak NZ FOB prices obtained for butter were $3.79/kg in November 
1989, cheese was $4.08/kg in February 1990, skim milk powder was $3.611kg in August 1989 and 
whole milk powder was $3.35/kg in July 1989. These prices result in an estimated weighted export 
index of 3.65 (equivalent to the price peaks). An export index of 3.65 leads to a price available for 
payment to dairy companies of $6.65/kg of milk fat. 
The lowest NZ FOB export prices achieved during the 1990/91 season were $2.65/kg for butter in 
December 1990, $3.14/kg for cheese also in December 1990, $2.54/kg for skim milk powder in May 
1991 and $2.15/kg for whole milk powder in October 1990. These prices equate to an estimated 
weighted export index of 2.54 (equivalent to the price lows) (30 per cent below the price peak export 
index). An export index of 2.54 leads to a price available for payment to dairy companies of $4.38/kg 
of milk fat. This is a reduction of 34 per cent from the peak prices received. It is interesting to note 
that the indicated price available for payment to dairy companies equivalent to the lowest prices 
received during the 1990/91 season is in fact higher than the price which was actually paid by the NZ 
Dairy Board for the 1990/91 season ($4.38 d $3.70). 
The least that can be said is that the New Zealand Dairy Board is an extremely conservative 
organisation when it comes to paying farmers for their product. The transmission of true market price 
information to farmers, and the translation by farmers of that information for investment decision 
guidance, is clearly not seen as a priority by the New Zealand Dairy Board. 
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ABSTRACT 
Over the last two seasons, the wool industry has experienced its worst downturn 
since the late 1960s. Large wool stockpiles have accumulated in both Australia 
and New Zealand. 
In this paper price projections are presented under three scenarios. The paper 
begins with a review of the background to the recent downturn in the wool 
market and then goes on to consider the forces shaping the prospects for wool. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and nOl necessarily 
those of their employers. 
SITUA TION AND OUTLOOK FOR WOOL 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two seasons the wool industry has experienced its worst downturn since 
the late 1960s. Large wool stockpiles have accumulated in both Australia and New 
Zealand. 
Over the past few months, however, tentative signs of a recovery in demand have 
emerged, leading to some improvement in prices. How sustainable is this recovery, 
and what are the major forces which will shape it? This paper addresses these issues 
in the context of the outlook for the 1991/92 and 1992/93 seasons. 
Price projections are presented for three scenarios: 'pessimistic', 'most likely'. and 
'optimistic'. The pessimistic and optimistic scenarios involve variations in 
assumptions with respect to the volatile Chinese and Soviet markets. The New 
Zealand Wool Board's (NZWB) stock disposal policy is varied in response to these 
differing demand assumptions. The paper begins with a review of the background 
to the recent downturn in the wool market and then goes on to consider the forces 
shaping the prospects for wool. 
Background and causes of the downturn 
To understand the recent downturn in the wool market it is necessary to understand 
the period which preceded it. The mid-1980s was a period of rapid growth in world 
wool consumption. Between 1982 and 1988 global consumption of wool at the 
spinning stage increased from 1.568 million tonnes to 1.757 million tonnes, an 
average rate of increase of 2% per annum. Although wool consumption had varied 
over the previous twenty years in response to changing economic conditions, the level 
of consumption in 1982 was little changed from what it had been in the early 196Os. 
This unprecedented rate of growth was due in large part to increasing wool 
consumption in China as a result of the liberalisation of the Chinese economy. 
China's wool consumption at the spinning stage reached a peak of 293,000 tonnes in 
1988, up from 123,000 tonnes in 1980. Although Chinese wool production increased 
by more than one third over that period, most of the increase in consumption was met 
from imports. China's imports of wool over the same period increased six-fold from 
29,000 tonnes to 187,000 !annes. (All quantities and prices are expressed in clean 
terms unless otherwise stated.) 
The increase in wool consumption in the mid-1980s was also due to the 
competitiveness of Australian wool following the fall in value of the Australian dollar 
after it was floated in the mid-1980s. This made Australian apparel wool cheaper in 
user currency terms and induced increased usage. Demand in market economies was 
sustained by strong growth rates, a preference for natural fibres and a premium paid 
for lUXury articles. 
The rapid growth in world wool consumption, largely due to increased demand from 
China, led to higher wool prices, especially once stocks in the main exporting 
countries reached a low in June 1988. Fine wool prices displayed the greatest 
increases which in tum led to increased wool production, particularly of Merino 
wools. World wool production increased from under 1.6 million !annes in the early 
1980s to a record level of 2.0 million tonnes in 1989/90 (see Appendix, Table 1). 
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The increase in wool consumption in China was not sustained. Following the 
political and economic clampdown in 1989, wool consumption at the spinning stage 
fell from 293,000 tonnes in 1988 to 171,000 tonnes in 1990. Imports similarly 
declined from their record level of 187,000 !annes in 1988 !a an estimated 52,000 
tonnes in 1990. The virtual withdrawal of China from the world wool market in 
1989 led to a weakening of demand, not only for raw wool but also for semi-
processed wool, such as tops and yam. 
The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the wool market in 1990, as a result of 
foreign exchange shortages, also led to a further decline in demand. Soviet wool 
consumption had been fairly constant at around 300,000 tonnes since the mid-1980s, 
approximately rwo thirds of which was supplied from local production. However, 
consumption in 1990 is estimated to have fallen from 325,000 tonnes the previous 
year to 257,000 tonnes, a fall of over 20%. (Refer to Appendix, Table 2.) For a 
period of nearly twelve months from May 1990, no wool was exported from Australia 
or New Zealand to the Soviet Union. 
The third main factor in the downturn in the world wool market in the last two years 
was a delayed response to the high wool prices of the previous years, combined with 
the slowing in the world economy. Total wool consumption at the spinning stage in 
the EC, Japan and the US peaked at over 600,000 tonnes in 1987 and declined 10% 
to 542,000 tonnes in 1990. This weaker demand led to a decline in commercial 
stocks of wool held in the main market-economy consumer countries. Estimated raw 
wool stocks held in the main consumer countries declined from 170,000 tonnes at the 
end of 1989 to 154,000 tonnes at the end of 1990. (Wool Statistics 1990/91) 
The fall in demand and increase in production brought an inevitable weakening in 
wool prices. The producer organisations in Australia and New Zealand sought to 
cushion the fall in price by purchasing wool at auction. The Australian Wool 
Corporation (A WC) had increased its Reserve Price by 70% over two seasons to 
A870 cents for the 1988/89 season. This was a fixed floor price at which the A WC 
bought wool which failed to meet the reserve level. The NZWB operated a flexible 
price support policy and a guaranteed minimum price to growers. Normally the 
minimum price was below the support price, but in May 1990 the market price fell 
below the minimum price and the Board paid the difference between the market and 
the minimum to growers as a supplement. 
Awe stocks increased rapidly in the 1989/90 season to over 3 million bales, 
representing just under 50% of annual Australian wool production. Following 
considerable speculation, the Australian Government instructed the A WC to lower the 
Reserve Price by 20% to A700 cents at the end of May 1990. AWC purchases at 
auction had been over 80% of sales in the preceding period. The NZWB stocks also 
increased during the course of the 1989/90 season from under 100,000 bales to 
490,000 bales, representing 26% of NZ annual wool production. (See Appendix, 
Table 3.) 
Raw wool markets came under increased pressure in the 1990/91 season. The 
absence of the Soviet Union from world wool markets, the Gulf crisis and speculation 
about the sustainability of the Australian reserve price scheme eventually led to the 
suspension of that scheme in February 1991. Australian stocks peaked at 4.7 million 
bales (80% of annual production) and government-guaranteed borrowings stood at 
A$2.8 billion. The NZWB also suspended its market support and minimum price 
schemes, citing financial constraints. Board stocks peaked at 650,000 bales (33% of 
annual production). At the first sales following the removal of the market support 
schemes in Australia and New Zealand, prices fell to the same levels in nominal 
terms as in the early-1980s. Prices have since recovered somewhat but remain at low 
levels. 
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The main reason for the dramatic decline in China's wool imports over the 1988-90 
period was a fall in domestic wool demand (see Figure 3), which in turn is believed 
to be mainly the result of a delayed reaction to relatively high wool prices, combined 
with a major slowdown in growth of consumer expendirure. The fall in growth of 
consumer spending power reflected the Chinese Govemment's austerity programme, 
which had been launched in late 1988 to bring developing hyper-inflation under 
control and eliminate a large external current account deficil These objectives had 
been accomplished by mid-1990, but only at the cost of a large increase in 
unemployment, which began to alarm the aUlhorities. The emphasis in policy 
switched to reviving the economy in the latter half of 1990 through a major 
relaxation of credit controls and greater subsidies to state enterprises which enabled 
them to resume full production, even in the face of large inventories of unsold goods. 
Reports suggest these stimulative measures are now leading to strong growth in 
aggregate consumer demand (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991). 
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However, the associated rapid expansion in the money supply, fuelled by a rising 
budget deficit, is leading to a build-up of inflationary pressures which threaten to 
derail the recovery. The authorities, though, are showing a growing awareness of this 
risk. They are attempting to avoid a repeat of the 1988 overheating of the economy, 
while raising the sustainable growth rate through adoption of a range of policies. 
These include: elimination of expon subsidies, movement to a market orientated 
exchange rate, reduction of consumer subsidies, raising retail sales taxes and selling 
the large. stockpiles of consumer goods produced by state enterprises, including textile 
products, at discounted prices. The above measures though are not expected to be 
sufficient to prevent some overheating of the economy later in 1991 or in early 1992, 
unless coupled with the introduction of tight budget constraints on state enterprises. 
The Chinese economy should continue to be characterised by stop-go policies, but we 
consider it unlikely that it will experience the same extremes in growth rates over the 
next few years as was evident over the 1988-90 period. (Refer to Table 1.) 
Table 1: Recent Trends in Chinese GDP and Consumption Expenditure 
(percentage changes) 
Years 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Real GDP 
7.9 
9.4 
11.2 
3.9 
5.0 
Real Consumption Expenditure 
6.0 
7.4 
8.5 
0.2 
-1.0(E) 
Data sources: China Statistical Yearbook 1989. Economist Intelligence Uni~ MAF. 
On balance, we expect an improved macro-economic environment over the 1991-1993 
period, together with recent gains in wool's price competitiveness relative to other 
fibres, to result in a recovery in Chinese demand for wool. Demand is expected to 
be strongest in 1991 but may decline over 1992 in response to a slowing in the rate 
of growth of the general economy. 
TIrroughout the 1991-93 period wool demand is likely to remain well below the peak: 
level of 1988 owing to current government policy to encourage the use of wool-poor 
blends in order to reduce dependence on impons and encourage use of domestically 
produced synthetic fibres. In accordance with this policy, officials at the Ministry of 
Textiles recently announced their intention to decrease the proponion of wool used 
in the wool spinning industry from the present 47% to 35% by 1995. It is expected 
this policy direction will continue to be reflected in the allocation of investment funds 
(Textile Asia 1990) and the maintenance of wool impon controls. As a result, there 
may not be any increase in overall wool processing capacity over the next few years. 
Wool proc"ssing capacity was reported to be around 200,000 clean tonnes in 1990 
(Wool Quarterly 1990). 
Import demand over the 1991/92 season will also be constrained by the expected 
reduction in the existing large stockpile of domestically produced wool. In June 1991 
the stock of domestic wool was estimated at over 100,000 tonnes greasy, equivalent 
to around 50,000 tonnes clean. The stockpile of domestic wool is reponedly of low 
quality and is therefore difficult to sell. As a result of the stockpile and the relatively 
low level of wool demand, returns to Chinese wool producers have fallen to very low 
levels. Chinese authorities are concerned that a continuation of lo,!\, wool returns will 
lead to a significant fall in wool production. The Chinese Ministry~ of Agriculture has 
recently announced a series of measures aimed at improving returns to wool growers. 
The main measures include subsidising the sale of domestic wool to processors, 
introduction of stricter quality standards and tighter impon controls (Capital 
Economic Infonnation Daily, 20 June 1991). 
SOVIET UNION 
The economic crisis in the Soviet Union has deepened in the last twelve months. At 
the end of 1990 foreign debt stood at US$60 billion (double its 1985 level), and 
unpaid trade debts were estimated to stand at US$5 billion, part of which was for 
wool and which has since been paid. In 1990 foreign reserves fell by two thirds to 
US$5.1 billion, indicating that debt repayments were made from reserves and not 
from current export earnings. It is estimated that US$11 billion of debt is due to be 
repaid in 1991 and that a further US$15 billion will be required to finance the current 
account deficit in 1991. 
Official estimates indicate that the economy may shrink by 16% in 1991, but western 
observers put the figure nearer 20%. Consumer prices were increased by 60% on 
average at the beginning of April to compensate for large increases in wholesale 
prices. Inflation is expected to reach triple digit figures by the end of the year. This 
is not yet eroding purchasing power by an equivalent amount as wages and pensions 
are being increased to panially compensate for the increase in consumer prices and 
there is a large monetary overhang of unspent savings. 
One of the sectors of crucial imponance to the Soviet economy is the energy sector, 
in particular oil and gas which account for 75% of total energy production. Output 
of oil fell by 9% in 1990 and is expected to fall by another 8% in 1991. The causes 
of the decline are labour unrest, inefficient extraction methods and a slow rate of 
exploration and well replacement. The decline is serious because oil accounts for 
60% of export earnings. Oil exports have fallen by more than production, because 
only the surplus after domestic requirements have been met is exported. 
The fall in oil exports will have a serious effect on the Soviet Union's ability to pay 
for imports and service its foreign debt. Foreign bankers are nervous about lending 
and extending credit without guarantees from their own governments. The time is 
approaching when the Soviet Union must reschedule its debt and seek further foreign 
loans. The West may insist on greater liberalisation of the economy as a condition 
of such loans. 
At present the chief constraint on wool purchases by the Soviet Union is the 
availability of foreign exchange. Both New Zealand and Australia have attracted the 
Soviet Union back into the wool market with the provision of 240 day credit, 
government guaranteed and revolving in the case of Australia. Continuing sales will 
depend on the provision of new credit or the roll-over of existing credit We assume 
here that it is most likely that there will be further sales, but at a reduced level. If 
a radical reform programme were implemented, perhaps as a condition of western 
loans, that would be unlikely to lead to higher imports of wool in the short term, as 
it would bring a contraction in domestic demand and a sharp decline in the demand 
for wool products and wool imports. 
Prices for domestic wool have recently been increased by 250%. We are unable to 
confirm whether the increase will be passed on to consumers, although that would 
be in line with recent policy. Soviet mills pay the same price for imported wool as 
for domestic wool, so recent falls in raw wool prices will not be felt by Soviet 
purchasers. If real prices to consumers do increase sharply it will certainly reduce 
the previous unsatisfied demand for wool and may also reduce actual demand. The 
recent increase in prices to producers may reverse the current declining trend in wool 
production and would tend to reduce the demand for imports. 
OECD 
Demand for Strong wool in the OECD area is expected to improve over the next few 
years in response to the previous fall in wool prices, a recovery in growth of real 
aggregate consumer expenditure and some further restocking activity. The fall in 
wool prices has resulted in major gains in price competitiveness relative to synthetic 
fibres. We estimate the carpet wool price to synthetic fibre price ratio has fallen by 
44% over the past two seasons. (Interior textile end uses are estimated to account 
for around three quarters of NZ wool consumed by OECD customers.) 
Regression analysis of the factors explaining wool usage in carpets suggests that a 
gain in price competitiveness of this magnitude is likely to have a significant impact 
on demand for carpet wools. Ptojections we have made on the basis of our estimated 
wool carpet usage equation suggest increases of 12.6% in 1992 and 9.5% in 1993. 
(Refer Appendix, Table 4.) However, a quick recovery in strong wool prices would 
eliminate much, or all, of the substitution effect, particularly as synthetic fibre prices 
are not expected to show any upward movement over the next few years. The laner 
assumption reflects the rerum to a period of low oil prices, coupled with existing 
excess synthetic fibre capacity (Wool Statistics 1990-91). 
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Growth in real consumer expenditure in the OECD area is expected to begin 
recovering in the second half of 1991 in response to a number of positive factors. 
These include an easing of monetary policy in the US, Canada, Australia and the 
UK, lower oil prices and improved consumer and business confidence. As a result, 
the rate of expansion of real consumer expenditure is forecast to recover from an 
estimated 0.9% in 1991 to 2.7% in 1992 (OECD Economic Outlook, July 1991), with 
a 3% increase assumed for 1993. The rise in consumer spending over the 1991-1993 
period is expected to increase demand for carpet wool. Using our carpet wool usage 
equation we estimate increases of 1.0% in 1992 and 1.7% in 1993. (Refer to 
Appendix, Table 4.) The improved macro-environment and relatively low strong 
wool prices may also encourage some further rebuilding of commercial strong wool 
stocks. 
Non Price Competition 
As a result of a stream of product innovations there have been numerous claims over 
the past two decades that the quality difference between synthetics and strong wool 
is continuing to narrow. However, we can fmd no statistical evidence of a significant 
downward trend in the ratio of carpet wool to synthetic fibre prices since the 1970s. 
This suggests that strong wool has maintained its perceived preference over synthetic 
fibres. 
Announced cutbacks to NZWB expenditure on wool promotion and product 
development in 1991/92 (NZWB February 1991) are unlikely to impact on strong 
wool's perceived preference over synthetics during the forecast period, and in any 
case may be compensated for by new product developments stimulated by the lower 
wool prices. In view of the above, we assume that non-price competitive factors will 
have no net effect on srrong wool demand over the forecast period. 
FORECASTS 
Fine Wool Prices 
Furure movements in prices for fine wools may also have an important influence on 
demand for strong wools because of the substitution possibilities in knirwear and 
other srronger apparel end uses, though this is only likely to be significant when there 
is a substantial change in the ratio of fine to srrong wool prices. For example, 
Davidson et al (1988) estimated that a 1% increase in combing (fine) wool prices 
would increase demand for finer carding (medium) wools by 0.22% and for carpet 
wool by only 0.06%. Fine wool prices, while recovering, are likely to remain 
relatively low over the next few seasons (ABARE, June 1991), reflecting large 
available supplies, in panicular the huge Australian wool stockpile (4.7 million bales). 
The stock disposal policy of the Australian Wool Realisation Commission (A WRC) 
will likely be aimed at keeping prices relatively low and stable, in order to stimulate 
and sustain demand among the more price sensitive, larger volume, apparel market 
segments, at least until substantial reductions in the stockpile have been achieved. 
Such an approach would also be consistent with the recent decisions to reorient IWS 
promotion and market development programmes in the apparel area, by placing much 
greater emphasis on increasing volumes (Vines Committee Report 1990). Bearing 
in mind the above, the average Australian market indicator price is forecast to lie in 
the range of 450-500c/kg for 1991/92 and to remain unchanged in real terms over 
1992193. For our central forecast we have adopted the latest ABARE projection of 
475c/kg for 1991/92 (ABARE, June 1991) and held it constant in real terms for the 
following season, which yields a central forecast of 5OOc/kg in 1992/93. 
Strong Wool Supplies 
World strong wool production has remained virtually static over the past five years 
with falls in New Zealand's output being largely offset by increases in EC 
production. EC wool production has been increasing consistently since the early 
1980s in response to EC sheepmeat subsidies and UK Government guaranteed returns 
to UK wool growers. UK production in panicular, has risen from 39,000 tonnes in 
1984-85 to 50,000 trinnes in 1990/91. EC wool production is likely to show a further 
small increase in 1991/92 but is assumed to stabilise from 1992/93 onwards. The 
latter assumption reflects latest indications that the EC sheepmeat stabiliser, coupled 
with the withdrawal of the UK variable premium, may have halted the previous 
expansion of the EC sheep flock (Agra Europe, June 21 1991). We assume that 
outside the EC and NZ, lower wool prices will bring to an end the previous gradual 
expansion in strong wool production. NZ production is also expected to show little 
change over the next two seasons. World availability of Strong wool may show a 
small increase in 1991/92 due to the increase in NZWB stocks in the previous season 
and the expected further rise in EC production. 
On balance, we expect demand to increase at a faster rate than production, leading 
to some potential upward pressure on world strong wool prices over the 1991192 and 
1992/93 seasons. There is though, considerable uncertainty surrounding the extent 
to which this will occur, principally because of the current volatile narure of Soviet 
and Chinese import purchases. Furthermore, the degree to which any net increase in 
demand translates into an improvement in strOng wool prices at the NZ auction level 
will depend on the stock disposal policy of the NZWB, and movements in exchange 
rates. 
New Zealand Situation 
New Zealand wool production is forecast to be around 225,000 tonnes over the next 
rwo seasons with an increase in wool output per head offset by a decline in sheep 
numbers. This compares with estimated wool production in the 1990191 season of 
225,000 tonnes. New Zealand accounts for an estimated 43% of world carpet wool 
production (Ward, 1991). Ne\V Zealand carpet wools are imperfect substitutes for 
overseas carpet wools. Allowance is made for this in the forecasts. 
Wool output per head is projected to improve as a result of a return to normal 
climatic conditions, while sheep numbers are forecast to fall from 57.9m at 30 June 
1990 to around 56.5m at 30 June 1992. The assumed decline in sheep numbers 
reflects the continuing poor profitability of sheep farming - the result of both low 
wool and sheepmeat prices - and the improvement in relative returns to beef. 
NZWB Stock Disposal Policy 
The NZWB has announced that it plans to dispose of its stockpile, which stood at 
558,400 bales (72,000 tonnes) at the end of the 1990/91 season, by December 1994. 
(NZWB, August 1991). In the first year (to June 1992) the Board is aiming to sell 
150,000 bales, but will vary the quantity of sales in response to market conditions. 
In effect the Board's stock disposal policy will act as a stabilising influence on prices 
over the next rwo seasons, panially offsetting increases in demand. 
The Board's policy in the short term at least is likely to be influenced by rwo 
opposing considerations. On the one hand it needs to liquidate stocks in order to be 
able to make retrospective supplementary payments to growers who sold wool after 
the suspension of the minimum price scheme in the 1990/91 season (and meet other 
financial commiunems), and on the other hand it will want to avoid depressing prices 
in a weak market. In the longer term, however, as NZWB stocks approach low 
levels, possibly around 1994, the disposal policy will tend to destabilise the wool 
market leading initially to sharp increases in prices, and then subsequent falls (Ward 
1991). 
Movements in exchange rates can also have a significant impact on wool prices but 
are notoriously difficult to forecast. For the purposes of our price projections we 
adopt the simplifying assumption of no change in both the wool trade weighted 
exchange rate and in the A$/NZS. 
Price Projections 
Taking into account the above factors and using the elasticities derived from the 
carpet wool usage equation to achieve a market clearing price, we present in Table 
2 below price projections for NZ strong wools at auction under three scenarios: 
pessimistic, most likely and optimistic. The 'pessimistic' scenario reflects a situation 
where the Soviet Union and China are virtually out of the market, whereas under the 
'optimistic' scenario we assume that the Soviet Union purchases 15,000 tonnes p.a. 
and China 33,000 tonnes in 1991192 and 26,400 tonnes in 1992/93. Under the 'most 
likely' scenario we have assumed Chinese purchases of 26,400 tonnes in 1991/92 and 
18,200 tonnes in 1992193, and Soviet purchases of 7,500 lonnes in both 1991/92 and 
1992193. 
Also shown in Table 2 are our assumptions regarding NZWB stocks and our 
projections of NZ auction prices for the fine and medium categories. The volume of 
NZWB stocks sales are varied to reflect the differing demand conditions along the 
lines suggested earlier. We have assumed that the fine wool price will follow the 
trend in the Australian market indicator. The medium wool price, on the other hand, 
is assumed to be influenced by movements in both strong and fme wool prices. The 
level of purchases by China and the Soviet Union also affect the Australian market 
and are reflected in the fine wool price. In the case of Australia, however, we 
assume that the stock policy of the A WRC is varied to a greater extent to offset 
fluctuations in demand. 
Under the 'most likely' scenario, prices for strong wool are projected to show a 
moderate improvement over the next two seasons with the main stimulus to demand 
arising from previous gains in price competitiveness. In contrast, prices for fine and 
medium wools are forecast to fall, reflecting large supplies of fine wool and the full 
year's impact of the abandonment of the Australian Reserve Price Scheme. The 
'pessimistic' and 'optimistic' scenarios illustrate the continuing vulnerability of the 
NZ wool market to fluctuations in demand from the Soviet and Chinese markets. 
In the 'pessimistic' case most of the decline in price in the 1991/92 season could be 
avoided if the NZWB were to freeze its stocks, but that is considered unlikely. 
Under all scenarios, forecast prices remain significantly lower than those experienced 
over the 1988/89 and 1989190 seasons. This reflects both the projected rundown of 
NZWB stocks and the continuing relatively low level of demand from China and the 
Soviet Union. Further sensitivity analyses with the model suggest that even in the 
absence of NZWB stock sales, full recovery to the relatively high prices of 1988/89 
and 1989/90 could not be maintained for more than one season. 
A substantial improvement in Chinese and/or Soviet impon demand growth would 
be required for a full recovery of prices to be sustainable. This is considered unlikely 
in the forecast period. 
Table 2: Price Projections of the NZ Wool Auction Market for 1991/92 and 1992193 
Years 
1990i9l 1991/92 1992193 1991/92 1992193 1991/92 1992193 
Scenarios 'pessimistic' 'most likely' 'optimistic' 
Sales to China (tonnes) 19,050 10,000 10,000 26,400 18.200 33,000 26,400 
Sales to USSR (IDnnes) 15,0001 0 0 7,500 7,500 15,000 15,000 
NZWB Stock Change 
(tonnes) 11,450 ·6,500 ·19,400 ·19,400 ·19,400 ·25,800 ·25,800 
(bales) 70,101 .50,000 ·150,000 -150,000 -150,000 -200,000-200,000 
NZ Wool Production 
(tonnes) 225,000 225,000 225,000 225,000 225,000 225,000 225,000 
So-ong Wool Auction price 
clki (32-41 micron) 362 320 380 365 425 400 450 
Medium wool auction price 
clkg (25-31 micron) 452 360 405 400 445 430 470 
Fine Wool Auction price 
clkg (18-24 micron) 1,108 720 760 760 800 800 840 
Average wool auction price 
clkg 422 350 405 400 450 430 480 
These are estimated sales. Aaual exports for the: season wen:: substantially less at 7.821 clean lOones duc to late purchases 
and conuaaual difficulties. 
Includes lambs wool 

APPENDIX 
Table 4: 
Variable 
Constam 
Wool usage 
in Carpets(-I) 
Wool to synthetic 
price ratio (index) 
OECD consumption 
expenditure 
Estimated Equation of Carpet Wool Usage Among the Eight Major OECD 
Consuming Countries 1971-1990. (All variables are expressed in log form) 
Estimated Standard T Statistic 
Coefficient Error 
-1.431 0.645 -2.220 
0.767 .080 9.651 
-.285 .052 -5.477 
.305 .079 3.855 
Adjusted R Squared 
0.903 
Durbin (1970) T Slat for AR (I) 
0.936 
APPENDIX 
Table 5: Dara Used in the Wool Carpet Usage Equation 
Weighted 
Wool Carpet Carpet Wool 
Usage Among Eight To Synthetic 
OECD Consuming Countries Fibre Price 
(million kg clean) Index 
(1981=100) 
YEARS(I) 
1970 163.1 0.493 
1971 176.3 0.479 
1972 182.8 0.624 
1973 151.9 1.289 
1974 117.6 1.184 
1975 125.3 0.668 
1976 129.2 0.907 
1977 125.2 1.203 
1978 .128.9 1.029 
1979 139.2 1.063 
1980 133.9 1.091 
1981 132.0 1.000 
1982 131.3 0.878 
1983 140.7 0.810 
1984 153.3 0.884 
1985 164.7 0.878 
1986 176.8 0.734 
1987 186.3 0.804 
1988 189.8 0.967 
1989 193.0 1.086 
1990 186.9 0.940 
1991 N/A 0.603(E) 
DaIa sources: Wool Facts (lWS). NZWB. MAF. 
OECD 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
(1980 USSb) 
3256.9 
3397.3 
3535.7 
3751.6 
3948.4 
3967.1 
4057.0 
4235.5 
4378.4 
4542.7 
4690.6 
4726.1 
4775.2 
4838.1 
4989.0 
5141.8 
5321.6 
5531.4 
5711.9 
5922.6 
6082.5 
61372(E) 
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INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS AN ASE? 
Computational equilibrium models are now an integral part of the economics 
profession's research program. In essence they characterise the markets of an 
economy (or part) by a set of equations, involving actual estimates for the data, 
which are solved to give a the levels of production and prices in the economy, 
assuming some sort of equilibrium in the individual markets. They are of 
particular interest in quantifying the effect of a change in the economic 
environment or of a set of policy instruments. 
The underlying economic structure is that of standard general equilibrium (GE) 
theory, and it is rare for the models to include a major deviation from it. As a 
result the qualitative results of the models are those predicted by general 
equilibrium economic theory. What they have new to offer is quantitative 
estimates of effects, and insights into areas which general equilibrium theory 
does not model well (such as partial changes in economic interventions). 
These models are some times called AGE models, that is applied general 
, Fellow of the Faculty of Business Studies, Massey University and Economic 
Consultant, Economic And Social Trust On New Zealand, 18 Talavera Tee, 
Wellington. Phone 04 728 950, Fax 04 725 305. 
This paper would not have been possible without a 1990 C.Alma Baker 
Travelling Fellowship, which enabled the presenter to visit a number of the 
..:cjjl,;:S · .... i.:: ::::;.dd~ -::f :!;;; world food economy in April and July 1991. I am 
also grateful for the hospitality and assistance of the various modelling groups. 
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equilibrium.' The expression 'general' can be mi~leading. Strictly it applies to 
a closed model. or one where there is no feedbacks between the economy that 
is being modelled. and an outside world. This may be realistic for New Zealand, 
but even here there are markets where New Zealand is a major supplier, and 
its supply can alter market price. This typically dealt with by the introduction 
of a simple Rest of World (ROW) sector, perhaps modelled by partially elastic 
world demand functions for New Zealand exports. So as a general rule these 
models of national economies, which are often used to explore trade policy 
questions. can be called AGE, even though the ROW is primitive. 
In the case of the modelling of a sector - the energy sector or the farm sector 
perhaps - even across the entire world, there is likely to be interactions with 
other sectors of the world economy. It is possible to have sophisticated accounts 
of this interaction with the ROW, or primitive ones, or to assume that there is 
little feedback. Describing these models as AGE becomes problematic. I 
propose that we call all such computational models of sectoral market activity 
as ASE, that is Applied Sectoral Equilibrium models, irrespective of their 
treatment of the ROW. But sometimes an ASE will also be an AGE. 
WHY IS A WORLD FOOD ASE OF INTEREST? 
Under the GATT rules, the regulation of protection and subsidisation of 
economic activities associated with food production' is not as strictly enforced 
as for manufacturing. As a result many food markets experience considerable 
interventions, and the outcomes are substantially distorted from what the free 
trade situation would be. 
Even if the interventions were fixed through time, we may want to ask such 
questions as what are their effects, who benefits and who loses relative to free 
trade, and what are the efficiency consequences? Such questions become even 
more pertinent when the interventions are partial or being varied rather than 
removed. 
, They are also called CG E or computational equilibrium models. 
, Note that while the term used here is the world food system, some other 
commodities may be relevant. Cotton competes with other farm products for 
land, while wool can be a joint product with sheep meats. The two products are 
themse!ve:; in sorr.:= ~e~pects substitutes. The scope of the mndel~ is disl'll~.~~rl 
below. 
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This is where an ASE model is particularly useful. Given the standard 
assumptions, we can broadly predict from GE theory the qualitative effects of 
the interventions. As a rule resources will be attracted into less efficient 
farming, and more efficient farmers will be worse off. Consumers who face 
higher prices as a result will be worse off. those who face lower prices will be 
better off. But no such confident prediction can be made for a partial change 
to levels of intervention. It is possible that a reduction of some interventions 
will make some inefficient and some efficient farmers worse off and some better 
off, even if no interventions are tightened or raised. This is because of the 
interactions within the sector. For instance a fall in price support for feed 
grains might make inefficient feedgrain farmers worse off, inefficient livestock 
farmers who use the feedgrains better off. and efficient livestock farmers who 
do not use the grains worse off. 
Such issues become acutely urgent during a process of liberalisation such as the 
Uruguay Round, where there is considerable commitment to making some 
progress in reducing the levels of support in a number of major food producers 
and traders. Nevertheless given the certainty that there will be only a partial 
liberalisation as a result of the Round, there can be no certainty that those 
farmers and countries most penalised by the current intervention regime will be 
the beneficiaries of the changes. 
THE NEW ZEALAND INTEREST IN FOOD LIBERALISA TlON 
As we shall see, New Zealand is one of .the countries most affected by the 
support given to farmers. From one perspective this is the consequence of the 
farmers in other countries with domestic markets protected from entry by New 
Zealand products, over producing, and dumping surpluses into third markets. 
Thus New Zealand farmers get hit two ways: they are denied access to high 
priced protected markets, and they are undercut by subsidised producers in 
unprotected markets. 
But there is a more subtle alternative characterisation. In terms of the ,food 
pyramid, New Zealand produces grass fed animal products, set above grain fed 
animal products, and grains. Policies which drive the bulk of the world food 
system - grain production and distribution - are only tangentially concerned with 
New Zealand's specific interests. If there were a major Northern Hemisphere 
grass fed animal industry world food arrangements might be different. Even 
Australia with its huge wheat export industry fills a different niche. 
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Yet the irony of it all is that the world food system is more important to New 
Zea!'lnd than to any other rich country, becausp 0 f (hI" hign propor!ion of food 
products (including wool and other complementary products with food 
production') in exports. The importance is almost in inverse to its influence. 
This means the outcome of the food liberalisation provisions in the Uruguay 
round are of particular interest to New Zealand, not least because the outcome 
need not be beneficial. As mentioned earlier a partial liberalisation need not 
be beneficial to all efficient and unprotected farmers. 
It is necessary to explore some sort of model to understand the consequences 
of various proposed liberalisation packages under the Uruguay Round. In 
principle a CSE model would be appropriate, although an ad hoc partial 
analysis might give some insights. Unfortunately there is no New Zealand based 
CSE model of the world food system (but some New Zealanders have worked 
on overseas models). The issue before us then is which of the overseas models 
is the most useful for New Zealand purposes. 
CHOOSING A CSE MODEL FOR NEW ZEALAND 
Obviously no CSE model is going to be ideal. Typically each has been developed 
for another purpose, and will not be as useful as the one New Zealand would 
construct, were it to put in the effort. What criteria should we use for 
evaluating each model. Here I consider four broad groups of items, with some 
illustrations of the problems involved. The models mentioned in the 
illustrations are detailed in a later section. 
Accessabiljty. 
A model is very little use to an outsider, unless it is accessible. Accessability 
occurs in a number of ways. 
_ Is the model well documented? Ideally, as in the case of the USDA 
SWOPSIM model, there should be access to the computer code. 
_ Does the outside have full and easy access to the model system? 
Unfortunately in the case of the Ministerial Trade Mandate (MTM) Model of 
the OECD, access is limited by the rules of the OECD which give reasonable 
1 e.g. casein. 
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access to qualifying governments, but not to non-government researchers. 
- Location of the modei is aiso important. This is an obvious attraction 
of the Australian models based in Canberra. Costs of living in the location, and 
airfares air schedules, and time zones may also be relevant. 
- Is the model being maintained and upgraded? This rules out a number 
of models that were looked out - Anderson & Tyers, IIASA, and the OECD 
WALRAS - whose development work has been abandoned. 
- A final accessability consideration is the amount of work that is done 
on the model and published. Big CSE models are so complex that one 
researcher could never master all aspects, so a lot of independent researchers 
and publications are valuable. 
Model Structure 
Within the general class of CSE models there are a number of ways that the 
structure can be modelled. These include 
- Partial or General? As discussed earlier the way that the ROW (either 
countries or of commodities) is included matters. It may also be important for 
individual countries. Where the food sector is small and unimportant, changes 
in the food sector will not impact on the economy. However in the case of the 
New Zealand economy the effect of a change could be great. For instance a 
hike in food prices would probably lift the New Zealand real exchange rate, 
cutting back some of the supply response by the farm sector. Unfortunately not 
one of the models explicitly includes this phenomenon,' even those which are 
AGE. The implications are discussed below. 
- Reduced Form or Structural Form? All models are to some extent 
reduced form, that is they combine sets of equations into a single equation 
which may not be easy to interpret behaviourly. However in the case of world 
food models there is a more acute problem with the policy instruments, 
illustrated by comparing the USDA SWOPSIM with the OECD MTM. 
In the MTM as far as possible each intervention is modelled separately. 
Thus barriers to entry, variable tariffs, fixed tariffs, domestic subsidies, and 
export subsidies are each explicitly represented in the model by their direct 
impact on the relevant market. This generates a great complexity, but it does 
allow complex policy packages to be investigated. 
On the other hand in SWOPSIM, the policy instruments are compacted 
into a single measure of a producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) and a consumer 
, It is possible that the resp0l))\p is implicitly i!!::::.:dd via the choice of 
supply elasticities. 
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subsidy equivalent (CSE). This simplifies the model structure enormously, but 
weans tl'''1 for each policy package must first be converted into a PSE and CSE. 
Unfortunately the conversion process may be dependent upon the state of the 
world market. For instance a variable tariff may have a PSE of zero if the world 
price is at the trigger point, or a very high level if the world price is far below 
the trigger price. That means that the PSE and CSE are endogenous, and 
cannot be calculated until the effects of the policy change are known. But in 
practice the model invalidly treats them as exogenous. Clearly ad hoc measures 
can be used to with this - albeit partially, but there is a terrible tradeoff 
between the simplicity of form of a model with a reduced form structure in its 
policy instruments (and hence wider structure) and the calculation of the policy 
instruments itself. 
- Static or Dynamic? GE theory is basically static. That is it assumes that 
all markets are cleared and in some sort of permanent equilibrium, where 
forecasts today prove to be correct. Conceptually this is the easiest to 
understand and analyze. But in practice the world is dynamic, with unintended 
stock changes, and farmers and other economic agents investing based on 
assessments whose outturns prove to be wrong. 
A specific problem for New Zealand is that there would be a considerable 
unwinding following any significant reduction in farm support. Stocks of surplus 
commodities would be sold off, while feedgrain herds with their subsidies 
withdrawn would be slaughtered. These would not happen overnight. The 
evidence of the energy price hike of the mid 1970s was that it took the world 
livestock industry five to seven years to adjust fully. In some of those years New 
Zealand farmers suffered heavily, even though in the longrun they were 
beneficiaries because they do not depend on (direct and indirect) energy inputs 
to the same extent as the Northern Hemisphere livestock farmer. 
- Simple or Complex? Modelling involves simplification related to the 
issues with which the modeller is concerned. In particular there may be many 
or few countries, and many or few commodities. If the concern is with American 
Japanese agricultural interaction, then a model with those two countries (and 
a ROW), and beef, rice, and other commodities may be sufficient. But it will 
not be helpful to a New Zealand analysis. Sometimes a model can ~e 
frustratingly blind. The MTM treats the European Community as a single policy 
entity, whereas the SWOPSIM suggests that national policies represent about 
half the effective interventions in the community. 
On the other hand mul tiplying countries and commodities, adds to 
complexity without necessarily adding to understanding. And one does not 
necessarily get the right mix for New Zealand. The FAO model. concern,,;:! 
about thiro world countries, focuses on grains, and on markets of little interest 
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to New Zealand. Few models include wool, although any extension in sheep 
m<;<it 5<1le;, wili abu generate some revenue there. Indeed often the models do 
not discriminate within the categories of red meats, while such important 
marketing distinctions for New Zealand as between grain fed and grass fed beef 
are ignored. 
Partly through what is available, we shall be mainly concerned with 
models which focus on the OECD. In terms of world food trade negotiations 
they are currently the biggest players, while the commodities which are of most 
interest to New Zealand are mainly produced (but not necessarily consumed) 
by the OECD countries. (The biggest exception is the South American cone 
countries.) 
Note the models do not as a rule include fish (where supply is relatively 
fixed but whose price may lift if the prices of other protein source also lift), 
horticulture (where protection does not seem as problematic), and forestry or 
any other land competing activities. These need to be kept in mind when 
evaluating the model outcomes. 
_ How well is New Zealand Modelled? Are the commodities and markets 
the most useful for New Zealand? Is the interaction berween the food export 
sector and the rest of the New Zealand economy properly modelled? These 
questions are implicit in the earlier ones but, because of our focus, need to be 
considered separately. 
New Zealand is a special problem compared with most of the economies 
which are modelled, because the farm export sector is particularly important 
here and plays a vital role in the overall importance of the economy. For most 
OECD countries the farm/ rest of economy interaction may be simply modelled, 
but in the New Zealand case it would appear to require some sophistication. 
Sitting behind this is a debate which needs to be briefly rehearsed. Do 
allocative losses from (border) protection and other such interventions matter 
very much? The AGE model studies of border protection of a single country 
typically suggest that the allocative losses of intervention are small, although 
the distributional gains and losses are much larger (perhaps indicating why the 
issue of protection is such a heated one, despite the total gains being small). 
ASE model studies of food protection come to broadly the same conclusion. 
Allocative gains from liberalisation of the food system are small - less than 1 
percent of world GDP. That they are small is perhaps surprising given the 
extraordinary high levels intervention which do occur, but this has to be offset 
by noting that the farm sector is only a small part of total production in most 
OECD countries. On the other hand there is a considerably larger distributional 
shifts berween farmers, taxpayers, and consumers. Moreover some countries 
suffer much more than others. The prime example is New Zealand, but even 
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here the measured cost is about 3 percent of its GOP. 
J"his figure is much lower than my indirect estimate, based on the 
argument that the deteriorating terms of trade have been a major factor in the 
poor New Zealand economic growth rate in the post war era. Part of this 
deterioration was due to the rising Northern Hemisphere farm protection. 
There is no measure of the effects of the change in world farm support in the 
postwar era, but were it to be from zero in the mid 1950s to today, then the 
removal of protection gives an indication of the total effect. This would raise 
the New Zealand terms of trade by around 25 percent, and explain most of the 
faU. I have estimated (econometricly) that this may have caused a long run drop 
in New Zealand GDP of between 12 and 25 percent, or four to eight times that 
measured by the ASE models. 
The divergence could be explained by some other processes which are not 
incorporated in ASE models, but which affect the GDP growth rate. One, which 
I have not investigated, is that a fall in the terms of trade results in a 
government response which is damaging to the long run interests of the 
economy (as when it subsidises those damaged by the fall). 
A second is that the growth process is intricately linked with the business 
cycle in the following way. It is only in the later stages of the peak of the 
business cycle that significant additions to long term economic capacity (which 
underpins growth) occurs. If the peak is short, there is little additional capacity 
added. A poor growth performance results, because in the next upswing there 
is not the capacity to add to output. What determines the length of the cycle in 
New Zealand is the balance of payments. In particular the peak gets choked off 
either directly by imports rising faster than exports, generating an expenditure 
drain, or indirectly as the government takes actions to defend the balance of 
payments. When there is a secular fall in the terms of trade this choke occurs 
earlier, and thus the growth performance is poorer. 
In many ways this story belongs to another paper, but it is told here to 
remind us that even the most 'dynamic' ASE model is static compared with the 
realities of the actual growth process, and that the cost to New Zealand of 
world agricultural protection are almost certainly markedly under estimated. It 
does not follow that the result is true for the entire OECD economy, since food 
exports do not play such an important role in their external accounts. However, 
there may be some other countries, including those in the third world for which 
the same mechanisms apply, and they too may also more substantially benefit 
from food trade liberalisation than the ASE models suggest. 
There is one further complication when thinking about the New Zealand 
economy's response to the liberalisation scenarios. The magDill1d~ <)f th:;: ;:::h::: 
changes are large for ~ew Zealand. There may not be the quality land implied 
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in these models to give the quantities supplied which are assumed in the 
scenarios. Note that the Story is 'less important for grain fed herds, which are 
less dependent directly on land in their production process. 
Reviewing the Models 
This section briefly reports a number of world food models. They are grouped 
together by centres of origins. There are a few models not covered by this 
survey, but the ones consciously omitted are not being maintained. 
Canberra (Australia) 
Anderson & Tyers was one of the first models, developed by two academics at 
the Australian National University (and subsequently the University of 
Adelaide). 
The model is a partial equilibrium model (i.e it has no commodity ROW) 
but is at the structural and dynamic end of the modelling spectrum (although 
it can be run in a static mode). There are 24 countries or country groups 
modelled, including a separate New Zealand, and the seven commodity groups 
include "meat of ruminants", and "dairy products". The model is well 
documented, with numerous publications. It has also been pioneering (and prize 
winning). The results are widely quoted, and some of the issues - particularly 
dynamic ones - have not been explored to the same extent by other models. 
Unfortunately the model is not being maintained,' so its interest is largely in 
terms of what it has done, rather than future usefulness. 
SALT ER (Sectoral Analysis of Liberalisation of Trade in the East Asian 
Region)' is a model recently constructed by the Australian Industries 
Commission for the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
It is a static structural AGE. Despite the acronym its models 8 explicit 
country or country groups includes Europe and North America, and New 
Zealand is modelled separately. There are 34 commodities, of which 12 a,re 
, Its authors are now working on different topics in Geneva and Canberra 
respectively. 
Z The name is an acronym for but also recognises Wilfred Salter (1929-63), 
and distinguished Australian international trade theorist. The model sees itself 
:J' a ~I!:::::::::~sor to the OECD WALRAS model, z,is.:; nz,1l1ed arter an outstanding 
economic theorist. 
10 
food or food related, including "wool", "other livestock products', "forestry", 
"fishing", "meat products' anci "milk prod!.l(;ts'. In some respects this 
underestimates the richness of the model because as in the WALRAS model, 
imported and domestic commodities in the same category are not perfect 
substitutes. 
The wide range of other commodities means that other issues may be 
explored with the model: for instance one study examines the impact of the oil 
price rises as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; another the effects of the 
removal of industry assistance. 
EMABA (Econometric Model of Pacific Rim Livestock Markets)' is a more 
limited model developed at the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics. As the name implies it focuses on the Pacific Rim, hardly modelling 
Europe, Latin America, or the Middle East. The commodity focus is beef and 
wool, but in the case of New Zealand (one of the explicit 7 countries, although 
up to 21 appear in various roles), there is supply equatIons for "beef", "lamb", 
"mutton", "wool", and "pig meat". There is no dairy products SALTER but I 
understand there have been proposals that New Zealand should develop the 
dairy sector. The model structure is partial, structural, and dynamic. 
EMABA has been around in various forms for about six years. Its 
beef/wool in the Pacific focus may be over narrow for New Zealand purposes, 
although the additional detail from this confined focus may be useful in some 
circumstances. 
OECD (Paris) 
AITJH The Ministerial Trade Mandate model arose from the OECD's concern 
in the last decade of food trade intervention. The model is partial, static, 
structural and fairly detailed, and is developed in the OECD's Directorate of 
Food, Agriculture and Fisheries. There are 11 (OEeD oriented) countries or 
country groups, including New Zealand, and 25 commodities including "milk', 
"butter", "cheese", "whole milk powder", "condensed milk", "skimmed milk", 
"beef", "sheepmeat", and "wool". 
The documentation is good, but because of the complexities of OEeD 
procedures it seems likely th:lt non government economists may not have direct 
access to the model. This is a particularly important model because it is 
common property of the OECD countries, and may have a privileged role in the 
, The acronym is from Econometric Model of Australian Broadacre 
Agriculture. 
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Uruguay Round negotiations in terms of acting as a common reference point for 
the negotiatofs. 
W ALRAS (World Agricultural LibeRAlisation Study). Like SALTER, this is 
a general, static, and structural AGE, and was developed in the Growth Studies 
Division of the OECD. It has 6 (OECD oriented) country and country groups 
including New Zealand, 13 industries, and 17 demand components. The 
industries include "livestock and livestock products", "meat products', and "dairy 
products'. The demand components include "meat", and "milk, cheese, and 
eggs". The number of consumption goods are effectively higher than this, 
because imports and domestic production are not perfect substitutes. 
Again the documentation is good, but the model is no longer being used 
for investigating agricultural issues, the focus having moved to the greenhouse 
effect. !.1y impression that in this sense it is not accessible for future work on 
the world food system, nor will it be maintained for that purpose. 
RUN S (Rural Urban North South) was originally developed in the Free 
University of Brussels in the early 1980s, and is now with the Development 
Centre of the OECD. It is a dynamic AGE, using price wedges for interventions. 
There are 12 country groups with New Zealand one of the "Developed OECD 
Food Producers" (in with Australia, Canada, and the US), and 19 commodities, 
including "meats", "dairy and dairy products", and "wool". 
RUNS is well documented, and the code may be available for researchers 
outside the OECD. Because of its concern with the third world, however it may 
be overly concerned with grain issues to be a great deal of help to New 
Zealand. 
USDA Washington 
SWOPSIM (Static World Policy SIMulation) is a static partial equilibrium 
model of the world food economy, which uses PSEs and CSEs as proxies for 
interventions developed by the EconomicResearch Service of the USDA. Not 
only are the interventions reduced form but, more than most of the other 
models, so are the model equations. There are 11 (OEeD oriented) countries 
or country groups, with New Zealand separate, and 9 commodities including 
"ruminant meats" and "dairy products". 
SWOPSIM is well documented, there is a large literature, and it is readily 
accessible, with the USDA making the code available to a number of N~w 
Zealanders. Because of the basic simplicity and accessability of the model, it 
is an attractive one to use, but its reduced form structure is a major limitation 
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on its usefulness. 
McDonald. I mention this as an example of world food models that pop up, but 
may not be an example of a major research modelling program. Bradley 
McDonald works in the Agricultural and Trade Analysis Division of the USDA. 
He has constructed his own model which is appears to be a static partial ASE 
model, probably using reduced form interventions. 1 The model appears to have 
only four country groups and New Zealand is in the ROW, outside the US, the 
European Community and Japan. There are nine food outputs including "meats" 
and "milk products". 
lIASA (Vienna) - FAO (Rome) 
II ASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis) developed a 
dynamic AGE model but work on it has now lapsed, with IIASA's attention 
moving elsewhere. It sees the FAO modelling as its successor so I focus on it. 
FAO (The FAO World Food Model) The FAO describes its model having been 
first developed in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery in the early 
1980s. Now resident in Rome the dynamic partial ASE covers 149 individual 
countries or commodity groups (with New Zealand separately) and 13 
commodity or commodity groups including "bovine meat", "sheep meat and 
goatmeat" and "dairy products". 
The model is consciously third world, and grain directed. As far as I can 
judge it appears to assume all livestock is grain fed, which if so would miss out 
the crucial feature of New Zealand's livestock industry.' Thus far I have seen 
only the documentation of the model specification, and not any model runs, 
although it is used for FAO commodity projections. 
What Can We Learn From the Models? 
As explained earlier all the models are in the GE theory tradition, and th~ir 
qualitative outcomes will correspond to well known propositions that restraints 
on free trade will diminish aggregate welfare. Thus these broad qualitative 
I I have not seen a model specification, only a model run. 
2 Becanse of a family e!T!erg::nc)", my trip overseas was terminated beiore I 
visited Rome, and so could avail myself of a briefing on the FAO model. 
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conclusions should not detain us. On the other hand it is quite difficult to aS$es~ 
the yualttiiaiive conClUSIOns of the modelling, because they use different bases 
and assumptions. What this section attempts to do is draw out four qualitative 
conclusions about quantitative magnitudes, which might - before hindsight -
been surprising to the economist uniformed about world food issues. 
1. The level of food protection/support varies markedly from year 
to year. 
The protection given to manufacturing is usually considered to be fairly 
constant, or to move smoothly with changes to policy instruments. However the 
policies for farm support are not merely tariffs, and are often variable levies 
related to international prices. Thus changes in world food prices - and the 
experience is that commodities jump around much more than manufactures -
alter the effective rates of protection quite markedly. 
The practical import of this is that it is almost impossible to give 
meaningful quantitative estimates of the effects of the interventions except in 
terms of a base year. which is likely to be atypical relative to the years 
surrounding it. All the remaining propositions should begin, therefore, with 
"Never-the-Iess". 
2. The commodities most penalised by present arrangements are in 
order: dairy products, sugar, and red meats. 
Not untypical estimates are that world trade prices for dairy products would be 
60 percent higher, sugar prices 40 percent higher, and red meat prices 20 
percent higher if there was total liberalisation. 
Two out of three of these groups are main New Zealand exports. It is 
reasonable to assume New Zealand suffers two ways from world food 
protection: depressed prices for what it does export, and reduced volume 
exports for dairy, meat and wool. 
3. It would appear partialliberalisation in the grain market will not 
damage New Zealand's interests via. supply and price responses in 
livestock markets. 
This at first surprised me, but it appears to arise from the Northern 
Hemisphere grain fed livestock producers being thoroughly insulated from 
world grain prices. The assumptions are that any gains from lower grain prices 
will be used to reduce the fiscal costs of the livestock support (although in 
principle the fiscal gains could be routed back to the farmers). 
-I. Of all the countries modelled New Zealand is most damaged by 
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world food protectiOn. 
The model estimates are up to 3 percent of GDP, but as explained earlier I 
believe that if effects left outside the modelling are included the loss is likely 
to be between 12 and 25 percent of New Zealand GOP. 
There has to be one country that was worse off, and it turns out to be us -
a small specialised country, with little political strength in world politics. That 
is exactly what the theories of politics of international trade would predict. 
5. The gains from trade for the world as a whole, while great in 
absolute terms, are small relative to aggregate output. 
The quantitative numbers suggest that the total gains from OECO food trade 
Iiberalisation are less than 1 percent of world or OECO GOP. This is not a big 
gain, representing about 3 months per capita growth of the world economy.' 
It seems to me that the result somewhat undermines the New .Zealand 
position that world food trade liberalisation would be of immense benefit to the 
world. Before commenting on the policy implications a sixth proposition is 
relevant. 
6. Alost countries would gain in aggregate output terms about as 
much from unilateral liberalisation of their food systems, as they 
would from multilateralliberalisation. 
Then why not unilaterally liberalisation? There are perhaps two explanations. 
One is that different sectors would benefit from the two liberalisation paths. 
Second, unilateral liberalisation has to be domestically driven, and politically 
may not an option, while multilateral liberalisation can be attributed to 
international forces for domestic political purposes. Moreover it is much harder 
to reverse an international agreement! 
Propositions 5 and 6 imply that the food trade liberalisation for substantially 
greater economic efficiency argument is not particulary compelling. Why then 
the sudden push to include food trade into the GATT round? 
I A 3 percent gain in New Zealand per capita GOP represents over five ye'ars 
growth at recent rates. 
'There is perhaps a seventh proposition. 
7. Despite the "single market" of the European Community, about 
half the effective food protection is applied independently by tlte 
member states. 
The i:np!i.:;",ion is that even if the Community ciisi1rlJiS, we may see member 
state responses to offset the effects. 
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Probably the drive is partly ideological, and partly political in the sense of 
politiL'.i pressure groups arguing over protection levels in order to influence the 
income distribution. But another motivating factor is fiscal, that is the 
protection is often a burden on the taxpayer, and there is a continuing pressure 
to increase [his burden. Looking to the future, the Treasuries of the world see 
their only protection as reversing the trend, rather than trying to hold the level. 
New Zealand's Strategy towards ASE Models 
From one point of view it is surprising that New Zealand, with so much to gain 
from world food trade reform has done so little to investigate systematically the 
issue. This is partly because New Zealand is a small country, partly it reflects 
our cavalier attitude to systematic analysis. We may also debate to what extent 
the negotiating stance of moral indignation towards farm protection means that 
careful consideration is unnecessary, and to what extent the lack of analysis 
means our only plausible stance is moral indignation may. 
More pertinent is the question of whether we should stay that way. 
In [he short term, New Zealand trade negotiators go into the last stages of the 
Uruguay Round not nearly as well prepared as those countries who have put 
effort into studying the intricacies of world food trade liberalisation. Whether 
that reduces our contribution to the negotiations - if any - may also be debated. 
But if I were the Minister in charge of the negotiations, I guess I would prefer 
to have at least one official accompanying me, with a detailed technical 
knowledge of the general impact of partial food liberalisation. 
Since there will not be a totalliberalisation following the Uruguay Round, there 
remains the long term issue of our stance towards systematic analysis of the 
food trade interventions. My judgement is that given the New Zealand stake in 
the issue, we need to be better informed than we have in the past. Reading 
others papers is insufficient. We need hands on modelling experience. That will 
require some public funding. 
I do not think there is much point, at this stage, of New Zealand building its 
own model. The costs are considerable, and there appears to be reasonable 
access to ongoing ones which would reduce the costs, or improve the 
effectiveness of funds used. However there may be a point in buildiq; ::. 
~omponent of an exisring model. For instance EMABA lacks a dairy sector. Co-
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operation to add one may both effective (and a positive part of CER). 
So probably the cheapest approach at the moment would be using accessible 
models, carrying out our own exploratory runs, and perhaps assisting the model 
builders to improve those parts of the model where New Zealand has relevant 
expertise. This is not only improving the New Zealand response functions, but 
assisting those commodities for which New Zealand has a special interest. 
Of the ongoing models, the ones of in terest are likely to be SALTER and 
EMABA in Canberra, SWOPSIM in Washington, and possibly the MTM in 
Paris, if access is not confined to officials only. The amount of effort to be 
devoted to each requires more thought, but my impression is that the costs of 
being involved with the first three will be relatively cheap, relative to output. 
There is however a need to do some careful modelling work on the 
responsiveness of the New Zealand economy. At the very least one of the RPEP 
models needs to be used to evaluate how appropriate the partial equilibrium 
parameters usually used for New Zealand have to be modified for the feedback 
responses given the size of the food export sector. (Doing so will not only be 
beneficial for New Zealand's policy understandings, but will draw attention to 
own onerously we have been penalised by the existing regime).' 
I make no recommendation for an institutional structure, although the Meat 
and Wool Economic Service and the Dairy Board should have an active 
involvement. Possibly a loose coalition of institutions would be most 
appropriate. (I would have thought their interests in the issue were sufficient 
for them to also contribute funding.) 
But this is all begging the prior question. What is New Zealand's position going 
to be on world food trade liberalisation? Naive moral indignation against all 
intervention, or a shrewd understanding of the issues involved, underpinning a 
very real grievance and view of what can be practically done? It is only if we 
choose the second path do we need to obtain greater expertise in AS,E 
modelling than we have at present. 
23 August 1991 Brian Easton 
, I also found considerable interest by the modcllcr;" when I elaborated the 
wider impacts of a terms off trade depression on the growth rate. 
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The dramatic increase in possum numbers throughout New Zealand during the 1980s 
threatens ecological attributes in many areas. Possums as carriers of tuberculosis also 
threaten agricultural trade .. Proposals to deal with the possum problem include 
promoting possum fur as environmentally sound, provision of a possum bounty, and 
having government subsidise poisoning and trapping programmes. An alternative 
approach is to assign property rights to the absence of possums which may result in an 
economically efficient solution to the problem of possums. It is identified that there is a 
need to relate the incentive to both the environmental attributes at risk and the results 
achieved (as measured by the absence of possums). It is suggested that this approach 
could be applied to many other pest problems. 
BACKGROUND 
The possum or brush tailed phalanger ITrichosurus vulpecula) was introduced into 
New Zealand from Tasmania in the late 1800's because of its value for fur. Possums 
spread rapidly with human assistance and are now established in virtually all suitable 
habitats on mainland New Zealand. The population is estimated at between 60 and 70 
million. The native flora and fauna of New Zealand has evolved without the presence 
of browsers. As a result possum browsing has severe ecological impacts killing mature 
trees and reducing native bird and insect populations. 
In some areas of New Zealand possum populations have been infected by bovine 
tuberculosis. This acts as a reservoir of infection defeating control programmes in 
domestic stock. If infection rises to significant levels there is the risk that agricultural 
products, which form a very significant proportion of New Zealand's exports, may be 
excluded from key markets. 
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TRADmONALAPPROACHES 
The traditional approaches to dealing with the present possum problems have been 
bounties, commercial hunting, and official government poisoning programmes. In the 
past fur trapping has provided the major form of control on the possum population. 
With the fall in fur prices in the 1980's hunting pressure on possum populations 
declined. It is unlikely that promoting possum fur as environmentally sound would 
have a significant impact on the depressed world fur market and this will not be 
considered further. 
Bounties have been placed on possums in the past and it has been suggested that it may 
be appropriate again as a way of dealing with the problem. A bounty however would 
not discriminate between a possum killed in a national park or shot from the side of the 
road. The problem with this method is that it encourages people to kill possums in 
areas where they are easy to kill, which may not necessarily be areas where killing 
possums has significant environmental benefits. Only when possum numbers are 
reduced to a level that requires the same amount of effort as the 'next' area will the 
focus of attention expand. It is also in the possumers' interest as a group to ensure that 
breeding populations remain or exist in all areas to supply future income. In the past 
when fur prices were high possums were deliberately introduced into previously 
possum free areas, with the result that almost all mainland New Zealand is now 
affected by possums. 
In the late 1980's government committed millions of dollars to control possum numbers 
in .key areas. These programmes however no inherent mechanism to ensure that 
resources will be used in the most efficient manner. 
EFHOENCY 
It is normal to place a positive value on those things wanted and a negative value on 
those things not wanted. With regard to possums their destruction is desired. The 
conservation and agricultural objective is to be free of possums (or at least to have 
considerably fewer possums). It therefore follows that a positive value should be 
placed on their absence and a negative value on their presence. Bounties and fur 
trapping however place a positive value on the presence of possums and as a result 
give the wrong economic signals for achieving conservation and agricultural goals. 
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Acting in a rational manner possumers will maximise their return by harvesting at the 
maximum economic yield of possums. This maximum sustainable economic yield 
however is unlikely to result in a population in concordance with the maximum 
environmentally tolerable level of possums desired. 
The degree of possum absence desired varies with the attributes that are threatened by 
possums. For example only low numbers can be tolerated in kamahi-rata or 
pohutukawa forest within national parks or in areas adjacent to high producing dairy 
land. High numbers however would be acceptable in gorse covered land with no 
nearby grazing. 
The use of bounties and fur trapping in reducing possum numbers does not recognise 
the variation in value ascribed to different environments. The correlation between 
possumer effort and environmental value is low or random and therefore inherently 
inefficient in allocating scarce resources (see Fig 1). What is required is a system that 
will efficiently concentrate high possumer effort into areas of high environmental value 
and not promote effort in areas of low value (see Fig 2). 
EFFORT AND THE POSSUM POPULATION 
Except on small islands it is generally not possible to eradicate any widespread pest. It 
is feasible though to reduce and maintain the numbers in selected areas. It is very easy 
to kill the first possum but the effort required to kill subsequent possums increases 
with each possum killed. When there are 1000 possums in an area it is relatively easy 
to find a possum. If there are only 10 possums in that area it takes considerably greater 
effort to find a possum. Using economic terms the "marginal cost" (MC) of finding an 
additional possum is high when there are few possums and low when there are many. 
Graphing the effort by the number of possums present would probably result in a 
hyperbolic curve (Fig 3). The marginal cost can also be represented by a straight line 
(Fig 4) if the inverse of possum numbers is used with a logarithmic scale. (This makes 
it easier to conceptualise what follows.) Effort or cost can be represented in terms of 
dollars spent (on person/hours and resources used.) 
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The benefit derived from possum absence, and willingness to pay (WfP) for possum 
absence, will increase with increasing possum absence. This benefit (or WTP) will be' 
higher for high value areas than for low value areas (fig 5). The marginal benefit (MB) 
however will decrease as possum populations are reduced. While the benefit derived 
from each subsequent possum killed increases, the additional benefit derived is less 
than the additional benefit derived from killing the previous possum. Economic 
efficiency is maximised when MB = MC (fig 6). That is when the difference between 
costs and benefits is greatest. 
CONfESTABLE OR TRADEABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
One possible way that may achieve economic efficiency would be to develop an 
institutional arrangement that assigns contestable or tradeable property rights to the 
absence of possums. A method to achieve this would be through a system of 
transferable licences to rights for the absence of possums. 'Possum blocks' would first 
need to be valued in terms of 'possum freeness' desired for conservation or agricultural 
purposes. In other words the maximum tolerable possum population that each 
environment or block could sustain without unacceptable damage or disease threat 
occurring has to be defined, and this is with the proviso that there is a willingness to 
pay for this benefit by the government, farmers, tourist operators, or conservationists. 
The value placed on an area, or the desire for an area to be free of possums, has to be 
equal or greater than the effort or cost required to achieve the desired level of possum 
control. If it is less then the level of control desired will have to be re-evaluated, or 
resources redeployed. 
Possumers will kill possums until the marginal benefit (MB) to them equals their 
marginal cost (MC). This point of equality needs to coincide with the target or tolerable 
population level (which is derived from the marginal costs and benefits of those people 
paying for the control of possums). (See Figure 7). To achieve the most cost effective 
control the actual payment schedule to the possumer should equal the marginal cost of 
the possumer. However it is very difficult for people other than possumers to know 
what this marginal cost will be in every (or any) situation, given the variability of 
"possum blocks" for topography, vegetation cover, distance from population centres, 
etc. 
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These factors have a profound influence on the amount of effort (or cost) required to 
kill a possum, or maintain "possum freeness". 
A simple way of overcoming the problem of estimating the marginal cost of possumers 
would be to set an arbitary or nominal payment schedule (NPS) above the estimated 
marginal cost for the possumer and allow possumers to competitively tender for the 
right to possum in a particular block. The possumer is the expert and s/he knows how 
much it is worth to them to control possums in a particular area. In a competitive 
situation the nominal payment schedule minus the tender schedule for the right to 
possum should equal the marginal cost of the possumer (see Fig 8). The NPS would 
increase inversely to the number of possums remaining until the target or tolerable 
population level was reached. Once the target level was reached the NPS would 
remain constant. The tender schedule offered by the possumer would be a percentage 
of the NPS. In other words this is the amount of NPS that the possumer is willing to 
forego in order to obtain an exclusive right to a block to control possums. The actual 
payment schedule (APS) would be determined by this derived marginal cost (see Fig 9) 
and would be set for the duration of the contract. Until the desired population level is 
achieved the 'marginal rate of return' would increase for the possumer as the possum 
population reduced. Effort above this point however would have a zero marginal rate 
of return. Effort by the possumer would consequently be targetted at the point of 
inflexion of the APS, as this point of achieving and maintaining the tolerable 
population would give the possumer the greatest financial return for effort expended. 
In areas of high value with low possums numbers tender schedules would be a 
relatively large percentage of the nominal payment schedule because relatively little 
effort would be required to maintain the possum population at the desired level. 
Where possum numbers were high in high value areas the tender schedule would be 
lower to account for the higher amount of effort required. In areas of low value the 
tender schedule would be minimal (Figure 10). Whether the marginal cost is high or 
low (because of access problems, topography etc) will also affect the tender schedules 
offered by the possumer (Fig 11). Tender schedules would also reflect the value of 
residual products such as fur (Fig 12 and 13). Where the interests of 'possum sufferers' 
overlapped, they woulq be free to negotiate the relative proportions that they would 
contribute to the NPS. 
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The term of possum block licences (PBL) is not important. However in the initial years 
of any scheme the licences should probably be relatively short term (one year?) in order 
that the market for PBL's gain knowledge and experience. Time will be required for 
those providing the service (possumers), and those buying the service (the government, 
farmers, conservationists, etc), to determine or establish their marginal costs and 
benefits, and thus fine tune the appropriate ranges for their tender schedules or NPS's. 
Because the licences to blocks would be transferable this would encourage the use of 
the most effective techniques for getting rid of possums. Those who are able to 
maximise their returns would move into the industry and those who were inefficient 
and ineffective would move out. Efficient possumers would buyout inefficient 
possumers. Innovation would also be encouraged by the desire to maximise returns. 
Control mechanisms used would be up to the 'possum block' owner (whether they are 
farmers, hunters - recreational or professional, private individuals or companies) and 
they would be free to choose the most appropriate control method (provided that the 
values sought to be protected were not harmed by the method to achieve possum 
freeness). 
'Poaching' of possums would also be encouraged as this would be to the benefit of both 
the 'poached' neighbour and the 'poaching' block owner. 'Poachers' would be 
protecting their property right to the absence of possums from the threat of wandering 
possums. 
Whatever the method used for controlling possums there should be mOnitoring 
undertaken to determine the effectiveness of the programme. Monitoring of possum 
numbers when using a property rights approach may however require a greater degree 
of accuracy than that required with other control methods because of the sliding scale 
nature of the payment system. To ensure that the 'transaction costs' of this approach 
are minimised, and also ensure that the level of possums monitored was seen as 
unbiased. by both the possummer and the payer, the right to monitoring possum 
numbers should also be contestable. This would result in policy, regulatory and 
implementation activities being kept separate. 
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Another advantage of this approach is that of greater transparency. The rationale for 
values placed on areas would need to be explicit, and the costs incurred in achieving a 
stated objective would be more visible. 
The principles involved in this approach to controlling possums, it is considered, have 
applicability to many other pest infestations, whether plant or animal in nature. For 
example rabbits, deer, thar, nasella tussock and wilding conifers. 
BIOLOGICAL CONTROL 
Biological control, if suitable control agents can be found, can have dramatic effects on 
pests. Biological control however is species specific while other forms of control (such 
as trapping or poisoning) are site specific. Site specific controls are amenable to 
transferable licence systems of property rights while species specific controls are not, 
given their all or nothing nature. Biological control requires considerable amounts of 
research and the results can be uncertain. Because of the high costs of researc/l and the 
uncertainty of outcomes it is financially a high risk area. Investment in biological 
control research is inhibited at present because of the dispersed nature of the benefits 
(given the existing institutional arrangements). If, however, future income for a 
specified period could be guaranteed by the absence of pests this may encourage 
venture capital funding of organisations (such as the DSIR or universities) to research 
biological control methods in greater depth. Conditions attached to site specific 
licences would need to acknowledge the possibility of successful biological control 
methods being introduced. 
SUMMARY 
Creating contestable property rights to the absence of possums (and many other pest 
species) could result in a more efficient allocation of scarce resources in dealing with 
the possum problem. Effort would be targetted at those areas where it is desired 
because the goals of possumers, government, farmers and conservationists would be in 
concordance. Creating property rights could give greater transparency to the decision 
making process and could also encourage innovation in methods to control pests. 
8 
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Recent analysis of New Zealand farming without subsidies (Sandrey and Reynolds, 1990) 
emphasised the need for a competitive agricultural sedor able to take advantage of any 
opportunities liberalised world agricultural trade presented. During the past decade rural 
debt problems surfaced resulting in reduced farmer security margins and falling investment 
confidence. Any financial adjustment in agriculture in the early 1990's will result in debt 
repayments, private sector debt write-offs and ownership transfer to new entrants at lower 
debt levels (to name only a few). Sandrey and Scobie concluded that private sedor solutions 
to rural debt problems would dominate, and Government must ensure ' ... that any 
intervention does not distort private sector decisions about debt resolution: 
Policies advocated above are familiar to the historian of agricultural policy and thought. Both 
mortgage relief legislation and private relief schemes during the early 1930's were designed 
to relieve farmers' debt servicing burdens. Academic economists were involved in 
surrounding debate and implementation of mortgage relief measures. Recent archival 
discoveries including economists' confidential evidence to the 1931 Special Economic 
Committee and Belshaw's unpublished notes, addresses, lectures and commentaries on 
agricultural finance policy allow review and evaluation of their arguments which (in light of 
more recent debate) may prOVide lessons for future policy. 
In this paper I evaluate economists' arguments concerning net agricultural investment and 
methods of mortgage relief. I have separated my discussion into three sections. First, I briefly 
describe the contemporary economic climate and present Murphy and Belshaw's arguments 
on agricultural finance provision. Second, I adopt O'Neil's (1985) recent analysis of net 
agricultural investment as a conceptual framework with which to compare and contrast 
economists' arguments. Third, I review available data on the mortgage market and 
agricultural investment with a view to assess accuracy of economists' claims and offer reasons 
why attitudinal divergence occurred. 
'The solution to the rural debt problem is clearly one for the private sector, 
and government must be careful to ensure that any intervention does not 
distort private sector decisions about debt resolution: 
(Sandrey and Scobie, 1990, 315) 
'If considerations of political expediency were ruled out, the proper course 
would be to take down the scaffolding represented by moratoria and other 
flimsy devices intended to bolster up an artificial situation, and let 
values adjust themselves to the altered conditions: 
(Murphy, 1932c, 3, 5) 
'The effects of this experimental and palliative legislation have been to 
adjourn a settlement, and to make settlement more difficult, since 
it has created a mentality in the debtors averse from meeting their 
obligations and prejudicial to the legal rights of mortgage creditors, 
and induced an indisposition on the part of parties concerned 
to come to any final settlement: 
(Murphy, 1935b, 195) 
3 
Introduction. 
Recent analysis of New Zealand farming without subsidies (Sandrey and Reynolds, 
1990) emphasised the need for a competitive agricultural sector able to take 
advantage of any opportunities liberalised world agricultural trade presented. 
During the past decade rural debt problems surfaced resulting in reduced farmer 
secuIity margins and falling investment confidence (Johnston and Sandrey, 1990). 
Any financial adjustment in agriculture in the early 1990's will result in debt 
repayments, private sector debt write-offs and ownership transfer to new entrants at 
lower debt levels (to name only a few). Sandrey and Scobie (1990, 315) concluded 
that private sector solutions to rural debt problems would dominate, and Government 
must ensure ' ... that any intervention does not distort private sector decisions about 
debt resolution: 
Policies advocated above are familiar to the historian of agricultural policy and 
thought. Both mortgage relief legislation and private relief schemes during the early 
1930's were designed to relieve farmers' debt servicing burdens. Academic 
economists were involved in surrounding debate and implementation of mortgage 
relief measures. Recent archival discoveries including economists' confidential 
evidence to the 1931 Special Economic Committee and Belshaw's unpublished notes, 
addresses, lectures and commentaries on agricultural finance policy allow review and 
evaluation of their arguments which (in light of more recent debate) may provide 
lessons for future policy. 
This paper has expanded from my original focus on economists' views of their role 
in government policy making to a more general evaluation of their arguments 
concerning net agricultural investment and methods of mortgage relief. I have 
separated my discussion into three sections. First, I briefly describe the contemporary 
economic climate and present Murphy and Belshaw's arguments on agricultural 
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finance provision. I Second, I adopt O'Neil's (1985) recent analysis of net agricultural 
investment as a conceptual framework with which to compare and contrast 
economists' arguments. Third, I review available data on the mortgage market and 
agricultural investment with a view to assess accuracy of economists' claims and offer 
reasons why attitudinal divergence occurred. 
1. Murphy and Belshaw on Financial Readjustment. 
New Zealand agriculture experienced a prolonged fall in export commodity prices 
during 1930-1933.2 Although agricultural production continued to increase, those 
farmers exporting produce received decreased incomes. Their ability to service 
existing debt reduced with financial leverage ratios peaking 25% on aggregate. Real 
interest rates rose as high as 18% in 1930/1931 and 12% in 1931/1932 (see table 1). 
The first attempt at mortgage relief involving contracted parties was privately 
organised in January 1931. The Canterbury Chamber of Commerce convened a 
conference of interested parties, with the prime aim of devising methods of relief that 
would prevent farmers leaving the land (Lawn, 1932, 297). Among those present 
were local bankers, farmers and Canterbury economists A.H. Tocker and G. Lawn.3 
A scheme of voluntary relief was devised which allowed the participating farmer to 
draw living expenses and capital asset maintenance (for example, fence erection, stock 
purchases, fertiliser application) from a working account. This would be the first 
charge on any farm income, with rates and land tax second and then allocation 
between land mortgagees and other creditors (for example, stock firms)(MacDonald 
I Barney Murphy was Professor of E"Jnomics at Victoria University College (1920-1950). Hora", Belshaw was Professor 
of Economics at AucklRnd University College (1927-1945). Other academic economists participated in contemporary 
discussion. I /uroe chasen Murphy and Belshaw because 1) they ~ representalive of opposing arguments on mortgage 
relie{, and 2) they were tha most prolific (tharefore readily accessible) writers on tha lopic. 
I I will take as understood tha general contours of tha 1930'5 depression and recovery period in New Zealand. I prefer 
Hawke (1985, 122-162) and RJ>nkin (1991). 
J Albert Tacker was Professor of Economics at Canterbury University College (1926-J950). George Lawn was Lecturer 
in Economics at Canterbury up 10 his appointment as Economic Adviser for tha Reserve Bank in 1937. 
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and Thomson, 1987, 234).4 
Government also initiated several institutional structures designed' to review and 
modify extant agrirultural finance packages.s This began five years of state 
intervention in agrirultural finance markets, beginning with the Special Economic 
Committee 1931 and rulminating (after numerous mortgage relief legislation) with 
establishment of the Mortgage Corporation in 1935.6 
In this section I present Murphy and Belshaw's arguments on agrirultural finance 
provision. Murphy was regular contributor to The New Zealand Financial Times (as 
Scrutator) and in wide-ranging reviews of economic conditions commented frequently 
on mortgage readjustment legislation. In contrast, Belshaw had spent most of his 
research energy on analysing agrirultural finance theory and conducting/supporting 
seminal indigenous research (Fleming, 1990). I have separated their ideas into two 
periods, pre-devaluation and pre-mortgage corporation. 
Pre-devaluation. 
In August 1931 the House of Representatives adopted a motion to set up an 
interparty committee to examine the recent fall in national income (NZPD, 229, 21 
August 1931, 468-477). It was clear from the outset that this committee was seen by 
politicians as a preliminary to fuller investigation. 'Fuller investigation' meant a 
committee of economists, Government officials and businessmen similar to that 
• The scheme's SIlCC<SS during the nat few years provided strong evidence for Tocker and LRwn's non-interventionist 
v~ and signDlled later policy initiatives. It led to recommendations by the reconuened Econom!c Committee to further 
possibilities for lXJluntary settlements (ralher than to again redu", fixed charges)(Economic Committee, 1933, 46) and 
prompted govrmrment to adopt (and further adapt) the sclle=. It beca_the basis for a~ments to the Mortgagors' Relief 
Act in laU 1931 wlUck allowed establishment of adjust_nt commissions encouraging voluntary settlement$. 
s It is acknowledged that to concentrate on agricultural finance aspects of so_ 1930's policies is an artificial separation. 
tlJITJice was usually giVl!n as part of a pockJzg. (for <XJ.mple. 1932 Economic Committee package of deoaluation and internal 
<kf!atum). 
• MacDonald and Thomson (1987) provide detailed discussion of mortgage reliEf legislation and institutional workings 
of adjust~t commissions. HOwaJer, they fail to =iew contemporary agricultural economic thought which /eads to 
erroneous condusions. Contemporary =iews of mortgage relief ~res are provided by Cocker (1932, 1934), Belshaw 
(1936) and Gmterbury Chamber of Commer", (1937a, 1937b). 
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established in Australia (Forbes, ibid, 471). The interparty committee met between 
24 August and 16 September, and called on a number of economists for evidence. 
Belshaw and Murphy participated as witnesses while Belshaw was also a member 
(with R.M. Campbell, M. Fraser and B.C. Ashwin) of the joint secretariat assisting the 
committee.7 The terms of reference defined by the secretariat included examination 
of attitudes regarding fixed charges and mortgage relief (Precis, PM 17/1, 17/2, 
17/3). The secretariat's precis provides representative quotes from each Professor on 
these matters. 
Murphy argued that statutory cuts in interest rates had adverse effects on business 
confidence (overriding the sanctity of contracts). These effects would outweigh any 
benefits accrued to net agrirultural investment. Short term interest rates would 
decrease through market forces as excess supply emerged. Murphy was unconvinced 
interest rate reductions would have positive short term results: 
' ... capital ... has its price determined by supply and demand, and there is no way 
of getting over this difficulty short of such a repudiation of existing contracts 
as would destroy or seriously impair confidence, credit and future borrowing 
capacity.' (1931, 7). 
Cheap credit would occur through increased savings and restoration of confidence, 
not through destroying sanctity of contracts. Private sector voluntary adjustments 
were preferred by Murphy although he did acknowledge the possibility that any 
worsening of the existing cyclical downturn could result in statutory interference: 
'As an economic proposition contracts should be observed up to the point 
where greater social damage would be caused by breaking than by observing 
them.' (PM 17/2). 
Murphy saw few problems (economically or legally) with parties entering voluntary 
mortgage settlement schemes. Private sector cooperation would resu.lt in productive, 
yet at that time overindebted, farmers trading out of their diffirulties (1932c, 3). If 
no private sector solution was forthcoming farmers should be left to face bankruptcy 
like any other business: 
The idea that the present body of individual farmers sho'!ld be maintained 
1 Files conarning the Special Economic Committee are ~.eld at National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington (~ 
Minister's Dtpartment Files) and are abbreuiated as PM 17/ ... 
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economically sacrosanct in the national interests is a pure illusion.' (ibid, 5). 
Murphy was aware of strong agricultural lobbying for Govemmen~ involvement in 
mortgage relief. By late 1932 he was prepared to concede (as he had acknowledged 
a year earlier) that statutory alterations in mortgage agreements may take place. 
However, he argued that this would create a debtor mentality adverse to upholding 
voluntary contracts. His solution remained a non-interventionist one: 
'If considerations of political expediency were ruled out, the proper course 
would be to take down the scaffolding represented by moratoria and other 
flimsy devices intended to bolster up an artificial situation, and let values 
adjust themselves to the altered conditions.' (1932, 5). 
Belshaw's advocation of lower interest rates rested on research completed during the 
. 1920's.8 With Condliffe he had provided the first economic review of agricultural 
finance provision in New Zealand (Condliffe and Belshaw, 1925). After PhD studies 
at Cambridge he returned to New Zealand and actively debated causes of agricultural 
depression. He believed that interest rate rigidities caused divergences between 
actual and potential output in the agricultural sector. Farmers' mortgage repayment 
increases were ' ... the main cause of the depression in recent times .. , together with the 
increase in the rate of interest and mortgage charges which accompanied it' (Belshaw, 
1928, 64). These are important because, as Belshaw had argued in his Economic 
Tournai article (1926b, 30), fixed charges represented a greater proportion of outgoings 
in agriculture than in extractive or manufacturing industries. ·Thus, the ratio of fixed 
to circulating capital charges was also higher, and, in many cases, land speculation 
resulted in farmer over-indebtedness. 
The primary benefit of a statutory reduction in interest rates would accrue to 
agriculture. Reconversion of Government loans at lower interest rates was of 
secondary importance (if possible at all). Indeed, Government would not directly 
, While Belshaw does nol explicilly define real and nominal interesl rates. consistenl reading of his work shows he 
adapled Marshallian definilians. The 'real" rale of interesl (Ihe eJjuilibrium rate consislent wilh full empluymenl) was 
determined by lhe supply and tkmand of free investible resources. The market (Dr nomina/) inleresl rate is tktermined by 
the demand and supply for loans and reflects business profilability. Belshaw does not define real interest rates as nomi1U1l 
rates minus inpation. On the MarshalliAn theory of interest see Eshag (1963, 45-71). 
8 
benefit from this proposal because it would be required to give relief as mortgagee 
without gaining an offsetting advantage of reduced interest payments.9 Belshaw 
argued that interest elastic agricultural investment would respol).d to statutory 
reductions: 
The effect of a statutory reduction would be to keep interest rates at a lower 
level for some time, perhaps permanently, and this would do much to facilitate 
investment and promote recovery.'(PM 17/3). 
Like Murphy, Belshaw saw statutory reductions as the most direct method of 
influencing fixed charges. After sitting on the Economic Committee in February 1932 
(in which he strongly advocated reductions in fixed charges), he also argued that 
immediate relief to agriculture could occur if Government actively reduced deposit 
rates of financial institutions under its control (1932a, 11; 1932b, 3). The problem was 
sub-optimal financial market allocation as investors choose to invest in fixed deposit 
accounts rather than in agricultural mortgages. Belshaw refused to acknowledge that 
investors had little confidence in agriculture and may have required a premium to 
invest in the sector. 
Belshaw also supported an interventionist approach to mortgage relief. If private 
settlement was not possible parties should have to negotiate with the aid of 
. adjustment commissions. Farmers unable to continue trading would obtain assistance 
in settling existing debt. Recent purchasers of productive farm land should be 
actively encouraged to apply for debt adjustment. Belshaw argued that greater social 
damage would result from observing mortgage contract terms than from altering 
them. to 
Pre-mortgage corporation 
The Economic Committee 1932 recommended statutory reductions of all fixed charges 
• The possibility of taxing holders of Got"rnment securities by the amounl of lhe proposed reduction was discussed in 
the Special Economic Committee precis (Precis, PM, 17/2, 15). 
" Apart from reviewing mortgage ad;uslment (in a comparative paper with the United Stales of America) (1936), 
Belshaw has little to say on relief legislation. 
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by twenty percent.ll Despite the committee's acknowledgement that in usual 
circumstances sanctity of contracts should reign (no doubt accepting Murphy and 
Tockers 'confidence' arguments), it argued economic conditions we.re ' .. .far from 
normal, and the revision of fixed money payments ... [wasl ... a reasonable measure of 
further economic adjustment: (Economic Committee, 1932, 27).12 Investors had 
enjoyed increasing real interest rates during 1930/1931 (as prices fell but contracts 
remained in fixed money terms). Under the slogan of 'equality of sacrifice' the 
Committee argued that reductions in fixed money contracts would not drastically 
alter original real gains (that is, those gains agreed upon by both parties when 
entering the contract). The Committee placed faith in the new Mortgagors' Relief 
Act. Any statutory reductions in interest rates would be a one-off measure. 
The second Economic Committee met intermittently between December 1932 and 
January 1933. It met informally (consisting of J. Hight, Belshaw and Tocker) and 
concentrated on updating the previous report.13 The tone of the second report 
concerning mortgage relief and statutory interest rate cuts was markedly different to 
the Copland-dominated 1932 report. While interest rates should be reduced on new 
Government and private sector loans, further statutory interference was rejected: 
' ... a second statutory reduction of capital charges would be more dangerous 
than a first ... lf the risks of investment are increased by the fear of repeated 
State interference with private contracts, higher rates will have to be paid in 
order to induce lenders to invest: (Economic Committee, 1933, 20). 
Despite the above reductions (late 1932) and exchange rate devaluation (early 1933) 
dairy farmers' financial positions had not improved. Dairy farmer representatives 
met the Prime Minister on 15 February 1934 and lobbied for a commission of inquiry 
11 &cent commentators ha.., generally focused on the centrepiece of the Economic Commiita's policy package, 
tkvaIlUltion of the Nt:UJ 2mblnd currency in ",lIltion to sterling (sa Hawke, 1985, 144-162; Endres, 1990). This is not 
surprising given the marked chang< in policy direction this proposal rep", .... ted. 
11 Hawke 11982, 34-35) argues that the motive behind these cut. was unclear. It could have b .... part of an internal 
tUf!Jltion package, an '<quality of sacrifice' measure or the implementation of cheap money principles. Hawke comments: 'The 
underlying reasoning differed and was not always compatible across different line. of advice .. :. 
U The r<quest for updJUing the report came from Prime Minister Forbe. (Bel.haw to Forbes, 11 FebrlUlry 1933, letter 
acaJmpanying the report). The committa received data from the Government StatisticiJln with regards to export commodity 
price index numbers as la~ as November 1932. 
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and immediate financial relief. Minister of Finance Coates proposed a conference of 
dairy representatives, from which a Royal Commission was agreed upon. 
The Commission concluded that mortgage relief during the early 1930's had done 
very little to solve underlying agricultural finance market deficiencies. Prolonged 
existence of relief meant investors were discouraged from entering the sector (as 
government involvement bred uncertainty) and any necessary downwards adjustment 
of land values was being postponed. The Commission estimated that ' ... at least 50 
percent of the dairy farmers of the Dominion are, in varying degree, unable at the 
present time to meet their financial commitments: (Dairy Commission, 1934, 65). 
The Commission argued that the most efficient means of encouraging flexible interest 
rates was to provide increased competition in the long term finance market. 
Introduction of mortgage bonds would allow investors to trade in mortgages like 
other stocks. Convertibility of bonds meant high premiums need not be paid to 
investors (in the form of high interest rates to encourage them to leave funds tied to 
land for long periods of time).14 This system would be coordinated through a newly 
established 'Rural Mortgage Corporation' (ibid, 69, 74). 
Contemporaneously, Coates' budget speech on 23 August 1934 announced 
establishment of a mortgage corporation encompassing urban and rural mortgages 
(NZPD, 239, 400-401). Such a decision was not independent of the Dairy 
Commission, as most likely their interim report had been presented to Coates prior 
to the budget. He wasted ·little time in initiating organisation. IS Before the 
Commission presented its final report on 15 October 1934, an officials committee was 
appointed to ' ... elaborate in detail the proposal as outlined in the Budget with a view 
It The commission (like the Economic Committas before them) rejected the use of sub.idies or gwrantad prices to 
stabilise farm incomes on four grounds; non·selective in application of relief, discourages efficiency, involves burdensome 
administration, injures trade agruments. 
IS Files relating to the Officials Committee appointed to recommend the {ann of mortgage corporation legislation are 
located in Treasury (ll and Justice Department (LJ files, both held at the National Archives of New ZeaJDnd, Wellington. 
One folder of newspoper cuttings on the corporation was found in Prime Minister's Department File. (PM), while Coates' 
publications and memos can also be viewed in Coates,J.G. Papers, A1S Paper. 1785, Folder 22, Alexander Turnbull Library, 
national Library of New 2eJllllnd (abbreviated MS 1785, 22). 
II 
to making recommendations on which legislation can be based: (Memo Coates to 
Public Service Commissioner, 31 August 1934,11, 1934/2/65). Consisting of public 
servants (including economist Campbell), the committee stated that their deliberations 
' ... started from the fundamental fact that farming is the basic industry in New 
Zealand .. : and that ' ... a ready flow of capital into it at reasonable cost is essential to 
the welfare of the Dominion: (Memo Officials Committee to Minister of Finance, 1 
October 1934, 1, I 25/7). It provided a seventeen page memorandum outlining the 
necessary questions legislation would have to address. From this information Coates 
released a statement on the proposed mortgage corporation (edited and partly written 
by W.B. Sutch and Campbell) in November (Coates, MS 1785, 22,1934).16 
Murphy was generally supportive of the mortgage corporation although he was 
sceptical of many Dairy Commission recommendations (1934). The corporation 
would rationalise existing loans held by different Government departments. 
Amortisation reduced transaction costs faced by farmers every time loan renewal 
occurred and provided an incentive for farmers to reduce principal debt (1935a, 148). 
Exchangeable mortgage bonds were also accepted.17 
Murphy argued that one could not predict interest rates would fall given this new 
structure. Amortisation of loans was an inconvenience for small investors. To 
compensate, higher rates of interest were usually offered. Insufficient evidence 
existed to judge whether these investors would accept lower rates of interest if the 
inconvenience was removed through exchangeable bonds (this inconvenience now 
being assumed by the corporation). What was required in conjunction with the 
corporation was writing down of capital values (that is, reduce land values) then 
" The Associated CluJmbers submitted a number of memoranda to government from 12 February 1935 until 17 April 
1935. A summary of their position was prUtJided by the Evening Post. Monday 4 February 1935. AU articles are contained 
in EM. 18/4/2. Such was the extent of opposition linduding the Wour Party) that Coates found it necessary to counter 
arguments concerning high interest rates. burtknsome a.dmjnistTativ~ casts of the corporation and its inability to provide any 
more fundS tluJn the State Advances Office (1935. copy in PM 15/1/45al. 
Jl unterbury economists also commented on the corporation.. Tocker (1935, 97) described the inslilutiotUll structure 
of the corporation. tentatit"ly arguing tluJt gtmernment provision of {inan"" may b. more inflexible given • ... Ihe routine, the 
rigidity and the delays cluJracteri5tics of Government-regulated business: Under the auspices of the CanterbUry CluJmber 
of Commerce a clearer evaluation was presented IC.C.C .• 1935.31. Economies of scale would accrue to the corporation and 
(urwrtisalion and bonds were positively commented upon. However, investor confidence would remain low as long as finance 
was issued to indebted farmerS on the security of cluJ<lels. 
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existing in agriculture (1935b, 196). 
Private sector agricultural finance was strongly advocated by Murphy. He supported 
initial Government involvement in the Corporation's institutional establishment but 
argued that long term success rested on independence. The agricultural finance 
market would benefit from tradeable mortgage bonds as long as these financial 
instruments were not guaranteed by government. Bonds should ' ... stand on their 
own feet and not lie on the back of the taxpayer, they must sell on their merits .. : 
(1935a, 148). 
Belshaw (1936, 573-583) endorsed mortgage relief legislation which reduced the 
distress and confusion forced sales and closures created. Unlike Murphy he was 
directly involved in agricultural finance policy making during the Coates 
administration and personally negotiated the structure of mortgage relief with Lands 
Department and Treasury officials (Memo Belshaw to Coates, MS 1785, 22). No 
doubt due to this involvement he avoided public comment on mortgage corporation 
proposals. However, he had supported Government mortgage provision previously 
and it is these views I compare with Murphy's ideas. 
In 1926 Belshaw discussed the· use of exchangeable mortgage bonds as a remedy to 
investor peSSimism in agricultural investment. By 1931 he strongly advocated this 
system for New Zealand. Investor confidence in agricultural securities would 
increase 
' ... through the operation of large institutions which raise their finance by 
means of bonds backed by the collective security of farm mortgages, which may 
be expected to assess the value of securities with care ... and which allow a good 
margin of security against all advances.' (1931, 178). 
To a limited degree the State Advances Office could perform this function but 
ultimately separate institutions would have to be established (see Belshaw, 1929). 
Belshaw supported the Corporation's establishment and continued Government 
control because he believed indirect manipulation of interest rates by Government 
would mitigate trade cycle amplitudes. This policy prescription derived from 
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Cambridge trade cycle theory (which Belshaw had studied in the 1920's). 
Manipulation of interest rates during cyclical downswings and qualitative control of 
bank loans during cyclical upswings were advocated by RG. Hawtrey and D.H. 
Robertson.ls Belshaw concurred: 
' ... the policy of the Government in controlling the rates offered by other 
institutions is essential if banking policy in the diredion of cheaper credit is 
to be effective. Not only would cheaper credit directly lower costs, but also it 
would permit the more active use of funds by making fixed deposits relatively 
less attractive.' (1932a, 11-12). . 
In contrast to pre-devaluation debate, Murphy and Belshaw agreed that the ~ortgage 
Corporation would facilitate the flow of investment funds into agriculture. However, 
two fundamental differences existed. First, Murphy supported private sector finance 
provision while Belshaw was prepared to allow Government institutions an 
operational role in finance markets. Second, Murphy argued that interest rates would 
not necessarily fall when the Corporation began operations and discounted the 
influence lower interest rates had on domestic investment. Belshaw believed that 
flexible interest rates (that is, lower rates in cyclical downturns) would encourage 
investment and mitigate economic consequences of falling national income. 
Murphy and Belshaw consistently disagreed over key determinants of domestic 
investment. Their arguments were always within analyses of proposed mortgage 
relief policy. However, both economists refrained from explicitly outlining how 
domestic investment responded to such things as confidence, interest rates, net farm 
income and cash holdings. How did each economist believe net agricultural 
investment would increase, bringing about full capacity utilisation of resources in the 
agricultural sector? In the next section of this paper I attempt to present Murphy and 
Belshaw'S arguments in a neoclassical investment theory framework. 
" For inlroductwn 10 Robertson's policy prescriptiDns see Saulnier (1938,173·2011. Hawlr"!!'s economic liwJries have 
b",n rr:a:ntly arudused by Deulscher (1990). Mlrshall argued lhal any divergence between 'rea!' and nominal inleresl rales 
would produce ' .. ':' cumulative process of <xpansiDn or conlractiDn of credit..: which wouid continue untU these two rates 
con_ged again. Thus, 1M discounl rate (Dr nominal interest ratel was a potent instrumenl in 1M control of short term 
pria and exchange fluctuations (Eshag, 1963, 1221. 
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2. Mortgage relief and agricultural investment. 
Murphy and Belshaw recognised that agricultural investment was an important 
policy aggregate because additions to farmers' desired capital stock was one aspect 
of aggregate economic growth. Recent agricultural economic analyses by Johnson 
(1971), Laing (1982), Laing and Zwart (1983) and O'Neil (1985) provide a structured 
approach to agricultural investment decision making in New Zealand. In this section 
I adopt O'Neil's net investment model as a conceptual framework with which to 
compare Murphy and Belshaw's arguments.19 I outline briefly O'Neil's flexible 
accelerator investment model (following Waugh 1977a, 1977b) and follow his 
description of behaviourial aspects of agricultural investment (see Stanbridge, 1972; 
Laing and Zwart, 1983). 
Net agricultural investment comprises land development, land improvements (for 
example, fencing, drainage), buildings, equipment and land purchases. However, one 
cannot analyse these investment decisions in isolation from other decision variables. 
O'Neil's model examines the relationship between available funds and investment, 
keeping in mind behaviourial factors. It formalises a more general belief that net 
investment depends strongly on farmers' transitory income and initial cash balances. 
(1) In = b, (KO, - K..I) 
where In is net investment, KO, the desired capital stock in period t, K.'I the actual 
capital stock in period t-1 and b, the coefficient of adjustment between desired and 
actual capital.20 
O'Neil (1985, 78-81) defined the desired capital stock as dependent on farmer 
expectations, Government policies and individual farmer and farm characteristics. 
" I have generalised O'Neil's work here. His analysis concerned Lower North Island SMer and beef farmers only and 
may not be appliCJlbIe to other farming types. 
20 Coefficient b, is usually constrained between 0 and I, being an ins/an/anevus adjustmenl modd if b, = 1 and a partial 
adjustment model if b, < 1. Ceteris paribus il is possible b, < 0 as e:rpectaliDns of a future decrease in 1M price of capital 
may cause postponement of net inveslment. 
IS 
(2) K". = f(PC" G._v F) 
Farmers' expectations about the ratio of the cost of capital to product p.rices are based 
on past experiences. The price ratio adopted here is an ·averagE! of two years 
observations. 
2-
PC', = (i.pc,) /2 
i.JI , 
Changes in Government policy shift farmers' desired capital stock. The relevant 
policy is that existing (G,) rather than expected policies. F is a composite variable 
explaining inter-farm differences. Farm size, farmer age and initial farm development 
affect K". 
The rate of adjustment (b.) is determined by farmers' opening real cash balances and 
transitory income. While agricultural finance supply largely determines whether 
farmers can finance desired net investment, this is not explicitly dealt with. 
(3) b. = f(CB._ I , ct.) 
O'Neil (ibid, 58) argues that net cash income is not a satisfactory measure of farm 
liquidity. This income may be spent in a variety of ways. While O'Neil prefers the 
balance of last period's working capital as a measure, the unavailability of such data 
for the interwar period means net farm income will be used. Agricultural commodity 
price fluctuations cause farmers to hold expectations of income variability. If farm 
income fluctuates greatly, farmers' will hold expectations of wide income variability 
(compared to a mean income change, Qm)(see ibid, 59). 
Q" = c.Q - c.Qm when /Q.l> Qm for any fl Q. >0 
= c.Q + 6Qm when / Q., > Qm for any t,Q. < 0 
= 0 otherwise. 
Any change in income beyond the expected levels is considered transitory income. 
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O'Neil (ibid, 58-59) assumes th(it increases or decreases in transitory income finance 
net investment. I adopt this assumption. 
A reduced form equation for net investment can be calculated. I have simplified this 
in equation (4). 
(4) I,. = f(PC'., G._v F, CB.~" Q,,) 
I will use these relationships to compare Belshaw and Murphy below. However, the 
decision to invest is only one of numerous decisions made simultaneously in farm 
management. Non-economic goals may dominate investment decisions. Stanbridge 
(1972) argued that farm investment decisions were affected by long term profit and 
growth expectations, profits over recent time periods, the current stock of capital, 
availability of internal and external funds and farmers' attitudes to risk. Some, but 
not all, of these variables are included in equation (4). Farmers' risk aversion and 
interdependence of consumption and investment decisions are idiosyncratic variables 
in this process (somewhat captured in F). 
How can Belshaw and Murphy's arguments be interpreted in light of equation (4)? 
Belshaw 
Belshaw's research pre-1931 concentrated on agricultural finance support packages. 
In 1928 he advocated Government persuade private sector banks to operate more 
elastic banking policy consistent with trade cycle amplitudes. He recognised that 
banks at this time agreed not to compete through interest rates but to offer varying 
terms on loans (that is, to quantity adjust). However, Belshaw argued that nominal 
interest rate rigidities prevented the New Zealand economy from reaching full 
capacity utilisation (particularly in agriculture). 
(i) Belshaw believed that farm investment was interest elastic. Thus, reducing 
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institutional barriers to price stability (that is, nominal interest rates) affected the user 
cost of capital. Thus, farmers would expect pc, to fall and would be encouraged to 
invest. 
(ii) Belshaw argued that farmers' expectations of increasing future farm 
incomes led to investment decisions that would cause high farm indebtedness during 
cyclical downturns. During periods of high net income farmers would be able to 
realise a desired capital stock quicker (as Q" affected b,). This net investment often 
took the shape of increased land purchases (embodying a speculative motive). 
(iii) Belshaw argued that statutory reductions in interest rates would facilitate 
investment and recovery in 1931. He continued this advocation while member of the 
1932 Economic Committee, and gained success in its implementation as part of a 
domestic deflationary package. In this stance he was implying confidence was not 
an important determinant of the expected user cost of capital (PC,) but had influence 
on investment decisions (In was responsive to G'.I)' For Belshaw the main, if not sole, 
determinant of the user cost of capital was nominal interest rates. 
Murphv 
Murphy's interest in agricultural finance support packages began with an overriding 
concern in the sanctity of individual contracts. He believed that any state interference 
would impair investor confidence in rural securities and adversely affect farmer 
confidence. In addition, overcapitalised land values would be preserved prolonging 
revaluation. 
(i) Farmers' investment decisions incorporated the user cost of capital and 
future income (PC,). Following Marshall, Murphy argued that capital prices were 
determined by supply and demand, and should not be interfered with. Government 
interference in capital markets caused divergencies between bank loan interest rates 
and the 'real' interest rate. Like Belshaw, he does not analyse real interest rate 
rigidities adversely affecting farm investment. Despite capital costs fluctuating (as 
IS 
price changes caused high real interest rates), he argued the responsiveness of I,. to 
PC', was low. 
(ii) Confidence was more important determinant of farm~r net income 
expectations. Voluntary alterations of private contracts would signal to farmers and 
investors that the state would not override private investment decisions. By 
bolstering confidence, Murphy hoped farmers' estimations of the early 1930's income 
falls would alter. Thus, one could argue that he thought farmers should not place 
great emphasis on the divergence between actual and expected income of 1931 and 
1932. Farmers should alter their propensity to invest out of Qt,. 
(iii) Murphy argued that voluntary writing down of capital values by 
contractual parties was the quickest route to economic recovery. This would relieve 
farmers' initial income constraints and encourage investment (as CB"I increases). 
Direct settlement of farmer obligations under non-interference Government policy (G,. 
I) would remove agricultural investment uncertainty intensified by stay orders and 
settlement deference. Thus, Murphy argued that net agricultural investment was 
relatively responsive to stable G"l and changes in CB,.t. 
3. Review and Tentative Compilation of Agricultural Data. 
Belshaw and Murphy recognised agricultural investment was an important 
component of aggregate economic growth. Obtaining the necessary data to evaluate 
their individual arguments is difficult given lack of disaggregated sources. However, 
Hussey and Philpott's (1969) aggregate data calculations provide some relief and 
from this source I have calculated interwar financial ratios similar to Johnston and 
Sandrey (1990,192-198).21 
Farmers' ability to service mortgages worsened dramatically between 1930-1933. 
2l As Johnston and Sandrey (1990, 197) nore, financUd analysts us< these ratios in groups rather than singly. It is not 
possible to calculate t~ range of ratios pr=ted in Johnston and Sandrey's analysis so t~ ratios presented in Table 1 must 
be analysed with ",ulion. 
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Financial leverage ratios (column 4 below) increased from 13.4% (1928/29) to 25.7% 
(1931/32) indicating farmers' income decreases made debt repayments difficult. This 
level of interest expenses was high in comparison with 1920's experience when 
leverage ratios fluctuated between 13.5 - 16.6%. However, initia~ activity ratio 
calculations (column 3 below) show that, excluding 1931-1933, interest expenses did 
not crowd out farm expenditure on other productive inputs (for example, repairs and 
maintenance, labour, fertiliser). 
While the proportion of expenses paid to different inputs did not change greatly, 
nominal farm factor expenses decreased. Interestingly, this resulted in increased 
productivity as farmers attempted to maintain production with lower levels of 
discretionary inputs (Reynolds and SriRamaratnam, 1990, 175)(see graph 2 below). 
Mechanisation also contributed to this productivity increase (Hussey, 1970, 19-20). 
Between 1930/1931 and 1932/1933 farmers' ability to efficiently allocate financial 
resources to productive inputs fell. Interest expenses comprised 24.6% of total factor 
expenses in 1931/1932 and 26.9% in 1932/1933 (compared to approximately 22% in 
the preceding decade). However, by the late 1930's farmers again faced lower 
activity ratios with interest repayments less than 20% of total factor expenses. Both 
Murphy and Belshaw had an intuitive grasp of the above trends in farmers' financial 
positions. In particular, Belshaw argued that increased interest expenses crowded out 
factor expenditure. Both economists were not aware of increased productivity during 
the period. 
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Table 1: Aggregate Agricultural Statistics, 1918-1939. 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year ~ Net cal2ital Activity Financial ~ ~ 
income formation !!lli! leverage interest interest 
(5000) (5000) ratio rates ('Yo) rates ('Yo) 
1918/19 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.21 5.84 
1919/20 N/A N/A N/A N/A ~.20 5.75 
1920/21 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.18 5.89 
1921/22 23 838 15521 2055 15.42 21.79 6.42 
1922/23 32737 16460 22.13 15.08 6.26 6.57 
1923/24 30 637 16152 2226 15.64 2.92 6.38 
1924/25 49156 16154 2245 1355 5.46 6.30 
1925/26 29 800 13 260 2294 16.47 10.31 6.22 
1926/27 27878 13302 22.68 16.67 9.87 6.47 
1927/28 40 079 12642 22.39 14.96 5.05 6.46 
1928/29 52588 12305 21.79 13.44 6.40 6.46 
1929/30 34953 10 704 2201 15.72 2.44 6.35 
1930/31 1346 8488 22.94 2259 18.00 6.25 
1931/32 -3246 8432 24.66 25.71 1231 6.28 
1932/33 4907 3899 26.89 25.15 7.00 5.88 
1933/34 32990 3790 22.39 14.95 2.76 5.56 
1934/35 26800 2574 22.16 15.78 -265 5.06 
1935/36 48959 2102 21.43 1254 2.13 4.73 
1936/37 69324 1018 1858 9.95 -2.66 4.60 
1937/38 50810 258 16.14 10.37 2.48 4.65 
1938/39 46 000 27 15.40 10.35 -1.98 458 
~ 
+ Years end 31 March for columns 2 & 5. Years end 30 June for columns 1,3& 4. Data for columns 1-4 has been 
taken from Hussey and Philpott (1969). 
+ Net farm income (1) and net capital formation (2) are expressed in current prices (Hussey and Philpott, 1969, 
18-27; 62~) 
+ Activity ratio (3) relates to farm efficiency. The higher the proportion of expenses that goes to interest expenses 
the less can be spent on other productive inputs (Johnson and Sandrey, 1990, 194-196). I have calculated this by 
expressing annual interest expenses as a percentage of total farm expenditure. 
+ Financial Leverage ratio (4) relates to farm debt servicing. The ratio of annual interest expenses as a percentage 
of gross farm income reveals the farmers' ability to service debt. 
+ Real interest rates (5) are the user cost of capital the farmer must pay anyone year. Calculating real interest 
rates is problematic, especially in relation to which price dellator to adopt. Following Rankin (1990, 10-1ll I have 
used an official price series of wholesale prices (New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1941, 710). Expressed in 
percentage form this has been subtracted from average nominal interest rates (New Zealand Official Yearbook, 
1940,753). I have used average nominal mortgage rates here (mortgages registered under the land deeds system). 
Hussey and Philpott (1969, 44) note that it is not possible to accurately calculate average interest rates because 
' ... this would involve a knowledge of the average rate of interest on mortgages discharged each year which 
information is not available: They adopt the minimum Trading Bank overdraft rate for each year plus 1/2 per 
cent as the interest rate farmers were Charged by banks and stock and station agents. The main aim of my series 
is to show that domestic price changes drive real interest rate changes. 
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There is little empirical support for Belshaw's claim that net investment was very 
responsive to changes in the perceived user cost of capital. A comparison of real 
interest rates (a component of PC,) and net capital formation in agriculture (graph 
1), shows that net investment continued to decrease despite decreasing (1930/1931 -
1934/1935) and continued low levels (1934/1935 - 1938/1939) of interest rates. 
Similar observations can be made if nominal interest rates are examined. 
Declining net capital formation is also significant in evaluating Belshaw'S argument 
that agricultural investment confidence would improve if statutory relief was 
provided. Farmers had little confidence in future farm profitability and were content 
during the 1930's to maintain (or to run down) farm capital in an attempt to repay 
existing debt.22 Farmers' cash flow problems were acute in 1930-1933 as interest 
expenses increased as high as 25.7% of gross farm income. In contrast, investor 
confidence in agricultural mortgages stabilised after large withdrawals of finance in 
the mid 1920's. While only a tentative measure of available finance, it seems that the 
proportion of mortgage funds allocated to rural lending changed little between 1924 
and 1937 (see graph 3). 
Murphy's arguments are more difficult to evaluate given that counter-factual history 
is involved. It is impossible to assess how farmers would have reacted to 
Government withdrawal of support, leaving only private sector relief schemes. Thus, 
policy conclusions for the 1980's and 1990's are hard to extract ( if at all valid given 
changing institutional structures over time). 
Estimates of net farm income and net capital formation give some support to 
Murphy's claims that initial farm income constraints prevented net investment (graph 
1). A large fall in income 1928/1929 to 1931/1932 accelerated the d.?wnward trend 
of net capital formation (see 1931/1932 to 1933/1934). This experience featured 
strongly in farmer expectations of future costs of capital and directly affected the rate 
Il HIlW~ (1985,137-1381 mtlkzs a similar point. While real farm Ctlpital grew (at a reduced ratel during the Depression, 
estimations are probably exaggerated d"" to ' .. .Ihe somewhat mechanical estimating procedures used'. In particular, the 
quality of farm Ctlpital was not regularly as .. ssed. 
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of adjustment of current to desired capital stocks. 
Why did Murphy and Belshaw disagree? 
It is not possible to present a definitive answer why economists disagreed. Indeed, 
any attempt requires detailed analysis of each economists' economic philosophy 
observable in diverse policy debates and is beyond the scope of this paper. My 
suggestions relate to the analytical framework Murphy and Belshaw used and their 
broad ethical positions on normative economics. 
Murphy's Outlines of Economics (1920) was the first introductory economics textbook 
written by a New Zealand academic. He adopted a Marshallian framework in the 
book and attempted to ' .. .integrate description of New Zealand's economic and social 
structure .. : within a survey of theoretical principles (Perrott et ai., 1987, 1). After 
completing a Master'S thesis under guidance of James Hight at Canterbury, Belshaw 
also had close contact with Marshallian theory. He completed his PhD at Cambridge 
in 1926 and continued teaching in that institution. Later courses taught by Belshaw 
at Auckland University College in the 1930's predominately used Cambridge texts. 
Both economists used Marshallian economic tools to analyse agricultural finance 
provision (for example, definitions of 'real' and nominal (market) interest rates). 
However, while Belshaw readily adopted Cambridge monetary theory policy 
proposals (for example, nominal interest rate manipulation by Government), 
Murphy's conservative disposition led him to reject Government interference in 
market operations.23 
This attitudinal divergence extended to economists' participation in economic 
policymaking. Murphy was ' ... strongly imbued with a concept of economics as a 
non-ideological and therefore politically impartial science' (ibid, 2). He believed that 
economists should participate in policy debate as contributory experts rather than 
ZJ Perrott et al (1987. 2) describe Murphy becoming • ... increasingly antagonistic towards what he saw as the growth of 
socialist institutions in New Ualand .. : after the banking nationalisation debate in the 1930'5. 
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advocates of a pre-annunciated policy solution.24 This attitude derives from a strict 
interpretation of Marshall's ethical beliefs. A recent Marshallian commentator 
described this position succinctly: 
' .. .the economist was not only equipped to deal "with the influences which still 
make for sectional and clilss selfishness", and to act as guide and adjudicator 
on the resulting conflicts between private and public interests; he possessed an 
important key to those influences on character that would determine how far 
in future material wealth could be sacrificed for higher ideals, how far 
individualistic agency could be replaced by collective provision.' (Collini et aI., 
1983,334). 
Murphy participated in few policymaking structures during the 1930's (he was a 
member of the Tariff Commission 1933) seemingly content to provide commentary 
on current economic issues. 
In contrast, Belshaw adopted a broader Marshallian approach to policy participation. 
He was willing to participate as economic expert in mortgage relief policy formation 
and advocated a particular policy solution. During postgraduate research Belshaw 
had synthesised Cambridge monetary theory with American agricultural economics. 
American institutional economists worked within an institutional structure focused 
on a synthesis of theoretical and practical considerations (for example, the 'Wisconsin 
ideal', under which agricultural economists like Henry Taylor developed research 
programmes)(Henderson, 1988). 2S 
It is clear from Belshaw's unpublished writings that he read and adopted much of 
Taylor's agricultural economics (for example, see Belshaw, 1922, 1). In particular he 
concurred with Taylor's belief that agricultural economic analysis needed to 
incorporate ' ... the social point of view ... when recommending changes in our laws and 
institutions which affect the agricultural interests of the community' (Taylor, 1921,6). 
Taylor recommended that economists educate businessmen and politicians regarding 
" Murphy (1935d. 292) was highly criticm of economists being employed to 'sell a policy'. The 1932 Economic 
Committ.., was an example of this. when economists were • ... preselected for tasks of such dubious validity becouse of their 
knawn opinions on the maUa in issue .. :. 
2S It is difficult to state definitively whether Belshaw was influenced by Taylor. This influence is conjectured on the basis 
of Belshaw's familiarity. understanding and use of Taylor's work. While frequency of citations is often used as an index of 
inJ1uence. such an approach is not adopted here. Belshaw's copy of Taylor's 1921 work (Agricultural Economics) has heavy 
annotations in the chapters on rents and profits and value of farm land and equipments. 
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the economic consequences of alternative policy solutions. In particular, economists 
should provide economic background for policymakers to establish social conditions 
that allow regulation of some agricultural activities but did not adversely affect 
agricultural productivity. 
It is probable that Belshaw's willingness to advocate Government involvement in 
mortgage relief also had an indigenous component. Consistent with previous New 
Zealand policymakers, he viewed the state as an agent for the community as a whole. 
Hawke (1982,25) summarises this philosophy well: 
'The State was not to be confined to setting the framework within which 
private enterprise should be undisturbed; it was expected to act where it could 
be useful, to moderate conflict within society as well as protect it from 
outsiders: 
Belshaw's acceptance of American institutionalist economics obviously reinforced this 
indigenous philosophy. In contrast to Murphy, he participated in numerous 
Governmental policymaking structures in the 1930's.26 
4. Conclusions. 
In this paper I have discussed distinctive features of New Zealand debate on 
mortgage relief from 1931 up to Mortgage Corporation establishment in 1935. 
Belshaw supported, and successfully advocated, statutory alterations in mortgage 
contracts and Government interference in mortgage relief. Murphy, anticipating 
policies in vogue in the 1990's, advocated private sector responses to the 1930's rural 
debt problems. 
I have demonstrated, using recent agricultural investment studies, that Murphy and 
Belshaw'S disagreements centred on the determinants of net agricultural investment. 
Belshaw believed that farmers' investment decisions were highly responsive to 
interest rate changes while Murphy argued that investment confidence (altered by 
non-interference policies) was important. Both economists recognised, though to 
" For =mple, 1931 Special Economic Committe/:, 1932 Economic Committee, 1934 Commission of Inquiry into 
Company Promotion Methods and the 1935 Departmental Commitlet: on National Superannuation and Health Insurance. 
25 
different degrees, that liquidity constraints affected investment decisions. 
My tentative compilation of aggregate agricultural data rejects Belshaw's interest rate 
arguments. Indeed, one could find support for Murphy's contention that 
Government interference in mortgage relief would adversely affect agricultural 
investment. While Belshaw'S position seems indefensible, there is some force in 
Murphy's arguments that private se~tor capital value write-offs would aid initial 
income constraints and ultimately investment. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to definitively state why this attitudinal divergence 
occurred. I have shown that in any such assessment of differences economists' 
broader philosophical beliefs must be analysed. Research into this aspect of New 
Zealand economic thought remains incomplete. 
26 
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1. 
APPLICATION OF SUBJECTIVE METHODS FOR THE 
DETERMINATION OF RISKS INVOLVED WITH FOOT AND MOUTH 
DISEASE OUTBREAK* 
R N Forbes 
Policy Services 
MAFPolicy 
Palmerston North 
ABSTRACT 
NZ relies on a two-tier system for protection from an outbreak of Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD). The first involves border control procedures and stringent 
quarantine requirements, and the second is an Emergency Response Programme 
(ERP). As part of an economic evaluation comparing ERP against a hypothetical 
Measured Response Programme (MRP), subjective judgements of the risks 
involved were required. Twenty eight selected professionals, predominately 
veterinarians, from MAF and Massey University were posted a questionnaire that 
used three techniques - single point estimate, three point estimates and elicitation 
methods - to determine the risk components in a FMD outbreak. The two key 
variables were the probability of an outbreak and the spread of FMD from the index 
case to secondary properties. A Delphi Conference of 10 selected participants then 
focused mainly on the two key variables with a second round postal extension for 
the first variable. The final mean probability of an outbreak was about once in 50 
years (0.0195) and the number of FMD infected secondary properties under ERP, 
under MRP with vaccinations and under MRP without vaccinations, had means of 
104, 681 and 4,942. Policy implications for ERP arising from the quantification of 
these two key variables are that more expenditure on preparedness is justifiable and 
current resource planning is barely adequate. 
>tBased on a recently completed study "Foot and Mouth Disease Risk Assessment 
Study: Revised Determination of the Risks involved", R N Forbes, MAF Policy, 
June 1991. 
The writer speCifically acknowledges the assistance of Ram SriRamaratnam, Policy 
Seryices; Herman Liberona, MAF Policy; Robert Sanson, MAF Quali ty 
Management; and Professor Roger Morris, Department of Veterinary Clinical 
Sciences, Massey University. 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the writer and not that of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
2. 
INTRODUCTION 
A recently completed study on Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) was initiated to 
determine the risks involved with an outbreak in NZ. A follow up study is 
intended to carry out a cost benefit analysis of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries' role in the eradication of FMD should an outbreak occur. The focus of 
this paper is on the subjective methods used to quantity two key variables; the 
probability of an outbreak and the subsequent spread of FMD from the first infected 
property (the index case) to secondary properties. 
FMD is an acute, contagious, febrile virus affecting all cloven-hoofed animals. It is 
characterised by ulcerating vesicles or blisters on the mouth, nose, hoof and teats of 
infected animals. There are seven strains and more than 70 subs trains of the virus. 
FMD has never been known to occur in NZ. 
FMD is a potentially disastrous epidemic should it be introduced into New Zealand. 
It can spread very easily and rapidly with cloven-hoofed animals being very 
susceptible to infection. Considering the critical importance of livestock to the New 
Zealand economy, an outbreak of FMD would constitute a national emergency. 
(Note that the Reserve Bank's CPI target of 0-2% by December 1993 allows for 
deviations caused by "a major disease-induced fall in livestock numbers".) Access 
to the USA beef market would immediately be denied and under existing 
legislation, resumption would not start until 12 months after the outbreak was 
over. Dairy product trade might also be effected. 
New Zealand relies on a two-tier system for protection from an outbreak of FMD. 
The first tier is border control procedures and stringent quarantine requirements. 
These are designed to minimise the possibility of foot and mouth disease obtaining 
a foothold in the animal population. As a backup, the second tier consists of an 
Emergency Response Programme (ERP), which is designed to swing into action very 
quickly if a case of FMD is suspected. Contingency plans for dealing with FMD have 
been implemented on several occasions over the years - Temuka in 1981 being the 
most significant event - but in all cases, FMD was finally ruled out. 
The key tasks of the ERP are to identify infected areas, prevent the spread of disease 
and eradicate any remaining infection. To facilitate this, a standardised set of 
responses has been drawn up, encompassing administration of the control 
programme, identification of personnel and organisations involved, emergency 
stores for containing the disease, methods of minimising spread, and approved 
techniques for disposing of infected animals. 
The risk of a FMD outbreak in NZ, is influenced by the risk status in overseas 
countries, mechanisms of transferring the virus to NZ, the efficacy of borde!" 
protection, initial viral contact '.vith susceptible animals (the index case), and the 
subsequent spread to secondary properties. 
In order to make analytical comparisons with the effectiveness of ERP containing 
the spread and eradication of FMD, a hypothetical Measured Response Programme 
(MRP) is postulated. MRP would involve: 
3. 
(a) FMD being treated no differently than other notifiable livestock diseases. 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Non-maintenance of a constant state of preparedness against an outbreak. 
Specifically, this would mean no exotic disease stores, no pre-selection of 
emergency head quarters and disease/disinfectant sites, no training of key 
personnel, and no national manager, regional co-ordinators and consultants. 
Eradication procedures are only undertaken when FMD is positively identified. 
Procedures to be taken are decided by the Chief Veterinary Officer and his 
advisers in the light of current available information. 
Greater potential damage in the advent of an outbreak. 
Substantial reduction in resource allocations during the years in which 
outbreaks do not occur. 
An overview of FMD risk to NZ, based on statistical analysis of passenger arrivals 
and imports from "at risk" countries, an assessment of intercepted animal products 
(MacDiarmid 1988) and a review of border protection specifications for visiting ships 
(MacDiarmid 1989), suggests that the chances of a FMD outbreak to be extremely 
low. However, the consequences are likely to be very great to the economy. This is 
analagous to the issue of nuclear power safety. 
RISK MEASUREMENT 
Risk and uncertainty have separately defined meanings, however in current 
practice, the distinction has become less important. Risk, in a pure sense, refers to . 
variability of outcomes that can be statistically measured. Uncertainty, in a pure 
sense, refers to variability or outcomes that are totally unmeasurable. Most variable 
outcomes possess a combination of both risk and uncertainty elements, and simply 
referred to as risk. 
Gough (1988) references Starr et al (1976) where they define four measures of future 
risk: 
'1. Real risk: 
fully. 
Determined eventually by future circumstances when they develop 
2. Stati~"~~l "".<u risk: Determined by currently available data, typically measured 
actuarily. 
3. Predicted risk: Predicted analytically from system models structured from 
historical data. 
4. Perceived risk: Seen intuitively by individuals.' 
In an ex ante sense, real risk can never be evaluated. Statistical and predicted risks 
are often called objective estimates, but subjective elements may be present due to 
lack of data and assumptions made in the estimation process. Perceived risks are 
referred to as subjective estimates, but there will be elements of objectivity. 
4. 
Risk estimates may be determined statistically, but at greatly increasing costs, in 
order to have a greater objective basis. Subjective risk estimation techniques have 
been developed for understanding decision making theory behaviour by groups and 
individuals making them up. The degree of risk can be explained in terms of the 
variance associated with a range of possible outcomes. 
In subjective risk estimation, the assessments are dependent upon what individuals 
believe. It will vary between individuals at a given point in time and over time for 
the same individuals, as new information comes to light. 
Subjectivity can be often opposed by an entrenched science mindset. An illustration 
of this is expressed in a recent Science and Technology Advisory Committee report 
on 'The Art of Science Management' (Franko 1989) and referenced in the March 
1990 edition of Management. 
scientists often fail to become competent managers because they lack 
interpersonal skills and are reluctant to take risks and to base decision making on 
intuition and judgement rather than hard facts' (underlining emphasis is the 
'writer's). 
Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977) point out that: 
'Some people have been unable to tolerate the sacrifice of "scientific objectivity" 
inherent in the personal approach (of probability). But "objectivity" in science is a 
myth, in life an impossibility, and in decision making an irrelevance. Its loss need 
not be regretted.' (p 18) 
For FMD, subjective risk estimation methods are required. This is because the 
disease has never been known to occur in NZ. Furthermore, it would be 
prohibitively expensive (if not impossible) to try and measure the actual incidence 
of the virus entering NZ, and then tracing it until it dies. Knowledge and 
understanding of the viral epidemiology in other countries does provide some 
objective basis, in order to make subjective assessments of possible epidemiology in 
NZ. There will still be no "right" or "wrong" answer in a pure objective sense. 
However the results obtained would provide a basis for a more rigourously defined 
systems model approach. 
A number of subjective risk determination techniques can be used, some of which 
are as follows: 
1. Single point estimates of the most likely value of the outcome. This is the 
starting point for risk assessment. Essentially, an individual makes an 
assumed certainty judgement of an outcome. By then canvassing other 
individuals a risk perception of the group can be developed. An important 
drawback of this approach is that the confidence (ie probability) attached to this 
estimate, while being the highest of all outcomes, varies considerably between 
individuals and is not elicited. 
5. 
2. Three point estimates of the minimum, maximum and most likely values that 
the outcome might take. This allows focus on underlying assumptions. The 
three point estimates can be developed further by assuming a triangular 
distribution from which an expected mean and standard deviation are derived. 
This is derived for an individual or for a group response. This is the approach 
used by MAF Policy in deriving medium term agricultural product price 
forecasts. 
3. Elicitation methods (Norris and Kramer, 1986) to directly derive probability 
distributions of the values of an outcome. In this case, individuals assess the 
minimum and maximum values and then a probability distribution between 
these two extremes. The probabilities elicited can either be in density or 
cumulative form. The interval method involves the elicitation of the 
probability density function and the fractile method involves the elicitation of 
the cumulative distribution function. A group response can then be derived. 
For all of the above techniques, a single interview is carried out with a number of 
individuals with expertise on the issue being assessed. To improve on the 
outcomes, a delphi conference (Linstone and Turoff 1975) can be initiated whereby 
individuals are given the chance to reassess their estimates on the basis of group 
responses and other new information. Individual confidentiality is maintained. 
Consensus is not necessarily the aim of a delphi. Further rounds of the delphi can 
be undertaken, but generally three are optimal. 
POSTAL SURVEY 
An earlier survey questionnaire was improved and redesigned for postal 
application rather than direct interview. The intention was to save expenditure. 
The questionnaire involved applications of all three techniques discussed above -
single point, three point and elicitation, and covered the following issues: 
Disease sources by country and risk rating (Q1) 
Means of disease entry and future risk expectation (Q2) 
Chances of disease entry and post entry exposure (Q3 and Q4) 
Disease protection measures in NZ (Q5 to Q8) 
Assessment of disease spread (Q9) 
Effects of vaccination (Q10) 
Evaluation of elicitation methods (Qll) 
The design process involved a number of revisions and trial testing. The final 
version was produced on three paper colours; white for responses to be recorded, 
blue for explanation pages and yellow for the annex containing statistical data and 
hypothetical answers illustrating the elicitation methods. A covering letter was sent 
out with it, under the signature of the Chief Veterinary Officer along with a 
stamped addressed envelope for its return. Telephone and fax follow up was 
subsequently made to encourage the completion of questionnaires. 
6. 
The questionnaire was mailed to a list of people compiled by Herman Liberona, 
National Operations Manager (ERr), and Robert Sanson, Veterinary Officer. The 
criteria being an epidemiological understanding of FMD, either in theory or with 
overseas experience or visitation, and a thorough understanding of ERr. The list 
involved veterinarians of MAF in field services, meat, animal health laboratories, 
ERP and policy. A group of Massey University Veterinary Faculty staff and retired 
staff were also included. The National Service Manager (Border Protection) and an 
ex MAF veterinarian with the Department of Commerce completed the list of 28 
people (see Appendix n. 
The response was 23 for the first eight questions, with 15 completing the whole 
questionnaire. Three others made partial attempts at question 9. Questions 9 to 11 
dealt with an elicitation method regarding the spread of FMD, if an outbreak 
occurred in a "garbage" piggery in the former Waipa County in the Waikato. 
Reasons for partial or non completion were lack of knowledge, unwillingness to 
play the game, method too complicated, method too time consuming, and the 
method not fitting the way a respondent would prefer to answer. A number of 
respondents felt that a direct interview would have been a more satisfactory 
approach. Table 1 sets out the responses by coding. 
Table 1: Responses to postal questionnaire 
~. ~ Question 1 to 8 Questions 9 onwards 
Responses 
BP 1 Yes No 
F 6 Yes Yes 
L 4 Yes Yes 
L 1 Yes Partial 
L 2 Yes No 
M 1 Yes Yes 
P 2 Yes Yes 
P 3 Yes Partial 
U 2 Yes Yes 
U 1 Yes Partial 
Non Responses 
F 2 No No 
U 3 No No 
Totals 15 Yes Yes 
5 Yes Partial 
3 Yes No 
--2. No No 
28 
The following codes BP (border protection). F (field), L (laboratory), M (meat). P (policy), and U 
(university) represent the different categories ot respondents used in the survey 
7. 
DELPHI CONFERENCE 
A delphi conference (between 9 am and 4.45 pm on one day) was organised to 
reassess the responses to questions 2, 3, 4 and 9 of the postal questionnaire; that is, 
means of disease entry and future risk expectation, chances of disease entry and post 
entry exposure, and assessment of disease spread. Some changes were also made to 
the questions during the delphi for interpretation purposes. A second round for the 
changes of disease entry and post entry exposure was subsequently carried out by a 
postal survey. 
The ten participants of the delphi are listed in Appendix I. They included two who 
were not part of the postal survey. Supporting documents were given to each 
participant. The programme of the conference involved a presentation of historical 
perspectives on overseas FMD outbreaks, a discussion of the report from the postal 
survey, an introduction to the delphi process, and the delphi process itself. 
The delphi process involved: 
1. Question introduced and time allowed for participants to read over group and 
their own responses from the previous survey and any new information 
given. 
2. Freedom given for participants to discuss the underlying issues and possible 
assumptions required in order to make subjective responses to the question. 
3. Participants record their responses on the survey form. 
4. Copies of individual responses gathered in for tabulation and calculation of 
group mean response. Occasionally, a participant might ask to change their 
response. 
5. Summary of responses given to participants, while still preserving anonymity. 
The remainder of this paper focusses on two key variables, the probability of an 
outbreak and the spread of FMD to secondary properties. 
CHANCES OF DISEASE ENTRY AND POST ENTRY EXPOSURE 
Postal Survey Results 
Respondents were asked two questions. The first was to estimate the number of 
separate occurrences that they thought FMD virus passes through NZ's quarantine 
barriers in a typical one year period. To assist, some relevant background 
information on imports and passenger arrivals was attached to the questionnaire. 
The respondents were asked to express their answer in terms of minimum, most 
likely and maximum occurrences. From these three values an expected mean can 
be derived assuming a triangular distribution: 
8 • 
. 'The second question was to estimate the probability of FMD virus reaching 
susceptible animals for each occasion the virus passes the quarantine barrier. Again, 
the respondents expressed their answer in terms of minimum, most likely and 
maximum probabilities. 
Table 2 sets out the results in terms of minimum, maximum, mean, SD and CV for 
the respondents as a group. The processing steps are as follows: 
(a) Derive the expected mean from individual minimum, most likely and 
maximum estimates. 
(b) Derive the group mean, SD and CV from the individual minimum, most 
likely, maximum responses and derived expected mean responses. 
The variability of responses between individuals is very large, and with respect to 
the probability of FMD virus reaching susceptible animals post entry to NZ, 
extremely large. This is illustrated by the lowest individual minimum and highest 
individual maximum perceived values and the standard deviations for the group 
responses. 
The variability increases from minimum to maximum for the estimates of FMD 
virus entries into NZ - as shown by the increase in CV from 1.0 to 2.3. The 
variability of the probability data is almost constant between the minimum and 
maximum - as shown by the CV at 2.2 and 2.1, respectively. 
Table 2: Estimates at the number at separate occurrences at FMD virus passing NZ quarantine barriers 
and the probabilities at reaching susceptible livestock 
Lowest Highest 
Individual Individual 
RllSQQOSll RllSQQnSll ~ so. QjL (rounded) (rounded) (rounded)"* 
Occurrences 
Minimum 0 10 4 4 1.0 
Most likely 1 75 22 32 1.5 
Maximum 2 1500 164 375 2.3 
Expected mean' 528 67 137 2.0 
Probabilities 
Minimum 0 0.0005 0.0016 0.0035 2.2 
Most likely 0.000001 0.01 0.0437 0.1130 '2.6 
Maximum 0.00001 0.05 0.1252 0.2636 2.1 
Expected mean" 0.000004 0.02 0.0568 0.1267 2.3 
Assumes a triangular distribution where the expected mean; (minimum + most likely + maximum)/3 • 
Derived values rounded as indicated 
Source: Risk assessment survey 
9. 
The risk of a FMO outbreak is derived by multiplying the number of separate 
occurrences of the virus passing quarantine barriers by the probability of reaching 
susceptible livestock. The results gave an unlikely range of subjective risk estimates 
from zero to greater than one. 
By taking the two factors making up the outbreak risk a matrix of 180 individual 
responses can be derived, ie: 
20 individuals" 3 levels of occurrences * 3 levels of probabilities. 
The frequency distribution derived is as follows: 
Probability range Frequency 
0 62 
>0 ~ 0.0004 10 
> 0.0004 ~ 0.001 6 
> 0.001 ~ 0.01 11 
> 0.01 < 0.1 34 
> 0.1 47 
Total 180 
By excluding probabilities of zero and in excess of 0.1, two possible acceptance 
bounds are defined. The means, SO and CV are then derived and set out below. 
Bounds of probability risk 
> 0 ~ 0.1 
2: 0.0005 ::; 0.1 
Delphi Conference Results 
Mean 
0.0369 
0.0441 
SO 
0.0383 
0.0379 
CV 
1.0 
0.9 
Table 3 sets out the lowest and highest individual response for occurrences of virus 
entry and probabilities of reaching susceptible livestock, along with the group 
responses in terms of the mean, SO and CV. In comparison with the postal survey 
results, the group mean responses for virus entry occurrences increased at the most 
likely and maximum levels, and markedly reduced for the probabilities data for 
reaching susceptible livestock. 
The matrix of 90 individual responses for FMO outbreak risk gave the following 
frequency distribution - a positively skewed function, if the zero responses are 
ignored. 
Probability range Distribution 
0 21 
>0 ::; 0.0004 6 
> 0.0004 ~ 0.001 12 
> 0.001 ~ 0.005 15 
> 0.005 ~ 0.02 19 
> 0.02 ~ 0.05 9 
>0.05 ::; 0.1 7 
0.5 1 
Total 90 
10. 
Table 4 sets out the minimum, most likely and maximum risk of FMO outbreak for 
the lowest and highest individual responses and the group statistics, and the group 
statistics for the same two probability bounds adopted above. A comparison with 
the latter shows the mean to have reduced by about half. 
Table 3: Estimates of the number of separate occurrences of FMD virus passing NZ quarantine barriers 
and the probabilities of reaching susceptible livestock (Delphi results) 
Lowest 
Individual 
ReSQQnse" 
Occurrences 
Minimum 0 
Most likely 2 
Maximum 10 
Probabilities 
Minimum 0 
Most likely 0 
Maximum 0.0001 
Different respondents to each question 
Derived values rounded as indicated 
Source: Delphi conference 
Highest 
Individual 
ReSQQnse" 
30 
600 
3000 
0.001 
0.005 
0.01 
.Mean llil Q1 
(rounded) (rounded) (rounded)"' 
6 9 1.5 
82 184 2.2 
388 930 2.4 
0.0002 0.0004 2.0 
0.0008 0.0016 2.0 
0.0020 0.0031 1.6 
Table 4: Probabilities of FMD virus entry into NZ and infection of susceptible livestock (Delphi results) 
Delphi Responses 
Minimum 
Most likely 
Maximum 
Lowest 
Individual 
ReSQQnse 
o 
o 
0.001 
Expanded Response Matrix 
Bounds of probability risk 
> 0::; 0.1 
~ 0.0005 ::; 0.1 
Source: Delphi conference 
Highest 
Individual 
ResDonse 
0 
0.01 
0.5 
.Mean 
0.0003 
0.0075 
0.1019 
0.0183 
0.0201 
llil 
0.0004 
0.0069 
0.1450 
0.0267 
0.0273 
Q1 
1.4 
0.9 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
11. 
A second round delphi was subsequently carried out by postal survey of the 10 
participants following advice (R Sanson and R Morris, pers comm) that risk bounds 
should be set at 0.0005 (five chances in 10,000 years) and 0.1 (one chance in 10 years), 
for the minimum and maximum levels, respectively. In particular, a zero 
minimum risk was ruled out. Participants were given the opportunity to comment 
on these bounds in the questionnaire. Only one participant expressed constraint - at 
the maximum level. Five responses at the minimum level were below 0.0005 (0, 0, 
0.00001, 0.0001 and 0.0003). After further contact with the participants concerned, 
these were all amended to conform with the minimum bound. Calculating the 
average risk with the initial minimum responses, reduced the mean by 0.00003. 
Changes in the maximum responses have very much greater impact on the mean, 
risk and its standard deviation. Changing one 0.1 response to 0.5 increases the mean 
by 0.00445 and doubles the standard deviation. 
Table 5 sets out the lowest and highest individual responses, along with group 
responses, for occurrences of virus entry, probabilities of reaching susceptible 
livestock, and risks of FMD outbreak. 
Table 5: Second round delphi results for entry of virus, probability of reaching susceptible livestock and 
risk of FMD outbreak. 
Lowest Highest 
Individual Individual 
Resoonse ReSDQJ)se 
.M.e.an .s..R ~ 
Occurrences 
Minimum 1 5 4 3.7 0.9 
Most likely 2 60 26 31.5 1.2 
Maximum 5 300 75 99.4 1.3 
Probabilities 
Minimum 0.00005 0.001 0.0005 0.0004 0.9 
Most likely 0.0002 0.005 0.0013 0.0015 1.2 
Maximum 0.0005 0.008 0.0041 0.0040 1.0 
Risks of Outbreak 
Minimum 0.0005 0.001 0.0008 0.0003 0.4 
Most likely 0.012 0.015 0.0113 0.0072 0.6 
Maximum 0.09 0.1 0.0779 0.0315 0.4 
Expanded Response Matrix 
~ 0.0005 $ 0.1 0.0195 0.0268 1.4 
In comparison with the delphi conference results, the occurrences of virus entry 
have been revised downwards in terms of the group responses. The group mean at 
the maximum and most likely levels reduced from 388 to 75, and 82 to 26, 
respectively. The variability also reduced, as can be gauged by the change in CV at 
the most likely level from 2.2 to 1.2. 
The probabilities of virus reaching susceptible livestock were revised upwards, but 
only by a minor amount at all three levels. The most likely level changed from 
0.0008 to 0.0013. The variability also reduced, for example, at the most likely level, 
the CV reduced from 2.0 to 1.2. 
12. 
The risk of FMD outbreak, within the bounds of 0.0005 and 0.1 for individual 
responses, was calculated at 0.0195, a downward revision from the delphi conference 
result of 0.0201. The variability is correspondingly reduced. 
The matrix of 90 individual responses for FMD outbreak risk gave the following 
positively skewed frequency distribution. Graph 1 sets out the distribution using 
average values within the probability ranges on a log scale between the minimum 
and maximum. 
Probability range Distribution 
0.0005 5 
> 0.0005 ~ 0.001 9 
> 0.001 ~ 0.0025 12 
> 0.0025 ~ 0.008 22 
> 0.008 :5 0.015 12 
> 0.015 :5 0.025 9 
> 0.025 :5 0.04 8 
> 0.04 ~ 0.09 8 
0.1 5 
Total 90 
ASSESSMENT OF DISEASE SPREAD 
Postal Survey Results 
In this section of the questionnaire an index case of a FMD outbreak was described 
under two scenarios; the first under ERP and the second under MRP. The index 
case was a "garbage" piggery in the former Waipa County. They were then asked to 
estimate the minimum and maximum numbers of enterprises by type and region 
on secondary properties expected to be infected. Two methods were used to elicit 
the probability distribution between the minimum and maximum secondary 
enterprises infected by FMD. The first method - interval approach - is based on the 
probability density function, and the second method - fractile approach - is based on 
the cumulative distribution function. 
The initial step for both methods is to elicit the minimum and maximum numbers 
of secondary properties that each individual believes would be infected in an FMD 
outbreak. The interval approach divides the range between the minimum and 
maximum into ten equal intervals, each of which are then allocated a weight such 
that the sum of the weights equals 50. The fractile approach elicits the lower 
quartile, median and upper quartile points between the minimum and maximum 
number of secondary properties infected. 
Under ERP, the number of secondary properties averaged 11 and 238 for the 
minimum and maximum respectively. Under MRP, the number of secondary 
properties averaged 122 and 765. However, one extreme response was excluded 
from this latter compilation. The respondent expressed the belief that all livestock 
properties would be infected at the maximum. Inclusion of this response in the 
group response under MRP, gave a minimum of 189 and a maximum of 8,620. 
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14. 
Table 6 sets out the combined results attained under the interval and fractile 
approaches. These are the derived means SD and CV for individual estimates of the 
spread of FMD under ERP, MRP and three group results. The first includes all 
respondents, the second excludes respondent code six who posits an extreme view 
and the third derives from a log transformation of all respondents. 
In the first case, the group mean of the spread of FMD onto secondary properties is 
80 and 4595 (ratio - 57.4) under ERP and MRP, respectively. In the second case, the 
means are 62 and 401 (ratio - 6.5). A log transformation technique using all 15 
respondents, derives geometric means of 36 and 237 (ratio - 6.6). The latter 
technique is considered appropriate here because of the positive skew of the 
distribution and to handle the one extreme response. Theoretically, highly positive 
skews could be expected (R Sanson, pers comm). 
The individual CV under ERP range from 0.2 to 1.5 with a mean for the group at 0.6. 
Only two respondents had values greater than or equal to one. For the situation 
under MRP, the values range from 0.1 to 1.0 with a mean for the group at 0.5. This 
is a slight decline in variability from the previous situation. 
In the evaluation of both approaches, the respondents were asked to score on a 1 
(unfavourable) to 10 (favourable) scale with respect to four questions. The means of 
the group responses are as follows: 
Ease of understanding? 
Ease of responding to? 
Least time taken? 
Confidence in your assessment? 
Interval 
5.1 
4.9 
4.2 
4.3 
Fractile 
5.7 
5.1 
5.5 
4.3 
The group means for the final three questions are higher for the fractile approach 
than the interval, but the same for the last question. Means are within the second 
quartile of the scoring scale, with the exception of that for the ease of understanding 
for the fractile approach. 
Delphi Conference Results 
In the postal survey two elicitation approaches were used, the results of which were 
then combined. For the delphi conference, the fractile approach was adopted for 
two reasons. Firstly, because it was scored more favourably by the respondents to 
the postal survey. The second and more important reason was that the approach 
would be better suited for individuals to estimate a positively skewed distribution. 
Arising out of the discussion in· relation to the spread of disease, the respondents 
decided to do separate elicitations of MRP, both with and without vaccination. 
en 
a 
c: 
d 
'" 
JJ 
in' 
A 
III 
CJ) 
CJ) 
m 
CJ) 
CJ) 
3 
m 
2-
~ 
<1 
m 
':" 
s:s:s: i CDCDQ ... III III III 0 :J:J::l C 
~.~ 
=\!l = JJ 
§.& :;; 
:::la. c: 
<om -08 (jj 
~~ 
OJ • 
:::l0l 
5-= 
3 
a 
ci" 
:::l 
(,)OlOJ 
OlNO 
N (,) U1 
<D<D~ 
000 
CoenCn 
U1 
0l0l--J 
mo..:t. 
.... 
l\J'::"o, 
(')0<0 
,,~ U1 
~<o 
" U1 <0 OOJ~ 
000 
C:.l~in 
i 
-. ..... -. ...... ....,. ..... c.oOJ-....,JCJ)01.,J::t..(.)I'\)-
U'1~(.,JI\) ..... O 
cc,$:-o-o","TI"TI"TI"TI"TI"TI 
OONNOONNOONNNNO 
(,) U1 ~ 
m01....a. .......... l\).,J::t.. ....... -Nm-"'I'\) ...... J\l 
.;:..W(..).....,.....,N ....... 01 ..... oc.o.::..m ...... c.o 
N 
NN01 ........... -.-....,J 011\) (» 
ON 00 OJ co O-l.O>NO)WC,OCU....., 
0000000 ..... 000000-
t.J~inmincoNomCn~m~t..lin 
U1 
a 
-"N(O <.ow Co(£) ..... ,:::. 
Of\)mm ....... (.rJ~mN ...... CO.,b...Q)Q)01 
00 w ...... .....,(.,.) 0> N-...,J"'"-JW I\)(Q (.)(.) ....... 
'" 
OJN CoN A 
NOJ(.)N(jJ(,JO ............ ....I.(£)-....L.l:;o.Ol 
mOOlNOl ...... Ol-NCOO1lDOlc.o....., 
00000000000000-' 
N~:"""t.>W<O~O>c.n~t.>~wwo 
~ ~ 
~ 
III 
m n 
JJ I I~ g. 
I 
I 
I~ 
I~ 
I~ 
I~ I~ 
P< 
r} 
0-
R> 
~ 
() 
a 
3 g 
:::l 
'" a. 
~ 
m 
CJ) 
S 
0; 
a 
3 
:T 
'" s· 
ro 
<1 
~ 
III 
:::l 
a. [ 
CD 
0> 
", 
", 
a 
III 
n 
:::r 
m 
C/l 
15. 
16. 
Table 7 sets out the minimum and maximum numbers of secondary properties 
estimated to be affected by a FMD outbreak under ERP and MRP. The differences 
between vaccination and non vaccination under MRP is striking. In the latter 
circumstances, four of the 10 respondents considered that FMD would become 
endemic as a maximum spread. Sixty-thousand secondary properties was taken to 
represent endemicity of FMD. At the other extreme, one respondent posited a 
change from 200 to 500 secondary properties. 
Table 7: Individual responses for minimum and maximum FRO spread on secondary properties under 
ERP and MRP both with and without vaccination (Delphi results) 
O:cup 
F 
F 
F 
L 
P 
P 
P 
U 
U 
U 
Mean 
SO 
CV 
F Field 
Exper 
o 
z 
z 
z 
o 
z 
o 
o 
o 
o 
L Laboratory 
P Policy 
U University 
Min 
o 
2 
1 
o 
o 
5 
5 
o 
4 
5 
2 
2 
1.0 
ERP 
Max 
800 
300 
600 
750 
120 
96 
150 
250 
1500 
200 
477 
445 
0.9 
MRP-vacc 
Min 
5 
10 
5 
10 
o 
30 
80 
20 
15 
100 
28 
34 
0.7 
Max 
1200 
5000 
4000 
6000 
200 
5000 
1200 
1000 
2000 
1000 
2660 
2113 
0.8 
o Overseas experience with FMO and knowledge of ERP 
Z Academic experience and knowledge of ERP 
Min 
5 
10 
5 
10 
o 
30 
80 
20 
15 
200 
38 
62 
1.6 
A figure of 60,000 secondary properties was taken to represent FMO becoming endemic. 
Source: Delphi conference. 
MRP 
Max 
6000 
60000 
60000 
60000 
500 
60000 
5000 
5000 
6000 
15000 
27750 
27981 
1.0 
Table 8 sets out the derived means, SD and CV for individual estimates of the 
spread of FMD under ERP, MRP with vaccination and MRP without vaccination, 
elicited by the fractile approach. Two group results are also derived; the first uses all 
the data as elicited and the second is derived from a log transformation of the 
elicited data. 
In the first case, the group means of the spread of FMD onto 'secondary properties 
are 104, 681 and 4942, under ERP, MRP with vaccination and MRP without 
vaccination, respectively. The relevant comparison with results from the postal 
survey is means of 82 and 4120 for ERP and MRP without vaccination, respectively. 
Thus the delphi process has increased the mean number of secondary properties. 
17. 
18. 
w ;;: ;;: i c c C -0 -0 -0 r " " " ::; I o>-l 0 '" '" Q. =>0> C 0> 0> <" Q.CT " ::l ::l $:co !'! . . c: :Do> 0 !lb c -0 •• Furthermore, the variability is greater with the CV increasing from 0.6 to 1.1 and 0.5 0 10 ~ ::;;" <t> iii §~ to 1.4, respectively. The impact of vaccination under MRP is significant --0 :D :!. ::l <t> OJ ::". particularly as in four of the responses, vaccination is perceived to prevent FMD n 15- (J) am 
0 3 c ::;;> becoming endemic at the maximum point of the probability distribution. Graphs 2, :J iii I _."0 co <t> -"0 3 and 4 set out the delphi responses in terms of the cumulative distribution Q. ::r~ C;; 00 :J 0 0 0 0 N 0 N N N 0 s.~ function (CDF) under ERP, MRP with vaccination and MRP without vaccination, 0 CD <::r respectively. 0>' 0 Q.O 
:JCD 
CJ ::::!. In the second case, the data is log transformed to derive the geometric mean and SD =-< Om 
:JQ. of the matrix of individual distributions. The geometric means are 40, 294 and 826 (33 
mm under ERP, MRP with vaccination and MRP without vaccination, respectively. 
-0> 
w ~ I I I !-~ This compares with the postal survey results of 36 and 223 for ERP and MRP .... 0 0> N 0> 0> W .... 0 ...... w m'" without vaccination, respectively . 0 .... w .... co .... .... 0 .... W 0> N ",-cO> ~g. While log transformation had some relevance in the analysis of the postal survey 0. 
Q. responses, (one out of 15 posited - FMD to become endemic as a maximum under 
.... I~ I m ...... Ol 0 ...... .... N N 0> .... ...... ...... Igj < MRP), this is not considered appropriate for the analysis of the delphi responses 0> CD .... W N Ol co 0> .... Ol CD §." 
o· where four out of 10 posited such an eventuality. 
:J 
'" 0> ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ::J Q. 
0 0 0 0 0 ~ f< (") <0 :... <0 N co 
'" 
~ ~ in ~ <:, ~ 0 ~ The risks of an FMD outbreak can be put into perspective in terms of annual dollar o· 
co· equivalents. Suppose the difference in total costs to NZ, between an outbreak under 
:J 
en MRP and ERP is taken as $1 billion. Then by multiplying the latter by the risks of 
2- outbreaks (in Table 5), a range of annual outcomes is as follows: 
< 
0> 
~ ~ ~ I I I ~ I\) 0> .... Ol W Ol .... ~ W 0> ~ N Minimum $0.8 million CD co 01 0> 0 W ~ N Ol ...... ...... o· .... ~ 0 .... Ol 0 .... Ol 0> co 0> W ::J Most likely $11.3 million Q Maximum $77.9 million 
;;: 
I 
5' Mean $19.5 million Q. 
~ l~ <' 0> w Ol N W .... W CD N I\) Igj c: ...... ...... 0 co CD w .... .... I\) Ol co c co 0> .... N N W W 01 N !!!. ERP comes under the Exotic Disease and Pest Response (EDPR) programme of MAF 
0> Policy. In 1990/91, the cost of training, design and maintenance of preparedness was :J 
Q. 
eo about $2.5 million. The additional salary costs, etc, of maintaining a "standing 
0 !=' !=' 0 f< a army" within MAF Quality Management to call upon in the event of an exotic <:, <:, <:, ~ <:, ~ :... <:, c: 0> <:, ...... 0> "0 
m disease outbreak, brought the total budget to $8.5 million. This covers animals, 
~ plants and bees. (The 1991/92 budget is provisionally about $11 million.) 3· 
D> 
co 
It is difficult to allocate the annual cost share strictly to FMD. A possible assessment '" 0 
- is as follows (H Liberona, pers comm): 
.... w (Xl CD W CD I I I :;: (Xl CD W W 0> CD Ol 0 m N .;:.. Ol (Xl 0 0 W 0> 0> I\) 01 I\) '" 0> N 0 CD 01 Ol .;:.. (Xl .... m ~ m "0 (a) For plants and bees, 25% of total budget or $2.125 million. C;; 
D> 
Q. 
I~ I 
2- (b) The state of preparedness for FNID applies equally well for other exotic diseases 
0> w W W 0> W 
." W 0> CD 01 01 01 m 01 0 01 W Igj (Schedule A of the Animals Act 1967) such as Vesicular Exanthoma, Vesicular Ol ...... 0> I\) .... (Xl ...... w 0 $: 
01 co 01 I\) ...... ...... .... I\) CD .... I\) .... 0 Stoma titus and Swine Vesicular Disease. 
c: 
:J 
a. 
~ (c) The state of preparedness also provides MAF with a basic ability to handle 
!=' 0 I~ m outbreaks of Swine Fever, Newcastle Disease and Avian Influenza. ~ N c.., N <:, in ~ ~ N in c.., :D .... 
-0 
19. 
(d) Given (b) and (c) above, FMD could account for 60% to 70% of the balance of 
EDPR budget. Taking a midpoint, this equates to $4.14 million on an on-going 
basis in real terms. 
A comparison with the mean outcome of FMD risk in annual dollar equivalents, 
suggests a breakeven difference of outbreak loss (MRP minus ERP) derived as 
follows: 
$4.14 m/$19.5 m ,. $1 billion $212 m 
While a full cost benefit analysis is required to evaluate the ERP versus MRP 
policies, it is suggested at this stage, that favourable economic results could be 
expected. 
Current ERP contingency planning is for an expected outbreak on 30 secondary 
properties. Comparing this with the delphi results of a median of 32, a geometric 
mean of 40 and an arithmetic mean of 104, indicates that resource planning for an 
FMD outbreak in NZ is barely adequate. 
20. 
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Graph 4: CDF of Responses 
Delphi: Under MRP - no vaccination 
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Field Services, Massey University F 
Field Services, Invercargill F 
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Animal Health Laboratory, Lincoln L 
Animal Health Laboratory, Ruakura L 
Animal Health Laboratory, P.almerston North L 
Animal Heatth Laboratory, Wallaceville L 
National Business Manager (Labs), Palmers ton North L 
Meat Processing, Nelson M 
EDPR Consultant, Wellington P 
Chief Veterinary Officer P 
National Advisor (Animal Health) P 
Consultant, Wellington P 
Dept of Commerce, Wellington P 
Massey University (retired) U 
Massey University U 
Massey University (retired) U 
Massey University U 
Massey University U 
Massey University U 
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Veterinary Practitioner. 
Field Services, Massey University 
National Adviser (Epidemiology), Ruakura 
Animal Health Laboratory, Invermay 
EDPR Consultant, Wellington 
National Operations Manager (ERP), Wallace ville 
Acting Chief Veterinary Officer 
Massey University 
Massey University 
Massey University 
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FARM AND HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL STRESS: 
Gerald A.G.Frengley, and Warren E.Johnston.1 
ABSTRACf: 
Deregulation of the agricultural sector in 1984, lead to a rapid collapse in farm 
incomes and land prices. Farmers had been encouraged to expand output in the previous two 
:. decades and many had borrowed to do so. Subsequently, the fall in farm incomes and capital, 
coupled with the debt, created imponant increases in financial stress affecting farm operations 
and household living standards. With the erosion of equity and living standards, induced by 
the cost of debt, many farm families became financially distressed. This paper examines the 
way in which financial streSS is measured and reviews a consumption stress ratio which may 
bener reflect the financial stress experienced by farm families. 
l.INTRODUCTION: 
It is a moot point whether the measures of farm financial stress reported in the 
literature have been developed as an attempt to reflect the effects of financial change on the 
farm business or the farm family. Following the severe fall in farm incomes in the USA in 
the early 1980s farm businesses became short of funds. While farm output and business 
operations were affected in a variety of ways. popular press reportS frequently referred to the 
sensational behaviour of severely distressed farmers. Measures of financial stress became of 
interest to economists. Within two years farm businesses in New Zealand were to be 
similarly affected. With deregulation. farm incomes fell and insolvencies increased. Farmers 
saw their expectations nullifled and families became distressed. 
Conventionally, accounting financial ratios have been used as indices or measures of 
stress (Penson) to examine the effect of financial constraints on the farm business. Exceptions 
to these measures of stress and which purport to directly reflect the effect on the farm family 
have been restricted to changes in annual net profits or household drawings. While financial 
streSS affecting farm families undoubtedly follows a change in the financial performance of 
the farm business, there is no evidence to suggest that any resultant changes in stress affecting 
both the farm business and the farmer are linearly related. It is for this reason that it has 
been suggested that several accounting measures should be used simultaneously to illustrate 
the extent to which farm business operations, and therefore farm families, have been affected 
by reduced profits and stress (Adelaja and Rose, Miller and LaDue. Mortenson et al.). This 
presupposes that in combination these measures better represent the financial imposition and 
the distress of the farmer and his family than any single measures (Melichar). 
Despite misgivings about the suitability of the accounting ratios used as measures of 
change in business performance to reflect farmer' distress, they are useful to examine the 
nature of the financial changes which in turn affect farm households. 
I Gerald Frengley is a Reader in Farm Management at Lincoln University. Warren 
Johnston is a Professor of Agricultural Economics at U.C.Davis. The authors grarefully 
acknowledge the assistance of the New Zealand Meat and Wool Board's Economic Service 
and John Lay who managed to defeat the intricacies of the laser printer and turned alphabetic 
spaghetti intO legible text. Also Elizabeth Burn who managed to make the thing make the 
tables and draw lines in appropriate spaces. 
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1. Financial Ratios; Measuring Change in Financial Performance: 
Financial ratios used to analyse the changing fortunes of farm businesses are usually 
identified in three sub-groups in the financial-management literature (for examples see Schall 
and Halley; Madura and Veit). They include activity or efficiency ratios, indicating the finn's 
efficiency in using its assets; profitability ratios which describe the firm's net returns on sales 
and assets; and financial-leverage ratios which reflect the firm's ability to meet long-term and 
shon-term obligations. 
An analysis of the changes in fmancial performance of New Zealand sheep and beef 
farms through the 1970s and 1980s is shown in Table 1. Some of the ratios outlined are 
routinely calculated by the New Zealand Meat and Wool Board's Economic Service. Others 
follow Johnston and Frengley (1990). 
Table 1 here. 
Ideally the capial turnover ratio (in colurtm l)should be high as high ratios reflect the 
efficient use of farm capital in producing gross farm income. However, high land values in 
the late .1970s and early 1980s forced down the ratio to low points in 1980-82. Farm buyers 
at that time were clearly exposed to the risk of a price fall. With the fall in land values, the 
ratios doubled by the late 1980s. Interest as a percentage of total farm expenditure peaked 
in the late 1980s. High ratios are undesirable as high interest costs crowd out other variable 
expenditure. From 1984, deregulation ensured the rise in both ratios, with land buyers' 
finances stressed by both the write-off of investment in land and the proponionate rise in total 
interest costs. 
Profitability measures are shown in the next three columns. The NZMWBES'rate of 
return on capital (calculated using the economic farm surplus) is influenced by both changes 
in income and land values as in the former ratios. Its relation to changes in stress is therefore 
indeterminate as is the case with the next measure, the rate of return on assets. High rates 
of return may simply reflect a write-off of capital which would undoubtedly stress many 
farmers. Rate of return on equity, the next measure, may rise with increased debt, providing 
the return on the borrowed funds exceeds their interest cost. High rates may therefore reflect 
a sigrtificant exposure to the risk of an income fall if financial leverage has been employed. 
Farmers may be worried by this prospect. Financial leverage effects are reflected in the fmal 
five ratios. Net wonh as a percentage of total farm assets falls when losses are incurred. Both 
increases in debt and the decapitalisation of assets have contributed to the fall in the ratio and 
the rise in stress since deregulation. Some recovery is evident in the late 1980s, reflecting 
recent rises in land values. 
Long term debt to equity ratios reflect the extent to which equity can be used to offset 
losses. Low ratios infer an effective equity cushion against fmancial stress .. as was the case 
in the early 1980s when propeny values rose more rapidly than farm debt. Coupled with the 
fmancial leverage index the long term debt to equity ratio becomes more meaningful. 
Desirably, the financial leverage index should exceed one, confirming that borrowed funds 
have been used efficiently, as the return on equity is greater than the return on total assets. 
If the return falls below one, the return on funds borrowed is less than its interest co~t and 
the investment has been inefficient. Both ratios suggest farm capital was used efficiently 
until 1976-77, gave conflicting signals and danger signs as the financial leverage index fell 
through 1978-84, and now reflect the effects of the write off of farmer equity and the 
continued effects of inefficient borrowing. Together, the ratios may correctly ret1ect changes 
in the direction of stress affecting farm families. 
3 
Both ratios, times interest earned and interest as a percent of gross farm income, 
reflect the likelihood of liquidity problems if product prices fall. 1979-80 is a watershed for 
both ratios as the former ratio fell and the laner rose as inadequate product prices and rising 
interest rates acted in concen to increase farm business stress. 
2. Financial Ratios; Inadequacies as Measures of Household Stress 
While each of the accounting financial ratios clearly identify some facets of fmancial 
stress affecting farm businesses and implicitly farm families, both net profits and personal 
drawings may more closely reflect their stress. However changes in their values are also 
inadequate measures of changes in stress even if expressed in real terms as they do not 
account for the changes in marginal utility which accompanies them. 
Apan from the inability of the accounting ratios (and income and drawings) to 
establish marginal utility changes, another impottant factor restricts their suitability. Stress 
induced by adverse fmancial events must account for the individual's perception and 
expectations about future events. A low present income with poor future prospects must 
undoubtedly be more stressful than if future prospects are bright. Before we can claim that 
a financial stress measure can reasonably express the change in marginal utility affecting 
individuals, it must be shown to account for the individual's expectations of future events. 
It is this characteristic which distinguishes the purely fmancial measures from those which 
involve utility. While financial ratios adequately represent the effects of fmancial changes 
on the farm business they may easily misrepresent the effect on the farm family. 
3. Constrained Household Consumption and Stress. 
Financial decisions of individuals are limited. We may save, consume or invest. 
Ultimately any deferred consumption effected by saving or investment must confer a net 
utility gain to a farmer or it is wasted. Farmers may also borrow to achieve the same ends, 
but incur an interest charge which continuously depresses their disposable income in doing 
so. Effectively, consumption will be depressed in the future. 
Through the 1970s and early 1980s farmers borrowed with the perception that their 
eventual gain in disposable income would be advantageous. From their perspective, how 
. successful or otherwise has the investment been? Has their consumption opponunity altered? 
Has their utility changed? Ideally stress measures must consistently reflect the magnitude of 
.the change in stress (or comfon) after prolonged time intervals to enable the before and after 
effects of investment to be assessed. 
If there is a consistent and all pervasive bench-mark (affecting the judgements of all 
individuals equally) and against which we always balance ourselves financially in our final 
marginal utility adjustments, a useful measure of consumption stress can be derived. In a 
homogeneous financial environment that bench-mark is the interest rate. Through its linkage 
to consumption time preference, it also allows us to account for individual perceptions of 
future events. 
Interest payments and the interest rate may be used to evolve an appropriate measure 
of marginal utility change resulting from changing financial events. First we must presume 
that we are least stressed when utility is maximised, if that is indeed possible. At all other 
times we are stressed and increasingly so as our current marginal utility rises. The 
consumption stress measure must account II r these characteristics and build in our utility 
modifying market behaviours of saving, inve,i:nent and consumption. To do so requires the 
measure to match the utility of expected future consumption expectations against the utility 
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of current consumption. As drawings and interest payments respectively. account for these 
characteristics they may be used in a ratio to express current financial stress. . 
The rationale is that if the marginal utility of present consumption exceeds the interest 
rate, farmers will use their financial reserves for consumption by borrowing or disinvesting, 
until their marginal consumption time preference rate is equated with the interest rate. As 
they consume capital, their opportunity to maintain their current level of consumption falls. 
Consumption in the future becomes increasingly threatened by their diminishing investment 
rerurns or increasing interest costs. Their current consumption stress will rise in proportion 
to the expected threat to future consumption expectations. As the threat rises so will 
farmers' stress. Thus the ratio of current interest payments divided by the sum of all funds 
used to suppon current drawings reflects the fmancial stress affecting farm households. 
When consumption stress is low, the ratio will approach zero. It will rise as stress 
rises. 
When current disposable incomes increase, the utility of marginal consumption 
may fall and the preferred time at which to consume may also change. Funds may be set 
aside and the resultant changes in savings or investments, or debt repayments, either increase 
future incomes or reduce interest charges. In either case, the consumption stress ratio will 
fall. When the ratio is falling, current consumption is unstressed relative to future income 
expectations and the marginal rate of time preference is less than the interest rate. If this was 
not so, current funds would not be set aside. 
This pivotal characteristic of the interest rate is an essential component of the 
consumption stress measure: the ratio will change according to the relative magnitude of the 
individual's marginal rate of consumption time preference to the interest rate. If it is higher 
than the interest rate the ratio will rise indicating a rise in current household consumption 
stress, if not, the ratio will fall. Thus an imponant feature of the ratio is that unlike the 
traditional accounting ratios, the consumption stress ratio does account for changes in the 
marginal utility of funds as well as future consumption expectations (Frengley and Johnston). 
Independent changes in the real interest rate alter the consumption time preference rate 
of some individuals (by altering the threat to· the future consumption of those who have 
borrowed) as well as by altering the pivotal balance in the ratio. By implication, constant 
annual net farm profits or constant real drawings may give the mistaken impression that 
consumption stress has not altered. . 
4. Household Consumption Stress Among New Zealand Sheep and Beef Farmers 
Changes in household fmancial constraints are examined using the adjusted 
consumption stress ratio. It is defmed as the ratio of interest payments to the sum of all funds 
used to suppon current consumption (whether from fmancial reserves or from income). 
Changes in the ratio, averaged over all sheep and beef fanners, are examined in Table 2. 
Table 2 here. 
Net fann income and interest expense are shown at the left of the table. While net 
farm income has varied berween years throughout the rwo decades, interest expense increased 
continually to 1988. Reversal of the trend in interest costs is attributable to both capital 
reconstruction and more recently to a fall in the rate of interest. In the consumption stress 
ratio, both the numerator (interest cost) and the pivot (the interest rate), affecting 
consumption/investment indifference are affected . 
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Apan from 1986 and 1991, nominal personal drawings have increased every year. 
However, in real terms personal drawings peaked in 1977 and have trended downwards since 
then. Real personal drawings which were rising in the early 1970s have more than halved 
since 1977. 
Savings clearly act as a buffer to smooth the variations in disposable income derived 
from net farm income (shown in the left column). Adjusted household consumption stress 
in the right hand column, tracks the effect on farm families. Until 1977 household 
consumption stress was relatively static then proceeded to climb, peaking with the commodity 
price collapse in· 1986. Thereafter household stress proceeded to fall even though real 
personal drawings were declining. Reasons for this include adjustments to farmer life-time 
income expectations, consumption time preference and changes in the pivot as described. 
Estimates for 1991 suggest that adjusted household consumption stress may again be rising. 
(Calculations from recent NZMWBES data suggest a ratio of 0.91 for 1991, assuming the 
pivot is unchanged). 
Cross sectional analysis of sheep and beef farmers according to percentage debt shows 
that household consumption stress is unevenly disnibuted. The effect is observed in Table 3 
Table 3 here. 
Data for 1989, the most recent year for which information is available, are shown. 
There are five farm groups ranging from those with minimal debt as a percentage of total 
farm assets (average 2%); then in 15 percentage point ranges to those whose debt exceeds 
50 percent. This latter group averages 70 percent debt. Interest expense rises accordingly 
through the groups and is tracked by declining cash surpluses and rising deficits. The most 
heavily indebted group has a cash loss close to $25000 whereas the least indebted averages 
approximately $14000 cash surplus. There is a $39000 interest expense difference between 
these extreme groups whereas their adjusted drawings only differ by approximately $8000. 
Household consumption needs, not surprisingly, are revealed to be comparatively inelaStic, 
demanding significant dissaving as debt rises. Below 20% equity, all groups dissave to 
sustain household consumption. The reason for the least indebted group dis saving is not 
known. 
Changes in the adjusted household consumption stress ratio, reflect the impact of debt. 
Inelastic household consumption (drawings) has its effect in this measure. With falling 
incomes and disposable cash, capital reserves are eroded to sustain current consumption, 
further increasing interest charges, reducing future income prospects and inducing increased 
consumption stress. On average, more than half of all sheep and beef farmers (those whose 
debts exceed 20 percent of total farm assets), have been forced to dissave. Implications for 
the sustained output of the sheep and beef industry at present levels are clear. 
5. Conclusion 
In general the accounting financial ratios do not adequately reflect the effect of 
financial constraint on farm families. Each of those measures is at variance with the adjusted 
household consumption stresS measure both in amplitude and in the direction of change over 
the two decades. As the accounting ratios do not account for farmer income expectations 
the variation could be expected. 
An important feature of the analysis relates to supply response expectations. In the 
circumstances described for 1989,53 percent of farmers were in no position to maintain long-
term output. They were all dis saving. Their marginal consumption time preference rate was 
6 
greater than the interest rate. A funher 30 percent were barely breaking even and the current 
outlook for 1991 suggests that group may also be forced to dissave. Improved understanding 
of the stress of these fann families may allow new policies to be formulated to better relieve 
their distress, to provide new insights to risk management strategies and to improve prospects 
to sustain or to promote growth in the sheep and beef farm industry. 
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DAIRY HERD TESTING 
SOME POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF INTRODUCING COMPETITION' 
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SUMMARY 
Herd testing enables increased cow productivity and international competitiveness 
in dairy production. Herd testing data is used by the farmer to make farm 
management decisions, and by the whole dairy industry for genetic improvement 
of cows and bulls. Contestability, or at least some competition in herd testing, 
mfght provide benefits to farmers ·such as greater differentiation of services and 
reduced charges. However, unless herd testing data is scientifically reliable and is 
provided to a national database for genetic evaluation, the rate of genetic 
improvement could decrease. Potential benefits from competition could be offset 
by increased costS of majntaining data integrity. However, pressure to replace 
cooperative cost sharing with a competitive structure could increase. 
Key Words: Cooperative, Competition, Cow Productivity, Deregulation, Genetic 
Evaluation, Herd Testing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Contestability has been introduced into many areas of business activity in New 
Zealand in recent years, with the aim of improving efficiency and lowering costs. 
Dairy herd testing is now provided by a monopoly service and introduction of 
competition could bring benefits to farmers. However, gains in cow productivity 
which enable international competitiveness can largely be attributed to the rate of 
genetic improvement in dairy herds, which is dependant on herd testing. These 
gains have been achieved with a structure of regulation and cooperative cost 
sharing. Although competition in herd testing could provide short term benefits, 
the structure needed to safeguard the collection and genetic evaluation of data 
used for genetic improvement needs careful consideration. 
The Dairy Board has set up the Herd Testing Review Committee to 
investigate all issues relating to herd testing. The Ministry of Agriculture is 
also reviewing the need for regulation of herd testing. This paper contains a 
theoretical discussion of some of the issues involved and is not intended to 
predict the outcome of these reviews. 
Comments and advice from MAF colleagues and from Dr Dorian Garrick of 
Massey University are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in 
this paper are those of the author and nO! necessarily those of the Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
BACKGROUND 
Herd testing involves measuring and recording the quantity and quality of milk 
produced by each cow in the herd at regular intervals during the lactation. 
Samples of milk are taken by a herd tester or by the farmer and the samples sent 
to a laboratory for analysis of fat content and other milk solids. The farmer can 
choose from a large number of options, including frequency of testing, the form of 
records returned and whether to use a herd tester. 
Herd testing serves two purposes. Firstly, dairy farmers purchase a herd testing 
service to enable them to make more informed farm management decisions, such 
as which cows to cull. Keeping only the most productive cows increases farm 
profitability. Secondly, the data collected through herd testing, along with 
ancestry data from calf identification and herd recording, form the basis of a 
national database. This database is used for genetic evaluation and comparison of 
cows and bulls, sire proving of bulls for artificial breeding (AB), and research. 
Genetic evaluation benefits dairy farmers in several ways. Herd testing farmers 
are supplied with breeding indexes (BI's) which rank cows on genetic value, and 
production indexes (PI's) which rank cows on productive ability. The PI is a 
bener measure of future worth than raw production data and is reflected in the 
market value of the cow. The genetic evaluation is used for AB sire proving and 
also indicates which cows should be used to breed future bulls. All farmers who 
use an AB service benefit from the use of genetically superior bulls. The database 
is a major source of information for research into improving cost effectiveness of 
production and breeding, which potentially benefits all dairy farmers. 
The number of herds tested has increased over the long term but varies from year 
to year. Iii 1989/90 it was 63% of all herds (69% of all cows). Many farmers 
consider continuity of herd records important and would cut expenditure on other 
items first when income falls. However in 1986/87, when the milkfat price fell by 
25% in nominal terms, the number of herds tested fell to 30% of all herds. 
Testing costs have risen in pace with inflation while nominal milkfat incomes 
have fallen. Present testing costs vary between well under $10 to over 
$20/cow!annum depending on option chosen, region and herd size. In recent 
years, farmers have tended to reduce the frequency of testing and/or sample 
themselves in response to increased cost or reduced income, rather than stop herd 
testing altogether. The number of herds tested is high by international standards. 
Some farmers have little use for herd testing information as they are nOl in a 
position to cull for productivity. Therefore the increase in number of cows tested 
in response to the availability of cheaper testing services might not be large. 
At present the Livestock Improvement Corporation (LIe), a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the Dairy Board, is the only organisation licensed by the Dairy 
Board to operate a herd testing service. LIC also runs the national database and 
evaluation, an AB service in competition with other firms, and several other linked 
herd improvement activities. Recently, there have been calls for introduction of 
competition to herd testing and for separation of genetic evaluation from provision 
of commercial herd testing and AB services. Some genetic evaluation users 
would like more consultation over criteria for evaluation. Some farmers consider 
they could obtain a cheaper herd testing service and more choice of options if 
there were several competing services. 
Evolution of the present structure 
The integration of functions in the LIC has evolved as part of the dairy indUStry's 
ethic of cooperative control to increase productivity on all farms. Before 1936, 
herd testing was provided by a ntimber of organisations, some farmer cooperative 
associations and some private organisations. The associations gradually 
standardised their methods, adopted and policed uniform rules for records to 
prevent malpractice, and agreed on boundaries within which an association would 
provide a service to any dairy farmer requiring it. The importance of herd testing 
to all dairy farmers in enabling them to increase the production of their herds was 
increasingly realised, along with the advantage of pooling the data for use in 
research and development and sire proving (Edey,1966). . 
In 1936 the Dairy Board was given statutory control to regulate herd testing. This 
was to prevent private herd testing services from using different procedures, 
prevent malpractice, provide for collaboration in the use of herd testing data, and 
prevent undercutting by associations that serviced only the larger, more accessible 
herds. The Dairy Board then developed the Herd Improvement Plan and obtained 
a Government subsidy to fund it. This Plan had the purpose of assisting dairy 
farmers to maximise their incomes. It consisted of a number of measures 
including calf identification, herd testing, collection of data for research, 
development and genetic improvement of herds, and an extension service. 
Advances in computer technology and genetic research have enabled the data 
evaluation and sire proving to become more sophisticated. The Government 
subsidy has been phased out over a number of years. It has been partially 
replaced by a subsidy from Dairy Board funds, and breed societies also contribute 
funds, but the remainder has to be financed from herd testing and AB fees. 
Regional associations have amalgamated and operations have become more and 
more centralised, presumably in order to reduce costs and to compete with private 
finns in providing an AB service. Now there is just the one organisation, LIC. 
Even laboratory testing of milk samples is now centralised in one location. 
Evaluation of the present structure 
Many farmers perceive that the one large organisation is less accountable and 
client orientated than the former regional associations, in spite of a structure which 
involves farmer representation. It is hard to measure the efficiency of a monopoly 
organisation and to sort out exactly what each function costs and what cross-
subsidisation is occurring. Ownership of animal data and evaluation gives LIC a 
potential competitive advantage in providing commercial herd testing and AB 
services. 
However, there are many advantages to dairy farmers deriving from LIC's present 
structure. Standardisation of herd testing is ensured through. the lack of 
competition. LIC can maximise available economies of scale and of scope. 
Establishment and maintenance of a database is expensive and so using one for all 
operations minimises COSIS, and also enables cross-checking for accuracy. A 
whole range of services can be offered to the farmer at reduced cost as transfer 
and transaction costs are low and LlC operates on a non-profit making basis. 
Herd testers also collect ancestry data and promote calf identification, another 
important source of information for the database. The database holds ancestry 
information on about 88% of the national dairy herd. 
Control of all herd testing enables locational cross subsidisation, so that all 
farmers in a region are charged the same rale regardless of accessibility, which 
most dairy farmers regard as desirable. The cooperative ethic, which is still strong 
in the dairy industry, provides advantages which could be lost in a more 
competitive environment. Information from the database is made available free to 
university and other researchers, and LlC also provides a free bull progeny testing 
service for rival AB finns and shares facilities and information with breed 
·societies. 
Organisation in other dairying countries and international considerations 
New Zealand is not unique in controlling herd testing and data evaluation. All 
major dairying countries have some kind of statutory control of herd testing and\or 
the genetic evaluation. In comparison with herd testing services in other countries 
the New Zealand service appears to be low cost. Inefficiencies that have occurred 
in other countries have apparently been avoided through having an integrated 
structure. This has led to a high rate of genetic gain in the New Zealand dairy 
herd compared to that of other countries. LlC has built up a reputation, 
recognised in the UK and elsewhere, for data integrity and efficiency. 
The International Committee for Recording the Productivity of Milk Animals, of 
which New Zealand is a member, has set out minimal requirements for milk 
recording for all member countries. One requirement is that there be official or 
semi-official supervision of herd recording. The LlC is also represented on 
Interbull, a sub-committee of the International Committee for Animal Recording. 
Interbull facilitates international sire proof conversions. International trade in 
bulls and semen makes recognition of the integrity of New Zealand production 
data and genetic evaluation of increasing importance. 
Regulation protects central data collection and genetic evaluation 
Contestable provision of herd testing services would maximise efficiency and cost 
effectiveness. However, contestability in herd testing may not be compatible with 
the other purpose of obtaining standardised, scientifically reliable data used for 
genetic improvement. Contestability implies costless entry and exit which could 
jeopardise long term continuity and reliability of data. The main justification for 
continued regulation of herd testing, therefore, is to protect the size and integrity 
of the database and genetic evaluation. 
Characteristics of the Database and Genetic Evaluation 
The database used for genetic evaluation has some characteristics of a natural 
monopoly as much of the benefits derive from its large size. Economies of scale 
result from investment in com pUler equipment and the employment of a geneticist. 
Economies of scope are obtained by using the same database for a variety of 
interlinked activities, including ancestry recording, cow evaluation, sire proving 
and research. The database is regarded as a public good in the dairy industry. 
Once data is entered it becomes the property of LIe. The data as a whole is 
mainly non-rival in consumption and is used for all dairy farmers. 
Genetic evaluation of the data by one agency ensures that all animals are 
evaluated on the same basis and can therefore be compared and ranked. Data for 
evaluation needs to be consistent, on a longterm basis, and reliable, for 
compatibility of the results and international recognition. 
An important use of production data is for sire proving, ie assessing the genetic 
value of AB bulls through progeny testing. Progeny testing involves comparing 
the milk production performance of the daughters of the bull with that of the other 
cows in a number of herds. Control of progeny testing by the central evaluation 
agency is desirable to ensure comparability of results and prevent falsification. In 
the US, where AB finns have conducted their own progeny testing, there have 
been several incidences of falsified results. 
Geneticists stress the imponance of having production data from as many of the 
nation's dairy cattle as possible recorded on one database for evaluation in order 
to increase the rate of genetic gain. This enables "reproving" of AB bulls using 
data from a large number of daughters to improve the reliability of the genetic 
rating. 
Another reason for having information on as many cows as possible is to find 
cows of superior genetic value from which to breed future bulls. As these 
superior cows can appear in any herd, more superior cows will be found the 
greater the number of cows recorded. However, as international interchange of 
information and semen increases, the need for a large number of cows on the NZ 
database may decline. 
Benefits of herd testing and genetic evaluation 
LlC has calculated the net benefits of herd testing and evaluation, in terms of 
increased milk production to be $31 million/annum post tax, giving a return on 
investment of 54%. Selection of AB bulls by progeny testing considerably 
increases the benefits from using them for breeding compared to selecting them by 
ancestry information only. The benefits through genetic gain are significantly 
funher increased by using production infonnation from herd testing a large 
number of cows. The increase in cow productivity resulting from using 
genetically superior bulls for breeding is much greater than the increase 
resulting from the farmers' culling and selection within their own herds 
(LIC,1991). 
The LlC study shows that centralisation and evaluation of milk production data 
from a large number of cows increases the rate of genetic gain that can be 
obtained through breeding. However, more infonnation is needed to determine the 
relationship between increase in genetic gain and increase in the number of cows 
for which production data is available. The loss of some production data from the 
central database might not result in much decrease in rate of genetic gain. 
CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO CHANGING TIffi STRUcruRE 
Pricing considerations 
Some dairy farmers would rather nO! pay for the sophisticated indexes they now 
receive. This could be because they do not recognise the value of them. 
However there may be some cross-subsidisation here. The main beneficiaries of 
the data evaluation are farmers who use AB services, whereas it appears that part 
of the cost of the evaluation is included in herd testing fees. Whilst it can be 
argued that farmers using AB services are mainly the same farmers who buy herd 
testing services, it would seem more appropriate for farmers to pay according to 
the benefits they receive. The Wilson Comminee, which investigated the 
separation of genetic evaluation from other activities in the UK, recommended that 
herd testing farmers should not pay for genetic evaluation (Wilson, 1991). 
Evaluation could instead be financed by a levy on all dairy farmers (of probably 
less than $2/cow/annum), or by charges to AB firms. 
The present pricing structure could have arisen panly because the LIC AB service 
has to compete with other firms, local and international, whereas the herd testing 
service does not. Other arguments for keeping the cost of AB down, and 
encouraging its use rather than the use of bulls, are to increase the genetic wonh 
of herds and to reduce the transmission of disease. However, if herd testing fees 
reduce, farmers might test more frequently and regularly, and more cows would be 
tested. As already mentioned, cross-subsidisation also occurs with less-accessible 
farmers paying the same herd testing charges as accessible farmers in a region. 
Equity is soU of great imponance in the dairy industry and farmers appear to 
favour this cross-subsidisation. Competition in herd testing could lead to charges 
for services more accurately reflecting their true costs. Conversely, competition 
could give rise to further cross-subsidisation by L1C, at least in the shon-tenn, as 
a means of competing. 
Possible effects of deregulating herd testing 
The genetic evaluation could possibly be safeguarded through market forces rather 
than by regulation, particularly if it is not essential that all herd testing data be 
used for evaluation. If herd testing were deregulated, and there was a central 
evaluation agency, some firms might then provide evaluated indexes as the LIC 
does now while other firms might provide basic production data only. If the 
evaluation was financed by a levy or by AB services, herd testing !inns could 
then offer evaluation of indexes at little extra cost and thus compete with finns 
that did not. Thus a large number of cows could continue to be evaluated. The 
number of farmers who would continue to have their herd data evaluated would 
depend on relative cost and the imponance farmers auach to the PI and BI 
indexes. Because many farmers have now become familiar with the indexes, 
recognise their superiority for cow ranking over raw production data, and base 
cow and bull prices on these indexes, it seems likely that many would continue to 
use them. 
Quality control could be achieved by the genetic evaluation centre stipulating the 
conditions and standards required for data to be accepted by it. The genetic 
evaluation might then have to be protected by regulation to ensure there was only 
one national evaluation and comparable indexes. A further consideration is that 
ancestry recording and calf identification are needed, as well as herd testing data, 
for genetic evaluation. A central genetic evaluation centre would need access to 
all this information. 
The risk of losing quality and quantity of data for genetic evaluation indicates that 
deregulation of herd testing may not be the best option. However, some of the 
benefits of contestability might be obtained by introducing regulated competition. 
Possibilities for competition in herd testing 
Regulated competition could provide benefits if the conditions for obtaining a herd 
testing licence ensured quality control without making the cost of entry so high, 
and licencing period so shon, that other finns could not profitably enter. 
Although there are some economies of scale in provision of herd testing, there 
could well be oppormnities for several fmns to operate profitable, small scale 
operations. Capital investment could be quite small, as an existing laboratory 
could be contracted to test milk samples. Computer equipment able to provide the 
data in the standard fonn required could be more costly. 
Several herd testing organisations could be licensed and required to provide data 
to a national database in a standard fonn. However, they could only compete on 
an equal basis if the database is independent from all of them. Or they might all 
have their own databases and send data for central evaluation for comparisons of 
cows and bulls, as is done by the USDA in the US. The evaluation centre could 
specify conditions and standards for herd testing. The criteria for evaluation could 
be determined by a committee on which the various users are represented. If 
several herd testing fmns provide data to one evaluation base, there will be higher 
transfer and transaction costs than occur in the present integrated system, because 
of costs of monitOring and duplication, eg of computer facilities. However, these 
higher costs might be offset by improvements in efficiency. 
Economies of scope could be more of a limitation on the number of !inns herd 
testing than economies of scale. All the !inns that have so far expressed an 
interest in carrying oUI herd testing have been already operating in related areas. 
Would there be net benefits to farmers from chancing the structure? 
A srudy of the effects of deregulation in six markets by NZIER found that in 
general an increase in competition did lead to some reduction in prices, but not 
always overall (Bollard and Easton, 1985). They did not find much evidence of 
increases in efficiency. The main result seemed to be that the markets became 
more differentiated, that is, the variety of products and the types of !inns 
producing them increased. 
There could be opponunities for differentiation in herd testing, but these would be 
limited by the requirement for firms to conform to rules for data quality conrro!. 
In order to gain benefits from competition, an independent genetic evaluation is 
probably necessary. This is likely to result in greater ttansfer and ttansaction 
cOStS, particularly in the area of monitoring herd testing finns to ensure reliability 
and standardisation of data. These extra costs could outweigh possible benefits. 
The cooperative ethic has given rise to a relatively low-cost, reliable srructure 
which produces substantial benefits and has a good international reputation. There 
may be no advantage to farmers as a whole in changing the srrucrure at present. 
More benefits might be obtained from improvements to the present srructure, such 
as changing the way in which the evaluation is funded, and improving 
communications with farmers and with other users of the genetic evaluation. 
However, there could be increasing sttain on the cooperative srructure as the 
necessity of and possibilities for increasing profitability increase. Increased 
international comparison of bulls and links between databases could reduce the 
irnponance of having one national database. Inrroduction of new technologies, 
such as use of BST or prolonged low international prices for dairy products, could 
have this effect. More efficient and innovative farmers with larger herds may not 
want to continue to share costs and returns with less productive farmers. Then a 
more contestable srructure which could provide greater benefits to some fanners 
might develop. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main purpose of regulating herd testing has been to ensure the quality and 
quantity of cow production data that enters the national data base. The use of this 
data for evaluating and comparing cows and bulls has brought about a high rate of 
genetic improvement and thus increased dairy cow productivity and international 
competitiyeness in dairy production. Conttol by the Dairy Board and free sharing 
of data and genetic evaluation have enabled a relatively low cost srructure and 
have prevented problems that have arisen in other countties such as malpractice 
and low genetic gain. 
Deregulation could jeopardise the provision of data for evaluation and thus the 
rate of genetic gain, although quality conttol might be safeguarded by market 
forces. However, the evaluation itself might then have to be protected by 
regulation. 
Conrrolled inrroduction of competition to herd testing could provide benefits of 
differentiation and reduced charges to farmers. However, the costs of separating 
the evaluation of data from provision of herd testing and AB services, to enable 
all firms to compete on an equal basis, and monitoring of herd testing finns, could 
be greater than the benefits. Detailed investigation of costs and of the relationship 
between size of database and rate of genetic gain would indicate whether there 
might be net benefits from changing the srrucrure. Farmers may prefer to retain 
the advantages of the present cooperative integrated srructure. However, if 
international dairy prices remain low, and if the potential benefits from adoption 
of new technologies increase, there could be increased pressure to replace the 
present srructure with a more competitive srructure. 
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SUMMARY 
This paper examines how rational decision making by producers 
modifies the equilibrium output position with regard to the 
marginal conditions when risk is taken into account. In the 
absence of other constraints this is called risk efficiency. The 
activities of marketing boards can be partly seen as a response 
to this rational decision making where they assume some of the 
market risk facing producers. It is not clear which system is the 
most risk efficient. Furthermore there is no mention of these 
implications for firms and marketing agents in the government 
briefs prepared by the Treasury in 1984 and 1987. Whether these 
perceptions have made any difference to the subsequent chain of 
events is assessed in this paper. 
Key Words: Risk, Market Agents, Stabilisation, Efficiency, 
Producers. 
INTRODUCTION 
The key question to be addressed in this topic is whether 
government intervention/withdrawal in recent years has been based 
on a sound appreciation of the risk structure of firms and agents 
in the marketing channel for New Zealand products. We first 
examine the theoretical constructs on which the hypothesis is 
based and then examine market and other institutions in the light 
of these constructs. Secondly we examine the Treasury briefing 
papers for their assessment of the situation. Third we examine 
farm level developments and possible measures that could have 
been developed. Finally we assess our over-all objectives and 
reach a conclusion. 
THEORETICS 
I first set out the basis of this argument in a paper to the 
Society in 1987 (Johnson, 1987). I was concerned to examine 
individual, collective and statutory stabilisation measures in 
a deregulated market framework. I suggested that the main 
question to be answered was whether stabilisation yielded 
improvements in economic efficiency compared with unfettered and 
fluctuating market prices. 
The argument rests on the production decisions of the risk averse 
producer. Blandford and Currie (1975) show that greater 
efficiency can be achieved by government intervention in the 
price fixing process in unstable markets. The case rests on the 
proposition that under uncertainty profits and output are lower 
for the individual firm than under price certainty. 
A government guaranteed price for a product allows the producer 
to move to a higher position on his marginal cost curve and hence 
improve resource use and income. After considering the case in 
a closed and open economy the above authors conclude that 
producers can be made better off by offering a guaranteed price 
above the equivalent price they would settle for in a risk averse 
situation. Their analysis shows in what circumstances the costs 
of stability are transferred to consumers and/or taxpayers. Thus 
the gain in productive efficiency is matched by a cost to someone 
else. 
The single product analysis can be extended to multiple 
enterprise firms. Under certainty, the producer uses the maximum 
profit combination of enterprises. Under uncertainty there is a 
trade-off between profit variability of enterprises and total 
profit and a less than optimum combination of enterprises is 
likely to be chosen but as Markowitz stressed this is likely to 
be a risk efficient combination. 
In the multi-period situation, the producer will be seeking to 
equate long run marginal revenue with long run marginal cost 
under uncertainty. This would be consistent with movement along 
the long run average cost curve. To move along this curve, the 
producer needs to make new investment. This would be to a point 
where the marginal efficiency of capital equated with the cost 
of borrowing (or opportunity cost in the case of his own capital) 
under certainty. The risk averse producer will require a rate of 
return higher than the cost of capital and hence embarks on a 
programme of under-investment. He therefore moves out along the 
average cost curve more slowly at a less than economic optimum 
combination of capital, other inputs and output. 
The argument then follows that stabilised prices would improve 
the situation in the multi-period situation as well and greater 
growth and income would be achieved. 
The same conclusions can be reached by working through the 
corporate finance view of risk management. Every producer has a 
risk margin built into his expected rate of return on equity. 
This is basically business risk concerned with the general 
conditions of running a business. As debt is increased the margin 
increases as more financial risk is assumed. Now the introduction 
of institutional arrangements for spreading and modifying 
business risk changes the individual's perceptions of the risks 
he faces. It is usually hypothesised that the transfer of risk 
away from individuals leads to a greater acceptance of financial 
risk (Gabriel and Baker, 1980). Producers are thus encouraged to 
move out along their debt-equity curve if they perceive that they 
have the back-up arrangements of collective stabilisation schemes 
as well as their individual risk prevention strategies. 
However when such support is withdrawn the risk environment 
changes back t:o what: it: was. Producer exposure t:o risk is 
increased and greater margins need to be built into the required 
rate of return. More conservative financing procedures will need 
to be followed and debt-equity ratios adjusted. Less government 
support thus raises the required rate of return, lowers the debt-
equity ratio, reduces investment in new projects, discourages new 
entrants and lowers the price of land (other things being equal) . 
The producer will have in fact adjusted himself to a more risk 
efficient situation than if he had stayed where he was. 
COLLECTIVE STABILISATION 
This proposal passes the bearing of market risk back to the 
government or an agency with government backing. Transaction 
costs are created that were not there before and some of the 
risks will be magnified by the role of a marketing agency in the 
market. There is therefore a need to assess the costs and 
benefits of this kind of intervention - is greater productive 
efficiency better than greater costs and inertia in the marketing 
channel? 
Quiggin and Anderson (1979) suggest there are two tests to be 
investigated: 
i) whether the private capital market is incapable of optimally 
spreading risks, so that individual producers must bear 
substantial risks, and 
ii) whether stabilisation offers a mechanism which enables the 
government (or it agents) to bear risks at costs lower than those 
of leaving individual producers to bear risks or of shifting 
risks to the private capital market. 
The assessment of these propositions is complicated by the 
multiple roles of marketing boards. There has been a strong 
preference for statutory collective action in New Zealand (and 
Australia), mostly arising from the weak trading position of the 
NZ export companies in the 1920's. This was strengthened by the 
accumulation of wartime reserves which were used to provide 
minimum prices in meat and wool. In dairy minimum prices had been 
introduced in 1938 with Reserve Bank backing and a self-funding 
mechanism. This was extended to meat and wool in the 1970's. Thus 
"pure" stabilisation was never the primary objective of the 
respective boards. 
Nevertheless the Zanetti Committee (1975) justified policies for 
some form of pure stabilisation in terms of needed farm 
investment. They isolated the need for continuity in farm 
investment and related this to more stable income flows. This 
concern has also been raised by the New Zealand Wool Marketing 
Study Group (1967). For a discussion of the merits of this claim 
readers are referred to my 1987 article. 
In terms of the Quiggin and Anderson propositions it is clear 
that a private institutional framework to bear risk will not 
develop while government guaranteed schemes are in place. In 
general, we know that risk preventing strategies are under-valued 
when some form of baCk-up is going to be provided by the state. 
This explains why there are no private insurance schemes for 
climate relief (except for a few closely defined crop schemes) 
as the government is always seen as the major player. The Board 
schemes for pure stabilisation can also be seen to have' 
discouraged private arrangements for risk sharing like forward 
contracts and futures. 
On the question of relative COSts the test suggested previously 
was to ask producers whether they would support a scheme that 
paid its own way without subsidies? It was pointed out that a 
self-balancing scheme paying market interest rates on borrowings 
would lead to a lower level of mean prices as agency costs would 
have to be met out of total revenue. If this was offered to 
farmers, they would turn it down as they would likely prefer 
higher mean returns to more stable returns. In practice both the 
Dairy and Wool Boards have faced this question in recent years 
and found no electoral support for a continuation of their 
respective schemes, especially at the time of a down-turn in 
trading. 
Zwart and Lattimore (1990) have recently reviewed risk management 
choices facing individual producers. They note the wide range of 
strategies available and stress the importance of information in 
individual decision making. In an examination of sources of risk 
they identify the major role of export prices. Where boards 
operated the variability is less at the farm level than at the 
export level. In the livestock industry the reverse holdS as 
there are greater fixed margins between farm gate and export 
price points. They conclude with a plea for more market 
information both to allow better decisions between alternative 
channels and improve the monitoring of agency activities where 
less options are available. 
ROLE OF AGENTS 
Looking at farm stabilisation alone tends to give a one-sided 
appreciation of the risk management problem. In practice there 
is a whole series of agents in the marketing channel for a 
product who are also interested in risk minimisation. In this 
process a great deal of price pooling and cost averaging takes 
place and some of the market risk absorbed in the process. The 
marketing boards take part in such a process quite apart from 
their inter year stabilisation role. Other strategies include 
diversification of products and markets, off-shore marketing, 
processing and development, and equity sharing. 
In some cases the risks of marketing are still carried by 
producers as in kiwifruit whether sold by consignment or by a 
board. In this case the individual must protect himself and run 
his business with adequate safeguards. 
Zwart and Lattimore stress that individual options include use 
of secondary or contingency markets to minimise risks from 
commodity sales. These options utilise other markets such as the 
financial, insurance or futures markets to minimise the exposure 
to business risks in dealing with specific products. Firms and 
boards offer pooling arrangements through specific contracts or 
marketing cooperatively. There is pooling within seasons and 
pooling across markets. POoling by contract is little different 
from consignment selling as far as risk sharing is concerned. 
The role of agents is important as they may absorb or may magnify 
the variabilty in prices emanating from the market place. Some 
agents are locked in by contractual arrangments involving 
guarantees of some sort,viz. the marketing boards, while others 
have arrangements which pass on the risk as in consignment 
selling. Resort to secondary markets shows that institutional 
arrangements can be set in place that Which give benefits to both 
parties in excess of the costs of the service. 
THE TREASURY ANALYSIS 
In the Treasury briefing papers in 1984 and 1987 the thrust of 
the analysis is very indirect as far as risk efficiency is 
concerned. There is relatively little information to go on and 
one is left to deduce what might have been their position. 
Curiously enough a more definite indication comes from 
instructions sent out to departments after the passing of the 
Public Finance Act 1987 where rates of return to the crown equity 
are required to be weighted by an appropriate risk premium. 
Effective policy, say the Treasury (1984), will be based on the 
most appropriate set of interventions for a particular purpose. 
Market forces are the touchstone in many areas of economic 
activity because policies must be judged in terms of their 
contribution to greater welfare. "Markets generally offer an 
efficient means for reconciling competing demands so that the 
government is more likely to achieve its ends effectively by 
harnessing and supplementing markets rather than suppressing 
them. In other areas there are good reasons for believing that 
appropriate forms of government action may improve market 
outcomes, and in still others that society would wish to trade 
a reduction in general efficiency for a more equitable 
outcome" (pp 111-112). 
These views foreshadow the thrust of the Treasury's approach to 
private sector regulation and industry assistance. The thrust is 
based on the idea of intervention assisting society to reach 
greater community welfare rather than an "adversarial II 
perspective with interventions interfering with the natural 
operations of unfettered markets. "The basic approach, therefore, 
is to seek that pattern of interventions and private initiatives 
which contributes the most to national welfare in terms of 
improvements in efficiency and equity"(p 120). 
The chapter on social policy seems to bring out the the detailed 
thrust of Treasury views on risk and economic efficiency rather 
than the purely economic chapters. Treasury notes (p 251) that 
strong individual initiatives to improve personal and family 
welfare underlie improvements in living standards which have 
occurred historically. They emphasise that efficiently 
functioning markets and increased opportunities for individuals 
to make their own welfare-improving choices maximise 
opportunities for welfare gains. Policies which reduce efficiency 
by reducing the resource cost of a service give the wrong signals 
as do policies which shift the burden of risk bearing such as 
accident compensation. It is thus by implication rather than by 
direct example that Treasury arrive at the modus operandi of risk 
management ie that individuals make the the best choices for 
their own good and that (social) policies should be slanted in 
this direction (p 259) . 
Chapter 14 is on industry regulation and assistance. Considerable 
research had been done on this topic and the arguments presented 
are fairly conclusive. Australian work had been drawn upon 
including Australian research in New Zealand (p 315). They say 
that non-neutral assistance of the type employed in New Zealand 
distorts decisions made by economic agents, whether they be 
consumers, consuming industries, or producers, away from the set 
of choices which would be made on the basis of less distorted 
market incentives. The result is a lower level of national income 
and welfare than would be the case if prices reflected more truly 
the value to the community of the resources involved (p 305) . 
For agriculture this philosophy meant reducing those forms of 
assistance with greatest associated distortions and reducing 
disparities in assistance. Included in the discussion are the 
effects of the supplementary minimum price scheme (a non-
balancing form of assistance), the Dairy Board's current account 
advance from the Reserve Bank (a subsidised advance of credit), 
and the Meat and Wool Boards' reserve accounts (balancing 
stabilisation funds with subsidised credit) (p 308). In this way 
the assistance argument was used to dispose of the board 
stabilisation schemes without consideration of their risk-sharing 
and stability provisions. Only in passing in Ch 15 is it 
acknowledged that the objective of these schemes was primarily 
to reduce the private risk to producers (p 317). This is 
dismissed as a matter of administrative convenience and the 
discussion passes on to limitations on exporters. 
The main chapter on agriculture is chapter 15 of part two 
"Limitation of Competition Among Exporters of Primary Products". 
The Treasury places this section in a discussion of intervention 
in sectors producing non-tradeable goods (p 299-300), presumably 
on the reasoning that regulatory control in marketing is on a 
service that is not exportable or importable. The thrust of the 
argument is that limitation of exporting among competitors does 
not have the advantages claimed for it - the so-called weak-
selling argument - and that in fact such policies erode export 
performance by discouraging initiative in seeking new forms of 
product presentation, new markets, new service packages and other 
forms of innovation (p 303). 
Chapter 15 is therefore a discussion of board power to license 
exporters. The arguments are put forward against the concept of 
weak selling and seem compelling. I have reviewed these elsewhere 
(Johnson, 1989). The fact remains that the industries concerned 
and many political figures still believe in the argument and 
policy is framed and chosen accordingly as in the case of the 
conversion of the Kiwifruit Marketing Authority to the Kiwifruit 
Marketing Board. This particular solution to set up a single desk 
selling agency confirming the existing arrangement that: the 
burden of marketing risk should be borne by the producers without: 
any debate of the issue. 
In 1987 the debate had moved on to other matters and no further 
elucidation was offered on the sharing of risk and its benefits. 
In discussing distributional effects of government reform (p 199-
200) ,Treasury discusses compensation for those adversely 
af~ected. "Residual risk takers, that is those people who stand 
to gain or lose the most from certain actions, must form 
expectations about a wide range of factors, including the future 
policy environment. It is not obvious why the losses from this 
source of risk should be socialised while the gains are 
privatised. There would probably be little support for taxing 
those who realised substantial wealth gains because of the rise 
in rural land prices in the late 1970' s and early 1980' s". 
Treasury go on to argue for a more stable policy framework 
without surprises. 
In reviewing assistance policy they remark that a "needs based" 
assistance regime requires government to make decisions about 
which industries require assistance and about the forms and 
levels of that assistance (p 246). They then say that in general 
the government will not be as well informed about the potential 
viability of an industry as its owners, nor will it face the 
proper incentives to monitor the industry. This is tantamount to 
but does not explicitly say that individuals would be better able 
to manage risk than some agency, government sponsored or 
otherwise. 
In reviewing regulatory policy it is suggested that the 
environment affecting land use needed further attention 
especially those regulations affecting land aggregation and 
purchase. The review notes that there have been a number of 
changes to the operations of producer boards, notably the 
tremoval of their access to concessional Reserve Bank finance. 
Further reviews were required on the powers to raise levies and 
to discipline industry participants. There is a need for 
efficient and innovative practices and a need to review ownership 
structures especially as regards financing new activities (pp 
262-263) • 
In summary, the thrust of the argument is toward greater 
individual responsibility and away from collective 
responsibility. The benefits and costs for changing the existing 
agricultural institutions are not discussed. The efficiency 
argument for stabilised prices is not heard. In effect the 
Treasury vote for a return to price allocation of resources as 
judged best by the individual entrepeneur. Only in this sense 
does the argument imply that risk efficiency can be achieved. In 
addition, the way is left open for individuals to enter into 
other risk ameliorating practices which mayor may not include 
collective schemes for spreading risk. 
We conclude that Treasury did not specifically address market 
risk in the 1984 and 1987 briefing papers. We know that some of 
the key decisions (like making the boards pay market interest 
rates) had already been taken. This then leads to the Quiggin and 
Anderson test of whether collective risk sharing can be provided 
at greater or less cost than private markets. The course of 
events since suggests that without credit subsidy collective 
stabilisation schemes are unlikely to be acceptable and 
workable. 
SOME FURTHER POLICY ISSUES 
In chis section I discuss the debt discounting scheme of 1986, 
the sales of Landcorp mortgages and leases, and climatic 
emergency measures from the point of view of risk sharing. 
The Discounting Scheme: the statistics for the sheep and beef 
sector for the period 1980-81 to 1988-89 are set out in Table 1. 
The figures reflect a magnitude of changes that took place in the 
period concerned. Just as farmers must adjust to commodity prices 
they must also adjust to macroeconomic policy changes like 
interest rates and to changes in institutional arrangements 
affecting stabilisation of returns. From the risk point of view 
the first factor is part of systematic risk and the environment 
has not changed much. However the latter two factors are outside 
previous experience and have raised the level of risk facing 
farmers. Theory says they should finance more conservatively and 
carry greater individual reserves both financial and technical. 
In the table debt-equity ratios reflect all of the changes which 
have taken place and the individual policy contributions are 
difficult to disentangle. Major movements of the ratio are due 
to the land price effect coming through in the valuation of 
assets and this in turn reflects the loss of profitability in the 
period. Land values are also lower as increased risk has lowered 
the discounted rate of return from the land. Less debt has been 
entered into and debt discounting took place for a priviledged 
few. Less new debt reflects less investment and lower 
profitability and less investment reflects higher desired rates 
of return from new investments. Lower asset values raise the 
debt-equity ratio and thus the financial exposure of the 
business; this also should be responded to by more conservative 
financing and higher desired rates of return. Higher interest 
rates raise the average cost of borrowed capital and also shift 
the level of the required return on equity upwards. 
In the data it is clear the high risk and low profit peak was in 
1985-86 and since then the ratios have improved except that new 
investment is absent and average nominal liabilities have 
continued to decline. This suggests a shift to a new level of 
risk perception as well as a general loss of profitability and 
confidence in the industry. 
The debt discounting scheme wrote off an average of $50000 on 
4706 farms (Johnson,Schroder and Taylor, 1989). Over some 22000 
farms which the figures in Table 1 represent, this is only an 
average write-off of $10670 per farm and this mostly in 1985-86 
and 1986-87. Apparently other forces were still driving up 
liabilities on some farms in this period. The scheme was based 
on the principle that the farmer maintained existing interest 
payments but the existing debt was discounted at current market 
interest rates. Thus the debt-equity ratio of the farm business 
discounted was reduced considerably and greater security added 
to the remaining debt holders. Such action takes the pressure off 
farmers facing very high desired rates of return on equity which 
their trading position had pushed them into, and consequentially 
Table I 
New Zealand Sheep and Beef Sector; Trends in Debt 
Structure 
June Total Farm Total Average Debt-Equity 
Year Assets·· Liabilities Interest Paid Ratio 
1980-81 $753,681 $114,131 $8,964 0.18 
1981-82 858,047 139,370 12.137 0.19 
1982-83 815.145 155,528 14,782 0.24 
1983-84 856,356 169.553 16,305 0.25 
1984-85 783.126 176,989 17,736 0.29 
1985-86 661.927 187.823 21.509 0.45 
1986-87 662,397 185.164 22.619 0.39 
1987-88 674,000 186,667 23.862 0.38 
1988-89· 675,000 170.000 23.000 0.34 
• Estimarc 
•• Includes non-farm capital and investmentS 
SOURCE: NZ Meat and Wool Boards' Economic SClVice, Wellington. 
Income 
cost 
of Debt 
Servicing (%) 
10.8 
12.7 
14.0 
15.6 
13.4 
20.2 
19.3 
18.9 
18.1 
makes new investment a litle more attractive, and also 
stabilises slightly the land market. But it mainly was designed 
to reduce the pressure from financiers for mortgage sales which 
is of course the ultimate threat to businesses with unsuitable 
or unstable debt-equity ratios. 
LandCorp Mortgage Adjustment: the consequences of changes in risk 
perception can also be traced through LandCorp's sell-off of 
former Lands and Survey's mortgages and leases. Leases had for 
some years been on a 33 year review basis with rent set at 4% of 
review valuation. This made the effective rent about 2.8% in 
practice. Leasehold tenure had been introduced by the McKensie 
Government to allow greater access to land for people with few 
means and to conserve private capital for development and 
expansion. Ir. the risk framework, leasehold tenure lowers the 
borrowing requirements of the proprietor, substitutes a fixed 
rental charge in place of servicing capital, and allows the 
proprietor to operate at a lower level of risk exposure than he 
would under the freehold system. 
Some 2400 renewable rural leases were transferred to LandCorp 
from the Department of Lands and Survey (Johnson, 1989). In the 
1988 Budget it was resolved to sell the leases rather than manage 
them. Many of the leaseholders also held former Lands and Survey 
mortgages as well. LandCorp resolved to sell the existing leases 
to the existing leaseholders rather than seek tenders for the 
parcel as a whole. The re-purchase plan offered by LandCorp 
provided a discount on the current face values of the mortgages 
and rental values of the leases. 
From the point of view of the Government (as a shareholder in 
LandCorp), leasehold land investment was a poor use of taxpayers 
money and the asset could be disposed of. In addition, there may 
be efficiency gains from its disposal. On top of this it appears 
Government was also driven by a simple demand for cash to meet 
the continuing budget deficit. 
From the point of view of LandCorp, the leaseholds and mortgages 
had already been discounted when they were transferred from the 
Lands Department. The cash return they could obtain from 
continued possession was probably near normal profits in the 
circumstances and hence was not an incentive for them for 
disposal. LandCorp could have probably administered such 
financial instruments more efficiently than the State as well. 
From the point of view of the leaseholder and mortgagee, the 
proposal presented a set of new problems in the risk area. The 
proposal came at a time of low profits and high interest rates 
and hence the leaseholder would have few extra resources to re-
finance his business. He also had to substitute a 16% interest 
rate for a rental agreement of 4% (2.8% actual)! In terms of 
discounting logic, it would therefore require a very high 
discount in principal to compensate for such a quadrupling of 
service costs. In turn this is an example of what happens when 
statutory rentals get out of line with nominal interest rates. 
Thus the LandCorp proposal in effect increases the lessee's 
financial risk exposure. The leasehold principle allows the 
leaseholder to share the risks of equity holding with another 
parey and insulaees ehe leaseholder in pare from economic 
downeurns. The proposal requires the leaseholder to service 
increased debt and satisfy his requirements for a risk-adjusted 
race of return on equity. As the purchase of the leasehold was 
also forced on him, the proprietor must accomodate it by 
accepting a lower rate of return on equity than his former risk 
percepeion justified in the short run. In the long run, he must 
reduce debt or raise productivity to restore himself to his 
previous required rate of return, or a new level of required rate 
of return in the de-regulated economic environment. 
Raising productivity means more investment hence more borrowing, 
hence this route could well be closed off in the short run. It 
seems more likely that the proprietor would retrench until he can 
get his debt-equity ratio back to desirable levels. New 
invesements themselves require a higher rate of return than 
previously as his desired equity return has shifted to a higher 
position. 
Thus this policy determination of selling leaseholds to the 
lessee increases both the debt servicing load and the financial 
risk exposure of the lessee. An alternative would be to sell the 
inseruments to a third party as this would spread the ownership 
of equity and lower the lessee's risk exposure. Apparently 
Federaeed Farmers was vehemently opposed to this course of 
action. In effect the farming community accepted that 100% 
proprietorship was worth more to them than increased financial 
risk and indebtedness. 
Climatic Emergency Measures: as is generally recognised 
Government accepts responsibility for a certain amount of 
disaster relief in climatic events like the Bola Cyclone and 
emergencies like earthquakes. There is a Disaster Recovery Plan 
operated from the Prime Miniseer's Department. The Department of 
Civil Defence and Regional Councils also have emergency plans. 
Some agricultural emergencies operate outside these frameworks 
and they are covered by the Adverse Climatic Events Scheme 
administered by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
In agriculture climatic risk is part and parcel of farming. It 
is part of normal business risk. Proprietors should take these 
risks into account in all their decisions. In some cases risk can 
be ameliorated by sharing arrangements, ie insurance. However a 
number of surveys have established that farmers are generally 
under-insured (Parton, 1990). The problem with extreme climatic 
events is that things happen that go beyond the expectations of 
existing risk planning. Human suffering is often produced and the 
State gets involved. As a consequence there is an intervention 
in risk markets which could be said to distort the operation of 
that market. In effect there is an expectation that Government 
will provide ~assistance and hence there is less need to make 
100% provision for these extreme circumstances. 
There is therefore a policy question involved in emergency 
climatic procedures of appropriate risk sharing responsibility. 
The State follows conservative rules for compensation including 
using indemnity values and thresholds. The general principles 
stated in the Disaster Recovery Plan indicate that risk 
~an~gement and ~ts associated casts should be carried by the 
LndLvLduals, busLnesses and local authorities which benefit and 
are best able to manage or mitigate risk. There is the 
expectation that these people have a responsibility to insure 
against and attempt to minimise or mitigate risk in advance of 
any event. These rules and procedures shift part of the risk 
burden back to the individual. There remains however some promise 
of assistance arising from expectations generated by past 
experience. The State continues to make such interventions and 
hence codifies the practice most of the time. This practice has 
been commented on by a number of recene reviews of climatic 
assistance (Webber and Rivers, 1989; Brown and Copeland, 1991). 
Such actions need to be viewed as part pf the safety net provided 
in a welfare sense probably rather than absolute devolution of 
responsibility to the individual. 
Thus in practice most of the cost of recovery from climatic 
events is thrust back on the individual producer. This 
effectively limits the drain on the exchequer but may not be the 
mose efficient solution. Clearly one has to be saeisfied that 
giving assistance itself will bring about a cost-effective 
increase in national income (ie recovery will be faster than it 
would otherwise have been), and also that the mose efficient 
collective mechanism has been employed to spread the risk (this 
involves the role of insurance, under-investment in insurance, 
and the effect of State intervention). 
SUMMARY 
The thrust of agricultural policy since 1984 has been to remove 
the State from the decision making environment and let the market 
work. Many collective arrangements for spreading risk were also 
discontinued in the name of efficiency and non-intervention. Few 
new arrangements have been introduced to cake their place. One 
is tempted to conclude that non-subsidised stabilisation 
arrangements are non-starters. This remains to be seen. Other 
micro policy initiatives examined indicate that risk management 
efficiency has been probably enhanced in the period under review. 
The discounting scheme had good risk management properties though 
these were not the main objective of the scheme. The LandCorp 
proposals were against lessee's interests in speading risk but 
were probably more efficient from the point of view of resource 
use diseortions. The adverse climatic event proposals were 
efficient if the individual is best judge of his own survival 
mechanisms though inefficient in preventing a market for risk 
sharing to develope. The Treasury view of the world, while not 
clearly articulated for this subject matter, is a move in the 
right direction, while perhaps falling a bit short on encouraging 
institutional responses to risk management and sharing. We 
conclude that this is an evolving area of research and policy and 
that fresh arrangements may yet be put in place to get an 
appropriate balance between individual and collective risk 
sharing arrangements. 
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Government Adverse Events Relief Assistance 1986-1991: 
Impact On Adjustment 
S D Moniss, MAF Policy, MinislIy of Agriculture and Fisheries,Wellington 
Summary 
It has been suggested that Government Adverse Climatic Events assistance between 1986 and 1991 has 
been detrimental to the necessary process of adjusunent, and has distoned the risk environment for 
agriculture. Reviews of major Adverse Events Relief programmes over this period provide suppon for 
this argument. However, the contention that Adverse Events Relief per se is an impediment to 
adjustment need not be supponed. The two issues of shon term disaster recovery assistance and long 
term adjustment assistance need to be separated. In New Zealand there exists a consistent framework 
for shon term disaster recovery. There is no such framework for encouraging adjustment. Adverse 
Events Relief programmes, therefore, tend to mix the objectives of recovery with adjustment. It is the 
contention of this paper that it is the lack of an adjustment framework in New Zealand agriculture that is 
providing the impediment to adjustment, not Adverse Climatic Events Relief policy. It recommends 
Government and the sector should jointly address this issue. 
Key Words: Adjustment, Adverse Events, Assistance, Relief 
Introduction 
It has been suggested that Government Adverse Climatic Events assistance between 1986 and 1991 has 
been detrimental to the necessary process of adjustment, and has distoned the risk environment in the 
agricultural sector. Since 1988 the role of Government in the provision of adjustment assistance to 
encourage long term growth and efficiency in the rural sector has also come under scrutiny. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the developments in Adverse Climatic Relief policy and 
programmes over this period and discuss the impact they have had on the adjustment process within the 
agricultural sector. It draws conclusions for the future direction of both Climatic Disaster relief and 
adjustment policy in New Zealand. 
Historical Background to Adverse Events Relief 
There has never been an Act of Parliament governing Adverse Events Relief. The Minister of 
Agriculture has customarily had authority to grant approval for Standard relief measures. Submissions 
requesting additional relief have been considered on their individual merits and require the specific 
approval of Cabinet. Payments are made on an ex gratia basis and are therefore not challengeable in 
law. 
1. Pre 1970 
Before 1950, ad hoc relief had included compensation for some forms of propeny damage, 
transpon subsidies on stock and fodder, loans and bank overdraft guarantees. 
The Standard measures of ) 952 excluded compensation for property damage, but regrassing was 
subsidised on subsequent occasions and became a Standard measure in 1962. 
Transpon subsidies changed in detail only. The 1952 Standard measures restricted transpol1 
subsidies to exceptional circumstances. Subsequently, free rail transpon of hay and stock was 
allowed, and during the 1 970s coverage included farmers being able to use their own vehicles. 
For many years the then Stale Advances Corporation provided loan extensions to existing clients 
in need of drought or flood rehabilitation. In the period 1954-65 this was incorporated into the 
Income Equalisation Scheme. During the 1969-70 drought this policy was extended to include 
all farmers, and became a Standard measure. 
A Seasonal Finance Guarantee Scheme was operative during this period through the Bank of 
New Zealand. However, this scheme was never widely used; it was considered to be a last 
resort as needs were usually met by normal loan facilities. There was also reluctance by other 
trading banks to refer cusromers 10 a competitor. 
In the period 1954-65, high country farmers were permined to accum u1ate rax free reserves to 
cover snow losses. From 1965 this was incorporated within the Income Equalisation Deposit 
Scheme. 
Tax relief on the forced sale of livestock was introduced in 1964. Individuals could, at that time, 
use this concession outside a declared adverse event area. 
2. 1970-1980 
During the 1970 drought a review of climatic disaster relief was carried out by the Agricultural 
Production Council. 
Measures available at the time of this review included: 
(a) freight subsidies for both feed and livestock; 
(b) the Standard Government Guarantee Scheme for overdraft provision through the Bank of 
New Zealand; and 
(c) raxation concessions in the form of: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Section 103A under which income which was derived from the forced sale of capital 
livestock could be carried forward; 
the provision for re-estimation of income where this was materially different from the 
o~ginal estimate; and 
the deferment of terminal rax liabilities as a result of hardship. 
The 1970 review concluded that the main problem caused by the existing drought was a shortage 
of stock feed. The provision of feed, fmancial assistance [0 pay for it, and its transport, fonned 
the basis of the recommendations of the review, and the basis of policy for the immediate 
subsequent period. 
Special grain subsidies were introduced in 1970 and 1978. A nitrogen fertiliser subsidy was 
introduced in Taupo in the winter of 1978. 
Adverse Events Bonds were introduced in 1974 but discontinued in 1978. 
In 1975 the Government introduced a new form of assistance in which Climatic Relief loans were 
made available 10 farmers whose properties had suffered hardship because of adverse climatic 
conditions such as drought, hail, snowstonn, flooding, etc. It provided, in cases of extreme 
hardship, for the first rwo years interest up to a maximum total of $2,000 on a Climatic Relief 
loan to be accumulated in a suspense account and written off after a period of five years if the 
property was nOt sold in the meantime. 
The stated objectives of these loans were to assist farmers to restore the overall farming simation, 
to minimise the productive losses and restore viability. 
Budgetary measures such as the $1,000 Suspensory Loans of 1970, the Sheep Retention Scheme 
of 1971, and the 1978 Special Payment for Sheep and Cattle, were each related to adverse 
seasons, although they were nOt classed as direct adverse events relief. 
Section 94 of the Income Tax Act 1977 provided thaI revenue from the forced sale of livestock 
may be held-over to offset against the purchase cost of replacement animals. This mechanism 
was designed to minimise the distorting effect on taxable income of adverse events. The 
maximum defennent was rwo years. 
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3. 
Government guaranteed bank overdrafts were discontinued in 1977 after being in-operative for a 
period of 5 years. 
1980-1986 
A further review of Adverse Events policy relief was undertaken in 1979. Regrassing and 
transport subsidies were removed, and although the raxation concessions continued, with this 
move Government sought to rely on assistance through the Rural Bank in the fonn of 
Suspensory Loans as the Standard fonn of relief for future adverse events. 
To be eligible, an area had to be "declared" an adverse climatic event area, and criteria were 
tightened with "credit-wormy" farmers being targeted (Rural Bank Annual Report 1982). In 
practice, this criteria meant that farmers had to be considered viable prior to the adverse event 
before assistance after the event was provided. 
Special assistance took the fonn of any additional assistance deemed necessary if Standard 
Assistance was considered insufficient given the nature and scale of the event Provision of 
Special Assistance required Cabinet approval and funding. Any range of measures could be 
included. 
Despite the outcome of the 1979 review, during the early 1980s adverse events continued to be 
considered on an ad hoc basis. Successive events received greater and greater levels of 
assistance. In addition, inadequate specification of the criteria which defined whether an adverse 
event should or should not be declared resulted in a simation where large parts of New Zealand 
were continually under adverse event declaration for drought 
Following the Otago and South Canlerbury drought in 1985/86 Government approved Drought 
Suspensory Loans, administered by the Rural Banking and Finance Corporation. 
In the Gisborne (Ngatapa Valley) floods of 1985, Standard Assistance was augmented by grant 
assistance of up to $1 million for 80% funding of the costs of restoring access and water 
supplies. The objective was to target assistance to restore the basic physical integrity of farm 
properties. Additional assistance was also provided through the RBFC who allocated $2 million 
for Standard Climatic Relief Loans. 
In the South Canterbury floods of March 1986 additional Non-standard Assistance measures 
were also made available by Government On this occasion assistance was in the fonn of grants 
for 90% funding to restore uninsurable physical damage plus special assistance where significant 
loss of income had occurred. 
The Last Five Years - 1986-1991 
Only the major events relevant to the evolution of policy are referred to in this section. Many other 
events have occurred, and a number have received Government relief assistance. 
1 . October 1986 Review 
In October 1986, Government decided it was necessary to develop a set of instruments to deal 
with individual adverse events which was consistent, simple and clear, involved a minimal coast 
to the public accounts, met the Government non-economic objective of being a credible response 
to adverse events, and provided incentives to beneficiaries to minimise demands for such 
expendimre by requiring that nonnal commercial sources be exploited before assistance is 
considered. 
Assistance measures available and eligibility criteria were tightened to include: 
(a) Meteorological Criteria 
Specific meteorological criteria were defined to detennine whether or not an adverse event 
had occurred. Those criteria were as follows: 
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(i) .QrQygill 
A 1 in 20 year occurrence defIned by the number of defIcit days occurring in the 
summer, or a lack of rainfall in the winter, the comparison made over a 3 month 
period. 
(ii) Hie-h rainfall - Ooodine-
A 1 in 50 year occurrence over a minimum period of four weeks. 
It was not considered possible to derive criteria for snow, fire and earthquake events, and it 
was resolved that these continue to be considered on an ad hoc basis on the merits of each 
evenL 
Where these meteorological criteria were satisfIed, the Minister of Agriculture could 
recommend that the area be declared an Adverse Event area within which farmers become 
eligible for Standard assistance. This comprised RBFC Climatic Relief Suspensory Loans 
and taxation provisions through the Income Equalisation Scheme. 
(b) Suspensruy Loans 
The amount of interest in the first two years of the loan which could be held in a suspense 
account and written off after fIve years, unless the farm was sold before hand, was 
increased from $2,000 to $5,000 maximum to take account of the changes in farm costs 
and interest rates since the loans were first introduced in 1975. 
Eligibility criteria were tightened further. Any farmer adversely affected by the adverse 
event who would have qualifled for an RBFC loan before the event, but who did qualify 
for a loan under normal RBFC lending policy after the event, was eligible for the 
concession. If, however, the applicant, even with the concession taken into account, still 
did nOl meet the RBFC security and viability criteria, no loan would be granted. 
The effect of this tightening of criteria was to narrow the window of eligible farmers to 
such an extent that very few new Climatic Relief Suspensory loans were subsequently 
approved. From 1 April 1988, with the change in their ownership structure, the RBFC 
withdrew from administering these loans on behalf of the Crown. 
Table I: Climatic Relief Loan Statistics for years 1981-95 
Year Number Authorised 
($ mi1lions) 
1975 133 0.62 
1976 35 0.20 
1977 56 0.41 
1978 89 0.71 
1979 492 2.80 
1980 275 3.20 
1981 217 2.86 
1982 312 3.99 
1983 369 5.75 
1984 1351 26.34 
1985 583 14.92 
1986 916 42.50 
Source: Rural Bank Annual Reports 
4 (c) Non-slllDdard Measures 
The October 1986 Cabinet decision standardised restoration measures to Government Grant 
to meet 50% of the cost of restoring boundary fences and uninsurable components, and to 
stock water to the property. In each case farmers were required to meet the fIrst $4,000 
involved. 
Also in 1986, with the introduction of the new livestock tax scheme, Section 94 of the 
Income Tax Act 1977 was removed on the grounds that the new tax scheme accounted for 
adverse event effects. However, Standard measures still included provision for early 
withdrawal of deposits from the Income Equalisation Scheme. 
2. Bay of Plenty Earthquake March 1987 
3. 
The new policy was soon tested by an event not previously covered. 
On 2 March 1987 a major earthquake caused varying degrees of struCtural damage and disruption 
to the operations of some 400 farms and horticultural units in the Bay of Plenty. Earth 
movements and subsidence caused severe damage to drainage and flood protection systems, as 
well as disrupting access and utilities to farm properties. In addition, severe damage was 
sustained in the agricultural servicing sector, particularly at the Bay Milk Products Dairy 
Company plant at Edgecumbe. 
Government agreed to provide special assistance to farmers and growers in the form of grants to 
the value of $5.25 million. Standard adverse events relief policy at the time (primarily Climatic 
Relief Loans through the Rural Bank) was considered inadequate to address the scale of this 
regional disaster. It was also argued that the policy did nOl cover earthquakes, and even if it did, 
the scale of damage sustained by some farmers and growers was much greater than the scope of 
Standard relief measures to provide assistance for. 
Grant funding was provided to restore the physical integrity of farm and orchard properties as 
quicldy as possible. Grants were payable on items not normally insured, notably drainage, water 
supplies, farm access and tracking, fencing and horticultural (kiwifruit) support structures. It 
was, however, agreed that Government should not m'!ke assistance available for items which a 
prudent farmer or horticulturist would be expected to insure, nor did it cover compensation for 
loss of production. 
It was stated at the time that, in order to encourage lower rather than higher cost restoration 
options, more widespread insurance in the future, and to reduce administrative costs, the fIrst 
$2,000 of the cost of restoration was met by the farmers and growers. 
Recovery Plan 1988 
During 1988 another attempt was made to standardise the Government response to adverse 
events and natural disasters. Cabinet agreed to the establishment of a central Disaster Recovery 
Plan. 
The purpose of this recovery plan was to co-ordinate the recovery responses of the range of 
parties involved immediately after an adverse event. Adverse Climatic Events Relief for the 
agriCUltural sector remained under the control of the Minister of Agriculture and MAF, but this 
form of Government response, as did those of other Government Departments, fell beneath the 
co-ordinating umbrella of the Recovery Plan. The Recovery Plan was almost immediately tested 
by Cyclone Bola. 
4. Cyclone Bola March 1988 
Cyclone Bola struck the East Cape region in early March 1988. The event resulted in severe 
flooding, erosion and wind damage. 
The Cyclone Bola Agricultural Assistance Scheme was introduced by Government in response, 
the rationale primarily being that the regional economy was at risk. This rationale has carried 
forth from then to subsequent consideration by Cabinet of Special Assistance, particularly for 
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drought where, as indicated above, Special Assistance has little other application. However, the 6 
criteria for establishing whether a regional economy is at risk has not been established. causing 
subsequent difficulties, particularly in the South Island Drought 
11tis response differed from recent programmes, and the 1986 Cabinet decisions, in that it 
provided for both compensation for uninsurable damage and income loss. The use of 
compensation payments was at farmers' discretion and was nOl tied to farm restoration. It was 
intended that this degree of flexibility would facilitate more effective use of resources. It was 
also "hoped" that, where necessary, this would encourage changes away from inappropriate 
and/or uneconomic land use and would encourage farmers on non-viable farms to leave. 
Compensation included that for loss of crops and current income, and loss of income through 
permanent damage. 
The Bola model grants were calculated on the basis of a proportion of a total sum calculated on 
the income loss and indemnity loss value sustained on the property. A proportion of 60% of this 
figure was paid for Cyclone Bola, less a threshold of $5,000. 
The Djsaster Recovery Employment Scheme is a non-agriculture specific measure which was 
applied for the first time in an agricultural response following Cyclone Bola. Employment 
schemes of similar nature had, however, been used in the past 
The DRES is used in the agricultural and horticultural disaster recovery effort where labour is 
required to clean up and restore fences, particularly after flooding. Unemployed labour is used. 
at a marginal cost above the Unemployment Benefit The DRES scheme was considered very 
effective in Cyclone Bola and has since become the most common form of immediate relief 
approved after flood events. 
5. 1988/89 South Island prou&ht 
In 1988/89 a severe drought on the East Coast of the South Island developed. Its severity was 
assessed, based on the standard meteorological criteria, to be an event likely to occur only once in 
every 100 to 200 years. It came at a time when the financial position of farmers in the affected 
area was extremely poor with rising costs, particularly interest rates, and low product prices 
being received. 
Supplementary feed reserves coming into the drought were low, having largely been expended 
during the winter of 1988. Confidence levels amongst the farming community were at a very 
low level, and StreSS being suffered within farming families was at a high level. 
Following on from the criteria developed after Cyclone Bola, the regional economy in the area 
affected by the South Island drought was also deemed to be "at risk". Being a major event 
requiring more than Standard assistance, Government agreed in November 1988 to provide the 
South Island DroUght Relief Package as a Special Assistance programme. 
The review states that the general objectives of the relief package were: 
(a) to maintain family income at a minimum level so that a reasonable level of household 
expenditure could be maintained; 
(b) to assist in the rehabilitation of farming by making finance available to those who would 
not be otherwise able to borrow; 
(c) to restructure farming units both physically and financially to be bener able to accommodate 
furore droughts, and to have less need for future assistance; 
(d) to give humanitarian assistance to insolvent farmers, and to improve farm viability by 
improving management or changing land use patterns; 
(e) to assist farmers assess their current practices and future opportunities; 
(f) to stimulate the rural economy; 
(g) to boost farmer confidence. 
The restructuring objectives in (c) above are, in the authors' opinion, overstated. It was 
recognised that there was an ongoing need for the adjustment of agriculture and that adverse 
events provide the stimulus to bring that need to the fore. However, in its design, there was no 
specific intent to use the drought relief package to encourage restructuring as such. 
The package was introduced in rwo stages. Initially in November 1988, measures were 
introduced that dealt with the drought that existed at the time. Government also announced that it 
would make a commitment to providing rehabilitative assistance once the drought broke. Thus 
further assistance designed to rehabilitate farmers after the drought was first introduced in the 
autumn of 1989. The range of measures introduced included: 
November 1988: 
(a) Adverse Events Family Income Support. 
This measure provided income support to families placed in financial difficulty by the 
adverse event, and where their farm business was not generating sufficient income to meet 
essential family living expenses. Payment rates were based on those paid by the 
Department of Social Welfare in similar circumstances of special need to the non-farming 
sector. 
The Department of Social Welfare administered the programme on an agency basis for the 
Ministry of Agriculrore and Fisheries. 
(b) New Start Grants 
New Start Grants were designed to provide farmers placed in an untenable position from 
the adverse event, and who either chose to or had to leave their farms because of it, with a 
fresh start. New Start Grants were only paid by Government when a scheme of 
arrangement was entered into by all the farmers' principal financiers whereby they agreed 
to waive all future and subsequent claims to the farm title, assets and person receiving the 
grant. This was to protect the grant in the hands of the recipient and ensure it was not 
simply used to repay outstandirrg liabilities. 
A New Start Grant of up to $45,000 was payable from Government, reduced dollar for 
dollar by any residual equity remaining in the hand of the recipient on the closure of the 
farm business after settlement 
(c) Humane Slaughter of Livestock 
Agreement was reached berween MAF Quality Management, Federated Farmers and local 
District Councils on a procedure whereby a stock slaughter operation for unsalable or 
emaciated stock could proceed without direct cost to individual farmers. 
(d) Holding of Capital Livestock Proceeds in Trust 
The intention of Government in including this measure in the November package was that a 
provision of "trust" be established whereby the proceeds from the forced sale of capital 
livestock due to the drought be held by a farmers' fmancier, to be available to repurchase 
livestock once the drought was over. The intent was to prevent these proceeds from being 
diverted intO servicing other liabilities and place the farmer in a position of being unable to 
restock after the drought. 
However, following subsequent discussions with farmers, Government decided not to 
intervene in the commercial process or prerogative of security holders, and fmanciers were 
simply encouraged to assess their respective clients' positions on a case by case basis, 
while recognising the reasoning behind Government's intent. In reality the same intent was 
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(e) 
held by financiers and where it was possible and practical, fmanciers accommodated this 
need themselves. 
Faun Appraisal Scheme 
It was considered that a Farm Appraisal component was going to be essential in helping 
farmers assess the opponunities open to them for the furore, and help them work through 
implementing the best course of action both during and subsequent to the drought 
Decisions included those of whether 10 take up the New Stall Grant option of !he package, 
or if deciding to continue farming, the appropriate POSt drought rehabilitation programme. 
Farm Appraisals were primarily targeted at those farmers who did not have adequate access 
to on-going working capital and for whom the New Stan Grant option was one to 
consider. Farm Appraisals could only be undenaken by approved consultants suitably 
qualified in Farm Management 
(f) TechnoloeY Transfer and Farm Mana\:emenr Consultancy Pro&rnmme 
In recognising the limitations of a Farm Appraisal on its own, and in order to maximise the 
benefit from it, Government agreed that those farmers who had received a Farm Appraisal 
could qualify for an additional Farm Management Consultancy to undenake more work. 
Government also approved a stand alone Farm Management Consultancy scheme for those 
farmers who did not qualify for a Farm Appraisal. The primary purpose of these consultancies 
was to look at the future prospects for that farm business and to help to develop stronger farm 
businesses in the furore, bener able to cope with adverse events. 
Aurumn 1989: 
(a) Cavy-on-Finance SchemeIDrou\:ht Rehabjlimrion Loan Scheme 
(i) Carry-on Finance Scheme 
The Carry-On Finance Scheme was developed early in the autumn of 1989 to be 
delivered through the commercial finance market The Rural Bank has been sold and 
is therefore no longer the obvious choice. It was designed to make available working 
capital to those farmers who, because of the drought, would otherwise not have 
access to finance if nonnallending criteria were applied (security, payability and 
personal factors). This intent was pursued as the feedback from financial institutions 
and advisers at the time indicated that one of the key issues facing farmers in the post 
drought rehabilitation phase would be access to fmance to allow the recovery to 
happen. 
Under the scheme, Government would fund, for a period of rwo years only, the 
interest component of credit advances for new lending made by farmers' seasonal 
financier to those bona fide farmers who, because of the adverse event, would not 
otherwise have access to finance if nonnallending criteria were applied. 
The scheme was to provide finance only to those farmers that financiers deemed to be 
viable in the medium tenn but who, because of the adverse event, experienced a 
"cash shonfall" which limited their ability to operate a viable farm business. Farmers 
who were non-viable before the event, as considered by the financiers, were to be 
ineligible, as were farmers who were considered by their financiers to be sufficiently 
strong to receive access to seasonal finance under nonnal circumstances and lending 
criteria. 
The scheme was therefore designed to assist the "window" of farmers who had a 
furore after the drought but who required assistance to do so. This was consistent 
with the intent of the Government at the time to encourage farmers to be more self 
reli;tnt and less dependent on Government for assistance. 
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6. 
The Carry-on Finance Scheme did not, however, get off the ground. Financiers 
were not prepared to make the son of decisions, on behalf of the Government 
necessary [0 target !he scheme. It was also claimed that the window of eligibility was 
too narrow and that there would be inadequate security available, by definition, on 
the additional lending made. Financiers decided that they would not take part in the 
scheme. 
(ii) Rehabilitation Loan Scheme 
Government was then required to reconsider the fonn of post-drought rehabilitative 
assistance it was going to provide. It decided to continue with the principles of not 
providing rehabilitative assistance to farmers who were in a non-viable position for 
the future, nor to farmers who were financially strong enough to rehabilitate their 
farm businesses from their own resources. 
However, policies were required to overcome the issues of the provision of adequate 
security for lending which went beyond what would nonnally be provided, 
mechanisms to target that middle band of farmers berween the non-viable and those 
sufficiently secure to recover from their own resources, and how money was to be 
spent to maximise the rehabilitative effect of Government funding, the purpose of its 
involvement. 
The Drought Rehabilitation Loan Scheme was thus developed. It was available to 
only those farmers whose farm businesses had a ratio of interest and rent to gross 
farm income of 15% and greater on 1987/88 (pre drought) accounts infonnation 
(targeting the middle band). Farmers considered by their financiers not to have a 
viable future were to be ineligible, as were farmers with interest and rent 
commitments of less than 15% as above. Non-eligible farmers were still able to 
apply for a New Start Grant. 
Government provided a guarantee on 80% of each qualifying loan made by financiers 
for a period of 4 years as the mechanism to resolve the additional security issue. 
Government paid interest at a specified rate on qualifying rehabilitation expenditure 
for 2 years, being their contribution 10 the cost of borrowings. 
A menu of eligible expenditure was derived against which the borrowing needed to 
be accounted for as the mechanism to ensure expenditure was targeted at 
rehabilitative expenditure. 
The maximum loan under this scheme was $45,000. 
Cyclone Delilah Kerikeri January 1989 
In January 1989 Cyclone Delilah hit areas of Northland, and Government agreed to provide 
Special assistance to fruit and vegetable growers in the area affected by the cyclone. The Cyclone 
represented a medium level event, in which the region was not at risk but individuals faced severe 
hardship. 
In April 1989, Cabinet approved, for eligible growers, access to ~ Adverse Events Family 
Income Suppon for a period of one year and New Start Grants, QJ: Carry-on Finance scheme for 
a period of two years, both based on the tenos and conditions of the South Island Drought Relief 
programme. An Orchard Appraisal Programme was also made available to assist in this decision. 
Interestingly, despite !he reasons given in the South Island why the Carry-on Finance Scheme 
would not work, it was implemented in Kerikeri and fmanciers did agree to take part. Nine 
growers received this fonn of assistance 
7. East Coast Noah Island Drou~ht 1988/89 
In March 1990, Government agreed to extend the provisions of the South Island Drought Relief 
Programme to the East Coast of the Noah Island. Drought conditions experienced in the summer 
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of 1988/89, combined with adverse weather conditions during the 1989 winter, resulted in high 1 0 
stock losses and had a significant impact on farmers and the East Coast of the Nonh Island. 
As with the South Island programme, justification for Government intervention was that the 
regional economy was at risk. On the basis of experience at that time from the South Island 
Drought Relief Programme, the East Coast North Island Special Drought Recovery Assistance 
programme was approved which included: 
(a) Farm Management Consultancies; 
(b) New Stan Grants; 
(c) Adverse Events Family Income SuPPOrt; 
(d) Technology Transfer Programme; 
(e) Drought Rehabilitation Loans. 
The programme details were based on those approved for the South Island, but were refined in 
detail to more specifically target the post drought recovery needs of the East Coast of the North 
Island. 
In effect this meant that the Adverse Events Family Income Suppon Scheme was more tightly 
targeted in its eligibility criteria, as was the New Stan Grant Scheme. Comparative levels of 
uptake with the South Island programme for both schemes reflect those changes. 
This programme is still under way, and has yet to be reviewed. 
8. December 1989 Revjew 
In December 1989, Government again reviewed the principles and guidelines that apply to the 
Recovery Plan for Natural Disasters and Emergencies within New Zealand and Adverse Events 
Relief policy. The purpose of this review was to: 
(a) more closely link the Recovery Plan and Adverse Events Relief policy through a common 
set of principles for disaster recovery; 
(b) following the variable responses to adverse events during the 1986-89 period, establish a 
consistent framework for short term recovery responses that was equitable and consistent 
between events, reflected both the scale and impact of the events, and was consistent with 
responses available under a civil defence emergency. 
The result was to align the principles for agricultural recovery assistance following an adverse 
event or natural disaster with those of the Recovery Plan. 
The Recovery Plan restricts Government assistance for both local authorities and individuals to 
cases were insurance is not available and hardship can be demonstrated. The principles, both 
implicit and explicit, in the Recovery Plan which, since December 1989, also apply to Adverse 
Climatic Events Relief pOlicy, include: 
(a) that central Government has a role in the recovery process after a major natural disaster or 
emergency; 
(b) that any Government response should be designed to restore the community capacity for 
self help, and be consistent with any Government policies regarding mitigation and 
alleviation measures; 
(c) the initial and primary responsibility for recovery rests with the community; 
(d) that risk management and its associated cOSts should be carried by the individuals, 
businesses and local authorities which benefit and are best able to rnitigatl! the risk; 
(e) 
(f) 
that individuals, businesses and local authorities have a responsibility to the extent possiblJ 
to insure against and attempt to minimise or mitigate risk, in advance of any event; 
that Government policies should encourage proper management practices such as: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
insurance of community and individual assets; 
establishment of adequate disaster reserve funds by businesses and local authorities; 
and 
the adjustment, over time, of infrastructures to limit the potential for future damage. 
Given the above principles, measures constituting Adverse Events Relief policy were amended to 
include: 
(a) the extension of shon-run emergency family assistance to the rural sector consistent with 
Social Welfare provisions; 
(b) the provision of humane means of disposal of distressed livestock; 
(c) the provision of shon-term emergency security measures consistent with the Disaster 
Recovery Plan; 
(d) the provision of disaster recovery employment assistance to non-civil defence emergency 
situations; and 
(e) taXation provisions for the early withdrawal of Income Equalisation deposits. 
Climatic Relief Suspensory loans through the Rural Bank were withdrawn. The Rural Bank had 
indicated it wanted to withdraw from their administration and uptake was low. 
These measures now form the basis of Adverse Climatic Events Relief. Some forms of Non-
standard assistance that had been provided since 1986 were considered inconsistent with the 
above principles and were therefore excluded from those measures mentioned above. However, 
it was recognised that the removal of those Non-standard means of assistance would not impair 
the ability of Cabinet to implement measures above and beyond those now within Adverse Events 
Relief policy as and if necessary. The adherence to these principles now depends on the resolve 
of Government in the face of future events. 
9. Taumaki-Wan&anuj Roods March 1990 
The resolve of Government in adhering to these principles was tested in early 1990. Following 
heavy rains and flooding in parts of Taranaki and Wanganui during the period January to March 
1990, Government provided Special assistance through the Taranaki-Wanganui Flood Relief 
Programme. , 
Grant funding was provided to contribute to the costs of restoring the physical security of the 
properties affected. Farmers were able to claim for 25% of the cost of restoration, less a 
threshold of $2,000, of: 
(a) boundary fencing; 
(b) internal access; and 
(c) essential water supplies. 
Given the relatively high number and cost of farm access bridges involved, additional assistance 
to the above was approved for their restoration. A threshold value of $5,000 applied to each 
bridge, and an additional percentage on a sliding scale assessed by Valuation New Zealand of 
, between 25 and 50% of restoration costs was paid. 
Grants lO!alled $607,000. Bridge claims amounted to 62% of total costs. 
A total of 124 claims for on fann damage were made. 
Table 2: Annual Expenditure: Adverse Events Assistance 
Year $ Year $ 
($000) ($000) 
1968/69 316 1980/81 689 
1969nO 477 1981/82 67 
1970m 3,541 1982/83 87 
1971n2 315 1983/84 31 
1972n3 192 1984/85 5 
1973n4 951 1985/86 1,220 
1975n6 263 1986/87 6,579 
1976m 374 1987/88 1,346 
197m8 203 1988/89 72,211 
1978n9 6,054 1989/90 27,199 
1979/80 314 1990/91 24,524 
1991/92 (est) 16,989 
Source: MAF 
Current Adverse Events Relief Policy Developments 
The details of the measures approved in the December 1989 review have not yet been finalised. A 
consultative process was entered intO during 1990. This programme, undertaken by MAP, was also 
aimed at improving the awareness of the rural community and agricultural organisations of the policy 
changes of 1989. 
There remain a number of issues that have yet to be fully resolved. They include: 
1. At what level should the trigger points be for central Government to provide assistance? 
Government has indicated its position is as insurer of last reson, and that the prime responsibility 
lies with local authorities, industry organisations and individuals. However, when does an event 
remain one that should be dealt with by the individual alone, when should local Government step 
in, and what role should industry organisations play? 
2. Related to the issue of oiggers is that of scale and impact Should the trigger points between the 
responsibilities of the above parties be defmed by causal parameters (such as meteorological 
criteria) or should they be defined by impact (such as the regional economy being at risk)? 
Associated with this is the number of people affected. Should impact be defmed by its physical 
effect or by the number of people, farms/orchards or businesses affected? and 
3. The issue of ~ between urban and rural, farm/orchard business and ·non-farm/orchard 
business also needs to be addressed. The question of why agriculture should be any different to 
non-agricultural activities has to be answered for adverse events policy as with all other policies 
this question has been asked of. 
Impact of Adverse Events Policy on Agricultural Adjustment 
It is difficult to establish the direct effect Adverse Events Relief programmes have had on the rate, or 
type, of adjustment taking place in the agricultural sector. However, fmdings of the major Adverse 
Event programme reviews during the last five years provide some leads. 
12 1. Cyclone Bola AIWCuirnral Assistance Scheme Review 
It was implicit in the Cyclone Bola package that reslOration of farmers' incomes and properties 
would lead to benefits to the region as a whole. The use of compensation payments was at 
farmers discretion. It was intended that this degree of flexibility would facilitate more effective 
use of resources. However, it was also "hoped" that, where necessary, this would encourage 
changes away from inappropriate and/or uneconomic land use. 
Government provided approximately $56 million in compensation payments to 2,217 farmers 
and propenies in four affected areas: Gisborne East Coast ($43.9 million), Nonhem Hawkes 
Bay ($4.7 million), Nonhland ($5.2 million) and Taranaki ($2.5 million). 
The review found that the assistance measures generally met the objectives set down by the 
scheme, noting in particular the depressed state of agriculture on the East Coast in 1987/88 and 
that the cyclone came at a time of low resilience amongst the farming community. The 
availability of compensation was therefore of immediate and positive psychological and practical 
benefit to many farmers. 
However, the review found that little change in land use took place and that compensation 
payments were used mainly to reslOre old land use patterns rather than develop more appropriate 
systems. It also found that compensation for loss of land due to erosion encourages incorrect 
land use. 
While the scheme succeeded in maintaining the social and economic fabric of the region as a 
whole, the effects were diluted by the fact that a significant portion of compensation funds were 
used to reduce debt. Farmers were not required to use payments for restoration work. 
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The review recommended that future programmes should better reflect risk and risk prevention. 
Therefore, while this programme provided useful amelioration of the shon term recovery 
problems of the affected areas, it did not provide for any long term solution. 
One would have to conclude that the Cyclone Bola Agricultural Assistance scheme did nothing to 
encourage long term adjustment in the rural sector; in fact in many cases likely impeded it, and 
provided the wrong signals to land users about acceptable and sustainable land use practices. In 
this way the risk environment for the agricultural sector was distoned. However, it must be 
accepted that there were no long term adjustment objectives explicit in the programme. 
2. South Island Drou~ht Review 
The review of the South Island Drought Relief programme, released in early 1991, was an 
extensive evaluation of the efficacy of the programme, and included a survey of 190 farmers and 
15 fmanciers involved in the scheme. 
Some 3,500 farmers out of a total of 5,500 in the affected area received Adverse Events Family 
Income Suppon (AEFIS), 350 received New Stan Grants (NSG), about 1,000 received a 
subsidised Farm Management Consultancy, and 2,040 farmers received Drought Rehabilitation 
Loans (DRL). The Technology Transfer programme, concerned with improving drought 
management practices, involved approximately 1,000 farmers. 
The review concluded that the AEEIS programme was effective in getting assistance rapidly to 
those in need, and reasonably effective in stimulating the rural economy. The consultants 
reviewing the programme indicated that it was not sufficiently targeted and put this down to the 
speed with which it was implemented at the stan (in order to be operational before Christmas). 
The consultant's view of the New Stan Grant Scheme was that it was not particularly effective in 
re-structuring farming Cnml;.: this was not the scheme's objective), though it did succeed in 
giving outgoing farmers some equity when they otherwise would have got nothing. The NSGs 
did provide humanitarian assistance to those in a stressful position and enabled an easier 
resolution of the problems of many people in a very difficult position. Government's waiver of 
GST requirements, however, benefited mainly the fmanciers rather than the NSG recipients. 
The Farm Consultancy and Farm Al1l1rnjsal components of the programme were viewed as being 4 
effective in providing advice 10 farmers. However, understandably some farmers did not take the 
advice they were given. The programme was found to make a positive contribution to improving 
the long term viability of farms concerned, and was therefore effective in encouraging positive 
adjustment. 
It was felt that the Technology Transfer Programme was moderntely successful in making people 
aware of strategies for coping with drought. However, such programmes need to be 
implemented prior to events such as this to encourage preparedness, rather than looking at what 
should have been done. 
The review found that the Droue-ht Rehabilitation Loan Scheme worked well in terms of 
increasing farmers' confidence but was relatively ineffective in encouraging a more rapid 
recovery of farming in the region. It is questionable whether this scheme made any more finance 
available to those who would not be otherwise able to borrow, as was its intent. 
The review concluded that, overall, the package did improve confidence in the region at the time, 
but that the regional impacts were less than anticipated. This was due 10 the fact that much of the 
assistance provided to farmers was used to reduce debt. The consultants undertaking the review 
felt that the package had little effect on strucrural adjustment. The NSGs, AEFIS and the DRLs 
all had the effect of supporting current management systems and did not address the issue of 
being berter prepared for the next drought. 
3. Review Of Taranaki-Wanganui Flood Relief Programme 
The key recommendations of this programme review relevant to this paper were: 
(a) the use of replacement COSt values was an improvement on the previous indemnity value 
approach and should be retained; 
(b) the review does not support the furure treatment of bridge claims on a more generous basis 
than other forms of farm damage; 
(c) there is a need to reconcile the principle of helping those farmers who are facing genuine 
"hardship" with the requirement for a relief programme to treat all affected farmers 
equitably; 
(d) few claimants had made reasonable attempts 10 insure against, or mitigate the risks of, the 
damage incurred in these floods. The programme has done little to encourage greater 
individual responsibility for reducing future climatic risks; and 
(f) there is a need for Government, MAF, Regional Councils and Federated Farmers to take a 
much more pro-active approach to encouraging improved risk management on farms and to 
informing farmers of the considernbly reduced probability of Government financial 
assistance in response to future adverse climatic events. 
Conclusions 
Reviews of major Adverse Events Relief programmes during the period 1986-1991 have indicated that 
some of the relief measures provided by Government have at best done nothing to encourage, and at 
worst impeded, the necessary process of adjustment within the agricultural sector. Government has 
recognised, in a number of reviews, that its policy should provide incentives to minimise demands for 
tax paper funded relief after adverse events( 1986 review), encourage individuals, businesses and local 
authorities to minimise or mitigate risk, and encourage proper risk management prnctices (1989 
review). Despite this, Government has continued to provide assistance within relief programmes that 
have not supported this intent. One would have to conclude, therefore, that the risk environment for 
agriculrure in the last five years has been distorted by adverse events relief prograrnrnes. 
However, the contention that Adverse Events Relief per se is an impediment 10 adjustment need not be 
supported. 
There is a need 10 separate the two issues of: 15 
1 . short term disaster recovery assistance; and 
2. long term adjustment assistance. 
Within the 1989 review, the issue of the separation between the short term recovery assistance and long 
term adjustment assistance was raised. It was recognised that some of the measures applied in recent 
years, particularly those in the South Island Drought Relief Package, were of a long term adjustment 
narure, were inconsistent with the principles for disaster recovery, and would be more effective if 
implemented independent of disaster recovery programmes. 
While Adverse Events Assistance provided during 1986-1991 (some $150 million) achieved much in 
terms of restoration of confidence to individuals, businesses and communities, it has done little to 
encourage greater individual and community responsibility for risk from future adverse events, i.e., 
adjustment. As a consequence, despite Government's stated intention over the years to make 
individuals more responsible for their own risks, insufficient effort has been put into pre-emptive risk 
mitigation and encouragement of prudent risk management prnctice. There has been no reduction in 
Government's exposure to future claims for relief. 
There currently exists a consistent framework for short term disaster recovery assistance in New 
Zealand in the form of the Recovery Plan for Narural Disasters and the principles it contains. 
However, there is no framework in place to address the long term adjusnnent needs for the agriCUltural 
sector outside adverse event siruations. In Australia, for example, the Rural Adjustment Scheme fulfils 
this role and enables adjustment to be encouraged in the better rimes as well as the post-disaster 
siruation. 
However, because this framework does not exist in New Zealand, Adverse Events Relief programmes 
over this period have tended to include measures that would be better suited within an adjustment 
programme. Encouraging bener risk management through Technology Transfer and Farm 
Management Consultancy programmes is one such example. Unfortunately the 1989 review left 
unresolved whether there was a role for Government in the provision of measures that facilitate and 
encourage long term adjustment and Government has yet to resolve this issue. 
There is a legitimate role for central Government to be involved in the provision (not necessarily the 
delivery) of adjustment measures in agriculrure. Adverse Events Relief programme reviews support 
the view that such assistance is best provided prior to, not in response to, an adverse event. 
My concluding statement, therefore, is that an adjustment framework that, amongst other public good 
activities, encourages bener risk management practice is required in New Zealand and this issue needs 
to be addressed by Government and the sector together. 
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THE PRIMARY SECTOR'S CONTRIBUTION 
TO THE NEW ZEALAND ECONOMY 
Prakash Narayan' 
MAF Policy, Wellington 
SUMMARY 
The primary sector comprises indusnies that obtain products directly from the 
land or water. These indusnies include agriculture, fishing and forestry. 
The agricultural sector, for the year ending 31 March 1990, accounted for 14.2% 
of New Zealand's gross domestic product (GDP) and 18.6 % of employment. 
The farming sub-sector accounts for around half of the agricultural sector's 
connibution. Processing of farm products, inputs purchased by farmers, 
wholesaling/retailing activities and transport of farm inputs and outputs account 
for the remainder. During the period from 1976 to 1990, the nominal value of 
output from farming and the other agricultural sub-sectors has increased steadily, 
apart from a slight decrease by the transport sub-sector between 1986-87 and 
1989-90. However, the % connibution by the farming sub-sector to the country's 
GDP has declined over the period from 1976-77 to 1986-87, though there has 
been a small estimated rise in the 1989-90 year. 
The agricultural sector provided employment for around 18 % of the New 
Zealand work force between 1976 and 1990. Although the % connibution by the 
agricultural sector to the total work force has remained relatively constant, the 
agricultural sector labour force has declined from 260,000 in 1981 to 217,000 in 
1990. The connibution by the farming sub-sector to the total New Zealand work 
force increased from 8.5 % in 1981 to 9.2 % in· 1990. However, for the 
processing, farm input supply, wholesalelretail, and the transport sub-sectors, of 
the agricultural sector, both the number of people employed and the % 
connibution to total work force declined over this period. The number of females 
employed by the agricultural sector has increased over this period, while the 
number of males has declined significantly. Table 1 below summarises the 
connibution of the primary sector and its sub-sectors to the GDP and 
employment. 
The tisheries sector contributed approximately 1.0 % of GDP in 1989-90, up from 
0.3 % in 1976-77. Most of this comes from direct fishing and fish processing 
activities and very little from transport, input supply, and wholesaling/retailing 
activities. The fisheries sector also connibutes only about 1.0 % to employment. 
The forestry/logging sector contributed 5.9 % to GDP in 1989-90 compared with 
4.3 % in 1976-77. However, the number of people employed by this sector 
declined from 31,200 in 1976-77 to 26,100 in 1989-90, and its contribution to 
national employment correspondingly fell from 2.5 % to 2.2 %. 
The author wishes to thank Dr Panick Aldwell (FRI) and Barbara Whittington 
(MAF) for their technical and editorial advice, and Trina Huggins (MAF) for 
typing. 
TABLE 1 
Primary Industries' Contributlon
' 
to the New Zealand Economy 
YEAR 
INCOME ($million) 
Fanning 
Fishing 
Foresuy 
Total Agricul1= 
Total Fishing 
Total Fo ... uy 
Total Primary 
Industry 
National Income 
EMPLOYMENT' 
1976m 
1.364 
(9.8)' 
22 
(0.2) 
115 
(O.g) 
2.702 
(19.4) 
45 
(0.3) 
605 
(4.3) 
3.352 
(24.0) 
13.926 
Fanning 106.641 
(8.4) 
Fishing 2.884 
(0.2) 
FOn:!try 7.834 
(0.6) 
Total Agricuh= 233.308 
Total Fishing 
(18.3) 
5.350 
(0.4) 
1981182 
2.196 
(7.5) 
68 
(0.2) 
342 
(1.2) 
4.958 
(16.9) 
281 
(1.0) 
1.702 
(5.8) 
6.941 
(23.7) 
29.272 
113.562 
(8.5) 
3.621 
(0.3) 
10.425 
(0.8) 
259.799 
(19.5) 
7.766 
(0.6) 
1986187 
3.012 
(5.5) 
159 
(0.3) 
1.040 
(1.9) 
7.380 
(13.5) 
557 
(1.0) 
2.685 
(4.9) 
10.622 
(19.4) 
54,493 
112.230 
(8.8) 
3.903 
(0.3) 
10.797 
(0.8) 
228.495 
(17.9) 
9.217 
(0.7) 
1989/90' 
3.811 
(5.5) 
201 
(0.3) 
1,565 
(2.3) 
9.867 
(14.2) 
713 
(1.0) 
4.081 
(5.9) 
14.661 
(21.1) 
69,590 
107.100 
(9.2) 
4.704 
(0.4) 
5.881 
(0.5) 
217.054 
(18.6) 
11.263 
(1.0) 
Total FOl<suy 31,186 39.182 37,205 26.096 
Total Primary 
Industry 
~.tiona1 
Employment 
(2.5) (2.9) (2.9) (2.2) 
265.080 291.585 274,522 247.407 
(21.2) (23.0) (21.5) (21.8) 
1,272,333 1.332.339 1,278,204 1,165,600 
Source: (a) Inter-Industry Srudy of the New Zealand Economy 
(b) New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 
2 Nwnbers in bracket indicate percent of total 
3 Fulltime employment only 
(e) estimate 
(I) forecasts 
1990/91' 
3.426 
(4.7) 
211 
(0.3) 
1,649 
(2,2) 
9.735 
(13.2) 
756 
(1.0) 
4,239 
(5.8) 
14.730 
(20.0) 
73,540 
109,456 
(9.4) 
4.784 
(0.4) 
6.075 
(0.5) 
217.705 
(18.7) 
11.280 
(1.0) 
26.211 
(2.3) 
248.249 
(22.0) 
1.163.268 
1991192' 
3.702 
(4.8) 
228 
(0.3) 
1.713 
(2.2) 
10,250 
(13.2) 
798 
(1.0) 
4.407 
(5,7) 
15,545 
(19.9) 
77.760 
111.098 
(9.4) 
4.765 
(0.4) 
6,191 
(0.5) 
220.676 
(18.8) 
11,403 
(1.0) 
26,526 
(2,3) 
252,256 
(22.1) 
1.177.227 
INTRODUCTION 
The initiative for this study arose from concerns about a lack of knowledge on 
the current size of the New Zealand agricultural sector. A previous study 
(Guthrie and Lattimore, 1984) reported the contribution of the agricultural 
sector to the New Zealand economy for the 1981-82 year. Since then, the 
government has implemented economic policies that have had significant and 
wide ranging effects on the agricultural sector. Also, over the years, the 
agricultural sector in New Zealand, as in other OECD countries, has increased 
in structural complexity. With significant innovations in farming technology, 
an expansion of those industries responsible for producing and supplying the 
wide variety of inputs is expected. As final consumers become more 
sophisticated, growth of processing, distribution and retailing activities is also 
expected. 
Information on the current and expected future size of the primary sector in 
New Zealand is an essential input into policy decisions that impact on this 
sector. 
The objectives of this paper are: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
to derive up to date reliable estimates of the total contribution which 
the primary sector of the New Zealand economy makes to net output or 
gross domestic product (GDP); 
to derive up to date reliable estimates of the number of people 
employed in the primary sector; 
to identify the changes in the contribution by each of the sub-sectors of 
the primary sector to GDP and employment over the last fifteen years; 
and 
to project the key estimates of the contribution of the primary sector to 
the New Zealand economy, for the 1990-91 and 1991-92 years. 
METHODS 
To achieve the above stated objectives, input-output tables from the Inter-
Industry study of the New Zealand Economy were used. The Inter-Industry 
study provides an economic statement of the industrial structure of the 
economy for a given year, measuring the direct and indirect inter-relationships 
between industries. This data is compiled by the New Zealand Department of 
Statistics once every five years, the latest available for the 1986-87 year. 
Using the inter-relationships between industries as published in the 1986-87 
Inter-Industry tables, and the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 
(NZIER) sectoral projections, the input and output figures for the primary 
sector were derived for the 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92 years. 
The input-output transactions (or flows) tables are a means of describing, for a 
particular period, the supply and disposition of the goods and services of an 
entire economic system. A framework of the input-output transactions table is 
presented in figure I below. 
Employment figures were compiled based on the New Zealand Standard 
Industrial Classifications, using data from New Zealand Census of Population 
and Dwellings. 
PRIMARY SECTOR DEFINED 
The 'Primary SeclOr' comprises industries that obtain products directly from 
the land or water. These industries include agriculture, fishing and forestry. 
Although mining and quarrying are also classified as primary industries, they 
are not included in the present study. 
The 'Agricultural Sector' consists of a number of sub-sectors. These sub-
sectors are farming, input supply, processing, distribution and retailing of farm 
products. Each of these sub-seClOrs consists of a number of industries or 
groups of industries, as classified under New Zealand Standard Industrial 
Classification. For example, the input supply sub-sector includes agricultural 
services, food, beverages, machinery and chemical products. The fisheries and 
the forestry sectors can also be sub-divided into input supply, processing, 
distribution, and wholesaling/retailing sub-sectors. The composition of the 
primary sector as defined in this study is depicted in figure 2, and the 
industries included in the sub-sectors are presented in the Appendix. 
This broader definition is adopted in this study since the primary objective of 
farming is 10 make final products available to consumers, and thus all the links 
in the production and distribution chain can be considered. The inter-industry 
tables for the New Zealand economy show strong interdependence of the 
farming, input supply, processing, distribution and retailing sub-sectors. This 
interdependence of the sub-sectors is also evident in the fisheries and the 
forestry seclOrs. 
The following is a more detailed description of the above sub-sectors of the 
agricultural seclOr. A similar description is also applicable 10 the fisheries and 
the forestry sectors. . 
Farming: This sub-sector is made up of all farming activities, such as 
livestock production, pOUltry farming and horticultural activities. 
Processing Industries: Industries included in the processing sub-
seClOr were selected on the origin of their major inputs. Hence, 
industries whose major inputs came from New Zealand agriculture, as 
opposed 10 imports, were included in the processing sub-seclOr. 
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FIGURE 2 
THE NEW ZEALAND PRIMARY SECTOR 
THE PRL~.4RYSECTOR 
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Source: After Stewart et al (1985) 
REST OF 
WORLD 
Agriculturally based processing industries that derived more than 50% 
of their inputs from impons were excluded from the processing sub-
sector of agriculture. These exclusions were on the basis that the 
industry could exist entirely on impons of materials and may exist 
without inputs from New Zealand agriculture. A related processing 
industry with more than 50% of its intermediate inputs from the 
domestic economy was assumed to exist primarily because of the 
inputs available from agriculture. 
On this basis the following two groups of industries were included in 
the processing sub-sector: food, beverages and tobacco; and textiles, 
apparel and leather products. 
Input Supply Industries: Input supply industries to farming were 
defined as any industry with a direct input to the farming sub-sector. 
On this basis a number of input supply industries were identified (see 
the Appendix). Industries included ranged from agricultural services, 
fishing, forestry, food, beverages, textiles, wood products, chemical 
products, metal products, finance and business services, government 
services, etc. Also included in this sub-sector was the transpon of 
inputs to the farming sub-sector. 
Transport: Only pan of the total net output from the transpon sub-
sector could be assigned to the agricultural sector. Road passenger 
transpon was omitted from the general transpon grouping as it did not 
apply directly to the movement of agricultural inputs or outputs. 
Transpon industries included here were rail, road freight, water, air 
transpon and storage. 
Wholesale/Retail: Only pan of the total net output from these 
industries could be assigned to the agricultural sector. 
A detailed list of all the industries included in the above sub-sectors of the 
agricultural sector as well as for the fisheries and the forestry sectors is given 
in the Appendix . 
THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
The agricultural sector, for the year ending 31 March 1990, accounted for 
14.2% of New Zealand's GOP and 18.6% of its employment (see tables 2 and 
3) respectively). The two main sub-sectors of the agricultural sector are 
farming and processing, accounting for around three quaners of the sector's 
contribution to GOP and employment. The input supply, wholesaling/retailing 
and transpon sub-sectors account for the remainder. 
Contribution to GDP 
Since 1976-77, the conrribution of the tOlal agricultural sector to the New 
Zealand economy has declined. The main reason behind this overall decline 
was a fall in the conrribution of the farming sub-sector. Lower world market 
prices for many of New Zealand's major agricultural products have conrributed 
to the relative decline of farming's conrribution to New Zealand's GDP in 
recent years. Since 1984/85, the decline in assistance to the farming sector 
with the subsequent decline in wool and sheepmeat production, high interest 
rates and exchange rates have also constrained growth in the value of farm 
output. Although the value of output from the processing sub-sector has 
increased significantly over the last decade, its % conrribution to total GDP has 
remained almost static. However, it has become more important within the 
agricultural sector, reflecting the greater emphasis on adding value to primary 
products. 
The input supply sub-sector has declined in relative importance over the last 
decade, in line with trends in the farming sub-sector. Lower profitability of 
many farming enterprises has led to cutbacks in expenditure on farm inputs, 
such as fertilisers, repairs and maintenance, and agricultural machinery. Total 
fertiliser sales fell from over 2.5 million tonnes per year in the early 1970s to 
around 1.4 million in 1990. 
In recent years, the nominal value of output of the transport sub-sector, as well 
as its relative importance has decreased. The factors behind this decline are 
lower livestock haulage, mainly as a result of reduced stock numbers, reduced 
fertiliser usage, a downward shift of transport charges caused by greater 
competition, and declining port company charges due to improved productivity 
on the waterfront. 
The relative decline in importance of the agriculture sector partially reflects the 
uneven removal of assistance across the different indusrries of the New 
Zealand economy. With the manufacturing sector remaining relatively highly 
protected, while assistance to the agricultural sector has been virtually 
eliminated, resources such as capital have shifted away from agriculture. Since 
1984, the removal of price support and taxation incentives for agricultural 
development, combined with depressed real farm profits and high interest rates, 
have resulted in a fall in investment in the farming sub-sector, with capital 
expenditure reduced to very low levels. 
The agriculrural sector's contribution to GDP is expected to decline in the 
1990-91 year 10 13.2 % and remain at around that level in 1991-92. One 
major cause of this decline is the continued increase in the relative imponance 
of service indusrries, while at the same time the relative importance of all the 
sub-sectors of the agricultural sector are in decline, although the value of their 
output is rising. Also, no significant world market price increases of our major 
agricultural product are expected in the more immediate future. 
TABLE 2 
AGRICULTURE'S CONTRIBUTION TO GDP 
YEAR 1976m 1981182 1986187 1989,," 1990191' 1991m' 
1m %of Sm 'I. of Sm %of Sm %of Sm %of Sm %of 
Tow Tow ToW Tow Tow Totd 
&:onomic Economic Economic Economic Economic &onomic 
Na Na Sa SOl 
Oulp" Oulpttt Oulpttt Oulp" 
Fuming' 1,164 9.8 2.196 7.5 1,012 5.5 1.811 5.5 
Proc=in8 778 S.6 1,404 4.8 2,192 4.4 1,480 S.O 
Input Supply 300 2.2 745 2.6 1,044 1.9 1,161 1.7 
W/Reuil 184 1.1 411 1.4 689 1.1 1,208 1.7 
Transport 78 0.6 202 0.7 241 0.5 207 0.1 
TOTAL 2,707 19.4 4,9S8 16.9 7,180 Il.S 9,867 14.2 
TotalNct 
Oulpw 11,926 29,272 54,491 69,S9O' 
Soun:e: lntct·lndusuy SlLIdy of lhc New Zubnd Economy, Depl.nmc:al of Statistics 
I MAFEmmo ... 
c Estimate 
f FOJCCI.N (US1nS NZIER projectiuu) 
Noce: Tollb may not add duo 10 rounding. 
TABLE 3 
Na 
Oulpw 
3.426 4.7 
1,611 4.9 
1.200 1.6 
1.2S7 1.7 
221 0.1· 
9,715 11.2 
71.540 
AGRICULTURE'S CONTRIBUTION TO EMPW~ENT' 
YEAR 1976m' 1981182' 1986187' 1989190) 1990i91f 
No's 'I. of No', 'I. of No's '1.0£ No's 'I. of NO'6 '1.0£ 
Total in Total in Total in Total in Total in 
Wodt Wod< Wmk Wodt Wmk 
Fo= Fo= Fo= Fo= Fo= 
Farming' 106.600 8.4 113.600 8.5 112.200 8.8 107.100 9.2 109~00 9.4 
Proc=ing 76.400 6.0 79.500 6.0 71.100 S.7 61.600 S.s 61.SOO S.l 
Input Supply 29.400 2.3 42.600 3.2 27.400 2.1 29.700 2.5 29.900 2.6 
Whol .... " 11.300 1.0 14.700 l.l 10.600 0.8 12.000 1.0 12.200 1.0 
Rouil 
Transport 7.700 0.6 9,500 0.7 S.2OO 0.4 4.700 0.4 4.700 0.4 
TOTAL 233.308 18.3 259.799 19.5 228.495 17.9 217.054 18.6 217.705 18.7 
Tow 1.272.333 1.132.339 1,278,204 1.16S.6OO 1.163.268 
?=on, 
in :\2 
WOIk Foccc 
Na 
Oulpw 
1,702 4.8 
1.7S0 4.8 
1,247 1.6 
1,315 1.7 
236 0.1 
10,250 11.2 
77.760 
1991mt 
No', 'I. of 
Tot.alin 
Wodt 
Fo= 
1ll.100 9.' 
62.300 S.l 
30,200 2.6 
12.300 1.0 
4.700 0.4 
220.676 18.8 
1,177.227 
1 Full time: labour force (including unemployed socking wodr.), There wcm: an Additional 59.vS persma employed put-time (in the: 
olgricultunl SCCLer) in 1990. 
W16m to 1986187 Source: !'lew Zealand Census of Population ud Dwellings. Deputmcnt of SU.USUC$. 
Fann.ing 1989/90 Source: Housc:.hold ubour Force Survey, OcpuunCnI of Sutisti~, 
Others 1989190 Sou.n:c: New Zealand Businc:s.s Directory. Dcpartmcm of Sl;uistiCi. 
r Forc:caru. using NZlER Sectoral Projoc:tiona: (Perccru Change Fo~lU) 
Note: T.ablcs m.y nO!. "dd due to rounding. 
Employment 
Although the agricultural sector's labour force has declined from 260,000 
people employed in 1981-82 to 218,000 in 1989-90, its contribution to the 
total work force has remained relatively constant at around 18 %. This is 
because the total New Zealand labour force has also declined during this 
period. 
Despite the relative decline in importance of the farming sub-sector's 
output, its contribution to employment increased from 8.4 % in 1976-77 to 
9.2 % in 1989-90. There is a general lack of suitable employment 
opportunities off the farm and rural workers are less geographically mobile 
than those in urban areas. 
The number of people employed in the processing sub-sector has been 
declining since 1981-82, with an acceleration in this trend from 1986-87. 
Technological change in this sub-sector, such as in meat processing, and the 
rationalisation of the meat industry, have affected labour utilisation. The 
reduction of protective barriers and the removal of export subsidies from the 
textiles, clothing and leather industries have also contributed to the decline 
of the processing sub-sector. 
The significant drop in the input supply sub-sector labour force can be 
attributed to the reduction in input use mentioned above, caused mainly by 
lower farm returns and reduction of input subsidies. 
Until recently, the transport industry had been highly regulated. 
Deregulation of road and rail, which make up most of the agricultural sector 
transport, resulted in significant restructuring of both industries, including 
major labour shedding. There was also a large reduction in the number of 
waterside workers as a result of reform in the shipping industry. 
Employment in the farming sub-sector is forecast to increase from 107,100 
in 1989-90 to 111,100 in 1991-92. Smaller increases in the other sub-
sectors, except in processing, are also expected. Since the deregulation of 
the New Zealand economy in 1984, and the subsequent removal of many 
forms of protection, the agriculture sector has now consolidated its position. 
The expected increases in profit will likely to be translated into investment 
and much-needed spending on intermediate inputs. This should generate 
increased employment opportunities in the sector. 
The above figures are based on full-time employment. The agricultural 
sector also employs a significant number of people part-time (table 4). 
During 1990, there were 212,600 people employed full-time and 59,300 
part-time by the agricultural sector. However, the contribution of the 
agricultural sector to total employment remained at around 18 per cent 
when part-time workers are considered in the analysis, for 1989/90 year. 
SUB-SECTOR FULL-TIME 
Farmln" 101.100 
Proc:wlng 51.975 
Input Supply 31.446 
Wholt:laJelRelall 13.979 
Transport 8.156 
T ... I 212.656 
TQIalNZ l,l65,6OfJ 
Wtlri;Jon_ 
TABLE 4 
Full-lime yen .... P.rl·lIme Agricultural 
Seclor Labour Force, 1990 
% OF TOTAL PART·TIME 
NEW 
ZEALAND 
WORKFORCE 
9.2 37.100 
4.4 5.798 
2.7 9,208 
1.2 6,205 
0.7 964 
18.2 59.275 
310,100 
TOTAL 
144,200 
57.713 
40.654 
20,184 
9,120 
271.931 
1,475,700 
Source: Department of Statistics (HOUKhold lAbour fOl'CC Survey, June 1990) 
TABLE 5 
Male nnUl Female A&rlcullurat Sulor Labour Jo'orce, 197' &. 1986 
SUB-SECTOR MALE 
1976 1986 1916 
~ OF TOTAL 
NEW 
ZEALAND 
WORKFORCE 
9.8 
3.9 I 
2.7 
1.4 
0.6 
18.4 
FEMALE 
1986 
!'Iio Percent' No Pcrcent No Percent' ~o 
Farming 85.400 80 83.500 74 21.200 20 28.734 
Processlni 59.200 18 49.000 67 17.100 22 24.{XlO 
Input Supply 20.000 13 19.100 70 7,300 27 8.300 
WholaaleJReta" 10.100 76 8.000 15 3,200 24 2.681 
Tralllporl 6.800 89 4,300 83 900 II 900 
Total 181,600 79 163.900 12 49.700 21 64.600 
Tol4lNZ 865,098 68 841,338 66 4U1,13S 32 436,866 
WDr·fof'C~ 
--'- -- '----
, ... 
1 ~Iale (or female) U I perc:a1l of totall.100ur in e.tch cau:"gory. 
Source: Departmall of Suwtics (New Zel.land Census of Popub.tion md Dwellings) 
i 
. 
Percent 
26 
33 
, 
30 I 
25 
11 
28 
I 
J4j 
The number of males in the total New Zealand work force declined by 
2.8 % from 1976 to 1986 (table 5), while the number of females increased 
by 7.3 %. By contrast, the number of males in the agricultural sector 
declined by 9 % and the number of females rose by 33 % over this period. 
The farming, processing and transpon sub-sectors were the main 
contributors to this trend. Changes in the life-cycle of rural people 
following the post World War 2 baby boom, and changing attitudes to work 
have led more rural women to seek paid employment. Types of jobs 
opening up in the processing and services sectors tend to be those taken up 
by women. Better roading and transponation, more processing of farm 
products, and greater mechanisation of farm operations, is providing rural 
women with greater opponunities for panicipating in paid employment. 
THE FISHERIES SECTOR 
Contribution to GDP 
The fisheries sector, compared with the agricultural sector, is relatively 
small. During the year ending 31 March 1977 it contributed only 0.3 % of 
the country's GDP. In more recent years, this contribution has increased to 
1 %. Most of this comes from direct fishing and fish processing activities, 
with very little from the transpon, input supply, and wholesaling/retailing 
sub-sectors. 
The compositional change occurring within the fisheries sector has been 
more in favour of fishing and fish processing activities. Their combined 
contributions to GDP rose from 0.3 % in 1976-77 to 0.7 % in 1989-90. 
This has occurred mainly as a result of greater participation by New 
Zealand fishermen in deep-water fishing and by enforcing a greater control 
over foreign owned vessels since the late 1970s. The number of foreign 
licensed operators in New Zealand's Exclusive Economic Zone has declined 
significantly since 1977, while joint venture schemes between New Zealand 
and foreign owned vessels have inCTeased. Expon sales increased by 63 % 
by volume between 1984 and 1988 (NZ Fishing Industry Board, 1990). 
Japan is the industry's principal expon market by both value and volume. 
Growth of the Japanese economy over the past decade has provided ample 
marketing opponunities for New Zealand seafood exponers, and is expected 
to remain a major source of market demand growth. 
To suppon the expanding fishing and fish processing sub-sectors, the 
remaining sub-sectors of the fisheries sector have also increased in relative 
imponance over this period. Table 6 below summarises the contribution of 
the fisheries sector and its sub-sectors to GDP. 
TABLE' 
Fbhertea' Contribution 10 GOP 
YEAR I'n6m 1981i82 1986/81 1989,wo 1990~1' 1991m' 
Sm %of Sm %of Sm %of Sm %of Sm %of Sm %of 
ToLii Tow ToW Tow Tow Tow 
Economic Ecooonuc Economic Economic Economic Economic 
Set Nco Nco Nco Nco Net 
Oulp'" 0uipU1 Oulp'" Ou",", Ou",", Ou",", 
Fishing' 22 0.16 68 0.23 159 0.29 201 0.29 211 0.29 22l! 0.29 
"'0<CUU>8 IS 0.11 101 0.35 220 0.40 279 0.40 299 0.41 310 0.40 
InPUl 3.5 0.03 19 0.06 40 0.07 38 0.05 40 0.05 43 0.06 
Supply 
WholCSllcl 74 0.25 37 0.07 109 0.16 114 0.16 119 0.15 
Retail 
Tn.n.sport 4.0 0.03 19 0.06 101 0.19 86 0.12 92 0.13 98 0.13 
Tow 45 0.32 281 0.96 557 1.02 713 1.02 756 1.03 798 1.03 
Tow 13.926 29.272 54.493 69.590 73.540 n.76O 
Nco 
Oulp'" 
estimate 
fo,"uls (U,ing NZlER Pmjc(;tions, Scptanbcr 1 m) 
Sowcc: Dep.nmc:nt of SLlwaCi (hucr--lndusuy Study oC lhc New Zealand Econc.my) 
TABLE 7 
Fisheries' Coatrlbudon to Employment 
YEAR 1976ml 1981i8Z' 1986/871 1989J'JO' 1990/91' 1991m' 
No's %of No's %of No's %of No', %of No's %of No's %of 
TotAl in Total in TOLalin Total in Total in. Toulin 
Wad< Wad< Wad< Wod< Wad< Wad< 
Fo"", Fo". Force Fo,," Fo"", Fo,," 
Fishing' 2.884 0.23 3.621 0.27 3.903 0.31 4.704 0.40 '.784 0.41 4.765 0.40 
Pnx=ing 922 0.07 2.154 0.16 2.793 0.22 3.588 0.31 3.520 0.30 3,636 0.31 
InPUl 332 0.Q3 531 0.04 865 0.07 727 0.06 726 0.06 738 0.06 
Supply 
Wholeulc 1.088 0.09 829 0.06 498 0.04 641 0.05 647 0.06 648 0.06 
/Reu.iJ 
Tn.nspon 12. om 631 0.05 1.158 0.09 1.603 0.14 1.603 0.1. 1.616 0.14 
ToW 5.350 0.42 7.766 0.58 9.217 0.72 11.163 0.97 11.280 0.97 11.403 0.97 
PI:rsons lo2m33 1.332.339 1.278.204 1.165.600 1.163.268 1.1TI.227 
in 
!'-lew Zul.and 
WorklOICC 
NoleS I to 3 sec footnote to Ulblc 3 
f • FOR:!Cut5. using r,'ZIER. Scc:ton1 Projccticas 
Employment 
The fisheries sector's connibution to national employment increased from 
0.4 % in 1976-77 to 1.0 % in 1989-90 (see table 7). The sector employed 
5,400 people in 1976-77 and this more than doubled to 11,300 in 1989-90. 
Approximately three quarters of these people were involved either in fishing 
or in fish processing. Greater participation in deep sea fishing, more joint-
venture operations with foreign operators and increased surveillance of New 
Zealand's exclusive economic zone have increased output from the fisheries 
sector. This has connibuted to increased employment in this sector. 
Increased investment in the catching sector as well as in processing capacity 
in recent years has helped create more employment opportunities. 
THE FORESTRY SECTOR 
Contribution to GDP 
The forestry sector's connibution to GDP increased from 4.3 % in 1976-77 
to 5.9 % during 1989-90. This coincided with the country's need to 
diversify the economy away from an almost total dependence on agriculture 
for its earnings of overseas exchange. Between 1981-82 and 1989-90, the 
relative importance of the forestry/logging sub-sector increased while the 
remaining sub-sectors of the forestry sector declined in relative importance 
(see table 8). This partly reflects a continuation in the trend of log export 
growth from New Zealand in more recent years. In 1989-90 log exports 
grew by over 40 % in volume and 54 % in value (Ministry of Forestry, 
1990). A number of factors, including an increasing wood supply, the 
partial sale of the State's plantation resource and a lack of investment in the 
sawmilling industry, indicate that log export volumes will continue to 
increase over the forecast period. 
The relative decline in importance of the processing sub-sector can be 
atnibuted to the growing log expon market, and to the low economic 
activity and downturn in the housing market in the past year, both in New 
Zealand and in Australia, where most New Zealand sawn timber exports are 
sold. In recent years profitability in the saw milling industry has greatly 
declined. World prices for pulp have also declined in the past year, as a 
result of an increased output and a decline in demand for paper. 
As wood has few environmentally acceptable substitutes and generally 
requires less energy for conversion than other materials, no decrease is seen 
in future wood demand. According to the Ministry of Forestry (1990), the 
opposite may well be true because, as wood becomes increasingly more 
environmentally acceptable, demand could actually increase. 
TABLE' 
Formr,.. Contribution 10 GDP 
YEAR 1916(T/ 1981/82 1986187 1989190' 1990~1' 1991192' 
Sm 'Lof Sm .. of S .. 
'" of Sm '" of Sm '" of Sm '" of 
Toul Tow Tow Tow Toul Tow 
Economic Economic &onomic Econonuc Economic Economic 
Sa NcI Na Net Na Na 
0u1pUl 0u1pUl Ou'!' .. 0u1pUl Ou'!' .. Ou'!' .. 
Fo<U\lY 115 0.8 342 1.2 1.040 1.9 1,S65 2.2 1.649 2.2 1.713 2.2 
Proc=ing 258 1.9 90s 3.1 1,291 2.4 1.943 2.8 1.990 2.7 2.064 2.7 
In!"" 18 0.1 54 0.2 65 0.1 66 0.1 68 0.1 71 0.1 
Supply 
Who1oWe1 189 I.' 317 1.1 124 0.2 3n 0.5 388 0.5 40S 0.5 
Rcuil 
Tnnspon 25 0.2 84 0.3 159 0.3 135 0.2 144 0.2 154 0.2 
Tow 60S 4.3 1.702 5.8 2.685 4.9 4,081 5.9 4,239 5.8 4,407 5.7 
Tow 13.926 29.Z72 54.493 69.590 73.540 77.760 
Net Output 
f Projections using NZlER Sectoral ProjcctionJ 
e c:rumltc 
Source: Dcpanmms. DC SU.UsUCI (lntcr-lnduslJ)t Swdy of lhc New Zealand Economy) 
TABLE 9 
Foralry'. Contribution to Employmen" 
YEAR If£l6ml 19811821 1986/871 1989J90' 1990el' 1991/92' 
No', "'of No', '" of No's '" of No', .. of No's '" of No', '" of 
TOlilin TouJ.in Total in Total in TOl&!in Total in 
Wod< Wod< Wod< Wod< Wod< Wod< 
Fo ... Force Fo= Fo= Force Force 
Fo""'J' 7.834 0.6 10.425 0.8 10.797 0.8 5.881 0.5 6.075 0.5 6.191 05 
Procusi.ng 17.662 1.4 19.966 15 17.784 1.4 12,111 1.0 11.987 1.0 12.q8 1.0 
In!"" 1.693 0.1 2.357 0.2 1,714 0.1 1.711 0.2 1.718 0.2 1.745 0.2 
Supply 
Wholcu.lcl 2.176 0.2 3.950 0.3 4.475 0.4 3.776 0.3 3.81' 0.3 3.814 0.3 
Retail 
Tnll5pon 1.821 0.1 2.484 0.2 2,435 0.2 2,617 0.2 2.617 0.2 2.638 0.2 
Toul 31.186 2.5 39.182 2.9 37.205 2.9 26.096 2.2 26.211 2.3 26.526 2.3 
Tow 1,272.333 1,332.339 1,278,204 1.165.600 1.163,268 1.177,2Z1 
Penons in 
NewZe,almd 
Wodiorcc 
f Forccuu. using NZlER Seeton.! Projections 
NOlCS 1 to 3 see fOOlnOlC to table 3 
Employment 
The number of people employed in the forestry sector declined from 31,200 
in 1976-77 to 26,100 in 1989-90 (see table 9). This trend is evident in the 
forestry/logging, processing and the input-supply sub-sectors, while 
employment remained stable in the wholesale/retail and transport sub-
sectors. 
The potential for growth in local demand for timber products, is limited, 
while exports .of unprocessed whole logs, or at best of chips, are expected 
to increase. Thus, some further decline in employment is likely. For 
employment to increase, greater domestic processing of the forestry resource 
would need to occur. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Over the last decade, the agricultural sector's contribution to the New 
Zealand GOP has declined from 19.4 % in 1976-77 to 14.2 % in 1989-90, 
while that for the forestry sector has remained stable, but the fisheries sector 
has increased in importance. This in part reflects past governments' 
policies of diversifying the economy away from an almost total dependence 
on agriCUlture for its earnings of overseas exchange, but is also influenced 
by unfavourable world price trends for many of our major agriCUltural 
products. 
In recent years, the forestry and fisheries sectors have had more favourable 
international markets than the agricultural sector. In forestry, wood has few 
environmentally acceptable substitutes and is likely to become increasingly 
more environmentally acceptable, thus increasing demand further. Although 
the market outlook for the fisheries sector is favourable, careful 
management of the resource base is required to prevent depletion. 
In terms of national employment over the last decade, the fisheries sector's 
contribution has increased, agriculture has remained stable and the forestry 
sector's has declined. 
In total, the primary sector's contribution to GDP declined from 24 % in 
1976-77 to 21 % in 1989-90, while its contribution to employment rose 
from 21 % to 22 % over the same period. These trends are forecast to 
continue through to 1991-92. Although further on-shore processing of 
primary products would increase employment, some products, such as sawn 
timber, have low demand in traditional markets and/or the industries are 
facing declining profitability. In order to promote increased investment in 
the primary sector and thus create employment opportunities, continued 
efforts must be made to improve international competitiveness. 
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APPENDIX: 
Industries Included in the 
Primary Sector* 
1 Industries included in the Agricultural Sector 
The left hand colwnn shows the agticulrural sub-sectors and their indusuies at the 128 industry level. 
right hand column shows the corresponding indusuies aggregated to the 62 industry level. 
(Note: numbers shown alongside industry names refer to inter-industry srudy table components). 
128 Industry level 62 Industry Level 
(1976{17) (1981/82. 1986/87) 
(a) Farming Industries 
1 Agrieuirure and livestock production 1 Dairy Fanning 
2 Poultry farming 2 Sheep & Beef Farming 
3 Other farming n.e.e. 3 Other Farming 
(b) Processing Industries 
10 Meat freezing and preserving 11 Slaughtering & Preserving meat 
11 Ham. bacon and smallgoods 11 Slaughtering & Preserving meat 
12 Abattoirs. slaughterhouses 11 Slaughtering & Preserving meat 
13 Butter, cheese. other milk products 12 Dairy Products 
14 Milk processing stations 12 Dairy Products 
15 lcecream 12 Dairy Products 
16 Fruit and vegelable preserv ing 13 Other Food Preparation 
18 Vegelable and animal oils and fats \3 Other Food Preparation 
19 Grain milling 13 Other Food Preparalion 
25 Feeds for fowls and animals 13 Other Food Preparation 
27 Malting. brewing beer and stout 14 Beverages. Tobacco Products 
30 Wool scouring 15 Textiles 
31 Woollen milling 15 Textiles 
34 Hosiery and other knitting mills 16 Wearing Apparel & Foolwear 
35 Other spinning and weaving mills 16 Wearing Apparel & Footwear 
38 Tanning and leather finishing 16 Wearing Apparel & Foolwear 
39 FeUmongery and fur dressing 16 Wearing Apparel & Foolwear 
40 Leather goods 16 Wearing Apparel & Footwear 
41 Footwear other than rubber. plastic or wooden 16Wearing Apparel & Foolwear 
(c) Input Supply Industries 
4 Agrieuirural services 4 Agrieuirural Services 
5 Hunting and trapping 5 Hunting & Trapping 
6 Forestry and logging 6 Forestry and Logging 
9 Mining and quarrying n.e.e. 10 Other Mining and quarrying 
13 Buner. cheese. orner milk produclS 11 Siaughlerings 
16 Fruil and vegelable preserving 12 Dairy Products 
19 Grain milling \3 Olher Food Prep. 
24 Food preparations n.c.c. 13 Other Food Prep. 
25 Feeds for fowls and animals 13 Other Food Prep. 
33 Made-up lex tiles (not wearing) 14 Beverages 
36 T exwes n.c.c. 15 Textiles 
37 Wearing apparel excluding footwear 16 Wearing Apparel & Foolwear 
42 Sawmills l7 Wood and wood products 
43 Planing mills and timber preservation 17 Wood and wood products 
46 Wood products n.e.e. 17 Wood and wood products 
49 Pulp. paper and paperboard 18 Paper and paper products 
52 Printing and publishing 19 Printing & Publishing 
55 Chemical products nec 21 Other Chemicals 
56 Chemical fenilisers 21 Other Chemicals 
57 Paint and varnish 21 Other Chemicals 
58 Pharmaceuticals. cosmetics. elc 21 Other Chemicals 
The 
• Source: Inter-IndustrY Srudy of the New Zealand Economy 1976-77. 1981-82 and 1986-87. Department of 
Statistics. Wellinglon, NZ 
(c) Input Supply Industries (Condnued) 
59 Soap. cleaning preparations 21 Other Chemicals 
61 Petroleum and coal products 23 Petroleum & Coal Products 
63 Motor vehicle tyres and tubes 24 Rubber Products 
64 Vuleanising and tyre retreading 24 Rubber Products 
65 Rubber products n.e.e. 24 Rubber Products 
66 Plastic products n.e.c. 25 Plastic Products 
72 Conaele Products 26 Non-metallic Minerals 
75 Basic metal industries 27 Iron & Steel Products 
77 Wireworking and nail making 29 Fabricated metal products 
79 Metal products D.e.C. 29 Fabricated meUlI products 
80 Agrieulrural machinery and equipment 
81 Machinery n.e.c. 
29 Fabricated meUlI produc!-, 
30 Machinery n.e.c. 
83 Electrical apparalUs and repairs 31 Elecuical Machinery 
86 Motor vehicle assemply 32 Transport Equipment 
87 Motor body building. caravans 32 Transport Equipment 
89 Transport equipmen~ n.e.e. 32 Transport Equipment 
95 Electric light and power 35 Electricity 
36 Gas Manufacruring & Distribution 
37 Water Works & Supply 
99 Non-residential buildings 38 Building & Ancillary Building services 
100 Construction other than building 39 Other Construction 
101 Ancillary building and construction 
102 Wholesale and retail trade 40 Wholesale & Retail& Hotels 
103 Restaurants and cafes 41 Restaurants & Hotels 
104 Hotels. camps and other lodgings 41 Restaurants 
105 Rail transpon 42 Rail Transport 
107 Road freight lranspon 44 Road Freight Transport 
108 Services to land transpon 44 Road Freight Transport 
110 Air transport 46 Air Transport 
111 Slorage. freight and travel agents 47 Services to Transport 
112 Communication 48 Communication 
113 Financial Institutions and services 49 Banking 
500ther Financial InsL & Services 
114 Insurance 51 Insurance 
115 Real EsUlte 52 Real ESUlte 
117 Business services 54 Business Services 
118 Renting and leasing machinery 54 Business Services 
119 Public administration 55 Public Administration 
119 Public administration 56 Sartitary & Cleaning 
119 Public administration 56 Sartitary & Cleaning 
119 Public administration 62 Domestic Services to Household 
122 Health services 59 Health Services 
124 Social and community services 58 Social & Community 
125 Recreational and cultural services 60 Recreational & Culrural 
126 Repair of motor vehicles 61 Personal Services 
(d)(i) Transport Industries (Distribution) 
105 Railtranspon 42 Rail Transport 
107 Road freighl transpon 44 Road Freight Transpon 
108 Services to land transpon 44 Road Freight Transport 
109 Water lransport 45 Wale< Transport 
110 Air transport 46 Air Transpon 
III Storage. freight and travel agents 47 Services to Transport 
(d)(ii) Wholesale and ReUllllndustrles 
102 Wholesale and retail trade 40 Wholesale & Retail Trade 
2 Industries Included in the Fisheries Sector 3 Industries Included in the Forestry/Logging Sector 
128 Indu,ay Level 62 Indusay Level 128 Indusay Level 62 Indusay Level 
(1976(17) (1981/82. 1986/87) (1976(17) (1981/82. 1986/87) 
(a) Fisblog Sector (a) ForestrylLogglng Industry 
7 Fishing Fishing 6 Foresay and logging 6 Foresay and logging 
(b) Processlog industry (b) Processing Industries 
17 Fish processing 13 Other Food Processing 42 Sawmills 17 Wood and wood produclS 
(c) Input Supply Industries 43 Planning mills and timber preservation 17 
Wood and wood produclS 
44 Plywood. veneer and building board n.e.c. 17 Wood and wood prodUCIS 
61 Petroleum and coal prodUCIS 23 Petroleum & Coal ProduclS 
85 Shipbuilding and repairing 32 Transport Equipment 
46 Wood produclS. n.e.c .• baske~ caneware and cork 17Wood and wood produclS 
49 Pulp. paper and paperboard 18 Paper and paper produclS 
102 Wholesale and retail trade 40 Wholesale & Retail 
109 Ware: transport 45 W IJ1et Transport 
(c) Input Supply Industries 
113 Financiallrtstirutions and services 49 Banking 
500ther Financial Irtstirutions 
114 Insurance 51 Insurance 
117 Business services 54 Business Services 
122 Health services 59 Health Se:vices 
124 Social and communil}' services 58 Social & Community Se:vices 
125 Recrearional and culrural services 60 Recreational & Culrural Services 
126 Repair of motor vehicles 61 Personal Se:vices 
3 Other farming n.e.c. 3 Other farming 
55 Chemical produclS n.e.c. 21 Other chemicals 
56 Chemical fertilisers. 21 Other chemicals 
61 Petroleum and coal prodUCIS 23 Petroleum & coal prOduclS 
63 Motor vehicle tyres and tubes 24 Rubber produclS 
77 Wireworking. nail and fastener making 29 Fabricaled metal prodUCIS 
79 Metal products n.e.c. 29 Fabricaled metal produclS 
80 Agriculrural machinery and equipment 29 Fabricaled metal produclS 
(d) Transport Industries (Distribution) 100 ConstrUction other than building (civil) 38 Building and ancillary building services 
101 Ancillary building and constrUction 38 Building and ancillary building services 
105 Rail transport 41 Rail Transport 
107 Road freight transport 44 Road Freight Transport 
109 WIJ1et transport 45 Ware: Transport 
102 Wholesale and retail trade 40 Wholesale & retail 
105 Rail transport 42 Rail transport 
107 Freight transport by road 44 Road freight lIansport 
109 Warer transport 45 Water transport 
(e) Wbolesale and Retail Industries 112 Conununication 48 Corrununication 
113 Financial institutions and services 49 Banking 
102 Wholesale and retail lIade 40 Wholesale & Retail Trade 500ther fmancial instirurions and services 
114 Insurance 51 Insurance 
117 Business services 54 Business services 
122 Health services 59 Health services 
124 Social and related community services 58 Social & communi[}' services 
125 Recreational and culrural services 60 Recreational & cui rural 
126 Repair of motor vehicles 61 Personal Services 
(d) Transport Industries (Distribution) 
105 Rail transport 42 Rail Transport 
107 Road Freight transport 44 Road Freight Transport 
108 Services to land transport 44 Road Freight Transport 
109 Water transport 45 Water Transport 
110 Air transport 46 Air Transport 
III Storage, freight and travel agents 47 Services to Transport 
(e) Wholesale and Retail Industries 
102 Wholesale and retail trade 40 Wholesale & Retail Trade 
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New Zealand \ Korean Casein Tradel 
Introduction 
During the last six years New Zealand-Korean trade has increased rapidly, 
from $140 million in 1985 to over $750 million in 1991 to be New 
Zealands fifth largest export market. Fuelled by phenomenal real GNP 
growth rates in Korea (see Figure J) exports from New Zealand of logs, 
wool, tallow, aluminum, mutton, hides and skins, pulp, leather, fish and 
casein have increased dramatically. 
Up till now casein is one of the few agricultural goods which has been 
allowed into Korea without being heavily restricted. Casein, therefore, may 
give some indication as to the extent of penetration that New Zealand 
agricultural exports could achieve if Iiberalisation of agricultural trade 
occurs in Korea. 
In this paper the objective is to develop a simple trade model of the 
world casein market incorporating the major players in the casein market. 
This is done by estimating demand and supply equations, transport and 
tariff costs. The model is then used to quantify the likely effects of 
various Korean government trade policy scenarios. 
Theoretical Considerations 
The problem of finding spatial market equilibrium conditions can be 
formulated as a mathematical programming problem. The nature of the 
mathematical programming problem depends on the form of the demand 
and supply equations in the trading regions and the form of the transport 
cost functions. Where country demand and supply functions are linear and 
per uni t costs of transportation are fixed, the spatial equilibrium model 
can be formulated as a Quadratic Programming problem. In this case, two 
alternative QuadratiC Programming formulations are possible: a) 
maximising a social welfare function, as proposed by Samuelson (J 952), 
I. This paper is based on a dissertation by Chris Nixon completed for the 
requirements of an MBS. I grateful for the assistance of Professors 
Townsely and Rae. 
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(expressed indirectly as a function of consumer and producer surpluses in 
the trading countries or regions), or b) maximising a net revenue function 
(sum of country or region net revenues). 
The Model 
To model the world casein market a one commodity, five country model 
was created focusing on production and consumption in these five major 
regions. The regions are New Zealand and the European Communitr (the 
major exporters of casein), the United States, Japan and Korea (the major 
customers). There are other players in the casein market but consistent 
time series data on these countries are almost impossible to obtain and 
their export quantities are small. They include Poland, USSR, and 
Argentina. 
The relationship between consumption and production is initiated by the 
demand for the final product in each region. Casein has a variety of 
commercial process uses. It is dried and used in edible foods as diverse as 
meat products, coffee whiteners, bakery products; its industrial uses 
include technical applications such as adhesives, artificial silk and plastics 
as well as animal feeds. The demand for casein is, therefore, complex to 
model. 
To establish a demand function in each region, the data on the major use 
of casein in that region was used. This simplifies the problem and 
abstracts from the potential minefield of estimating four or five different 
demand equations (for different casein product uses) in each region. In 
most regions the substitutes for casein are other milk based products 5uch 
as cheese) and skimmed milk powder. 
The world casein market is dominated by the European Community. 
Compared with the European Community, New Zealand is a very small 
producer of milk} New Zealand's small domestic market, however, allows 
2. EC is treated as one region because the countries in the Community 
are covered by the same subsidy regime. 
3. Casein is used in pizzas as a cheese substitute. 
large quantities of dairy products to be exported. Coupled with this, New 
Zealand's competitive production costs enable the New Zealand Dairy 
Board to compete favorably with the European Community. 
To make their farmers price competitive the European Community have 
developed a raft of subsidies to protect its producers. This has lead to an 
oversupply of milk in the European Community and depressed world dairy 
prices. To restrain milk production, Community planners introduced a milk 
quota system in 1984. The effect of the quota system has been to reduce 
the amount of milk produced. For example milk production has fallen from 
103 678 thousand tonnes in 1984/85 to 94 509 thousand tonnes in 1989/90. 
The world price, because of its dominating influence in the market, is 
determined by the level of European Community assistance to its farmers. 
The reduction of European Community production subsidies has had a 
significant bearing on the recent dramatic rise and fall of world dairy 
prices. For casein the scenario is no different, with European Community 
production outstripping all other regions. International prices are set by 
the policy makers in the European Community. This is reflected by the 
fact that as quotas are curbed in the European Community, production has 
dropped pushing up world casein prices by 2! times over the past twO 
years. 
Demand for Casein 
Over 99 percent of casein production in New Zealand is exported to world 
markets, therefore, modelling domestic demand is unnecessary. A base year 
of 1987 is used as a representative year. The quantity exported to the 
three major casein markets from New Zealand was 40 836 tonnes. The 
other 21 164 tonnes was exported to at least twenty other countries.The 
major use of casein in the United States, Korean and Japanese markets 
are cheese substitute in pizzas, and coffee whitners. The dominant 
suppliers are the European Community and New Zealand. 
4. The EC producers 26 percent of world milk production while ;-\ew 
Zealand produces 1.7 percent. 
In 1987 United States imported casein from countries other than New 
Zealand and the European Community amounting to 10 270 tonnes. The 
assumption was made that these imports were not sensitive to United 
States casein prices5• 
Although the demand for casein is smaller in Korea than in the United 
States, European Community and Japan, it is New Zealand's most 
important dairy product exported to the Republic of Korea. Casein and 
sodium caseinate, used in industrial applications and in coffee whiteners 
are the chief money earners. In 1987 casein exports to Korea earned New 
Zealand NZ$9.6 million compared with NZ$1.9 million for all other dairy 
products. The major outlet for New Zealand dairy products is the hotel 
trade which is worth some NZ$8.3 million. In the Japanese market, casein 
(along with milk powder) makes up 80 percent of New Zealand's dairy 
trade with Japan. 
US 
Japan 
Korea 
n=17. 
TABLE I 
Estimates of Regional Casein Demand Equations, 1987 
Price 
Intercept Coefficient R2 Durbin-Watson 
30051 -26.42 87.7 2.27 
20200 -1.10015 61.8 2.01 
-990 -0.3054 96.9 1.27 
The estimated demand equations presented in Table I are "collapsed" in 
the sense that all explantory variables other than casein price are set at 
their respective 1987 levels. Explanatory variables included wholesale 
prices of casein substitutes (cheese, wholemilk powder and skim milk 
powder) and per captia income. 
5. So that imports do not de!in)crease dramatically as prices de!in)crease. 
R2 estimated equation values were acceptable. The t statistic values for 
per capita income and casein price coefficient were significant at the 5 
and 6 percent level respectively. 
The signs of the independant varibles are mostly as expected for the 
Japanese, Korean and United States demand equations. However some were 
not as expected6• Given that United States, Japanese and Korean milk 
production and milk by-products are heavily subsidised and imports are 
subject to restrictions, perhaps this is not a suprising result. 
Calibration of the Model 
The objective of this study was to use the estimated demand equations, 
presented in the previous sections of this chapter, to analyse equilibrium 
casein consumption and prices in response to supply and tariff rate 
changes, relative to the actual situation in 1987. 
For a number of reasons, the estimated demand equations fail to exactly 
predict 1987 casein consumption levels in each country. The most obvious 
reasons for prediction errors include omission of relevant explanatory 
variables and incorrect functional form of the estimating equations. Also, 
the method of ordinary least squares, used in this study, minimises the 
prediction error variance at the mean value settings of the explanatory 
variables included in the estimating equations. Since the 1987 values of 
the explanatory variables are in general some considerable distance from 
their mean values, the prediction error variance for 1987 casein 
consumption will be correspondingly greater. Although estimating 
procedures designed to minimise forecasting error variance are available, 
for example autoregressive moving average models, their use was beyond 
the scope of this study. 
Since the estimated demand equations fail to exactly predict 1987 casein 
consumption levels, their use in a spatial equilibrium analysis of the casein 
market is likely to produce results that are unrealistic when compared to 
the observed pattern of prices and consumption in 1987. To overcome this 
6. See :\ixon CG, forthcoming Dissertation Massey University 1991. 
problem, the estimated demand equations were "calibrated" for 1987 by 
adjusting the constant term value so that the 1987 casein consumption 
prediction error is zero for each country at the observed 1987 casein 
price. A similar approach has been reported by McCall and Townsley7 
where, given a range of equation and coefficient values as reported in the 
sCientific literature, models were calibrated (coefficient values found) to 
minimise forecasting error variance. The calibrated demand equations are: 
TABLE 2 
Unadjusted and Adjusted Demand Equations 
Adjusted Unadjusted 
United States 141263.63 - 15.916 P2 160392.8 - 15.916 P2* 
Japan 23925.2 - l.l p. 24558.39 - l.l p. * 
Korea 6286.7 - 0.184 P3 6463.73 - 0.184 P/ 
NB * Demand equations have been collapsed into the Intercept and Price 
Coefficients converted into $NZ from Table I. 
P2' P3 & p. represent the price of casein in US, Korea and Japan 
respectively. 
The adjusted demand equations are used for the base result and scenario 
analysis. Table 2 compares the adjusted and unadjusted demand equations 
for the United States, Japan and Korea. 
7. See McCall D.G. and R.J. Townsley, A Use of Calibration in the 
Development of Simulation Models, Mathematics and Computers in 
Simulation 30 (J 988) 27-32 North-Holland. 
Supply of Casein. 
New Zealand and the European Community dominate the world casein 
market, producing over 80 percent of casein on the world market. In this 
model they are assumed to be the only producers and exporters. Lack of 
data on Eastern European and South American producers hinders the 
extension of the model to cover these regions. 
Stocks of casein are assumed to be zeros, therefore, supply is assumed to 
equal production in any particular year. 
New Zealand production has been relatively static9 over recent years. In 
the quadratic programming model both the European and New Zealand 
quantities have been kept constant. The 1987 exports values have been 
used as a base year in the quadratic programming model. Since we are 
concerned with the major markets, only the tonnage exported to these 
markets is used in subsequent analysis, 'ie. 40 836 tonnes. 
The European Community is the largest producer of casein in the world. 
The major producers in the European Community are West Germany, 
france, Denmark and the Irish Republic. West Germany and france have 
traditionally been the major producers of casein. Subsidies have encouraged 
increased production not only in West Germany and france but also in 
Ireland and Denmark. Aid to casein producers has gone up substantially 
over the past twenty years. 
The European Community has built up a complex raft of subsidies to cover 
its dairy industries. Prices have been driven by these subsidies rather than 
by market demand. Given that the EC has such a large influence on world 
dairy trade it also means that world dairy prices are largely influenced by 
EC subsidies. for example when the EC decided to increase export 
subsides on a wide range of dairy products international dairy priCes fell 
virtually instantaneously in direct correlation with the subsidy increase. 
8. Over 99% of casein produced in any year is exported in that year. 
9. Apart from 1973 where drought and poor returns contributed to a 
slump in casein production. 
Part of the reason for the difficulty in predicting European casein export 
volumes is that casein production depends upon not only casein prices and 
subsidies but subsidies and priCes of joint products such as skimmilk and 
wholemilk powder. Casein production in the EC depends almost entirely on 
the amount of subsidy paid out rather than the world price. Therefore, in 
one scenario (scenario 2) EC production is set at different levels (ie. 
between 30 000 and 100 000 tonnes at 10 000 intervals) to simulate 
various levels of government intervention. In all other scenarios European 
casein supply has been held constant in the quadratic programming model. 
Using this approach a supply profile can be built up without delving' into 
the complex subsidy support given to European producers. What drives the 
product mix for European milk products is an area beyond the scope of 
this thesis. (for further work in this area see Clough and Isermeyer and 
Lattimore et al.) The intention in this study has been to vary the amount 
of casein supplied by the European Community on to the world market to 
examine its effect on Korean, New Zealand, United States and Japanese 
prices and trade flows. 
Transportation Costs 
Transportation costs have been estimated for the shipment of casein from 
the EC and New Zealand to each of Japan, Korea and the United States. 
All cOStS are ocean freight rates. These rates are port to port rates only. 
(Transportation rates are made up of ocean freight rates only.) Table 6 
shows the various freight costs between suppliers and their markets. 
TABLE 3 
Transportation COStS 
EC US KOREA JAPAN NZ 
NZ$ per tonne 
EC 260.10 169.56 169.56 
NZ 308.06 150 150 
Source: New Zealand Shipping Line, Wellington. 
Tariff Costs 
Tariffs are Imposed in Korea and japan (20 and 10 percent respectively). 
Ad valorem tariffs are use in both cases. Ad valorem tariffs are 
incorporated inside the quadratic programming matrix (Takayama and Judge 
p272). 
Scenarios 
To speculate on various market opportunities given a 'freer' trading 
environment and to facilitate evaluation of the solutions, three scenarios 
involving various levels of tariffs and European supplies are examined 
relative to the base scenario. These are: 
1. Removal of Korean tariff; 
2. SenSitivity analYSis on the quantity of European Community 
casein exported to the world market with a) 20 percent Korean tariff and 
b) tariff barriers removed; 
3. 'freer' trade ie EC exporting 69 000 tonnes and no tariffs on 
casein entering the Japanese or Korean markets. 
Base Scenario and Solutions 
After calibrating the demand equations, the base solution along with actual 
values for 1987 are presented in figures 2 and 3. Actual and estimated 
priCes and trade flows are compared. 
The base scenario is calculated from the speCified fixed supply volumes 
and the calibrated demand equations. 
The base price results approximate the 1987 values. Japan (4.65 percent) 
and Korea (3.61 percent) shows the largest difference between priCes, 
whereas European, New Zealand and American prices are within 1.5 
percent of the actual prices. 
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The major difference between the model and actual results is that the 
model did not predict casein trade flows from the European Community to 
Korea and Japan. In none of the scenarios did the model predict European 
product to be shipped to the East Asian market (see figure 3). All 
European casein exported was consumed in the American market. New 
Zealand supplied all three markets (Korea, Japan and the United States). 
Moving into the East Asian market requires set up costs. The Europeans 
may be looking at the potential this market offers and not so much at its 
set up costs. for example, Nestle have just entered the coffee whiteners 
market in Korea stating that they see large potential for growth in this 
market over the next five years 
As the multilateral and bilateral pressures for trade liberalisation increase, 
markets in East Asia will open up, allowing opportunities for suppliers. The 
current GATT round has focused attention on the highly protected markets 
of Asia. The Europeans are probably looking to exploit a freer trading 
environment in the future. 
These reasons reinforce the naive nature of this type of model. Strategic 
and political objectives are ignored when modelling the market equilibrium 
trade flows and prices. 
The base result gives an fob revenue return for the New Zealand casein 
exports to the three major markets of r--:ZSJ33.06 million. 
Scenario J removal of the Korean tariff on casein. 
Results are given in figures 4 and 5, where they are compared with the 
base result. With the further reduction in the tariff rate, New Zealand 
and European prices for casein increase slightly, as do the prices in Japan 
and the United States. The Korean price drops by 16.4 percent from 
NZ$4090 to NZ$3415.6. a change of NZS674,4 per tonne (fob). Here also 
returns to producers are increased because the percentage drop in price of 
casein in Korea is lower than the actual tariff removal. 
Figure 5 
SCENARIO 1 PREDICTED TRADE FLOWS 
Scenario 1 Nil 
Base Nil 
(Tariffs: Korea 0%, Japan 10%) • 
(Korea) 
• Korea 
188 Japan 
Scenario 1 
European Community to: ~ United Stales 
Nil 
Nil 
(Japan) 
Base 
Scenario 1 -h-,-7777"7"7"T.rTr777-· - W227ff/,7d/L/:27m# /):/$/,1 
Base fCLL<~CLLLt'LLL-2'//ij~/~//~/////~~/.I 
Scenario 1 -
Base 
Scenario 1 -'~&':Q12221Q~&l 
Base 
Scenario 1 -~ 
Base 
- 22ZZZ7ffL2l 
---T--" 
o 20,000 
New Zealand to: 
40,000 
tonnes 
Figure 4 
60,000 
SCENARIO 1: PRICES 
Prices (Tariffs: Korea Nil, Japan 10%)" 
Scenario 1 --1---------- --_.-- _I 
-I 
Base 
~--------------- .. 
Scenario 1 -~~'--"-_____ ------- 1 
J Base 
Scenario 1 -
Base 
Base 
----------_. -_. -_. __ .-
\----'--'-'-------_.- -
Z;;;;;;;Vff/§/PoL/'//  // § /,'ij 
?Z2Z!7/b/§//Z//////P///§//////,1 
---------r---
o 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 
lonnes 
80,000 
I .) European Community 
! ) New Zealand 
f;d Korea 
t:::SJ Japan 
~ United States 
5,000 
Figure 4 shows the predicted world trade flows in casein following the 
removal of the Korean tariff. The Japanese and American traded 
quantities are slightly down while the Korean trade is up by 2.2 percent 
compared to the base scenario. This is an increase from 5534 tonnes to 
5656 tonnes, an increase of 122 tonnes. As expected the removal of the· 
tariff in Korea increases returns to producers. 
Not surprisingly trade volumes in the Korean market increase with the 
partial and total removal of the tariff. 
The increase in trade with the removal of the Korean tariff means New 
Zealand revenue increases to NZ$133.35 million fob. This is an Increase of 
NZ$290 000 over the base result. As in the first case, the same caveats 
appl}' to this result. 
Scenario 2 : sensitivity analysis on the quantity of European Community 
casein exported to the world market. 
Scenario 2A with existing tariffs 
Scenario twO is designed to show the effect of the European Community 
subsidy regime on the world casein market. Figure 6 varies the amounts of 
European casein exported to the rest of world from 30 000 through to 100 
I 
000 tonnes (shown by the bar graphs in figure 6). The tariffs are set at 
the levels for 1987 ie 20 percent in Korea and 10 percent in Japan. As 
European production increases, prices (as shown by the line graphs in 
figure .6) decrease. 
In each case the model predicts that at no stage will product be traded 
between the European Community and Japan or Korea. Competition from 
New Zealand makes this prohibitive. 
In figure 6, for every 10 000 tonnes increase in quantity supplied by the 
European Community, prices in Europe, New Zealand and United States 
decrease by NZ$576.3 per 10 000 ronnes. The price in Korea and Japan 
decreases by. :-':Z$691.56. 
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For every 10 000 tonne increase in European Community supplies exports 
from New Zealand to the United States decrease by 828 tonnes, exports 
from New Zealand to Korea increase by 127 tonnes, while exports from 
New Zealand to Japan increase by 697 tonnes. 
As figure 6 shows, the relationship is linear, since we are moving along a 
linear world excess demand curve. Linearity Implies that no other factors 
(except EC production), shift the price locus as European Community 
supply increases. 
Trade flows in figure 7 also exhibit a linear relationship as European 
Community supply increases. In the North Asian markets volumes increase 
as exports of casein from the EC increase. This reflects the increased 
supply of European casein into the American market diverting New 
Zealand casein onto the Asian markets. 
New Zealand's fob revenue peaks when EC supply is at its lowest scenario 
level ie. NZ$224.96 million when EC export supply is 30 000 tonnes. For 
every 10 000 tonne increase in European Community supply, New Zealand's 
revenue received by producers decreases by NZ$23.57 million. 
Scenario 2B With Korean and Japanese tariffs removed 
A comparison between figures 6 and 7, 8 and 9 suggests similar results to 
those obtained under scenario 2A. As expected prices are higher in the 
producing nations and the United States while lower in the East Asian 
countries in the 'no tariff' scenario. 
For every 10 000 tonne increase in quantity supplied by the European 
Community, prices in Europe, New Zealand, United States, Korea and 
Japan decrease by NZ$58 1.25. As the European Community supply 
increases in 10 000 tonne amounts, exports from New Zealand to the 
United States decrease by 749 tonnes, exports from New Zealand to Korea 
increase by 107 tonnes, while exports from 1-.:ew Zealand to Japan increase 
by 640 tonnes. 
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FIgure 8 
SCENARIO 28:WORLD PRICES WITH VARYING EC SUPPLY 
(Tariffs: Korea 0%, Japan 0%) 
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Slightly more casein goes to the markets of Asia under the 'no tariff' 
scenario, reflecting increasing returns to producers with removal of the 
tariff. 
With EC production at its lowest scenario tonnage, New Zealand producers 
benefit the most in revenue terms, ie. NZ$226.91 million when European 
supply is 30 000 tonnes. For every EC export tonnage increase of 10 000, 
New Zealand's revenue decreases by NZ$23.17 million. 
Scenarios 2A and 28 contrast sharply with scenario I. As EC producers 
vary production the effect on New Zealand producers is substantial 10. This 
reinforces the dominance of the EC in world dairy markets. 
Scenario 3 nil tariff barriers. 
Figures 10 and II illustrate the effect of the removal of all tariff 
barriers on the casein trade between the countries in this study. 
Predictably, prices in Korea and Japan are equalised because the transport 
costs are the same between New Zealand and each of these East Asian 
markets. Prices in these markets drop by between four and six hundred 
dollars. The Korean price takes the biggest fall because they have the 
largest tariffs. Prices in Europe and New Zealand increase slightly (0.9 
percent) while the American price drops (by 4 percent). 
Excluding 2A and 28 the nil tariff barrier scenario is the best case 
scenario for New Zealand producers in terms of revenue. Results are in 
line with the scenarios already produced. Trade flows between New 
Zealand and East Asia are slightly up on the base results, and 
correspondingly. New Zealand exports of casein to the United States 
decrease. 
10. Historically EC casein export supply has been less than the 69 000 
tonnes set in the QP model. O\'Por the past 10 years it has ranged between 
30 000 and 80 000 tonnes availble for export. 
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World prices also increase in scenario 2 over scenarios 1, contributing to 
the increased revenues to New Zealand exporters. The removal of all 
tariffs means New Zealand revenue increases to NZ$134.25 million, an 
increase of NZ$1.19 million. 
The scenario analysis can be divided into two parts: firstly the scenarios 
which do not manipulate European Community production, scenarios 1 and 
scenario 6. The revenues predicted for these scenarios are set out in table 
4. Secondly, scenario 2 which is designed to vary quantities of EC exports 
on to the world market and gauge the effect on revenues to New Zealand 
producers is set out in table 4. 
TABLE 4 
REVENUE RETURNS TO NZ PRODUCERS: VARIOUS TARifF SCENARIOS 
Japanese Tariff 
0% 10% 
(NZ$, millions) 
0% 134.25 133.35 
Korean 10% 134.10 133.21 
Tariff 20% 133.95 133.06 
European Community supply 69 000 tonnes. 
If we take the first set of scenarios, the results were as expected. In 
each case, exports from the European Community were directed 
exclusively to the United States. As tariff barriers came down in East 
Asia, exports from New Zealand to the United States decreased. This 
occurs because the world price of casein increased as demand in East Asia 
increased (stimulated by the tariff drop) diverting casein from the United 
States to East Asian markets. In revenue terms the best case scenario 
occurs where tariff barriers are completely removed. However, the tariff 
barrier drop only increases revenue by 0.9 percent. for a policymaker the 
removal of :-":orth Asian tariff barriers would be something of a pyrrhic 
victory because the revenue gains are small compared to what could be 
gained from the reduction in EC exports. More specifically, a reduction in 
subsidises paid to European farmers under the Common Agricultural Policy. 
As Japan and Korea Iiberalise, domestic prices of casein in East Asia fall, 
while world priCes increase. for the two exporters, New Zealand and the 
European Community, prices received increase slightly while demand 
increases in East Asia and decreases in the United States. 
In table 5 the second group of revenue scenarios are presented. The 
amount of EC casein export production has been varied in steps of 
10 000 tonnes. Obviously, of these possibilities, the best case scenario for 
New Zealand dairy exporters w~)Uld be where the European Community 
exports was set at 30 000 tonnes (or less) and East Asian countries 
removed its tariff barriers. The fob revenue to New Zealand exporters is 
estimated at NZ$133.06. With the EC restricting exports to 30 000 tonnes 
and no North Asian tariff barriers New Zealand exporters would expect to 
earn NZ$224.96 million, an increase of over NZ$90 million dollars. Even 
with tariff barriers in place, the gains from trade for New Zealand are 
almost as great with the a European casein production decrease. 
It is implicitly assumed that the EC greatly influences the world price of 
casein through production subsidies. EC export production in 1987 stood at 
69 000 tonnes making them the largest exporter of casein in the world. 
Any increase in production is shown to have a serious impact on revenue 
gains by New Zealand producers. 
Summary 
The modelling of major players in the world casein market has shown the 
benefits to New Zealand producers of a reduction in EC supplies and the 
removal of tariffs in East Asia. The reduction in Korean and Japanese 
tariffs increases world priCes and decreases domestic prices. A reduction 
in EC supply and by implication EC export subsidies will bring the biggest 
gains to New Zealand producers. 
TABLE 5 
REVENUE TO NZ PRODUCERS WITH VARYING EC EXPORTS 
EC Exports 
Tonnes 
30 000 
40 000 
50 000 
60 000 
70 000 
80 000 
90 000 
100 000 
Revenues 
With Tariffs 
(Korea 20% japan 10%) 
(NZ$, millions) 
224.96 
201.39 
177.83 
154.28 
129.54 
107.17 
83.62 
60.07 
Tariffs Removed 
226.91 
203.15 
179.40 
155.66 
133.95 
108.13 
84.39 
60.60 
Korean imports of dairy products are largely controlled by the government. 
Imports of dairy products, except casein, are banned outright. This 
suggests that given the very high prices in the Korean market place, that 
country's dairy industry would suffer drastically if a free market in dairy 
products was introduced. 
It was estimated that gains to New Zealand dairy producers would be 
made following the removal of tariffs and a reduction in the amount of 
casein supplied to the world market by the European Community. 
Sensitivity analyses predicted that gains from a given percentage reduction 
in the japanese tariff would be more than in the Korean case. The larger 
volume of casein exported to the Japanese market (in relation to the 
Korean marked and the more elastic demand equation in Korea (than the 
japanese marked contribute to this result. 
According to the analyses, the complete removal of Korean and japanese 
tariffs will lead to increases in the value of imports of 2.2 and 1.7 
percent respectively. Revenue from New Zealand casein exports will 
increase by NZ$1.19 million (fob). The higher world price results in higher 
returns to producers in New Zealand. 
Sensitivity analyses also showed that greater revenue gains to New Zealand 
can be achieved through reductions in the volume of EC exports, ie a 
reduction in EC production and export supports. More pressure focused on 
European policy makers to reduce these subsidies (which will reduce 
European Community supply) will lead to greater net revenue returns will 
accrue to New Zealand. Even with Korean and japanese tariffs in place, a 
decrease in European supply of 10 000 tonnes would result in an increase 
of NZ$23.53 million (fob) in New Zealand's export receipts. In the best 
case scenario examined (no East Asian tariffs and European Community 
production at 30 000 tonnes) New Zealand's revenue increased by NZ$93.85 
million (fob) from the base result. With East Asian tariffs and European 
production at 30 000 tonnes, total revenue is NZ$1.95 (fob) million less 
than in the best case scenario. Clearly, greater gains to New Zealand's 
casein export revenue can be achieved with the reduction in European 
Community export supply than through tariff reduction in Asian markets. 
Limitations of the model 
New protein-rich products, particularly those derived from soya beans, are 
appearing as substitutes for casein. Lack of price data on these products 
precluded their use in the model. The specification of the demand 
equations was limited to those products for which price series existed. 
This could mean bias in the estimation Qf its demand coefficients. 
Autocorrolation and insignificant t statistic results could also be an 
outcome of substitutes not being included. 
The assumption of fixed casein supplies for New Zealand and the EUropean 
Community do not take into account changes in technology. The nature of 
dairy supply in the European Community is a possible area of further 
study. What drives the 'product mix' for dairy products in the European 
Community, and how that affects world prices, production and trade flows 
is an important area of study for New Zealand. 
The QP model used in this study estimates a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium solution. However, given that the European Community 
dominates the world casein market, price setting in this environment is far 
from perfectly competitive. This is one of the major drawbacks of this 
model to describe behavior in the world casein market. 11 
The QP model did not accurately describe the world casein bilateral trade 
flows. The QP model did not predict trade flows from the EC to East 
Asia, whereas in reality, half the market in East Asia is taken up by EC 
supply. Other approaches such as Armington-type models (see Dixit and 
Roningen, 1986) have been shown to more accurately describe bilateral 
trade flows by assuming that products produced in many countries are not 
homogenous. This leads to the conclusion 'that the law of one world price 
does not hold'. 
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RURAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Ann Pomeroy 
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Paper to the New Zealand Branch of 
the Australian Agricultural Economics Society 
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Analysis of rural communities by government is not a new phenomenon. However, 
official documentation of the activities and concerns of rural people and of 
changes in the rural population structure has been sporadic. The DSIR conducted 
one of the earliest studies of rural life over fifty years ago. Unfortunately, 
the unit which undertook the work (on living conditions of dairy farm families, 
Doig, 1940) was closed (it is said, because the findings were unpalatable to the 
government of the day). 
Government involvement in rural community research did not, however, end there. 
The Department of Agriculture established a Rural Development Division in 1944 
to extend its farm advisory activities to the whole farm family and the 
community. This section included rural sociologists who investigated topics 
such as rural-urban migration (Viggers, 1952) and home scientists who focused 
on home economics issues. Over time, however, the latter area was pursued with 
greater d il i gence than the former, and by the 1 ate fift i es work in rural 
sociology had ceased with home science remaining the focus of the section until 
it closed in 1972. 
During the sixties the Government sponsored a series of industry conferences. 
In 1964, the Manpower Working Party of the Agricultural Development Conference 
highl ighted the loss of workers from the industry and in following years 
attention was drawn to social factors which were considered to be related to 
farm manpower supply and rural depopulation. This concern culminated in a 
review of rural social conditions (with reference to farm manpower) - The Lloyd 
Report - sponsored by the Agricultural Production Council (Lloyd, 1974). 
Rural research activity escalated during the seventies with assistance from the 
Universities. The first Rural Development Conference was held at Lincoln in 
1975 and a survey on rural women (carried out by the Sociology Department, 
Canterbury University and Women's Division Federated Farmers) was published. 
The Unesco/Geographi ca 1 Soc i ety sponsored a programme on rural depopul at i on, the 
first of a series of consultations on continuing education for rural clergy were 
held in Sheffield and Waikari, the Kurow Man and Biosphere workshop and many 
other projects designed to assist rural people and planners understand and deal 
with rural issues took place around the country. Information presented at these 
meetings was written up in publications such as the Studies in Rural Change 
series which was developed through Canterbury University's Geography Department 
(Bedford and Cant, 1979). 
Government maintained an interest in these projects by sending staff to attend 
workshops and conferences, by sponsoring research (for example Ministry of 
Works' sponsorsh i p of Packman's study of rural services in New Zealand -
Packman, 1985), and to a limited extent through legislation such as the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1977 which provided the opportunity for more flexible 
planning and gave recognition to 'social' issues as a purpose for planning. 
2 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) also employed special ist 
analysts responsible for monitoring rural social issues between 1977 and 1986. 
Thus the seventies and early eighties were marked by considerable rural research 
activity together with 
a seemingly never ending series of land use, agricultural and rural 
seminars ... [which] all featured rural people and their communities. 
Regional and national conferences not only canvassed the needs of rural 
communities but rural people participated as land use, resettlement and 
planning matters were debated. 
(little, 1990) 
Rural organisations such as Federated Farmers, Farm Workers Association, Women's 
Division Federated Farmers, Country Women's Institute, Young Farmers Club, rural 
councils and government departments came together in associations such as the 
Joint Working Group on Rural Development (established in 1976) which met in some 
regions as well as nationally. 
Information from these sources and the lists of practical problems identified 
in Danna Glendining's TREC (Towards Rural Equality of Citizenship) newsletters 
did much to bring rural social issues to the attention of government - but there 
was little official action. As Heather little indicates, despite all these 
discussions and research activity, from the mid-eighties it was clear 
we had 'blown it' ... we had fallen far short of influencing policy .. [we 
had failed to produce] a recognised rural policy agenda. Neither had we 
developed the community/researcher partnership into any form of action-led 
research. 
(little, 1990) 
Issues of concern to rural people did not diminish simply because there was no 
official assessment of the problems. Rural groups continued to press the 
bureaucracy and politicians to recognise that many of the decisions being made 
at head office level by government and the private sector were having an adverse 
effect on rural livelihoods and living conditions. Government was extensively 
lobbied in the late eighties to establish a Ministry of Rural Affairs based on 
the model of the Victorian Office of Rural Affairs (which began first under the 
Department of Agriculture and later shifted to the Department of Ethnic, 
Municipal and Community Affairs). 
The concept of a separate Ministry of Rural Affairs was not accepted, however, 
problems associated with rural location were recognised by the labour Government 
in the MAF Corporate Contract for 1990-91. One of the outcomes required of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries by the Minister of Agriculture was: 
Healthy rural communities able to contribute even more effectively to New 
Zealand's economy and culture. 
This outcome has been made more explicit (under the National Government) in the 
1991-92 contract: 
Adequate access to basic services for rural communities. 
The addition of this outcome to MAF's work is the official acknowledgement that 
the agricultural sector is heavily dependent on its rural/small town and urban 
3 
infrastructure and that monitoring of, and contact with, the whole rural and 
minor urban community is required. This is resulting in an extension of MAF's 
traditional work programmes, which focus on the economic performance of the farm 
and agri-business sector, to include a human resource and rural affairs 
perspective. 
MAF now has the expl icit task of monitoring changes in the socio-economic 
structure of New Zealand's rural communities, and providing more in-depth 
analysis of key issues concerning rural communities. Several studies have been 
commissioned and analysis of rural structural trends and issues at both national 
and regional levels is being undertaken. 
Studies include the Rural Communities Project; Impact of the Treaty of Waitangi 
on Government Agencies; The Waitangi Tribunal and Maori land Claims; a Public 
Discussion Paper on Sustainable Agriculture; various projects on the social 
organisation of agriculture; some studies on rural servicing and a project on 
rural women and women's organisations which will be part of the celebration of 
100 years of universal suffrage in New Zealand in 1993. 
Of particular importance is the Rural Communities Project which began under the 
1990-91 contract. The project, which is the work of a team of people', is in 
four parts. 
The first is a national level overview of the demographic, social and economic 
structure of rural and small town New Zealand. 
The second part looks at the factors which influence rural activity by analysing 
the political, economic and physical environments in which rural New Zealanders 
conduct their lives. 
The third part examines factors which contribute to the 'well-being' of rural 
New Zealand. This includes an analysis of the power structure of rural New 
Zealand: particularly the powerlessness of Maori people, women and lower socio-
economic groups. It also includes a discussion on rural servicing and 
communications. 
The fourth part will cover recommendations which emerge from the previous 
sections. It is envisaged that such recommendations to MAF (and possibly other 
government agencies), will include suggestions for policies, programmes and 
their implementation. 
The following section of this paper draws together some of the main findings of 
the rural communities project. 
The Rural Communities Project 
Definitions 
In New Zealand rural is officially defined (by the Department of Statistics) on 
a geographical basis as those areas outside centres which have 1,000 or more 
people. This definition encompasses a continuum from areas without people and 
1 Those involved to date include: Ann Pomeroy, Russ Reynolds, Robin Johnson, 
Murray Arthur-Worsop, Jamie Newell, Stuart Morriss, SriRamaratnam 
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sparsely settled territory through to small towns with fewer than 1,000 people; 
and of very remote locations to areas surrounding small or even large cities. 
For policy development and planning purposes, 'minor urban' areas are also often 
regarded as part of 'rural' New Zealand. However, statistical information 
separates the two. Minor urban areas are centres of population with between 
1,000 and 10,000 people. 
In the rural communities project 'rural' was defined in the same way as the 
official Statistics definition, but for completeness data was also analysed for 
'minor urban' areas. 
The Structure and Characteristics of New Zealand's Rural Communities 
The project began by analysing the structure of the rural population. This is 
important because one of the major concerns traditionally expressed by farming 
communities is the depopulation of rural areas. An analysis of the figures 
shows, however, that the total population of rural New Zealand has hovered 
around half a million for the last 60 years (table 1). In 1986 (the latest 
available information) there were 528,000 rural people, just below the peak of 
544,000 in 1956. 
However, the substantial increase in the urban population over the same six 
decade period, has led to a notable decline in the proportion of New Zealanders 
who live in rural as distinct from urban communities (graph 1). Whereas in 1911 
about 51% of the population was rural, by 1936 the proportion had dropped to 32% 
and since 1976 has been about 16%. That is, the population of New Zealand is 
highly urbanised. 
Over the sixty year period, minor urban areas have almost tripled in size (from just over 100,000 in 1926 to 300,000 in 1986, table 1), but the proportion of 
the population living in those areas has remained much the same (graph 1). 
The distribution of the Maori population has also changed. While the size of 
the Maori community living in rural areas continued to expand until the mid 
1960's there was an even greater expansion of the numbers of Maori people living 
in urban areas. This has caused a corresponding decline in relative size of the 
rural Maori population (table 2). The expansion of the urban Maori population 
coincided with increased availability of urban based skilled and unskilled work 
opportunities in the post World War II era. As a consequence, the proportion 
of Maori living in rural areas (predominantly in the North Island) fell from 
about 84% of the Maori population in 1926 to about 19% in 1986. 
Regional Variation 
It is not population decline in itself which is of concern but differences in 
the size of the resource base of rural areas. Areas with a narrow resource base 
are less able to provide employment opportunities or maintain population and 
services. While only 24% of the population is usually resident in rural and 
minor urban areas at the national level, there are distinct variations in the 
proportion of people living in these areas in the regions. For example, the 
Coastal-North Otago region has only 12% of its population living outside centres 
with 10,000 or more people. At the other extreme, everyone in Clutha-Central 
Otago and Thames Valley regions live in rural or minor urban areas (table 3). 
Table 1: Distribution of Population 
Year Rural Minor Urban Major Urban Total 
1926 448,501 112,292 840,881 1,401,674 
1936 503,885 122,723 942,505 1,569,113 
1945 472,076 133,778 1,093,291 1,699,145 
1951 508,849 162,166 1,262,579 1,933,594 
1956 543,727 193,207 1,432,680 2,169,614 
1961 542,525 216,854 1,650,040 2,409,419 
1966 526,507 238,350 1,907,251 2,672,108 
1971 496,171 256,207 2,105,107 2,857,485 
1976 511,004 282,044 2,332,075 3,125,123 
1981 520,487 289,860 2,361,044 3,171,391 
1986 527,742 304,938 2,427,804 3,260,484 
50""",-- .. St-..twbos 
Table 2: Distribution of Maori Population 
Year Rural Maori Minor Urban 
1926 
1936 
1945 
1951 
1956 
1961 
1966 
1971 
1976 
1981 
1986 
Year 
1926 
1936 
1945 
1951 
1956 
1961 
1966 
1971 
1976 
1981 . 
1986 
Maori 
53,714 
68,087 
73,310 
81,702 
89,156 
89,514 
77,321 
66,674 
64,263 
59,805 41,604 
75,693 58,602 
Rural Maori as a % 
of Total Rural Population 
% 
12.0 
13.5 
15.5 
16.1 
16.4 
16.5 
14.7 
13.4 
12.6 
11.5 
14.3 
5b-"",<""CL' ~'~h:,,) 
Major Urban Total 
Maori Maori 
63,670 
82,326 
98,744 
115,676 
137,151 
167,086 
201,159 
227,414 
270,035 
177,687 279,252 
261,810 396,288 
Rural Maori as a % of 
Total Maori Population 
% 
84.4 
82.7 
74.2 
70.6 
65.0 
53.6 
38.4 
29.3 
23.8 
21.4 
19.1 
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Table 3: 
Proportion of Population 
Usually Resident in the Rural and Minor Urban 
Part of Local Government Regions 
(1986) 
Clutha-Central otago 100% 
Thames Valley 100% 
west Coast 68% 
Northland 65% 
Tongariro 58% 
Wairarapa 51% 
Waikato 48% 
Taranaki 46% 
Aorangi 46% 
Wanganui 41% 
East Cape 41% 
Southland 38% 
Marlborough 38% 
Nelson Bays 36% 
Bay of Plenty 33% 
Manawatu 31% 
Hawkes Bay 25% 
Horowhenua 21% 
Canterbury 14% 
Coastal-North otago 12% 
Auckland 6% 
Wellington 1% 
National 24% 
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Not only are there variations in the distribution of population, but some areas 
are more highly developed than others, and regions differ widely in their share 
of the assets on which economic activity and growth are based. While some rural 
economies have a heavy dependence on the primary industries (farming, fishing, 
forestry or mining), others rely on manufacturing, or tourism and recreational 
activities. Rural areas which remain dependent on pastoral agriculture are the 
most likely to be experiencing population decline, while those with a wider 
resource base have a stable or increasing population. 
Population Dynamics 
Most rural communities become established in response to new developments or to 
make use of or to exploit a particular resource, such as a micro-climate or soil 
type or mineral deposit. Examples include kiwifruit production, fishing, energy 
development, gold and coal mining. In the initial stages of development there 
is a period of growth when businesses are established. This is accompanied by 
large increases in labour and capital in the locality. There is then a period 
of stability. Often this is followed by a wind-down when capital and/or labour 
are reduced, or a natural resource is exhausted, or technology or market 
opportunities change. New Zealand's rural communities tend to span all three 
stages. 
In the wind-down stage, some of the excess labour force adjust by moving to 
areas of greater economic opportunity. Depopulation is thus part of a natural 
process of adjustment in the life-cycle of a community. However, recognising 
this does not make the burden of coping with the effects of decline any easier. 
Moreover, the effects of depopulation and the continuing servicing requirements 
of those remaining in a locality are complex issues. 
As employment opportunities in the larger urban centres have declined, Maori are 
increasingly moving (back) to rural areas to their papakainga (traditional home 
base). In addition, people who have been unable to find work in the main urban 
centres, or who see the cost of living as cheaper in rural areas, are also 
moving into rural communities. Thus, regions such as Northland, eastern Bay of 
Plenty and East Cape which have increasing populations, also have high levels 
of unemployment. 
Concerns about the viability or sustainability of rural communities and the 
services they provide have traditionally been linked with fluctuations in the 
performance and prosperity of the farming sector. It is now being recognised 
that the issue of community prosperity is more broadly based than this, not 
least because the pattern and structure of commercial activity in rural New 
Zealand goes beyond the agricultural sector. 
Occupational Structure 
.Data was specially requested from the Department of Statistics to provide 
information on people over 15 years employed (full and part-time) in the nine 
industry divisions and living in rural and minor urban areas. This data shows 
that in 1986 less than half of the rural workforce was involved in primary 
industry (graph 2). Of these people, 42% were engaged in agriculture and 
livestock production, 3% were in agricultural services, and 4% worked in the 
forestry, fishing and mining industries. Some 10% of those 1 iving in minor 
urban areas were also involved in primary industry (graph 3). 
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Thus, while farming is the main occupation of rural men (49%) and women (39%), 
a 1 arge proport i on of the rural workforce is not engaged in agri cu ltura 1 
production or agricultural servicing (table 4). Instead, the rural workforce 
is, like the urban workforce, involved in secondary and tertiary industries. 
These people include the 15% of the rural workforce who provide community, 
social and personal services (such as education and health services), 11% in 
manufacturing and a further 11% in the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants 
and hotels . 
The secondary and tertiary industries are also the main source of employment for 
those living in minor urban areas (table 4). 
On the other hand, almost half of rural secondary industry activity involves the 
processing and/or distribution of farm production. Statistics' business 
directory data shows 49% of the 25,500 people engaged in manufacturing within 
rural areas in 1990 were processing food or fibre products. Just over 18% of 
New Zealand's food, beverage and tobacco processing is located in rural areas. 
From a national perspective rural commercial activity is in decl ine. For 
example, business directory data shows that the number of people engaged in 
manufacturing in rural areas dropped by 23% and those engaged in building and 
construction businesses dropped by 39% between 1987 and 1990. However, some 
localities are maintaining their economic base by widening it beyond primary 
industry, or are attracting people for other reasons. Population growth in 
retirement areas, for example, has led to an increased demand for services . 
Across New Zealand this has meant that the number of people engaged in 
community, social and personal services in rural areas increased by 10% in this 
three year period. 
Factors Influencing Rural Activity 
This section of the project examines the wider environment in which rural people 
live and work. The purpose of this section is to establish which factors need 
to be considered in determining the process of managing change . 
The Political Environment 
At the formal level it would seem that rural people are well represented. Of 
the 93 general seats, 39 (42%) are rural (South Island 48%, North Island 40%), 
although many of these contain urban centres of varying sizes. In the last 
election all rural seats went to National, but election night results indicate 
that over half the voters in almost two-thirds of these rural electorates voted 
for the candidate who was elected. Thus, theoretically rural people should be 
having a say in the way in which their affairs are run. This is not necessarily 
so. Representation in Parliament of some groups is poor with only one rural 
seat on the general role being held by Maori, and only 4% of the North Island 
seats being held by women . 
Similarly, at organisational level well established groups such as Federated 
Farmers have the ear of government on rural issues. Unfortunately, these groups' 
not only have few women and Maori at executive or membership level, but they do 
not represent all farmers, or all rural interests. 
Because the traditional emphasis of government policy has been on agriculture 
as the primary source of export earnings and rural wealth and prosperity, there 
has been a failure to recognise and respond to wider social and servicing needs 
-ro. .. 1..&.. + 
EMPLOYMENT 1986 
RURAL 
ag/livestock prod 
ag services 
hunting 
forestry 
fishing 
mining/quarrying 
manufacturing 
utlities 
bldg/constr 
W'sale/retail 
trnspt/cnunnctn 
finance/ins/prop 
cnunnty/soc/prsnl 
nad 
total 
MINOR URBAN 
ag/livestock prod 
ag services 
hunting 
forestry 
fishing 
mining/ quarry 
manufacturing 
utlities 
bldg/constr 
W'sale/retail 
trnspt/cmmnctn 
finance/ins/prop 
cmmnty/soc/prsnl 
nad 
total 
so~,~ ~ S'-J>..~k:, 
MALES 
NUMBER 
70236 
5445 
528 
4077 
1395 
1911 
20094 
2331 
11484 
12045 
6390 
3255 
15129 
1467 
155787 
MALES 
total 
3405 
1539 
168 
2208 
632 
1464 
20241 
2157 
10539 
12317 
6171 
2883 
13806 
741 
78271 
% 
45.1% 
3.5% 
0.3% 
2.6% 
0.9% 
1.2% 
12.9% 
1.5% 
7.4% 
7.7% 
4.1% 
2.1% 
9.7% 
0.9% 
100.0% 
% 
4.4% 
2.0% 
0.2% 
2.8% 
0.8% 
1.9% 
25.9% 
2.8% 
13.5% 
15.7% 
7.9% 
3.7% 
17.6% 
0.9% 
100.0% 
FEMALES 
NUMBER 
31830 
1533 
54 
486 
228 
174 
7356 
261 
1089 
14277 
3480 
4293 
22263 
729 
88053 
FEMALES 
Total 
2274 
468 
3 
189 
66 
o 
105 .. 
o 
7077 
243 
945 
13992 
2673 
3387 
16188 
348 
47958 
% 
36.1% 
1. 7% 
0.1% 
0.6% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
8.4% 
0.3% 
1. 2% 
16.2% 
4.0% 
4.9% 
25.3% 
0.8% 
100.0% 
% 
4.7% 
1. 0% 
0.0% 
0.4% 
0.1% 
0.2% 
14.8% 
0.5% 
2.0% 
29.2% 
5 .. 6% 
7.1% 
33.8% 
0.7% 
100.0% 
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
102066 
6978 
582 
4563 
1623 
o 
2085 
o 
27450 
2592 
12573 
26322 
9870 
7548 
37392 
2196 
243840 
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
5679 
2007 
171 
2397 
698 
o 
1569 
o 
27318 
2400 
11484 
26309 
8844 
6270 
29994 
1089 
126229 
% 
41.9% 
2.9% 
0.2% 
1.9% 
0.7% 
0.9% 
11.3% 
1 .. 1% 
5.2% 
10.8% 
4.0% 
3.1% 
15.3% 
0.9% 
100.0% 
% 
4.5% 
1.6% 
0.1% 
1. 9% 
0.6% 
1.2% 
21. 6% 
1.9% 
9.1% 
20.8% 
7.0% 
5.0% 
23.8% 
0.9% 
100.0% 
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of the whole rural community, including the non-agricultural component of rural 
New Zealand. Even when dealing exclusively with the farming sector, government 
and the private sector still have mental blocks which result in their ignoring 
some groups. 
For example, although a third of farmers are women, MAF's Management Consultancy 
Service continue to talk about farmers as 'he' thus contributing to the mind-
set which relegates women farmers to a subordinate position. The problem with 
this is that women as individuals often fail to recognise they have a power role 
in farm decision making because it is not recognised by others. Failure to 
identify all significant stakeholders in a business results in failure to 
communicate messages about the need for, and ways to, introduce change. 
Overseas studies (Newby et al, 1978; Gray, 1990) show that economically and 
politically dominant groups can intentionally or indirectly repress the 
emergence of different or opposing Viewpoints. By ignoring subordinate groups 
and strongly articulating their own position, values and perceptions, dominant 
groups can give the appearance of having consulted widely and having reached 
consensus. Demands which do not fit into established frameworks or which will 
upset the status quo are either not dealt with or are redefined. Groups which 
are routinely excluded from effective political activity and decision making 
become apathetic and often fail to respond even when their opinion is sought. 
Policy makers who fail to allow communities to shape their own future may have 
an agenda of their own, although it may not be explicitly recognised by either 
group as such. For example, development means different things to different 
people. 
If you belong to· the dominant group, you will see development in a certain 
light. If you belong to the so-called receiving group you will have a quite 
different view of development .... Bitter experience has taught them [the 
people receiving funding] that development means the dominant group has some 
idea of what they want you to do. The process of transferring funds, 
resources, or whatever, is to"get you to do what it is that they believe is 
good for you ... development on someone else's terms ... is in fact an extremely 
sophisticated way of continuing dependency. 
Henare (1990) 
It is, therefore, crit Ica 1 that pol icy development takes into account the 
certainty that dominant groups control the decision-making process and set the 
agenda. Not only is it important to canvass the opinions of those outside the 
usual leadership group, but accurate information needs to be sought on wider 
perspect i ves. For example, census and survey data can be used to estab 1 ish 
standards against which opinion can be assessed. At the same time, it should 
be noted that such data is also constrained by dominant cultural values which 
ensure some questions are asked while others are not, and which influence the 
way questions are asked. 
The Economic Environment 
The rural community economy is driven by a variety of forces. These include 
income earned from the export of goods and services, income earned and brought 
back by rural people from working outside rural areas, earnings repatriated by 
family or others living outside rural areas, income received from government 
subsidies or benefits, the inflow of investment from outside rural areas, and 
the mutual exchange of goods or services between rural people (graph 4). 
~ 
0", 
0"" 
e" .~ 
...... 
0'" "t~ 8.c(j 
~ 
~ 
~ 
0 
... 
5 
.§ ro 
I... en 
:::l ... 
cr. .. c: 
CIJ 
-
.c 
~ 
c 
CIJ 
(IJ 
::: 
.., 
(IJ 
.c 
In 
CIJ 
0> 
ro 
~ 
c 
..J>- » 
"0 E s.. 
c 0 Vi 
ro c ] 0 In U 
~ UJ 
'" C ... 
CIJ u 
c ro 'S: c ... o I... ... 
Cl.(IJ U) 
E'" o x 
u UJ 
c"O c 
ro ro 
L 
(IJ lC .c 
"-
0 
(IJ 
"0 
0 
L 
.: 
ro c :::l ... 
.., E a. 
'" Q) Vi 
U ... 15", ;.. 
c 
.E 0 ... 0 c.~ 
U ..... > 
0'" t:~ 
8.c(j 
E 
.... 
til 
"" ..... )< c: 0; 
""Eo-§c(j 
ij~ / >eJl os.. e"o; ..c U 
>-
L >- 0 L z 0 0 z u 0 UJ 
U 
UJ ..J 
..J -< Z 
-< cr. cr. UJ 
::> ~ 
cr. x 
UJ 
'" <> :a 
.;;; 
.o~ 
=t.:: UJ ... 
~c: 
c: ... 
<>~ 
§c>?l 
... 
<> 
.. 
0 
C 
~ 
cr Q: 
~. 
'----
.;:;;, 
-':.l 
" 1 
." 
~ 
~ 
,; 
~ 
~ff 
8 
Analysis of the diversity of the occupational and employment structure of New 
Zealand's rural communities (discussed above) provides insight into the extent 
to which the paid labour force is involved in the range of activities carried 
out within rural and minor urban areas. However, changes in commodity prices 
and responses by firms to market signals leads to changes in the use of land and 
other resources. This in turn impacts on downstream industry, whether primary 
product processing or servicing, particularly that located in rural and minor 
urban areas and leads to restructuring, closures and relocation of plant (such 
as the closure of dairy factories and meat processing works). 
Changes in the economic base of rural areas are usually accompanied by social 
changes: jobs disappear and skills are no longer required, and while new skills 
and types of jobs may be created, they are often in new locations, 
Multiple occupation (or pluriactivity) is not a new phenomenon in rural areas . 
Many of New Zealand's early farmers were foresters or road/rail navvies and 
today many farmers run contracting and other businesses. Vertically integrated 
operations within the primary sector have ownership at all stages of the 
production to market cycle. Investment finance flows both into and out of the 
rural economy. These investment may create buffers during economic downturn, 
they may also be a drain on otherwise profitable operations. Investment by non-
farmers into farming land and business can also create social upheaval. For 
example, planning legislation has been used to restrict 'hobby' farmers in some 
areas and foreigners and city-based investors are also discouraged . 
Government subsidies or benefits can be an important source of income in rural 
areas, The real standard of living for a person or family in some rural areas 
may be higher than it would be in 'many urban areas, despite the costs associated 
with distance from services, and problems associated with social interaction 
between newcomers and established residents from different socio-economic 
backgrounds. 
Also of significance is the mutual exchange of goods and services between rural 
people. While many inputs into the rural economy such as fertiliser, machinery 
and chemicals are supplied from outside, sometimes via a small-town 
intermediary, many goods and services are generated within the rural area. 
These include home grown food, housing, some entertainment, some education, and 
some services. The availability and adequacy of services (such as plumbers and 
doctors) is an important factor in maintaining primary and secondary industry 
in rural areas. 
The non-cash economy is often turned to when there is a reduction in cash-flow 
and people substitute 'cash intensive' goods and services for non-cash goods and 
services. In that people are generally accustomed to using the cash economy, 
the switch to the non-cash economy may require some readjustment of decisions 
about essential needs. On the other hand, particular groups have considerable 
experience in exchanging services or sharing resources. For example, farmers 
often co-operate and share tasks such as shearing or mustering and may share 
stock yards and landing strips for aerial-topdressers. 
The 'green-dollar' network is a recently coined term to describe quite 
sophisticated bartering of locally produced or owned goods and services. 
An example is the River Exchange and Barter System operating since July 1989 in 
Wanganui (Boswell and Brown, 1990) . 
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In addition, the 'black economy' (the production and/or trade of illegal goods 
and services usually for cash) can be an important source of income. 
There are a number of problems in dealing outside the legal cash economy. When 
goods are bartered there are no controls so that quality assurance, 
standardi sat i on and ava il abil i ty of product are not guaranteed. On the pos it i ve 
side, exchanges made within the non-cash economy enable the maintenance of 
1 i vi ng standards by reduci ng dependence on the wi der soci ety. By start i ng 
production of goods and services in a situation of low overheads it may also be 
possible to build-up enterprises which would otherwise not be established. 
The Physical Environment 
The tendency in the past has been to give economic growth and development 
priority over conservation. Government programmes aimed at the efficient 
development and exploitation of natural resources. Within agriculture this 
emphasis was reinforced through policies aimed at developing marginal land 
(through, for examp 1 e~ the Land Development Encouragement Loans and Li vestock 
Incentive Scheme). Separate from central government activities, local bodies 
have been responsible for soil conservation and river control. In the past most 
of this work dealt with damage created by poor farming practices rather than 
being integrated into farm programmes so erosion problems could be avoided. 
Recent moves to integrate resource management object i ves wi th economi c goals has 
led to the development of policies for sustainable land use. While initial 
attempts at developing sustainable land use pol icy focused on the physical 
issues, it was recognised that the impetus to change was constrained by economic 
and social factors. 
For example, benefits of soil conservation works may occur off-site rather than 
on the property of the person paying for the work. Such spill-over benefits are 
rarely considered in private land-use decisions, so that it is likely that there 
will be underinvestment in risk mitigating practices. 
Individuals may be aware that there are soil conservation problems in their 
area, but not see there are problems within their own boundaries. On the other 
hand, land owners may recognise there is a problem but not know where to go to 
get advice on dealing with it. Alternatively, landowners may see a need to 
change, but be reluctant to lead the.way in the face of pressure to conform to 
established practice. 
Change may be constrained by the landholders lack of money to do the work, and 
conservative bankers may be reluctant to provide finance for activities aimed 
at generating sustainable agriculture which do not yield a quick return. Change 
may be impeded by properties being too small to make conservation work 
worthwhile, reluctance to adjust boundaries and the cost of making such 
adjustments. There may also be a lack of support services able to undertake the 
work efficiently and cheaply. 
In the past, grants went directly to growers for tree-planting and the building 
of structures. This has now changed with regional government pooling rate-payer 
resources with farm owners and land care groups in a partnership arrangement. 
Regional government assists by undertaking a review of the whole property 
including the operating budget, management skills and conservation needs. 
Community education programmes also take high priority. 
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Factors Contributing to the Viability or 'Well-being' of Rural New Zealand 
In managing change recognition should be given to the factors which currently 
impede individuals and groups from satisfactorily conducting their lives and 
work. 
Intervention 
There are two main ways in which state intervention impacts on rural New 
Zealand. One is in the redistribution of wealth, the other is in the 
legislation controlling, particularly, economic activity. 
Wealth has been redistributed to rural areas through a number of policies. For 
example, regional development grants were used to encourage local initiatives, 
needed either because of market failure or because there was a lack of adequate 
1 oca 1 support. 
Subsidies were paid to industries involved with agriculture as well as directly 
to farmers. For example, fertiliser had a transport subsidy depending on the 
distance of the farm from the manufacturing plant. The purpose of this grant 
was to promote hill country development, but the consequence was to raise the 
capital value of the land above the value of its production potential. 
There have also been a series of measures implemented to fulfil perceived sociql 
equity goals. Provi s i on of fi nance for flood damage works, rura 1 
electrification, school buses and so on, serves to bring people to, and retain 
people in, areas they might not otherwise live or work in. While on the one 
hand there are economic arguments against providing support for inefficient 
industries and discouraging the movement of labour and capital, on the other 
there are percei ved to be pub 1 i c good benefits associ ated with a stable or 
expanding population, maintaining the countryside and promoting industries such 
as tourism. 
In the past most economic intervention has been aimed at the agricultural sector 
and producers on the assumption that by supporting the agricultural community, 
the whole rural and regional community would benefit. However, given the 
importance of secondary and tertiary industries in rural areas, more needs to 
be learned about the inter-relationship between the sectors before this 
assumption can be accepted. 
In addition to direct intervention, rural economic activity has been constrained 
by planning philosophies inscribed in legislation. For example, the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1953 separated rural (that is, agricultural) land uses from 
industrial and residential uses, and controls developed for more densely 
populated urban locations (e.g. Factories Act, 1946) have been inappropriately 
applied to rural locations. Because of the emphasis on farming, the operation 
and extension of non-agricultural enterprises has been prohibited in many rural 
areas, and this has inhibited many rural communities from developing a broader 
economic base. The result has been that many rural communities no longer have 
the critical mass of people needed to support and pay for services. 
There are a number of other problems associated with government intervention. 
These include getting the right balance between intervention and market 
influenced adjustment. This balance is needed to avoid creating unrealistic 
expectations or a dependency mentality which leaves people with a perception 
that they are 'worse-off' when interventionary devices are withdrawn. It is 
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also important that support does not prop up rural communities to the extent 
that market signals are obscured and local economies are only viable as a 
consequence of on-going heavy assistance. 
Decisions made by the private sector also impact on rural community viability. 
In particular, policies on lending to business by banks and other institutions 
effectively promotes some activities and discourages others. 
Servicing 
The significant interchange between rural and urban communities on financial, 
soci a l, occupat i ona 1 and res i dent i all eve 1 s means rural communit i es do not 
function in isolation. The improvements in communication and particularly 
roading links between rural and urban areas and the changing structure and 
character of rural communities are not. only impacting on service provision but 
also on perceived opportunities for rural investment. 
The necessary restructuring which has taken place within agricultural industries 
(particularly within pastoral farming) has led to less intensive production in 
some areas. This, together with reduced profitability, has meant that unless 
these communities have a diversified economic base, they have become smaller and 
less affluent and less able to support the range of services available in the 
past. It is only where small towns are relatively isolated from main urban 
centres and can draw on a large population catchment that they have been able 
to retain a range of functions. 
While the changes being experienced are a necessary part of the adjustment 
process, many communities are not accepting that because an agency closes they 
have to do without a service. Innovative ways are being found to maintain and 
build-up the economic base of a community, usually with only the minimum of 
assistance. Government has a particular role to play to ensure legislation does 
not impede private initiatives. 
Communication 
Responsibility for providing information and policy co-ordination in rural areas 
is currently spread across a number of social service departments. Some of 
these do not differentiate between rural or urban location when determining 
policy. Structures of decision making also vary from local (e.g. education), 
to regional (e.g. soil conservation), to central (e.g. Social Welfare). 
Currently there is no agency or organisation which collects and analyses area-
specific data other than for narrow sectoral interests (for example some 
regional and local councils collect some information on an ad hoc basis). 
Implication for MAF and Government 
Because the economy and population of rural New Zealand consists of more than 
the farming sector it cannot be assumed that the welfare of the agricultural 
sector alone accurately reflects the well-being of the whole rural community or 
of all rural communities. Where once rural communities rel ied on farmers, 
government departments and the commercial servicing of the primary industry 
sector to sustain their industrial and commercial base, fall ing agricultural 
commodity prices and the restructuring of government departments have altered 
this situation. 
12 
Traditionally the response to this situation would have been to go to government 
for help. However, the New Zealand Government has signalled that it cannot and 
will not supply the kind of assistance which subsidised the farming sector in 
the past. Policies to encourage positive development in rural areas are no 
longer based on agricultural ass i stance or subsidies. Such programmes are 
fiscally unsustainable and inequitable in terms of the benefits they provide to 
different communities and different sections within communities. 
Much greater emphasis is being placed instead on enabling communities to resolve 
their problems themselves through collective action, often in partnership with, 
for example, traditional providers. Communities have generally not tended to 
undertake this process in the past because they lacked information, did not have 
knowledge of workable options and alternatives and often did not have the 
management skills to undertake such action. There are, however, some positive 
examples of community problem solving taking place. 
While agriculture still dominates rural employment, there are also other 
industries, particularly tourism, which are vitally important to the survival 
and growth of the rural sector. Many of the 55% of the rural workforce who are 
not involved in agriculture provide services to those who are. From the point 
of view of the agricultural industry everyone who lives in a rural community 
should be regarded as important. The extra buying power and social interaction 
brought by non-farming people strengthens agriculture's economic and social 
base, and helps carry the cost of infrastructure such as roading, and 
reticulation of electric power and telecommunications. 
MAFts Impact on Policy 
MAF has begun the work of encouraging its officials to broaden their attitudes, 
and to incorporate these wider perspectives into their monitoring, pol icy 
development and networking roles. 
In part i cul ar, the scope of work act i vit i es is bei ng extended beyond the 
traditional farm and agricultural sector. With recognition of the reliance of 
farmi ng on its non- farmi ng support structure, has come acceptance that MAF 
should extend its monitoring beyond the economic structure and technical 
servicing needs of agriculture alone. Efforts are being made to establish how 
policies of other government departments impact on rural New Zealand. There is 
also more emphasis on passing information on issues from rural communities to 
government, and in passing back information on central government policies to 
communities. 
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Abstract 
The Social Value 
of an 
lndigneous Forest 
by 
Dean Ailey and Frank Scrimgeour 
Department of Economics 
University of Waikato 
New Zealand's indigenous forests are assets which produce a range of benefits including timber, 
recreational opportunities and erosion control. For the crown to efficiently allocate the forest resources 
it controls it must have some estimate of the value of a forest. This paper reports the empirical results 
of a contingent valuation study of forest in the Kauaeranga Valley of the Coramandel Peninsula 
Riley and Scrimgeour: Forest Valuation 
THE SOCIAL VALUE OF AN INDIGENOUS FOREST 
Introduction 
Forests produce many products of value to society Including timber, recreational opportunities, and 
erosion control. Society derives value from the current How of benefits and from the prospect of future 
Haws resulting from the maintenance of forest assets. Some forest products are complementary in 
production whereas others are substitutes as depicted in figure 1 (Tomkins, 1990). Given that some 
consumption flows from forests are incompatible with some other consumption flows, decisions have 
to be made about the alternative uses of a forest. 
Ffgure 1: Production Possibility Curve For a Forest 
T b 
a T=limber 
O=all other goods 
c 
o 
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Decisions about forest uses are in part detennined by the ownership of the resource. The definition 
of property rights provides incentives which influences the outcomes. Alternative forms of ownership 
are possible and Stroup and Baden (1974) have previously discussed the issues associated with 
privatization of public forest land. Within the New Zealand context, large areas of forest (of various 
types and in different locations) are part of the public asset portfolio. For a considerable proportion 
of this portfolio the existing pattern of ownership is likely to continue in the immediate future. For 
these forests decisions have to be made in the absence of a market. Some of the questions faCing 
forest managers are: 
a) Should a particular forest be kept in public ownership? 
b) What is the appropriate form of public ownership? 
c) What use should be made of a particular forest? 
d) How should a particular forest be funded? 
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The decisions made in response to these questions determine the aggregate level of net benefit 
society gets from these forests (ie. the efficiency issue) and who gets the benefit (the equity issue). 
For Government to make informed decisions some benefit cost calculus is essential. This requires 
infonnation about the biophysical and socioeconomic impacts associated with alternative allocative 
and management decisions. This information includes costs and benefits for which market prices are 
available and costs and benefits for which there are no readily available market prices. Where all 
infonnation is available there is the possibility Government decisions may tend towards a maximization 
of social welfare. Where some of the information is unavailable this result is less likely. This can be 
illustrated in the case of the decision as to the optimal time to harvest a standing crop of timber. The 
classic Faustmann solution is to harvest when "the growth in the value of the crop equals the sum of 
the foregone annuity from the standing value of the crop and the annuity from the maximum value of 
the land' (Silberberg, 1978, 45). Yet as Strang (1983) has shown, if there is a flow of benefits 
associated with the standing crop the optimal harvest decision must take account of these flows. This 
may mean that the time of harvest is delayed or may never occur depending upon the size of the 
Hows associated with the standing crop as seen in figure 2. 
Figure 2: Derivation of Optimal Harvesting Period 
$ 
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The task of estimating all the costs and benefits associated with alternative uses of a forest is fraught 
with difficulties. As mentioned previously, there are no market prices for some outputs such as scenic 
views. There is jointness of production which makes it difficult to match costs artd benefits. 
Furthermore some forest products are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, including option 
value, existence value and bequest value. Also forests are often characterized by external effects on 
other locations and agents. Finally, the benefits and costs associated with any forest are spread over 
long time horizons which raises the issue of the appropriate discount rate to use In determining their 
Rilert end Serimgoour: Forest VaJuation 3 
present value. Future demand and supply relationships are unknown leading to significant uncertainty. 
This paper presents the results of an effort to value a forest, recognizing the complexity of the task 
and using commonly accepted methodology. 
The Kauaeranga Valley 
The Kauaeranga Valley is the largest Single block within the 86,000 hectares of the Coromandel State 
Forest park. It is situated ten kilometres east of Thames. Approximately one third of the New Zealand 
Population lives within 90 kilometres of the Valley, (Kelly and Black, 1972,45). 
The opportunities for recreation include camping. picnicking. swimming. fishing. tramping. nature study. bird 
watching, plelUlur. driving and sightseeing. Aockhounda aro attracted by the many aemi--precioul atonel 
thai can bo found, (Kolly and Black, 1972, 45). 
The Valley is covered in indigenous forest apart from 450 hectares of pine planation. Much of the 
native forest is regrowth as the area was subjected to heavy timber milling and Kauri gum digging. 
Historic sites, such as wooden dams and the remains of tram lines, are another part of the attractions 
of the Kauaeranga Valley. 
Over 50 kilometres of walkways provides a range of tracks to suit different fitness and skills levels. 
Four huts situated in and around the Valley allow overnight stays. Park headquarters provides 
information on the park's walkways and historic sites and also features a museum. 
The Valley is a very popular recreation area, especially during the summer months, where many 
families spend their holidays. Tourists also visit the Kauaeranga Valley. 
The Kauaeranga Valley was chosen as the site of this study because it is a typical area of publicly 
owned forest which has multiple uses. It is also a forest which has been studied previously and the 
Travel Cost Study of Everitt (1983) provides some basis for validating the results. 
The Contingent Valuation Methodology 
This study used the contingent valuation methodology to estimate non-market values. Seller, Stoll and 
Chavas (1985) state that: 
Non-market valuation techniques are used for the purpose of estimating the changes In individual weHare 
which would result from the alternative use of resourcel for which competitive markets do not exist (Sellor 
0/ ai, 1985,S7). 
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These techniques are now recognized as being legitimate methods for estimating non-market values, 
as shown by the passing of the Environment Act 1986, which: 
", establishes tho legal roquirement for considering non-merket values In an environmentaJ context. Some 
of the purpo ••• of the act are: "to ... Ensure that. in the managemont of natural and physical resources, full 
and balanced account io taken of ... The intrinsic value of 8Coayaterm; and ... .A11 values which are placed by 
Individuals and groups on the quality of the onvlronment, (Korr, 1988,4). 
Non-market valuation seeks to value goods whose value is not revealed in markets. The methodology 
builds on the concept of consumer surplus: the amount a consumer is willing to pay for a unit of a 
good, above what they actually have to pay. An individual's demand curve shows marginal willingness 
to pay (WTP) for another unit of a good. Summing marginal willingness to pay for all units of a good 
consumed gives total willingness to pay - the area under a demand curve 
Changes in the size of consumer surplus is a measure of welfare change. Two approaches to 
measuring this change are measuring willingness to payor willingness to accept. Formally these 
measures are defined as follows: The equivalent variation is the amount that would need to be paid 
or received by an individual to take them to the subsequent welfare level if the welfare changing policy 
did not go ahead. Compensating variation is the amount that would need to be paid or received by 
the individual to leave them at their original welfare level if the policy change did take place, (Seller 
at ai, 1985,157). 
Given the proposed, unambiguous loss of a beneficial natural resource, 'Equivalent measures are the 
maximum amounts people would pay to prevent the loss,' (Kerr, 1986, 6). Thus in the present study 
equivalent variation and WfP is the measure of value to be used, since it assesses the loss or partial 
loss of the services provided by the Kauaeranga Valley. 
A range of methods have been developed for the purpose of non-market valuation. Some of these 
approaches have been based on the cost side and some on the benefit side (Hufschmidt et al).Three 
of the most common approaches are the uses of the Travel Cost Method (TCM), the Hedonic Price 
Method (HPM), and the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). The contingent valuation method is 
based on hypothetical markets. It includes surveys which seek to gauge consumers' reactions to 
changes in the quality and quantity supplied of a non-market good. 
The theoretical basis of valuation can be described using the following analysis from Hanley. 1989. 
Using a bid function, as proposed by Bradford (1970), consider the economy in which two goods are 
produced: Y a numeraire good and Z, a non-rival and non-excludable public good. Different states 
oftha economy, (S), distinguished by different bundles ofY and Z, are determined by the preferences 
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of agents active in the economy. In figure 3 the preferences 01 an individual are shown. From the initial 
state, S., the individual's utility can be kept constant by increasing Z as Y is decreased and vice versa 
Moving from S. to Z· it can readily be seen that the individual would bid or give up S •• V" of Y. This is 
the individuals's willingness to pay (WTP) for a change. Similarly the compensation required, in terms 
of Y. for a fall in Z from 5 to 1: is shown by S.·Y'. Thus, AB is the individuals bid curve, with the slope 
of the line indicating a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between Z and Y. Since the initial 
state, U.=U(Y.z.J is the reference point against which changes are compared, figure 3 shows the 
individual's compensating variation for changes in the provision of Z. Thus for a reduction in Z of Z;Z: 
the compensating variation is S.·Y'. Equivalent variation can be described in a similar manner. 
Figure 3: Bid Curve and Compensating Variation 
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The advantage to be gained from using the CVM for this study is that it can be used to measure non· 
use values as well as use values in contrast to travel cost and hedonic methods which can not. 
Furthermore, when a valuation exercise involves existence values, contingent valuation is the 'only 
known method of estimating monetary values,' (Bishop and Heberlein, 1987,99) 
However. there are some difficutties associated with using the CVM. These relate to sampling errors, 
questionnaire format, bias and aggregation. Sampling errors occur when a non·random sample is 
used to estimate population parameters, Edwards and Anderson (1987). In order to obtain a random 
sample the probability of every element in the population list being selected must be non-zero. The 
questions used to elicit contingent values, can be framed in a number of ways. Decisions have to 
made as whether to use an open ended or closed format, or variations of either of these techniques. 
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A major challenge is to eliminate bias, so that sample values are consistent with the true values of the 
population. Forms of bias include hypothetical bias (bidding erroneously), strategic bias (adjusted 
bidding due to perceived incentives), vehicle bias (adjusted bidding because of the payment vehicle), 
information bias (when insufficient information on which to base a bid), and non·response bias (as 
when non respondents censor themselves). Finally the data from a survey can produce a wide range 
of aggregate benefits depending on the aggregation method used. The two major issues here are the 
size of the population which the survey represents and the similarity between respondents and non· 
respondents. It is possible to regard them as identical, totally different or to use some form of 
weighting. 
There has been some debate as to the appropriateness of CVM methods in New Zealand. For 
example: 
Research conducted In New Zealand hao Indlcaled that approech .. to non-market valuation amployed 
alsewhere do not necessarily work well here ... {furthermora] n non merl<et value. are to be employed ao aids 
to decision making, thon valuation method. mull be validated In New Zealand. (KBrr. 1988. 14). 
In contrast: 
Countriosllke Now Zealand can apply contingent valuation to many environmental Issu •• with considerable 
confidenco. (Bishop and Heberlein. 1987,100). 
Despite the debate several studies have been completed in New Zealand including those of Harris 
(1984), Copinga (1984), Kerr (1987), Kirkland and Meister (1987), and Uncoln College Agricultural 
Economics and Business Unit (1990). 
The Kauaeranga Vallev Survey 
The Survey Instrument 
The design and implementation of a survey questionnaire is an immensely complex undertaking. 
Attention must be given to every detail to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the resutts. This 
required many revisions of the questionnaire to make it a simple and short as possible yet st.imciently 
sharp to elicit the required information. The challenge was to obtain both an adequate response rate 
and the appropriate information form the respondents. The questionnaire is attached to the paper as 
an appendix. 
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The Survey Sample 
The sample was taken from the Waikato Parliamentcuy Electoral District. The area includes both urban 
<Parts of eastern Haminon, Huntly, Ngaruwahia and Te Aroha) and rural constituents giving a cross 
section of lifestyles. The electoral roll simplified the task of selecting a sample as the people on the 
roll are numbered. From the 19,nO names on the roll 201 numbers were randomly selected for the 
surv~. 
Payment Vehicle 
It is very important to select a payment vehicle which is both acceptable and realistic to participants. 
It must be acceptable to minimize protest behaviour and realistic to encourage participants to act as 
they would if actually faced by this situation. Taxes were not considered suitable as many people 
indicated th~ fen taxes are 'high enough already'. Given these goals the questionnaire considered 
two options: a) payments to a trust fund and b) entrance fees. 
Commodity Description 
A crucial requirement of a survey is to provide those participants who are unfamiliar with the good with 
a useful description. To this end a written description and a map was included as part of the 
questionnaire. 
Survey Presentation 
A complete copy of the survey appears as an appendix to this paper. The questionnaire itself was 
printed on three sheets of A4 paper -that is, two each of the six pages was reduced on to one A4 
page. 
Great care was taken in design to provide a brief, attractive, professional document along with a 
'pressed blue ball point signature approach' as suggested by Dillman (1978). 
Two weeks alter the initial survey was posted out a follow up letter with another copy of the survey 
was sent out in an endeavour to achieve a high response rate. 
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The Survey Resu~s and Aggregate Benefits 
Survey Information 
Two hundred and one surveys were posted. Thirty one of these were retumed immediately because 
the addressees had moved since the electoral roll was printed reducing the effective mailout to 170 
surveys. One hundred and twenty two of these surveys or 71.8% were retumed. This information is 
summarized in table 1. 
Table 1: Survey Information 
Posted 201 
Incorrect Addresses M 
Delivered 170 
Retumed 122 
Non-respondents 48 
It should be noted that in just over one week almost 50 percent of the eventual number of surveys had 
been received. From day eight until day fourteen daily (the day of the second mailout) returns 
declined steadily. On day nineteen, thirteen of the second mailout surveys were returned. Initially, it 
was thought that a follOW up mailout aiter two weeks would be appropriate. The resurgence in the 
number of surveys being retumed and the continuation of this trend until around day 23 tends to 
support this. Finally note that 50.6% of the first round surveys and 33.6% of the second round surveys 
were returned. 
Respondents 
Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests were carried out between sample data and 1986 Waikato electorate 
data to ascertain if sample data differed significantly from population data Table 2 summarizes the 
results of these tests. 
Allay and Scrimgeour. ForUl Valuation 9 
Table 2: Chi-Square Goodnesa-of-FIt Teats 
Sample x' Critical x'.05,df Decision 
fm..A 
Respondents against census data: 
Respondents-age 12.54 x',05,. = 11.07 Reject H. 
Respondents-income 115.95 l,05,. = 11.07 Reject H. 
Respondents-occupation 23.76 l,05,o = 12.59 Reject H. 
Respondents-sex 0.13 l,05,I = 3.84 Accept H. 
Pan B" 
Non-respondents against respondents: 
Non-respondents-sex 2.00 X',05,I = 3.84 Accept H. 
Non-respondents-occupation 13.40 x',1>!> ... = 18.30 Accept H. 
Since Ho was rejected lor age, income and occupation the conclusion must be reached that the 
sample is not representative 01 the population. That is there are statistically significant differences 
between sample and population strata This implies that sample data can not be used to make 
Inferences about the population with 100% confidence. 
Aggregation of Results by Means 
The simplest aggregation method involves multiplication of the mean bid by the population. The adult 
population of the Waikato electorate was approximately 24,317 according to the 1986 census data 
A conservative aggregation method assumes non-respondents place a zero value on the resource. 
For the entrance fee, the mean bid from respondents was $3.11 (n=110). Protest bids and non-
respondents numbered 60. Adding this information results in a reduced average bid of $2.02. This 
figure multiplied by the population gives an annual entrance tee willingness to pay of $49,120. 
If respondents and non-respondents are treated alike then the average bid is multiplied by the 
population: $3.11 • 24.317 = $75,625. The present values 01 aggregate entrance benerlts lor the 
Kauaeranga Valley calculated using four discount rates ( 10%, 7.5%, 5% and 2.5%.) are presented in 
table 3. 
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For the trust fund, the mean bid was $8.05 (n=98). The adjusted mean is $4.64 if a zero value is 
placed on the 72 non-respondents. Using these figures annual trust fund WTP can be calculated as 
$112.830 if respondent and non-respondents are considered differently and as $195,751 if they are 
treated the same. Net present values lor trust fund bids are presented in table 3. 
Pan A: Entrance Fee 
Discount rate 
10% 
7.5% 
5% 
2.5% 
Pan B: Trust Fund 
Discount rate 
10% 
7.5% 
5% 
2.5% 
Table 3: Aggregate WTP • Preaent Values In S 
NPVfor 
Mean bid = ~.11 
756,258 
1,008,344 
1,512,517 
3,025,034 
NPVfor 
Mean bid = ~8.05 
1,957,518 
2,610,024 
3,915,037 
7,830,074 
NPVfor 
Mean bid - $2.02 
491,203 
654,937 
982,406 
1,964,813 
NPV for 
Mean bid = $4.64 
1,128,308 
1,504,411 
2,256,617 
4,513,235 
Aggregate of Benefits by Regression AnalySis 
Aggregation of the benerlts using regression analysis produced slightly different results which are 
reponed elsewhere (Riley, 1990). 
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Validity of the Results 
The validity of a CVM study is not easily assessed because ~ attempts to place a value on a non-
market good, the true value of which is unknown. This means the calculated value can not be 
compared to the true value. An alternative, although second best method is to compare the results 
of two or more studies that have valued the same resource. In this case the results can be compared 
with travel cost study of the Kauaeranga Valley carried out by Everitt (1983). 
The entrance fee bids of this study are comparable with the travel cost study because the travel cost 
study only estimates use value. Everitt's most conservative estimate for the recreational benefits of the 
Kauaeranga Valley was $100,000 per year in 1981 dollars. Adjusting this to 1990 dollars gives a value 
of $234,000. This is significantly more than the $49,120 willingness to pay for entrance fees in this 
study. There are a number of possible causes for this divergence. 
Firstly it. is possible that the rCM is measuring some sort of total value that is different to the strictly 
use value of the CVM method estimated. Seller et aI (1985) note in their study of the recreational 
benefits of four lakes that: 
-aha travel cost method gives estimates of consumeR surplus for the whole recreation experience whereas 
tho contingent valuation methods provides estimates of consumer surplus for just the boating aspect of that 
oxperionce," (Soller et al, 1985, 172). 
In the present study a similar divergence may be the case where Everitt's study measured the total 
experience while the present study measured WTP for an entrance fee. 
Secondly note that all participants in Everitt's ~udy were users of the Valley. In the CVM study only 
31% of the participants had visited the Valley before, and it is unknown how many actually use the 
resource now. It is not surprising that respondents less likely to visit the Valley had a lower WTP. 
The nine year time difference between the studies should be noted as should the fact that the 
benefits from the CVM study were only aggregated for the population of Waikato electorate 
Another issue which potentially distorts the results of this study is people's expectalions about other 
forest parks. It would seem some people expect the status quo to remain for other parks whereas 
some people expect that if entrance fees are charged at one park they will be charged at all. Similarly 
it would seem people's willingness to contribute to a trust fund would be influenced by whether or not 
all forest parks were to be funded that way, or only some. 
It would seem the divergence is caused by a combination of the factors listed. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
The CVM study of Kauaeranga Valley proved to be a relatively simple method of obtaining an estimate 
of the value of the Valley. 
It was particularly pleasing to achieve the high response rate to the survey of 71 %. 
The study indicates that the Kauaeranga Valley has a net present ·use· value of approximately $0.5 
million dollars and a total net present value of $1.1 million assuming a 10% discount rate. 
These recreational and non-use values are significant and should be considered when management 
decisions are made concerning this Valley. 
The CVM results must be treated with caution given the divergence between the results of this study 
and the rCM study of the same Valley_ 
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APPENDIX 
26 September 1990 
You have been selected at random to participate in a survey with regard to how 
people value the Kauaeranga Valley Park on the Coromandel Peninsula. It will 
take less than 10 minutes to fill out. 
Please fill in this survey even if yo~~ot value the park because I am trying to get 
an idea of how EVERYONE values the park. 
The aim of this study is NOT to find out how much people could be charged to 
enter the park. The aim IS to estimate a value for the park and to test methods 
for measuring these values. 
The information in this survey is CONADENTIAL The questionnaire is numbered 
only to allow me to remind people, who have not replied, to return the surve.¥-
The survey should be returned in the FREEPOST envelope provided. 
The valuation of New Zealand's parks is an important issue - your effort in filling 
out and returning this survey will be useful and appreciated. 
Thank you for your time. 
Dean Rilev 
Kauaeranga Valley Survey 
This is NOT just a survey of people who visit this park - it is a survey 
of ALL people, even if they NEVER intend to use the park. Try to 
answer the questions as honestly and accurately as possible. Space 
has been left at the end of the survey for comments. 
Dean Riley 
Economics Department 
University of Waikato 
Private Bag 
Hamilton 
II 
COROMANDEL PENINSULA 
r 
~ ~ 
V 
"-
'AUCKlAND 115km 
~ HAMILTON 107km 
PAEROA 
• 
WAIHI 
With a subscription scheme, people would voluntarily give an annual 
donation to the Department of Conservation towards the running of the 
Kauaeranga Valley. Donations to such schemes are common overseas 
and are similar to giving donations to organizations like Save the Whales and 
The Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society. 
Question 2 
Rank the schemes in your order of preference [Use 1, 2 and 3 - with 1 
most preferred and 3 least preferred] 
Yearly subscription 
Entrance lees 
Higher taxes 
Question 3 
Imagine now that the government decided that the park was becomin'g too 
costly to fund from taxes only. If an entrance fee was used to help fund 
the park, what is the most you would be prepared to pay per person to 
enter the valley? [Circle one] 
Nothing $1 $2 $3 $4 
If nothing why is this? 
$5 $6 if more than $6 
How much? 
$-
Now suppose the government decided it would be better off if it sold the 
park and used the money for other parks. If the Kauaeranga Valley was 
sold it would be possible for private companies to buy the valley for timber 
and gold mining purposes. Public access would be severely restricted and 
the appearance at the valley would be greatly changed. To avoid this a 
TRUST FUND could be set up to BUY and run the valley. This trust would 
be funded by subscriptions and the park, and public access, would be 
preserved. 
With a subscription scheme, people would voluntarily give an annual 
donation to the Department of Conservation towards the running of the 
Kauaeranga Valley. Donations to such schemes are common overseas 
and are similar to giving donations to organizations like Save the Whales and 
The Royal Forest and Bird Proteaion Society. 
Question 2 
Rank the schemes In your order of preference [Use 1, 2 and 3 - with 1 
most preferred and 3 least preferred] 
Yearly subscription 
Entrance lees 
Higher taxes 
Question 3 
Imagine now that the government decided that the park was becoming too 
costly to fund from taxes only. If an entrance fee was used to help fund 
the park, what is the most you would be prepared to pay per person to 
enter the valley? [Circle one} 
Nothing $1 $2 $3 $4 
If nothing why is this? 
$5 $6 if more than $6 
How much? 
$-
Now suppose the government decided it would be better off if it sold the 
park and used the money for other parks. If the Kauaeranga Valley was 
sold it would be possible for private companies to buy the valley for timber 
and gold mining purposes. Public access would be severely restricted and 
the appearance of the valley would be greatly changed. To avoid this a 
TRUST FUND could be set up to BUY and run the valley. This trust would 
be funded by subscriptions and the park, and public access, would be 
preserved. 
Question 4 
What Is the most you would be prepared to pay per year Into such a 
Trust Fund towards the running of the Kauaeranga Valley? [Circle one] 
Nothing $2 $4 $8 $10 $12 $16 if more than $16 
If nothing why is this? 
Part B: 
How much? 
$-
It would be helpful, for interpreting the results of this survey, if you could 
also answer the following questions. 
Question 5 
What age group are you in? [TIck one] 
Under 20 41-50 
21-30 51- 60 
31 -40 over 60 
Question 6 
What income group are you in (before tax)? [TIck one] 
- -
Under 15000 15000 - 19999 20000 - 24999 
25000 - 29999 30000 - 34999 above 35000 
Question 7 
What is your occupation? [TIck one] 
Professionalf Agriculturel Forestryl 
Technical Fishing 
Administrationl Productionl Transport! 
Management Labouring 
SelVice Student 
Sales Retired 
Clerical Other 
Domestic 
Comments: 
Thank you again for your help. 
FINANCIAL MARKET DUALISM AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
by 
Rodney L. St. Hill 
Senior Lecturer 
Department of Economics and Marketing 
Lincoln University 
PO Box 84 
Canterbury 
NEW ZEALAND 
Telephone: +64 (03) 3252811 
Fax: + 64 (03) 325 2099 
Paper presented at the Winter Conference of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society (New 
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Financial Market Dualism and Economic Development 
ABSrRACT 
The main purposes of this paper are to analyze financial market dualism as a constraint on economic 
development and to suggest some policy initiatives that might promote integration of a dual financial 
market into a coherent national market. Firstl y, the contributions of financial development to 
economic growth are reviewed. Where relevant, the importance of integration among financial 
institutions is emphasized. Secondly, the relationship between integration among financial institutions 
and saving-investment causality is discussed. Thirdly, the roles of money and finance in low income 
economies are analyzed within a dual economy framework. Absence of an integrated national 
financial market is shown to be a barrier to economic growth and structural transformation. Finally, 
a number of policy initiatives are outlined. It is suggested that a dualistic approach to financial 
market policy is appropriate until the national financial market is integrated into a coherent system. 
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Financial Market Dualism and Economic Development * 
Introduction 
Since publication of treatizes on causal relationships between financial development and economic 
development by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), financial market liberalization has become an 
integral part of the economic policy progranunes advocated by multilateral agencies such as the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund. During the 1970s and 1980s both theoretical and empirical 
literature in this area burgeoned. I Liberalization has generally been interpreted as removing inflexible 
controls over interest rates and foreign exchange transactions, eliminating intervention in the 
allocation of credit and improving the structure of prudential regulation and supervision (World Bank, 
1989: 128-131). Not all attempts at liberalization have been very successful in terms of improving 
the contribution of financial markets to economic growth (Dfaz-Alejandro, 1985; Villanueva and 
Mirakhor, 1990) and some authors have been particularly critical of efforts to raise interest rates 
(Akyuz, 1991; Beckerman, 1988; Dutt, 1990-91; and Taylor, 1983: ch. 5 and 6). 
In this paper it is suggested that one reason why experiments in financial liberalization have 
sometimes proved to be disappointing is that they have not adequately addressed the issue of financial 
market dualism. Financial market dualism can be defined as the simultaneous existence of backward 
and modem financial systems within a national economy. If a large part of the national financial 
market is backward, then orthodox liberalization progranunes need to be supplemented by policies 
directed towards integrating financial institutions into a coherent national system. 
The paper is set out as follows. Section II reviews contributions of the financial system to 
economic growth. The importance of integration among financial institutions is emphasized in the 
context of the spatial dimension of economic transactions. Section III discusses the relationship 
between integration of financial institutions into a coherent national system and saving-investment 
causality. Section IV analyzes the roles of money and finance in the context of low income 
economies that exhibit technological and financial dualism. Absence of an integrated national 
financial market is shown to be a barrier to economic growth and structural transformation. The final 
section outl ines a number of appropriate policy initiatives that might supplement orthodox 
liberalization progranunes when financial market dualism is present. 
II Contributions of the financial system to economic growth 
In this section contributions of the financial system to economic growth are reviewed. These include: 
a) reductions in transactions costs associated with the introduction of a medium of exchange and 
development of a payments system; b) changes in the time profile and spatial dispersion of 
investment projects associated with mobilization of savings; and c) improved allocation of credit 
associated with the information-gathering and project-monitoring roles of financial institutions. 
a Reductions in Transactions COSIS. Textbook introductions to the evolution of financial systems 
usually explain the innovation of money in terms of the development of devices to reduce high 
transaction costs associated with exchange. Consider an economy in the early stages of development 
with no medium of exchange. In such an economy, when market transactions occur, they are 
characterized by barter which requires a simultaneous double coincidence of wants. As buyers and 
sellers seek each other and endeavour to match their individual demands and supplies, they incur 
search costs (real resource costs and opportunity costs of time). The greater the spatial separation 
among buyers and sellers, the higher are search costs. Introduction of a medium of exchange such 
as commodity money reduces search costs by relaxing the double coincidence constraint on exchange 
transactions. In an economy with no medium of exchange, information costs are also high. It can 
be easily demonstrated that in such an economy, if there are N goods, there are O.5N (N-I) prices. 
In an economy with N goods plus a medium of exchange there are only N prices. 
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Search and information costs are not the only costs incurred in exchange transactions. 
Consider now an economy with a medium of exchange but no payments system. A payments system 
comprises a set of clearing house arrangements and equipment (for example, networked computers) 
that integrates financial institutions that provide the medium of exchange. In an economy without a 
payments system buyers and sellers must settle transactions on their own behalf. This might often 
require that pairs of buyers and sellers meet at the same location. incurring real resource costs of 
travel and opportunity costs of time. Clearly. the more spatially dispersed are buyers and sellers. the 
higher are these costs. One way of reducing them would be for each buyer-seller pair to net out their 
transactions periodicall y or to use bills of exchange. Indeed. these were common practices among 
merchants in Western Europe during the Middle Ages (Brandel. 1982; McIntosh, 1988). However. 
once such credit arrangements are put in place. the risk of default arises and must be taken into 
account in exchange transactions. An alternative would be for buyers and sellers to appoint agents 
to settle on their behalf. although this would substitute monitoring costs for opportunity costs of time. 
The existence of a payments system allows a buyer who owns a deposit account to issue an order to 
pay a nominated seller at any geographical location covered by that system. thereby reducing 
transactions costs. 
High transactions costs encourage self-sufficiency and discourage specialization. Introduction 
of a medium of exchange and payments system in the early stages of economic development is likely 
to increase economic growth because of efficiency gains associated with specialization (Smith. 1869: 
ch. 2)2. 
b Mobilizarion of savings. Apart from providing a medium of exchange and payments system the 
financial system also provides safe custody for the savings of households and businesses. Therefore, 
it performs an essential role in the mobilization of savings. Mobilization of savings can be said to 
have taken place when savers in aggregate increase the proportion of financial assets and reduce the 
proportion of real assets in their stock of savings. Mobilization of savings improves efficiency by 
liberating real resources that would otherwise remain idle. thus enabling investors to bring investment 
projects forward in time. J This is particularly important in rural areas of many low income countries 
where lack of investment in plant and equipment rather than deficient demand for agricultural output 
causes low productivity and poverty. McKinnon (1973:13) observed that "financially isolated 
entrepreneurs can easily be caught in a low-level equilibrium trap. where innovation is completely 
blocked except for a small handful of the very wealthy. " 
Mobilization of savings not only a1low.s investment projects to be brought forward in time: 
it also allows them to become sectorally or geographically dispersed. If the financial system is well 
integrated the net savings of one economic seclOr or geographical region can be transferred to another 
in wbich expected returns are high but lack of savings is a constraint. It will be argued in section IV 
that this is crucial 10 the relationship between financial and economic development. 
c Informarion garhering and project monitoring. In an economy in which there are no institutions 
specializing in gathering and analyzing information about prospective loans and in monitoring the 
performance of existing loans. there are important information asymmetries. Leyland and Pyle (1977) 
developed a model in which entrepreneurs sell securities directly to the public. In their model it was 
assumed that entrepreneurs have bener information about expected returns on prospective investment 
projects than anyone else. This is what Diamond (1984:407) called ex ante information asymmetry. 
It gives rise to an adverse selection effect because if some entrepreneurs are dishonest in disclosure, 
it is not possible for the public to distinguish good investments from bad. Consequently. dishonest 
entrepreneurs are able to sell securities backed by worthless investment projects and the market for 
securities is a market for "lemons" (Akerlof. 1970). Financial institutions can reduce adverse 
selection and improve allocation of investment funding by specializing in gathering and analyzing 
information on potential investment projects. 
Diamond (1984) identified another type of information asymmetry, namely ex post 
information asymmetry. This type of asymmetry arises because entrepreneurs have better information 
than anyone else about how investment projects covered by existing loan contracts are performing. 
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Diamond showed that financial institutions have a cost advantage over individuals gathering and 
analyzing information needed for enforcement of loan contracts because the alternatives are either 
duplication if individuals monitor directly. or no moniooring at allowing to the problem of free riders. 
Financial institutions can improve the allocation of credit by. for example. using their information to 
ensure that funds are actually used for the investment project specified in the loan contract. rather than 
10 supplement working capital or to finance some other project. 
OJ Causality between saving and investment 
In section II above it was argued that the financial system contributes to economic growth by reducing 
transaction costs. changing the time profile and spatial dispersion of investment projects and 
improving allocation of credit. In this section it is argued that as a financial system develops and 
becomes more integrated. the direction of causality between saving and investment changes. The 
analysis presented here uses the post-Keynesian approach 10 stages of banking and regional 
development outlined by Chick (1990). Chick and Dow (1988) and Dow (1987) and applied in the 
context of economic development by St. Hill (1991). 
Consider firstly a low income economy in which exchange is by means of barter and in which 
there are no financial assets. In such an economy saving and investment decisions are simultaneous. 
although investment might be nothing more than the addition of currently produced foodgrains to 
stockpiles (porter, 1966:354). Consider now an economy in the early stages of development with 
currency and a fledgling financial system comprising money lenders who finance cash loans from their 
own savings. and local banks that provide safe custody for household savings and make cash loans. 
This corresponds to Chick's "stage I" banking system. The degree of integration among individual 
money lenders and local banks is low. Consequently. money lenders are constrained by their own 
savings and banks are constrained by the savings of their depositors. Furthermore, if most 
consumption goods are both produced and consumed by the same households. redeposit ratios 
following loans will be low, being determined by the (low) marginal propensity to save. Under these 
circumstances saving must precede investment and economic growth is slow because the marginal 
propensity to save is low. 
As economic development occurs and the financial system evolves bank liabilities become 
widely accepted as a medium of exchange. Bank deposits represent money that can be used to finance 
consumption as well as safe custody for savings. Once bank liabilities are used for transactions 
purposes redeposit ratios are high and bank lending is constrained by reserves rather than by saving. 
Given additional reserves banks in aggregate can lend out a mUltiple of the increase in reserves. 
creating new deposits as they finance investment. By this means banks can finance investment prior 
to the emergence of new saving. This is. of course. the basis of Keynesian income multiplier theory 
in which investment, financed by credit expansion, generates saving equal 10 that investment. 
At first banks are not well integrated, so individual banks must beware of leakages to other 
banks. Therefore. actual credit expansion following on addition to reserves is considerably less than 
the theoretical limit set by the credit creation multiplier. This corresponds to Chick's "stage 2" 
banking system. As the network of banks becomes integrated inoo a coherent system an interbank 
funds market develops (Chick's "stage 3"). This means that an individual bank will be able to buy 
in reserves. providing that other banks in aggregate hold excess reserves. Consequently. it is more 
likely that following an increase in reserves loans will expand to the theoretical limit set by the credit 
creation multiplier. Under these circumstances it is not the marginal propensity to save that constrains 
investment. but (assuming that investment opportunities themselves are not limited) jointly the size 
of any increase in reserves and the credit creation multiplier. If a lender of last resort facility is made 
available (for example. through a central bank - Chick's "stage 4") then. as long as the effective cost 
of last resort funds is less than or equal 10 the interbank interest rate and as long as there is no 
quantitative restriction on last resort lending. banks in aggregare can buy in reserves. The central 
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bank would validate whatever level of lending banks collectively supplied. At this stage of 
development the credit creation multiplier is irrelevant, because banks can effectively make loans 
before they have deposits.' The only constraint on investment under these circumstances (once again 
assuming that investment opportunities themselves are not limited) is the willingness of banks to lend. 
It is the availability of finance rather than saving that constrains investment once banks are integrated 
into a coherent system. The essential role of banks at this stage is to validate desired expenditures. 
As Keynes (l937:668-{569) observed: 
"The public can save ex anJe and ex POSt and ex anything else until 
they are blue in the face ... (but) the banks hold the key position in 
the transition from a lower to a higher scale of economic activity ... 
The investment market can become congested through a shortage of 
cash. It can never become congested through shortage of saving. " 
Further development of the financial system is associated with integration of domestic 
financial markets into international markets and the acquisition of skills and technologies that allow 
banks to actively manage both their liabilities ("stage 5") and assets ("stage 6"). Banks are able to 
fund new loans by borrowing either domestically or overseas and by securitizing existing loans. 
In summary, as the financial system develops the nature of the saving-investment relationship 
changes. When there are no financial assets, saving and investment decisions are simultaneous. Once 
financial assets evolve saving and investment decisions are separated. In the early stages of financial 
development saving is causally prior to investment and the marginal propensity to consume constrains 
investment. Once bank liabilities are widely accepted in exchange transactions and banks are well 
enough integrated to establish an interbank funds market, increases in bank reserves and the credit 
creation multiplier jointly constrain investment. At this stage the Keynesian income multiplier comes 
into play and investment becomes causally prior to saving. If a lender of last rsort facility with no 
quantitative restrictions is made available or if the domestic financial system is integrated into the 
world financial market, the only constraint on investment is the banks' collective willingness to lend. 
Investment is causally prior to saving under these conditions also. 
IV The roles oC money and finance in dual economies 
Many low income economies are characterized by a dualistic structure. In this section two types of 
dualism, technological and financial, are discussed and the roles that money and finance play in the 
structural transformation of a developing economy are analyzed. 
a Strucrural dualism. Models of technological dualism have been very influential in the contexts of 
both development theory and policy. The most famous of such models is the classical model of Lewis 
(1954) and its elaboration by Ranis and Fei (1961) (referred to hereafter as the LRF model), but there 
are also less Well-known models such as the neoclassical two-sector growth model of Jorgenson 
(1961). The dualistic structure comprises a large traditional sector confined mainly to agriculture (and 
services) and a much smaller, modem sector concentrated in manufacturing industry. In agriculture 
the production function is of the general form Y A = Y A (L, A.) where Y A represents agricultural 
output, L represents labour and A. represents a fixed area and quality of land, whereas in 
manufacturing industry the production function is of the general form Y, = Y, (L, K), where Y, 
represents industrial output and K represents capital. In the LRF model capital is assumed to be 
immobile berween sectors. It is also assumed that: i) owing to lack of capital in agriculture, marginal 
product of labour is zero or negative; and ii) total agricultural output is just enough to meet 
subsistence or "traditional" consumption. Therefore, there is "surplus" labour that can be transferred 
from agriculture to manufacturing industry without there being a reduction in total agricultural output. 
Consequently, as labour is transferred out of agriculture a surplus of output over and above the 
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subsistence or traditional consumption of remaining labour in that sector emerges. It is this 
agricultural surplus that makes it possible to satisfy demand for basic consumption goods that arises 
as employment in industry expands without having to resort to imports (Kalecki, 1970; Nicholls, 
1963). Once surplus labour has been removed from agriculture total agricultural output begins to fall 
and the size of the agricultural surplus is reduced. Thus the tenns of trade tum against manufacturing 
industry and its expansion eventually stalls.' 
In order to prevent the tenns of trade effect shifting industrial development investment must 
occur in both sectors.6 The balanced growth criterion derived by Ranis and Fei (1961) requires that 
once surplus labour is exhausted, investment in the agricultural sector occurs at a rate high enough 
to allow labour to be transferred out of agriculture and into manufacturing industry as investment 
there expands demand for labour without depressing the tenns of trade for either sector. However 
Ranis and Fei offered no analysis of how investment in the agricultural sector might be financed 
except to say that industrial sector profit is an "investment fund (that) is to be allocated in part to the 
agricultural sector, thus raising agricultural productivity ... and in part to the industrial sector, thus 
raising the industrial capital stock" (p. 545). They did not address the important question of how 
industrial sector profit is actually transformed into agricultural sector investment. There was no 
financial sector in their model. 
b The roles of money and finance. The roles of money and finance in dual economy models have 
been grossly neglected (Sideri, 1984). Chandavarkar (1977) noted that in their comprehensive 
critique of dual economy models Kelly, Williamson and Cheetham (1972) hardly referred to the roles 
of money and finance. Nevertheless, money and finance are crucial to the structural transformation 
that is associated with economic development. 'There are three crucial aspects that need to be 
considered. Firstly, the agricultural surplus must be traded in markets if the process of economic 
development is to begin. However, it is unlikely that an agricultural surplus will be marketed unless 
the economy is monetized (Ghosh 1986a, 1986b). One reason is immediately obvious: transactions 
costs associated with Cartering industrial products for agricultural products would be prohibitively 
high if farms and factories were long distances apart. Another reason is that in a non-monetized 
economy the agricultural surplus might be saved in kind (food grains) as the only safeguard against 
possible future crop failure (Bardhan, 1970; Mathur and Ezekiel, 1961; Toquero, et ai, 1975). . 
Secondly, the initial investl)1ent in manufacturing industries and any additions to the capital 
stock that cannot be financed from industrial profits must be financed somehow. This aspect was 
discussed in some detail by Lewis (1954) who asserted that industrialists could finance investment by 
the expansion of bank credit, that is, by creation of new money. Lewis noted that prices would rise 
temporarily because nominal national income would rise while output of consumer goods remained 
constant. However, "the rise of prices eventually peters out, as savings grow into equilibrium with 
investment; and reverses itself, as the output of consumer goods begins to pour out" (p. 166). Lewis 
clearly envisaged an industrial sector financial system that was at a high level of development, for he 
explicitly ruled out ex anJe saving as a prerequisite for industrial investment. 
The third crucial aspect is that investment in agriculture must occur if the growth of 
manufacturing industry is to be maintained. The only alternative is to import basic consumption 
goods, but this might itself reduce the rate of industrial expansion if scarce foreign exchange is needed 
to pay for imports of capital goods. If agricultural investment is self-financed out of current income 
(assuming household income levels are such that it can be), there will be a fall in demand for 
industrial output. For this reason expansion of bank credit is just as necessary in the agricultural 
sector as it is in the industrial sector. However, financial market dualism might result in a shortage 
of agricultural credit. This possibility is now examined. 
c Financial market dualism. Lewis' description of bank credit reflects the standard credit creation 
process described in principles textbooks. As discussed in section ill above credit creation is only 
possible if either the redeposit ratio is high or if individual banks can acquire reserves on demand. 
The latter is possible only if there is a lender of last resort facility; or individual banks are well 
enough integrated to sustain an interbank funds market; or the domestic financial market is well 
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enough integrated with the world financial market to make overseas loans possible, It does not seem 
plausible in the context of dual economy models that the agricultural sector financial system would 
be developed enough to realize the full potential of the credit creation multiplier. 
I believe that there is considerable merit in incorporating the notion of financial market 
dualism into models of technological dualism such as the LFR model along the following lines. In the 
agricultural sector of a dual economy most transactions do not involve money. Most credit is 
provided by landlords who supply foodgrains or seed in return for a portion of the following year' 
harvest and by village money lenders who finance loans from their own savings. Where they exist, 
formal financial institutions have simple forms such as rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) 
or local banks. The degree of integration among individual landlords, money lenders, roscas and 
banks is low. So too, is the degree of integration of different groups of providers of credit. In 
contrast, in the industrial sector the financial market is dominated by modem banks that may be 
subsidiaries or branches of large foreign banks, or urban-based government or private banks. Such 
banks are integrated into a coherent system that is linked to international financial markets. The 
credit creation multiplier is clearly unimpeded in the industrial sector financial system, but the 
necessary conditions outlined above are lacking in the agricultural sector financial system. Moreover, 
if the industrial and agricultural sector financial markets are not closely linked, industrial sector 
profits cannot finance the agricultural investment that is necessary to expand agricultural output as 
the industrial sector grows. Thus, financial market dualism can act as a brake on economic 
development. 
Financial market liberalization programmes advocated by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund appear to ignore financial market dualism and assume that their client countries 
exhibit integrated domestic financial markets. The purpose of the following section is to outline some 
policies that might be used to support liberalization when financial market dualism is present. 
V Some policy suggestions 
There is much to gain from financial development. Without an integrated national financial market 
economic development is likely to be slow. Monetary transactions and, therefore specialization are 
limited and lenders must accumulate savings before they can extend credit. The credit creation 
process only becomes viable as the financial system develops and becomes integrated into a coherent 
whole. Economic development, from which "everyone" benefits, accelerates. For this reason some 
forms of government intervention are justifiable in the early stages of financial development. The 
policies outlined below are intended to nurture emerging financial institutions in a manner that does 
not unduly impede competition. 
a Supponing nwnerizarion of the agricultural sector. Monetization of transactions in the agricultural 
sector appears to be necessary before an agricultural surplus can support industrialisation. This 
suggests that governments in low income countries should implement a number of policies that are 
commonly followed in high income, industrial countries. 
Firstly, in order to encourage widespread use of bank liabilities as a means of payment, 
governments should accept them for payment of taxes and government charges. This is already done 
in many low income countries. When governments make payments to farmers they should also be 
in the form of bank liabilities. A good example of this practice occurred in Ghana in the early 1980s 
(Dadzie, Akaah and Dunson, 1989). Cocoa farmers were already required by law to sell their 
produce only to the Cocoa Board. Beginning in late 1982, the Board paid farmers by means of 
cheques rather than cash or "chits"(signed receipts acknowledging debt owed by the Board). Farmers 
could either cash their cheques in full at designated banks or deposit them in savings accounts. 
Where necessary new rural bank branches were established, so that no farmer was more than 25 miles 
from a designated bank. The advantage of this policy was that it required farmers to interact with 
the financial system. Survey evidence reported by Dadzie, Akaah and Dunson indicated that the 
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policy did encourage more farmers to use banks. 
Secondly, the acceptance of bank liabilities would be encouraged if they were redeemable for 
cash at par, that is, if depositors could make deposits with a high degree of certainty that they could 
subsequently make cash withdrawals or write out cheques up to the face value of their deposits, plus 
accrued interest. McKinnon (1973:16-18) noted that it is pervasive and unquantifiable uncertainty 
that prevents the development of financial institutions. Because both saving and investing entities are 
small and poor, they cannot obtain reliable information on either prospective loans or investment 
projects. Therefore, when loans are made they are usually for short terms and are heavily 
collateralized. If depositors had confidence in banks, loans might be for longer terms and less 
collateral might be required. 
A deposit insurance scheme is one method by which a government could raise confidence in 
banks. A small number of low income countries have already established deposit insurance schemes. 
These include Chile, Colombia, India, Kenya, the Philippines and Yugoslavia (Mas and Talley, 
1990). Shaw (1973: 131-132) justified the use of deposit insurance as a means of making money a 
secure asset, although he cautioned that banks should pay insurance charges according to the size of 
their net worth and variance of yield within their portfolios. Experience with deposit insurance in 
high income countries, such as Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, attests 
to the need to grade insurance charges according to risk. Although fledgling banks in rural areas of 
low income countries might lack the income to pay insurance premiums initially, they should 
contribute something once their establishment costs have been recouped. Otherwise they might 
sacrifice prudence for profit, knowing that insurance will protect themselves and their depositors in 
the event of insolvency. A degree of government subsidisation can be justified on the grounds that 
there are externalities created by financial development. 
An alternative to deposit insurance that might be implemented in the early stages of 
development is deposit guarantees .which might operate as follows. If bank A becomes insolvent, the 
government issues bonds to the central bank which prints money that is transferred to depositors who 
give up their claims on bank A. Bank A then writes the deposit liabilities out of its balance sheet. 
This procedure would not adversely affect monetary policy management. In the absence of a deposit 
guarantee scheme, a bank's insolvency would reflect negative net worth of some of its borrowers and 
WOUld, in tum, be reflected in reduced net worth of depositors. Money supply, defined as cash and 
deposits owned by the non-bank private sector, would fall as a result of bank insolvency. The deposit 
guarantee scheme would effectively substitute a reduction in net worth of the government for a 
reduction in net worth of depositors and money supply would be restored to its pre-insolvency level. 
The cost to banks for guarantees could be a statutory requirement to hold a minimum proportion of 
their asset portfolios as interest-bearing government securities. Periodical reviews could be set up 
to ensure that each bank's minimum proportion is related to its net worth. These securities could be 
designated "deposit guarantee bonds" to make their insurance nature transparent, so that governments 
would not be tempted to use them for raising general revenue. 
For basically sound banks that are experiencing a solvency crisis, perhaps caused by a decline 
in farm income associated with a natural disaster or by "thin-ness" of the domestic capital market, 
government could become a last resort supplier of capital. The Bank of Thailand has successfully 
operated such a scheme in recent years (Supachai Panitchpakdi, pers.com.). 
Deposit insurance and last resort capital schemes might be effective in removing uncertainty 
associated with insolvency-related losses, but there is also a need to implement policies to cope with 
liquidity crises. One method is to allow banks to temporarily reduce their holdings of deposit 
guarantee bonds below the minimum requirement by discounting them at the central bank, or to other 
banks. Governments might also become lenders of last resort by buying assets from solvent but 
illiquid banks on the condition that they repurchase those assets once the liquidity crisis is passed. 
b Supponing rhe inlegrarion of financial insrirurions. Integration of banks and other financial 
institutions into a coherent system is crucial if investment is not to be constrained by ex anle saving 
and confined to the sector or geographical region where savings are concentrated. There appear to 
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be two priorities for government in this area. Firstly, governments could assist in the development 
of the payments system by providing national clearing house facilities. The advantage of a national 
clearing house is that inter-institutional transactions can be netted out on a regular basis. This has 
become an issue of considerable importance in the emerging market-orientated economies in Eastern 
Europe (Crockett, 1990:126). Secondly, governments could assist in the development of modem 
communications systems. In rural areas of many low income countries communications systems are 
hopelessly inadequate. In some countries waiting time for telephone installations is over twenty years 
(Christchurch Press, 23 March, 1991).' It is very difficult to see how integrated national financial 
systems can evolve without efficient telecommunications systems. However, the specific role that 
government should play in the establishment of communications infrastructure is not clear. In some 
low income countries government owned and operated communications systems are inefficient and 
riddled with corruption. Perhaps an appropriate start would be for governments to provide venture 
finance to private communications firms. 
c Training staff. The successful operation of modem financial systems is dependent upon personnel 
who are skilled in management, financial analysis and services marketing. Therefore, it is important 
that training programmes be developed. International banks already provide some training 
opportunities for people from low income countries by employing them in local branches. Such 
opportunities need to be expanded as financial development occurs. Given that financial development 
in low income countries will eventually increase competition for international banks, it might be 
necessary for governments to assume some responsibility for training. This could be particularly 
important in the context of the marketing of bank services in rural areas. It might be necessary to 
equip bank staff with the communications and technical skills necessary to enable them to "take the 
bank to the people". This approach appears to have been successful in countries such as Sri Lanka 
where rural banks are sparsely distributed (Dharmabandu, 1987). 
VI Concluding comments 
The policy suggestions outlined above should be interpreted in the context of low income countries. 
These countries often exhibit both technological and financial dualism. Urban-based industrial sector 
banks are often well integrated and linked with the international financial market, while rural-based 
agricultural sector banks either do not exist or are small, insulated institutions dealing with a local 
population. Under these circumstances dualistic policies with respect to industrial and agricultural 
sector banks might be appropriate. For example, although the case for deposit insurance might be 
equally valid for both agricultural and industrial sector banks, subsidization of insurance premiums 
for agricultural sector banks can be justified until their establishment costs have been recouped. 
Similarly, there is little justification for unrestricted goverrunent-provided liquidity facilities for 
industrial sector banks that have access to interbank and overseas markets for shon term funds. If 
agricultural sector banks do not have access to such markets a case can be made for government-
provided liquidity facilities exclusively for them. 
It will be noted that little has been said about interest rates in this paper because it has been 
assumed that removal of government controls over interest rates is always part of a financial 
liberalization programme. However removal of controls over interest rates might be of little benet!t 
to producers in the agricultural sector who obtain credit from landlords or local money lenders whose 
effective interest rates have never been controlled. High effective nominal interest rates may be used 
as a "device to keep the peasants permanently in debt (although) actual repayments cannot exceed to 
margin between subsistence and rent "(Robinson, 1965: 290 fu). Alternatively, they may renect a 
high perceived default risk on the part of lenders (Bottomley, 1975). If high interest rates are, in 
fact, used for the purpose of debt peonage, then development of an integrated financial system will 
potentially free peasants from the economic and social dominance of landlords and local money 
lenders. 
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Finally, it should be emphasized that the thrust of this paper is not to denigrate the orthodox 
approach to financial market liberalization as advocated by the World Bank and International 
Monetary. Its purpose is to analyze the implications of financial market dualism for economic 
development and to examine policies that could supplement the orthodox approach to liberalization. 
In the early stages of economic development what is needed is the development of institutions, 
including financial institutions, that facilitate both investment and the marketing of output as 
efficiently as possible. 
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Footnotes 
" An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar in the Depanment of Economics 
and Marketing at Lincoln University on 13 June 1991. I am grateful to participants in that 
seminar and to Peter Earl for their suggestions. I also thank Steve Bailey and Hempala 
Talgaswana who alerted me to Dadzie, et aI (1989) and Dhannabandu (1987) respectively. 
1. Surveys of the literature include Dralce (1980), Fry (1988) and Gupta (1984). 
2. Historically, the use of barter in market transactions (in contrast to social transactions such 
as marriage) has been quite limited. See, for example, the literature review by Wray (1990: 
. 3-10). It is plausible that transactions costs are high enough to block most market activities 
in the absence of a medium of exchange. 
3. A good example of this effect can be found in Callier (1990). He showed that compared to 
self-financing, a rotating savings and credit association can approximately halve the average 
waiting time for funding of investment projects by members. 
4. This is the quintessence of the post-Keynesian approach to endogenous money supply (see, 
for example, Kaldor, 1982; Moore, 1988; Rousseas, 1988; Wray, 1990). 
5. If there is little or no surplus labour in the agricultural sector initially growth of 
manufacturing industry will be very slow indeed unless demand for basic· consumption goods 
by industrial workers can be met by imports. It should be noted in this context that one of 
the major criticisms of the LRF model is that surplus labour is, in fact, not universal among 
low income countries (see, for example, Jorgenson, 1966 and Desai and Majumdar, 1970). 
6. The agricultural production function would then become YA = YA (L, K, A). 
7. For a recent study of the Thai economy that explores this relationship, see Jansen (1990). 
8. The newspaper summarised a report prepared for the International Finance Corporation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A continuing debate surrounds the question of the costs imposed 
on the agricultural sector of protection to the manufacturing 
sector. It has long been recognised that protection raises the 
costs of imported goods used in farm production. Were this the 
only cost, the matter would be relatively straight forward. 
However there are two additional sources of costs. 
The first arises as a result of tariffs used on inputs in the 
industries that process raw farm products. If the concern is for 
the impact of all tariffs on the farm sector, then one needs a 
mechanism to estimate the incidence of these tariffs at the 
processing stage. 
The second arises because of the economy wide impact of tariffs 
on the real exchange rate. In this paper we follow Clements and 
sjaastad (1984) who offer a parsimonious approach to 
incorporating this effect. However their formulation assumes that 
imports and import competing goods are perfect sUbstitutes. We 
follow Chiao and Scobie (1990) in allowing for less than perfect 
sUbstitution. This provides a framework for estimating the impact 
of tariffs applied to inputs used in processing on the derived 
demand for farm products in the presence of an economy-wide 
change in the real exchange rate. 
After a brief review of the approach taken by Chiao and Scobie 
(1990) we develop an equilibrium displacement model of the 
agricultural processing sector, which allows for sUbstitution 
between four classes of inputs: imported goods, importables, home 
(or non-traded) goods and raw farm products. From the industry 
cost function we derive the input demand functions, which allows 
us to estimate the effect on the producers of raw farm products 
of tariffs applying to the processing sector. 
A similar framework is used to estimate the costs of tariffs to 
farmers on that part of their output that is directly exported 
rather than entering as an input into the production of processed 
products which are in turn exported. 
2. A FIXED INPUT MODEL 
The approach taken by Chiao and Scobie (1990) and Gibson, Scobie 
and Horan (1991) involved estimating the cost excesses in the 
processing sector. These costs were then added to the costs of 
tariffs at the farm level to obtain the total cost of protection. 
This assumed that all the costs at the processing sector were 
passed on to producers. Processors were seen to be price takers 
in the market for their products, facing infinitely elastic 
demand curves in world markets. On the other hand they had the 
market power to pass all the extra costs directly to producers, 
maintaining profit margins in the processing industry. 
The implications of this approach are sketched in Figure 1. The 
import supply schedule facing processors is assumed to be 
infinitely elastic, so that the domestic price of imported inputs 
cost of Protection to Agriculture 2 
rises by the full extent of the tariff. The higher price of 
imported inputs shifts the demand for importables and home goods. 
Notice that in the absence of subsidies the real export prices 
fall, due to rise in the price of home goods. This is the real 
exchange rate effect. 
The supply of inputs was assumed to be perfectly inelastic. The 
cost excess in the processing sector is represented by the sum 
of the rectangles formed by the constant quantities multiplied 
by the rise in price. If it is assumed that all this cost excess 
is borne by producers, then implicitly the derived demand for raw 
farm product must fall so that on an unchanged quantity the total 
revenue loss is just equal to the cost excess at the processing 
stage. 
There is an inherent inconsistency with this approach. The effect 
of tariffs on importables and home goods is derived from a 
general equilibrium model of an economy with four classes of 
goods (Chiao and Scobie, 1990). In that model sUbstitution 
between inputs is allowed. However the components of the cost 
excess are computed by assuming fixed quantities. 
In the next section we develop a more general framework which 
allows the supply and demand functions for the final product and 
the four inputs to assume any value of the corresponding 
elasticity. 
3. A FOUR VARIABLE INPUT MODEL OF THE AGRICULTURAL PROCESSING 
SECTOR 
In this section we outline the equilibrium displacement model of 
the processing sector. The model is an extension of that used by 
Scobie, Mullen and Alston (1991), and Mullen, Alston and 
Wohlegenant (1989) to analyse the incidence of benefits of supply 
curve displacement in the Australian wool industry. The genesis 
of the model can be found in Muth (1964). A linear elasticity 
(percentage change) modelling approach is used to measure the 
impacts of (assumed parallel) shifts in factor supply and demand 
curves. This is a parsimonious representation because it allows 
shocks to equilibrium to be analysed in the absence of detailed 
knowledge of the functional forms for supply and demand (Alston 
and Scobie, 1983). It has recently been shown by Alston and 
Wohlgenant (1990) that the linear elasticity model is exactly 
correct when the true supply and demand curves are linear, and 
is approximately correct when they are constant elasticity. For 
a true constant elasticity model the error of approximation is 
small as long as the supply and demand shifts are relatively 
small (less than 10%). 
The model assumes that the production function for processed 
agricultural products (Q) is: 
Q=f(Xl' Xz' Xl' X4) 
cost of Protection to Agriculture 3 
where X, is the quantity of imported inputs, X2 is importable 
inputs, X3 is home goods (including labour), and X, is the raw 
agricultural product input into processing. If there are 
constant returns to scale the total cost function is: 
C = Q.c(Wl' W2' W3' W4) 
with Wi being the input price for factor i and c(.) being the 
unit cost function. Using E to define relative change (e.g. EP 
= dP/P) a model can be derived which measures changes from 
initial equilibrium. The components are: 
1) Demand For Processed Agricultural Products 
P = f(Q, 11) 
where Tr is an exogenous demand shifter for this model (but 
endogenous to our analysis); the real exchange rate for 
exportables, derived in the earlier part of this paper. By total 
differentiation and division through by P 
Dp/P (6p/6Q.Q/P).dQ/Q + (6p/6Tr.Tr/P).d11/Tr 
and setting the elasticity of price w.r.t. the real exchange rate 
equal to one allows the relative change in price to be expressed 
as 
EP (l/l1).EQ + ETr. 
2) Market Clearing Condition 
P = C (Wl' Wz, W3' W4) 
which assumes that output price (equal to the minimum of 
average total cost) and input prices clear their respective 
markets. The processing industry is modelled as being 
competitive. We recognise that individual processing activities 
(such as meat) were subject to entry restrictions but believe 
that the competitive assumption is justifiable across the more 
broadly defined processing sector. Totally deriving the market 
clearing condition, dividing through by P (and multiplying by 
Wi/Wi) yields: 
Dp/P (6c/6W,.W,/P) .dW,/W, + • + (6c/6w4·W4/P).DW4/W4· 
As the unit cost function c(.) is simply total cost divided by 
output, 
c(. ) C/Q (W"X, + + W4'X4) 
we can express 
6c/6Wi (6c/6wi) /Q X;lQ 
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so that the market clearing condition becomes 
Dp/P (X,/Q.w,/P) .pw,/w, + + (X4/Q.W4/P) .Dw,/W4 
and defining the input cost share Ki as 
Ki Wi·Xi/P.Q 
yields 
EP = K,EW, + KzEWz + K3EW3 + K4EW4• 
3) Input Demand Functions 
Demand for input i is a function of own-price and other input 
prices, and is constrained by final output. 
X, = h, (W" Wz, Wp WJ.Q 
DX, = (6h,/6w,).Dw,.Q + + (6h,/6w4).Dw4.Q + h,.Dq. 
Rearranging the input demand functions yields, 
hi (.) = X;lQ 
6hi/6wi = (6Xi/6Wi) /Q. 
Dividing through by Xi (and multiplying by Wi/Wi) yields 
DX,/X, = (6x,/6w,.w,/X,) .DW,/W,+ (6X4/6w4.W4/X4) .Dw4/W4+ Q. (h,/X,) .Dq/Q 
which simplifies (noting that Q.(h,/X,= 0) to 
EX, = v"EW, + v'2EWZ + v13EW3 + V'4EW4 + EQ 
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where vij are" the output-constrained own i=i and cross i;t:j 
price elasticities of demand for input Xi w.r.t. the price of 
input i. From symmetry of the cost function Vi .=vji . Assuming 
that the input demand functions are homogenous of degree zero in 
prices allows us to express v,,=-v'2-v'3-v'4' Using Allen's 
definition of the elasticity of input sUbstitution Vi.=KjO"ij we can 
write J " 
EX, = - (KZO",Z+K30"'3+K40"'4) EW, + KzO",zEW2 + K30"13EW3 + K40"'4EW4 + EQ 
Similarly, 
EXZ K,O"Z' - (K,O"Z,+K30"Z3+K40"Z4) EWz + K30"Z3EW3 + K40"Z4EW4 + EQ 
EX3 K,0"3' + K20"3ZEWZ - (K,0"3,+KZO"32+K40"34) EW3 + K40"34EW4 + EQ 
EX4 K,0"4' + K20"42EW2 + K30"43EW4 - (K,0"4' +K20"4Z+K30"43) EW4 + EQ 
4) Input Supply Functions 
Input supply is assumed to be a function of own-price and an 
exogenous shifter variable Ti reflecting government policies 
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having an impact on inputs (tariffs and subsidies). Writing the 
supply equations in price-dependent form we get, 
Wj = gj (XjI Tjl 
and oWj/Wj = (6W;l6XjoXj/Wj)oox;lXj + (6W;l6T joT;lW j)oot;lTj . 
The elasticity of input price change w.r.t exogenous shift is 
trivially assumed to equal one (a 10% tariff increases import 
prices by 10%), so we can simplify to, 
EW j = l/S jEX j + ET j 
where Sj is the elasticity of supply. 
In addition to this model for the processing sector we use a 
similar model for the farm production sector. This is needed in 
order to estimate the cost to producers of the tariffs for that 
part of the production which enters into direct export. Based on 
the Input-Output Tables for 1986-87, $l,430m of output was 
directly exported. In the case of the farm model, the four 
categories of inputs are imports (X,), importables (Xz), home goods and labour (X3 l and the residual claimants of land and 
management (X4l. 
4. USING THE MODEL TO ANALYSE THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRY PROTECTION 
ON AGRICULTURE 
The four variable input model provides a major improvement over 
the fixed input assumptions because it allows the processing 
industry to sUbstitute between inputs in response to protection-
induced price changes. It can also accommodate an exogenous 
shift in final demand, or evaluate the impact of subsidies. 
The exogenous shifters of the input supply functions in each of 
the four input markets can be used to generate the new values of 
the prices and quantities of inputs, and, as a consequence the 
price and output of the final processed product. The shifter of 
the raw farm input supply function can be used to represent 
subsidies paid to agricultural producers as a partial offset to 
the costs imposed by tariffs. 
Based on the changes in the equilibrium values of the endogenous 
prices and quantities, we can compute changes in producer surplus 
in each of the four input markets. The change in producer surplus 
in the market for the raw farm product is the appropriate measure 
of the incidence of tariffs applicable to processing on the farm 
production sector. 
We apply the models in two stages. We first estimate the cost to 
producers in terms of foregone producer surplus by tariffs which 
impact on farm production directly for export. Throughout we 
assume that the economy-wide effect of general tariff levels is 
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to raise the price of importables and horne goods and wages. This 
is estimated by using the effective incidence parameter, 
developed by Chiao and Scobie (1990). Of the imports used 
directly in agriculture, we assume that 90 percent are exempt 
from tariffs. 
We then turn to the processing sector, and estimate the impact 
on the producer surplus of farmers who supply raw materials. 
Fifty percent of imported inputs are assumed to be exempt. The 
total effect of tariffs on producers is then the sum of the 
changes in their producer surplus arising from production 
directly for export, together with the raw materials they supply 
to processors, the derived demand for which would be shifted were 
tariffs to be reduced or eliminated. 
5. INPUT DATA 
The 1986-87 Input-Output Table was used to provide estimates of 
net processing output and factor cost shares. These data are 
presented in Figure 2. The processing sector was defined as all 
of SNA Group 5, one-fifth of Group 6, and one-fiftieth of Groups 
7 and 8, based on the ratio of agricultural to other intermediate 
inputs. In order to make claims about the welfare changes for 
factor owners, in the presence of trade interventions it was 
necessary to disembody the input commodities. Without this 
disembodiment the welfare changes for a part·icular input 
commodity would not correspond with a homogenous group of factor 
owners because other factors are inputs into the processing 
inputs. Separating out the share of imports was straightforward, 
but a potential problem of infinite regression arises in 
separating out agricultural raw product, importables, and home 
goods as inputs into one and another. The data in Figure 2 are 
based on input ratios of importables into agriculture of 0.1, 
home goods into agriculture of 0.4, importables into homegoods 
of 0.1, and homegoods into importables of 0.2. Only the first-
round effects were estimated. 
The data in Figure 2 were used to calculate factor shares Kj for 
dividing total processing costs among the four inputs. It was 
generally difficult to find evidence in the literature for 
parameter values other than the elasticity of demand for 
processed output (fJ). We used the result of Findlayson, Ward and 
Lattimore (1988) that the foreign elasticity of demand for New 
Zealand agricultural output can be treated as infinite in the 
long run. We were also able to find an estimate of aZ4 and a34 
from the u.s. beef processing sector of 0.1 (Mullen, Wohlgenant 
and Farris, 1988) which we increased to 0.2 in this model because 
we were dealing with a more broadly defined processing sector. 
The chosen values for a,z, an' and aZ3 reflect the degrees of 
substitutability found with the augmented Clements-Sjaastad model 
as developed by Scobie and Chiao (1990). 
6. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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A summary of all the basic parameter values used in the 
computations for both the farm and processing sector is given in 
Tables 1 and 2 respectively. Based on an overall average level 
of tariffs of 11 percent, the price of importables rises by 7.7 
percent. This result comes from the extended model developed by 
Chiao and Scobie (1990) who introduced importables as imperfect 
sUbstitutes for imported goods. The rise in the price of non-
traded goods is 5.8 percent. This means that the real price 
received by producers of exports, will fall in the absence of any 
compensation. 
These changes in relative prices which pertain at the economy-
wide level are next entered into the input supply functions for 
imports, importables and home goods as shifters, equivalent to 
a tax. In other words both the farm and processing sectors use 
inputs whose prices are elevated due to the presence of the 
tariffs in the economy at large. They are taken as small sectors 
who face given prices of importables, home goods and labour whose 
prices are set in the general economy. In contrast, the prices 
they pay for imports is determined by the tariff levels specific 
to the sector. 
The changes in the endogenous values of all prices and quantities 
are computed by removing the tariffs. There are both sUbstitution 
and output effects in the derived demand for each of the factors. 
Of key interest is the impact on the market for the raw farm 
product as an input into the processing sector. 
The first results are those for the farm sector presented in 
Table 3. The results in this table and Table 4'should be read as 
the changes arising from the removal of the tariffs. In the case 
of farm production for direct export, removal of the tariffs 
would increase output by 4 percent, and increase producer surplus 
by $28m. This, and all subsequent dollar values are in constant 
1986-67 terms. Alternatively the presence of the tariffs 
represents a tax of some 2 percent. 
As the majority of farm output enters the processing sector 
rather than direct export, the significant effects of the tariffs 
arise in that sector. The results are summarised in Table 4. 
The derived demand for raw farm product shifts back by 12 
percent, and under the assumption that the supply elasticity is 
unity, prices received by farmers fall by 12 percent. 
Final output would be 14 percent higher and the producer surplus 
$309m higher in the absence of tariffs. Tariffs represented a tax 
of 14 percent on the returns to farmers as a result of cost 
excesses imposed on agricultural processors. Of the total 'cost 
excess on processors, 57 percent was passed on to farmers. The 
balance is in lower returns to suppliers of other inputs into the 
processing sector. 
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The overall cost to the sector in 1986-87 dollars is estimated 
to be $337m, or a true effective rate of protection of -16 
percent. 
The above results were computed by using a basic incidence 
parameter of 0.7. This is consistent with the findings of Russel 
(1986), Wong (1987) and Yeo (1987) for New Zealand. However in 
computing the above results we have used an effective incidence 
parameter of 0.52 which reflects a basic value of 0.7 adjusted 
for the a coefficient developed by Chiao and Scobie (1990). This 
is a transmission elasticity from tariffs to the price of 
importables. 
However, estimates from general equilibrium models (Evans et al. , 
1987) have found low values of the incidence parameter. We 
recomputed the effect of tariffs on producer surplus in the raw 
farm product market assuming alternative values of both the 
incidence parameter and of the tariff levels. The results are 
summarised in Table 5. 
If all imported inputs into farm production were exempt from 
tariffs the costs would fall from $309m to $261m. If the general 
level of tariffs in the economy were reduced to 6 percent from 
11 percent, costs to producers of tariffs affecting processing 
would decline to 170m, or a rate of protection of -8 p~rcent. 
Reducing the incidence parameters by 50 percent so that the 
effective value is 0.13 would impose a fall of producer surplus 
of $178m when the overall tariff rate was 11 percent. 
In other tests of the sensitivity of our results we reduced the 
demand elasticity facing New Zealand to -5 in deference to those 
who cling to the view that we have some market power. The tax on 
producers fell from 14 to 9 percent, as more of the costs in this 
case can be shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher 
prices. In a further test of the robustness of the results, we 
doubled all the values of the input sUbstitution elasticities. 
This led to a marginal reduction of $25m in the loss to 
producers. 
The model can be used to explore the effect of subsidies as well 
as taxes. We found that suppliers of raw farm products to the 
processing sector would need to receive a subsidy of 20 percent 
in order to offset the loss of producer surplus that is imposed 
on them through tariffs that raise the costs of agricultural 
processing. 
In conclusion, this paper has developed a detailed framework for 
analysing the impact on farmers of tariffs in New Zealand. It 
combines the work of Clements and Sjaastad (1984) with extensions 
developed by Chiao and Scobie (1990). It extends the economy wide 
approach by developing a more detailed framework at the sector 
level. The conclusion remains however, that tariffs impose a 
substantial costs on the agricultural sector. Liberalisation has 
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gone some way to removing that cost, but the process is far from 
complete. 
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Table 1: BaSic Paramelers used in ESlimating the Impact otTariffs on Farm Output lor Export 
-------------------------------------------------------------
INPUTS Name 
-------------------------------------------------------
Exogenous 'shifters: Vertical price changes (%) 
Shift in Demand lor Finshed Product 
Import Tariff (Ex) 0.110 
Importable Price Rise (End.) 0.077 
Home GOO(1lWage Price Rise (End.) 0.058 
Net Farm SubSicly(-) or Tax(+) (Ex.) 0.000 
Shift in Import Supply Curve (End.) 
Shift In Importable Supply Curve (End.) 
Shift in Home Good and Labour Supply Curve (End.) 
Shift in Supply Curve lor Land and Management(End.) 
Own Price Elasticity 01 Demand lor Output Directly Exported 
Cost Shares 01 Inputs into Net Output: 
Imports 
Importables 
Home goods and labour 
Land and Management 
Elasticities 01 Input Substitution: 
Imports and Importables 
Imports and Home Goods 
Imports and Land and Management 
Importables and Home GoodS 
Importables and Raw Farm PrOduct 
Home Goods and Land and Management 
Supply Elasticities 01 Inputs: 
Imports 
Importables 
Home goods and labour 
Land and Management 
Value 01 Net Output Directly Exported (Sm) 
Import Cost (Cl) 
Importable Cost (c2) 
Home Good and Labour Cost (c3) 
Land and Management Cost (C4) 
Sm 
$m 
$m 
$m 
Sm 
EN 
ETI 
ET2 
ET3 
ET4 
N 
Kl 
K2 
K3 
K4 
SIG12 
SIG13 
SIG14 
SIG23 
SIG24 
SIG34 
SI 
S2 
S3 
S4 
VAL 
VAL·Kl 
VAL·K2 
VAL·K3 
VAL ·K4 
Value 
0.0% 
-1.0% 
-7.1% 
-5.5% 
0.0% 
-1000 
0.09 
0.12 
0.23 
0.56 
0.50 
0.25 
0.05 
0.50 
0.05 
0.05 
100 
5.0 
5.0 
1.0 
1430 
129 
172 
329 
801 
-------------------------------------------------------------
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Tat1e 2: Basic Parameters Used in tie Model of tile Agiculturat Procassng Sector 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
INPUTS Name Value 
---------------------------------.------------~-------------------
Exogenous stufters: VeniCal p-ice cnanges (0/0) 
Shift in Demand for Fin5t1ed ProCiJct EN 0.0% 
Import Tariff (Ex) 0.110 
Importat1e Price Rise (End) o.on 
Home GoodINage Price Rise (End) 0.058 
Net Farm SUbsiclf(-) or Tax(+) (Ex.) 0.000 
Shift in Import Su!+iY OJrve (End) 
Shift in Importat1e SupPY OJrve (End.) 
Shift in Home Good and LabaJr SupJ:/Y OJrve (End) 
Shift in Farm RaN ProCiJct SupPY OJrve (End) 
Own Price Elastidty of Demand for Processed Output 
Cost Shares of Inp.lls into Net Output: 
tmports 
Importat1es 
Home goods and labour 
RaN Farm ProCiJct 
Elastidties of Input SubSlitutiOn tatween: 
Imports and Importat1es 
Imports and Home Goods 
1m ports and RaN Farm ProCiJct 
Importables and Home GoocJs 
1m portables and Raw F a-m ProCiJct 
Home Goods and RaN Farm ProCiJct 
SupJ:/Y Etastcities of Inputs: 
Imports 
Importat1es 
Home goods and labour 
RaN Farm ProCiJct 
Value of Net Output ($Ill) 
Import Cost (Cl) 
Importable Cost (c2) 
Home Good and Labour Cost (c3) 
RaN Farm ProCiJct Cost (C4) 
$In 
$In 
$In 
$In 
$In 
ETI -5.00/0 
ET2 -7.1% 
ET3 -5.5% 
ET4 0.00/0 
N -1000.0 
Kl 0.13 
K2 0.25 
K3 0.41 
K4 0.22 
SIG12 0.70 
SIG13 0.50 
SIG14 0.20 
SIG23 0.75 
SIG24 0.20 
SIG34 0.20 
SI 100 
S2 5.0 
53 5.0 
54 1.0 
VAL 11000 
VAL*Kl 1430 
VAL*K2 2750 
VAL*K3 4510 
VAL*K4 2420 
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Table 3: Impact on Endogenous Variables of Tarilfs on Farm Output for Direct Export 
ITEM 
Change in final output 
Change in product price 
Change in quantity imports demanded 
Change in quantity importables 
Change in quantity home gOOdS/labour demanded 
Change in quantity land and Management 
Change in import price 
Change in importable price 
Change in hOmegoocJs price 
Change in implicit price of land and management 
Surplus Measures ($m) 
Consumers of Finished Product (-dP(1 +0.5(dO»)*TRo 
Producer Surplus to Import Suppliers (dP-ETl)(1 + 0.5(dQ))*c 1 
Gain in PS for Importables as DO increases (dP-ET2)(1 +0.5(dQ))*c2 
Gain in PS for Home Goods as DO increases (dP-ET3)(1 +0.5(dQ»*c3 
Gain in PS for Land and Management (dP-ET4)*(1 +0.5(dQ)))*C4 
Change in Total Revenue for Raw Farm Producers «1 +dP)(1 +dQ)*C4) -C4 
Name 
EY 
EP 
EXI 
EX2 
EX3 
EX4 
EWI 
EW2 
EW3 
EW4 
CS 
12 
Value 
0.04 
-0.00 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
-0.01 
-0.06 
-0.05 
0.03 
o 
0.04 
1.50 
2.56 
27.90 
56 
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Tatle 4: Changes in lIle EncDg910US Variatles and Surpus MBaSJres 
Change in final OUIPJI 
Change in p-oduct p-ice 
Change in q,Janlily importS demanded 
Change in q,Janlily imponatles 
Change in q,Jantily home g::lOdsllab:lJr demanded 
Change in q,Jantily riiIN farm p-oduct demanded 
Change in import pice 
Change in importatle pice 
Change in homegoodS pice 
Change in riiIN farm p-ocU:t pice 
Surpus Measures ($m) 
Consumers of Finished Producl (- dP(1 +0.5(dQ)))"TRo 
Changes in Producer Surpus 
10 Import Suppiers (dP-ETI)(1 +0.5(dQ))*CI 
10 Importatlas (dP-ET2)(1 +0.5(dQ»*C2 
10 Home Goocii (dP -ET3)(1 +0.5(dQ))*c3 
10 Producers ofRiiIN Farm Products (dP-ET4)*(1 +0.5(dQ)))*C4 
EY 
E? 
EXI 
EX2 
EX3 
EX4 
EWI 
EW2 
EW3 
EW4 
cs 
PSI 
PS2 
PS3 
PS4 
0.14 
-0.00 
0.16 
0.16 
0.15 
0.12 
-0.05 
-0.04 
-0.03 
0.12 
2 
2 
92 
142 
309 
Change in Tolal Rwenue br RiiIN Fa-m Producers $m «I +dP)(1 +dO)*C4)-C4 618 
Share of Tariff Costs on Processed 0utp.J1 Bome bt Fa-lTlQ"s PS4/(PS2+PS3+PS4» 0.57 
EffeC!ille Rate ofProtectiallO Fa-mars (-PS4/(PS4+AVA) % -14% 
13 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Note: AVA is Assisl8dValue Added ($1 ,831m in 1986-67) 
Table 5; Impact 01 AlternaUve AssumpUons on the Cost 01 Tariffs to Farmers 
-------~-------.-------.-----------------------.-------"----------------
Overall Tariff Rate II 11 6 1) II 
Share 01 Imported Inputs Exempt 
a) in Farm Production (%) 90 90 90 90 90 
b) in Processing (%) 50 100 50 100 50 
Incidence Parameter 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.35 0.35 
Elasticity ollmportables wrt 10 Tariff 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.375 0.375 
Etrect~e Incidence Parameter 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.13 0.13 
Change In PrOducer SLI"plus to Producers ($m) 309 261 170 98 178 
Effeclive Rate 01 Protection (%) -14 -12 -8 -5 -9 
_______________________________________________________ 0 _______ 0 ______ --
Notes: The incidence parameter IS as denned by Clements and Slaastad (1984). 
The elasticity od the price 01 impotables willl respect to the tariff rate is taken from Chiao and Scobie (1990). 
The elfect~e Incidence parameter Is the product 01 the previous two nems. 
The change in p-oducer surplus (PS4) is the cost to prOducers of the ta-iffs at the processing slage. 
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Figure 1: Fixed Inputs Analysis of Tariff Incidence on a Processing 
Sector Facing Completely Elastic Demand. With Price-making 
Power in the Raw Farm Products Market 
D S S 
S(l +t) D' J1'. A D' 
S D D 
Q Q Q Q 
Imports Importables Home goods Raw Farm 
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Figure 2: Data Structure of the Model 
Net Agricultural Output 
Final Consumption / 
1-0 Sectors 63,68 
($1430m) I 
Disembodied Inputs 
I 
\ 
Input into Processing 
1-0 Sectors 11-15 
($4021m) 
\ 
1- I I I . 
Imports Importables Home Farm Disembodied Inputs 
I ($130m) ($170m) Goods ($800m) I I I 
($330m) Imports Importables Home Raw Ag. 
Importables 
Home goods 
Imports 
($1196m) 
I 
($283m) ($420m) Goods Product 
~ \($1000m) ($2320m) 
Imp~\ 
($2440m) -I Net Processing 
Home goods I Output 
($3720m) - ($11000) 
Raw Ag. Product _---($260m) 
MAKING WATER QUALITY DECISIONS: 
WHEN COSTS AND BENEFITS DON'T FIT OUR ASSUMPTIONS 
Jim Sinner 
MAF Policy, Wellington 
ABSTRACT 
Agricultural activities have a wide range of impacts on the quality of surface and 
groundwater supplies in New Zealand, imposing costs on other users. The paper 
presents results of a survey of regional resource managers and discusses economic 
analysis of pollution control when cost and benefit curves vary from typical 
assumptions. The paper emphasises that benefits of pollution control may be subject 
to threshold effects, and that identifying these will aid in setting emission policies. 
The marginal cost curve will be discontinuous when polluters are faced with a choice 
of discreet technologies, funher complicating the determination of optimal pollution 
control. A method of incorporating intangible benefits into emission policy decisions 
is also presented. . 
OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS ON WATER QUALITY 
There is a large body of literature in New Zealand regarding various agricultural 
impacts on water qUality. The vast majority of this information consists of technical 
descriptions of site· specific situations. As a result, we have a growing appreciation 
of the physical processes of runoff and groundwater flows, including how sediment, 
nutrients, and contaminants are transported. 
Agricultural impacts on water quality are a form of pollution and are widely 
recognised to cause damage to other users. These damages include increased 
treatment costs for drinking water, desecration of a central element in Maori culture, 
decreased value of lakes, rivers and streams for fishing and other recreation, and 
degradation of habitat for native flora and fauna. 
It remains difficult, however, to obtain a comprehensive picture of agricultural 
impacts on water quality. DSIR has only recently begun national monitoring of a full 
range of water quality criteria, designed more to monitor long term trends than 
indicate absolute water quality (Smith and Quinn, 1991). Funhermore, because 
problems are diverse, comparison of effects is diffitult and their summation is 
virtually impossible. 
SURVEY OF REGIONAL RESOURCE MANAGERS 
In an attempt to assess the overall severity of agricultural impacts on water quality, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries surveyed regional councils in June 1991. 
In the survey, regional resource managers ranked primary agriculture and human 
sewage as causing the most damage to water quality of nine major sources, with the 
average values being 4.9 and 4.8, respectively, on a scale from 0 to 10. Three 
resource managers gave primary agriculture ratings of 8, indicating serious damage. 
See Table 1. 
The survey responses were also weighted by population of each region as a rough 
indication of the intensity of water use in a given area. In other words, this increases 
the weight given to responses from heavily populated regions on the premise that 
more people are affected and therefore the water quality problems are more serious. 
This weighting system increases the amount by which primary agriculture exceeds 
the second-ranked source, but the only other difference is that industry (excluding 
agricultural processing) replaces human sewage as the second-ranked problem. 
Table 1: Sources of Impacts on Water Quality, as Ranked by Regional Resource 
Managers 
Primary agriculture 
Human sewage 
Urban storm run-off 
Industry (excl agric.) 
Agric. processing 
Mining 
Forestry 
Other 
Native vegetation 
0= no damage 
10 = severe damage 
4.9 
4.8 
3.9 
3.8 
3.7 
2.6 
2.6 
0.7 
0.5 
Total land area was used as an alternative weighting scheme on the premise that, 
because larger areas are likely to include more total water, a stated water quality 
problem probably affects more water and is therefore more serious than a problem 
given a similar value in a small region. Again, this weighting increases the 
prominence of primary agriculture as a source of water quality problems. Other 
effects are that agricultural processing and urban storm runoff appear somewhat more 
serious, and non-agricultural industry somewhat less serious, though relative rankings 
are only marginally affected. 
The survey also asked respondents to indicate the severity of specific agricultural 
impacts on water quality, the sources of those impacts, and the relative damage done 
to other users of the water resources. The results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Agricultural Impacts on Water Quality 
Severity Main Sources Main Effects 
0= no damage 
10 = severe damage 
Sedimentation 6.4 1 non-ag activity I scenic 
2 crops (all) 2 fishing 
Nutrient contamination 6.2 I dairy sheds I fishing 
2 dairy pasture 2 scenic 
Alteration of 5.6 I dairy grazing I habitat 
physical characteristics 2 other activity 2 scenic 
Faecal contamination 5.4 I dairy sheds I Maori 
of surface water 2 dairy pasture 2 Recr'n 
Nitrate contamination 4.6 I stock urine I drink'g 
of groundwater 2 feniliser 2 
Pesticide contamination 2.8 -- insufficient data --
of surface water 
Faecal contamination 2.8 I sheds 1 drink'g 
of groundwater 2 other 2 stock 
Pesticide contamination 1.6 -- insufficient data --
of groundwater 
Of nine major agricultural impacts on water quality, regional resource managers 
identified sedimentation and nutrient loading of surface water bodies as the most 
serious. Changes to physical characteristics of surface waters and faecal 
contamination of surface waters were ranked as slightly less serious impacts, followed 
closely by nitrate contamination of groundwater. 
On the issue of pesticide contamination of surface and groundwater, many 
respondents indicated they simply do not have enough information to judge whether 
this is a serious problem. 
Responses regarding severity of specific water quality problems were weighted by 
popUlation and area, respectively. Neither alternative weighting had a significant 
effect on the ranking or magnitude of the various impacts. 
Lacking in both the economic and namral science literature examined is information 
on how different amounts of pollution would affect various end uses. Though there 
is a great deal of uncenainty about precise consequences, scientists could be asked 
to provide estimates of the probabilities of various outcomes. Such information is 
essential for economists trying to determine the costs of pollution and the benefits of 
abatement. 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT 
Under the Resource Management Act, regional officials will have to examine the 
costs of available technologies for pollution control and weigh these against the 
benefits of reduced pollution. In economic terms, the problem is to determine the 
level of pollution control which maximises net benefits to society, where net benefits 
(NB) are defined as total benefits of pollution control (~) minus total costs of 
control (TC). That is, 
maximise NB = TB - TC. 
This Rroblem is usually solved by equating marginal cost (MC) and marginal benefit 
(MB). In this context, MC is the additional cost to the fum of one more unit of 
pollution control. MB is the additional benefit to society of one more unit of 
pollution control, and includes cultural, social, and intrinsic values as well as 
financial concerns. 
Economic analysis generally assumes the costs of controlling pollution increase as 
control increases. For example, to reduce pollution from 100 tonnes to 90 tonnes is 
assumed to be relatively cheap compared with the cost of reducing pollution from 10 
tonnes to zero, which may be prohibitively expensive. This assumption is reflected 
in the MC curve in Figure 1, which shows that costs rise as the level of pollution 
control increases. 
Similarly, it is generally assumed the marginal benefit of pollution control decreases 
as pollution control increases. That is, society derives more benefit from reducing 
pollution from 100 tonnes to 90 tonnes than from a reduction from 10 tonnes to zero. 
Thus, in Figure 1 the MB curve declines as the level of pollution control increases. 
Neither of these assumptions necessarily holds in the real world, as will be explained 
below. 
Regardless of the shape of (hese curves, the optimal situation for society is typically 
where marginal benefit equals marginal cost. If MB is greater than MC, as at 
pollution control level PCI' the benefits of pollution control exceed the COStS, and 
therefore the (otal welfare of society can be improved with more pollution control. 
At control level P~, however, the cost of pollution control exceeds what it is wonh 
to society, indicating a waste of resources on pollution control technology. Only at 
PC* is there an optimal level of control, ie the cost of control is equal to the benefits 
of contrOl. 
For a discussion of (he theory of optimal pollution control, see Randall, 1987. 
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In order to determine the optimal level of pollution control using this model, one 
needs to know the shape of the MC and MB curves. In practice, it is likely to be 
impossible to chart these curves precisely. Nonetheless, describing these curves, even 
in general terms, should assist those setting resource use policies. 
The Mare:inal Cost Curve 
The marginal cost (MC) curve is the more definable of the two, as it is based on the 
cost of controlling pollution. This information is often not readily available, 
however, and there is usually more than one way to control the pollution. Different 
options may be cheapest for different levels of pollution control. Each section of the 
MC curve should reflect the lowest cost technology for reducing pollution over that 
range; the complete MC curve may therefore represent a composite of different 
control technologies, in which case it would probably not be a smooth curve at all. 
As an example, a study of dairy shed pollution by O'Neil and Scrimgeour (1991) 
presents three technologies for controlling effluent: 
barrier ditch system, which can eliminate about half the pollution problem, at 
relatively low cost; 
oxidation ponds, which cost about 50% more than a barrier ditch but control 
about 95% of pollution, assuming good management; and 
land based disposal, which costs twice as much as oxidation ponds but can 
achieve 100% pollution control if properly managed. 
The study presents these technologies as having set costs and set results, but in 
practice both are likely to vary. Through increased (or decreased) management and 
maintenance, a farmer can increase (or reduce!) pollution control within any of the 
three systems. Once good management and maintenance is in place, however, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to achieve improved performance, and the only way 
to increase pollution control is to move to a bener technology. 
Cost data are presented in Table 3; while some data are drawn from O'Neil and 
Scrimgeour, most of the figures are purely hypothetical. The resulting marginal cost 
curve, assuming the choice of technology has not yet been made, is shown in Figure 
2. ACI and MCI are average costs and marginal costs, respectively, for the barrier 
ditch technology, A~ and M~ for oxidations ponds, and A~ and M~ for land 
based disposal. Again, these MC curves are hypothetical, and should not be 
interpreted as representing the actual costs of controlling dairy shed effluent. 
Table 3: Hypothetical Costs of Effluent Control for 10 Dairy Sheds of 180 Cows 
Each 
Total Costs: 
Barrier Ditch 
Oxidation Ponds 
Land Based Disposal 
Long Run TC 
Average Costs 
Barrier Ditch 
Oxidation Ponds 
Land Based Disposal 
Marginal Costs 
Barrier Ditch 
Oxidation Ponds 
Land Based Disposal 
Long Run MC 
Figure 2 
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33.5 34 35 
6.7 5.7 5.0 
0.5 
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38 
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38 
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85 
58 
120 
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The long run MC curve has a "ratchet" appearance because of the fixed costs of 
moving from one technology to the next. A producer will accept relatively high 
marginal costs before committing to the fixed cost of another technology with lower 
marginal costs. For any given level of pollution control. the most effIcient 
technology is that which has the lowest average cost. However, once a technology 
is chosen the optimal level of control will be determined by the marginal cost curve 
for that technology.2 
In this way, MC curves can be mapped. Even if precise information on costs of 
pollution control is not available, general knowledge about average costs can prove 
quite useful. As will be demonstrated, however, the fact that different technologies 
have different fixed costs means that caution is required when equating marginal cost 
and marginal benefit to determine the optimal level of pollution control. 
The Marginal Benefit Curve 
The marginal benefit curve must incorporate a variety of values, most of them 
diffIcult or impossible to measure. Again, financial benefits are often the least 
difficult to obtain. For users of water who incur direct costs due to pollution, control 
of that pollution will generate measurable financial benefits. For instance, a polluting 
dairy shed may prevent farmers downstream from using a stream for stock water, 
thereby forcing them to incur extra costs for stock watering. Likewise, pollution may 
require increased treatment costs for human drinking water. Any controls on such 
pollution will translate to measurable benefits for these other users. 
A second category includes benefits, such as recreation and aesthetic enjoyment, 
which are difficult to measure but still tangible. That is, the availability of clean 
water and other environmental amenities has economic value to people, and several 
techniques have been developed to estimate this value. Among these methods are: 
contingent valuation, which uses surveys to ask people how much they would be 
willing to pay for an environmental improvement, or willing to accept in 
compensation for a proposed environmental degradation; 
travel cost method, which estimates the value of environmental amenities based 
on the costs (including travel, purchase of gear, etc) people incur to enjoy those 
amenities; and 
hedonic valuation, which uses market prices of other goods that are affected by 
environmental concerns, for example, housing in an area with dirty air compared 
to areas with clean air, as indicators of the value of amenities such as clean air. 
These techniques have been used in New Zealand to examine water quality issues. 
See, for instance, Meister and Harris (1981). While each of these techniques has 
limitations, for any given problem one or more of these methods will help to define 
the marginal benefits of pollution control (Randall, 1987; Hoehn, 1991). 
Estimates of these two categories of tangible benefits can be used to begin mapping 
the MB curve. The key question is the relationship between total benefits and 
different levels of pollution control. Once this has been estimated, it is a 
straightforward exercise to map the incremental, or marginal, benefits of increments 
to pollution control, yielding the MB curve. 
2 This discussion and Figure 2 are based on the "envelope theorem" of long run 
average costs. See eg Mansfield, pp. 196-203. 
It is important to identify key points on the MB curve, since the relationship between 
pollution control and benefits to other uses of water may not be a smooth curve. 
Rather, there are likely to· be threshold effects, that is, levels of pollution below 
which there is little damage to other users but, once reached, effects on other users 
are substantial. Furthermore, above a certain level of pollution, a given use may be 
damaged to the maximum extent possible, and additional pollution may have little 
effect. 
For instance, a small amount of dairy shed effluent in streams may pose little or no 
problem for fish. Once a critical level is reached., however, the biochemical oxygen 
demand in the stream will be raised to a level that will kill fish by starving them of 
oxygen. Once all the fish are dead, additional pollution causes no further reduction 
in water quality benefits related to fishing. Though fish impacts are likely to occur 
below the critical level, there is likely to be a range over which probability of fish 
kill increases rapidly to a 100% probability of a 100% kill. 
A hypothetical example is shown in Table 4, where figures represent the total 
benefits of pollution control to different uses of water. It must be emphasised that 
these numbers are entirely a figment of the author's imagination, and are for 
illustrative purposes only. nus example might apply to dairy shed effluent in a 
stream which feeds a reservoir with a variety of uses, including human drinking 
water. Ten units of pollution control, at the right of the table, represent total control 
and therefore clean, natural water. 
Table 4: Hypothetical Benefits of Controlling Dairy Shed Effluent 
Units of Pollution Control 
Other Uses 0 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
of Water 
Annual Benefits (x $100) 
Drinking 0 3 10 25 25 30 35 
Stock water 0 1 1 5 6 8 8 
Fishing 0 0 0 0 2 8 9 
Other recreation 0 1 2 5 8 9 9 
Subtotal: TB 0 5 13 35 41 55 61 
MB 0 5 8 22 6 14 6 
HabitatlIntrinsic ? 
Maori/Cultural ? 
In this hypothetical case, the water has no tangible benefit until five units of control 
are achieved. Achieving six units of control increases drinking water benefits from 
$300 to $1000, for example by decreasing some operating costs of a water treatment 
plant. At seven units of control, a less expensive treatment system can be substituted, 
and benefits increase to $2500. Some additional benefits are achieved at higher 
levels of control. 
Similar logic applies to the other uses of water. No benefits from fishing are realised 
until eight units of control are achieved. A major threshold is passed at nine unitS 
of control; maximum benefits occur when pure water is achieved. 
These benefits are summed for each level of control; the difference from one to the 
next is the marginal benefit of pollution control. This relationship between pollution 
control and marginal benefits to other users is shown graphically in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
MB 
~.B 
o 4 5 6 7 8 10 Pollution control 
Note the variance from the assumption stated earlier that pollution control has highest 
marginal benefit when pollution is greatest. As shown here, there may be little or no 
benefit to control when pollution is severe; benefits begin only when pollution is 
controlled below a critical level. 
Also of interest is an example from the U.S. literature on air quality which shows that 
the MB curve may have the same general shape as the MC curve. That is, the largest 
benefits of pollution control may be precisely where the costs of control are the 
highest, where pollution control nears 100%. This scenario is not explored further 
here, but it should caution us not to make too many assumptions about the shape of 
these curves without solid justification.3 
These tangible benefits are only part of the picture, however. Natural water also has 
intrinsic value as habitat for native flora and fauna and cultural and spiritual value 
to Maori. While many will argue that these values are impossible to measure, the 
fact remains that policymakers must somehow decide how much weight to give these 
values when balancing the benefits and costS of pollution control. 
Contingent valuation methods might be used to estimate cultural and intrinsic values. 
Especially in the case of Maori values, however, some might object that it is 
inappropriate to treat these as just one of a set of values of society at large. If only 
Maori expressed these values in a survey of an entire community, the estimated 
benefits might be small compared to recreational values expressed by the Pakeha 
community. The partnership principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, however, might 
su~gest that Maori concerns be given equal weight. 
The optimal solution in the reported case still depends on the relative slopes 
of the MB and MC curve; two possible outcomes of interest are 100% 
pollution control, ie preservation of the natural quality of air or water, and 
no pollution control whatsoever. See Repetto. 
This paper does not attempt to describe methods for estimating cultural and intrinsic 
values. However, these values must be incorporated into resource policy decisions, 
either implicitly or explicitly. Even if not explicitly stated., any detennination of 
environmental standards which affect cultural assets and values gives a certain 
amount of weight, large or small, to those cultural concerns. The same is true of 
intrinsic values. A method for incorporating these values is described below. 
Detennining the Optimal Level of Pollution Control ' 
Even without directly estimating intangible benefits, such as cultural and intrinsic 
values, a sensitivity analysis can provide a useful guide to policymakers. Using 
economic analysis of tangible costs and benefits, we can estimate a provisional 
optimal level of pollution control and can indicate how different weights assigned to 
intangible benefits would alter the outcome. 
To see how this might be done, consider Figure 4, which incorporates the MC curve 
from Figure 2 and the MB curve from Figure 3. Given this relationship between MB 
and MC, the provisional optimal level of control is q*. In the dairy shed example, 
this implies use of the barrier ditch technology with a high level of maintenance and 
management to achieve pollution control at q;. 
Note that, because of the unusual shape of the MB and MC curves, it is not enough 
simply to equate MB and MC because MB=MC at ql and <h as well as at q;. Thus, 
we must apply second order conditions to ensure that we are at a maximum rather 
than a minimum on the total benefit curve (not shown). In other words, we must 
ensure that, at the chosen point, the slope of the MC curve is greater than that of the 
MB curve, ie dMC > dMB (the letter "d" is used to indicate a quantity of change). 
In graphical tenns, a maximum occurs where movement in either direction results in 
a loss in net benefits. By this condition, we can rule out ql as a solution. 
We must also check that the chosen level of control is the global maximum rather 
than a local maximum, that is, we must choose between <h and q;. To detennine 
which is the global maximum, one can calculate whether net benefits, TB-TC, are 
increased by moving from q; to <h: 
dNB = (TB2 - TCJ - (TBp - TCp). 
Equivalently, one can compare the difference in benefits between the two positions 
with the difference in costs: 
dNB = (TB2 - TBp) - (T~ - TCp). 
Given the difference in fixed costs between the two positions, one cannot simply 
examine the areas between the curves. Since average costs reflect fixed costs and TC 
= AC * q, we can substitute as follows: 
dNB = (TB2 - TBp) - (A~*<h - ACp*q;). 
Thus, if average costs are substantially higher at <h than at q;, or if the gain in 
benefits is small, there will be a loss of net benefits in moving <h; ie q; would be the 
global maximum. Knowledge of threshold effects of benefits can be especially useful 
here, for it helps to detennine whether an increase in pollution control is likely to 
result in significant gains in benefits. 
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If necessary, the global maximum can be ascertained by examining the infonnation 
gathered on benefits and costs, as summarised in Table 5. The provisional net 
benefits are highest at eight units of pollution control. 
Table 5: Hypothetical Net Benefits of Dairy Effluent Control 
Units of Pollution Control 
o 4 5 6 7 8 
Costs and Benefits (x $100) 
Subtotal: 
Total Benefits 0 5 13 35 41 
Marginal Benefits 0 5 8 22 6 
Total Cost 0 33 34 35 38 
Marginal Cost 1 1 3 20 
Net Benefits (provisional) -28 -21 0 3 
Intangible Benefits ? 
Valuing Intangible Benefits 
9 10 
55 61 
14 6 
58 
72 
-3 
130 
-59 
Finally, we consider how to incorporate cultural and intrinsic benefits into pollution 
control decisions which will affect the choice of control technology. Intangible 
benefits are additional to tangible benefits already measured, so we know that the real 
marginal benefit curve MB* lies above the measured curve, MB." ie MB* lies 
somewhere in the shaded area in Figure 5. 
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Intangible benefits may also be subject to threshold effects, so the amount by which 
MB* exceeds MB., may vary for different levels of pollution control. In this 
scenario, there are no intangible benefits until the threshold q. is reached, so only 
beyond that point does MB* exceeds MBm. Another threshold is depicted at PC = 
8. Through surveys or discussions with iwi and other groups, we may be able to 
learn whether these threshold effects exist and at what levels of pollution they occur. 
In Figure 5, the provisional optimal level of pollution control is qt, before taking 
intangible benefits into account. A critical question, then, is, what increase in 
benefits would be required to justify the cost of moving to the next technology, in 
this case the oxidation pond system with pollution control at q~? The answer is 
clearly the difference in total cost of going from one system to the other, eg from q; 
to q~. Similarly, the amount of benefits needed to justify going from q~ to qr is the 
difference in total cost of achieving the two different levels of pollution control. 
By detennining the amount of benefits needed to justify a change in technology, 
analysts can present choices to decision makers. In the hypothetical example shown 
in Table 5, the gain in benefits needed to move from 8 units of control to 9 is $2000. 
We know that tangible benefits would increase by $1400, so intangible benefits 
would have to make up the difference of $600. 
Analysts can present this infonnation to decision makers and indicate that if the 
increase in intangible benefits achieved by this move is considered to exceed this 
cost, then the higher level of control is optimal. It may be of assistance to compare 
this $600 to the $600 increase in fishing benefits achieved from going from 8 to 9 
units of control. Would there be an equal or greater increase in cultural and intrinsic 
values? 
This .process still requires decision makers to give a relative weight to intangible 
benefits. While still difficult, this is at least preferable to having to put an absolute 
value on these intangibles. As said before, any decision implies such a weighting; 
this process simply makes it more transparent. 
Note that if intangible benefits place the real MB curve at the top of the shaded area 
the optimal solution is complete pollution control, ie no pollution. Even for 
negligible amounts of pollution the loss of benefits exceeds the costs of control, as 
long as the fixed costs of LBD do not outweigh benefits gained. Again, analysts can 
estimate the cost of achieving total control, the gains in tangible benefits, and the 
difference which intangible benefits would need to cover. This information can be 
presented to decision makers who would then choose whether intangible benefits 
should be given that much weight. 
Similarly, analysts can present decision makers with other intermediate options, 
indicating what increases in intangible benefits would be necessary to justify various 
levels of pollution control. Obviously, the more options presented, the more decision 
makers are forced to put an absolute value on the intangibles, and this mayor may 
not be advisable. Nonetheless, this may be a useful way of addressing issues that are 
by their very nature both difficult and politically sensitive. 
The Choice of Policy Instruments 
The method by which a governing authority should enforce or encourage the optimal 
level of pollution control has been the subject of much debate, and will only be 
briefly covered here4• Four options of interest in the case of agriCUltural non-point 
pollution are described below: 
(a) emission charges are levies per unit of pollution emitted; 
(b) tradeable permits are licenses to emit a given quantity of pollution, with overall 
emiSSions fixed; 
(c) regulation is usually characterised as a set of rules statin~ what people are and 
are not allowed to do, especially as the rules relate to activities rather than results 
or performance; 
(d) subsidies can have an effect similar to emission charges if made available per 
unit of pollution control achieved, though there is a danger of rewarding poor 
performers. 
Because both the cost and the effectiveness of implementing a given technology are 
likely to vary from one producer to another, the most efficient way to achieve a 
pollution control tar~et will usually involve different levels of control by different 
producers. Economic theory suggests that economic instruments such as emission 
charges and tradeable permits are preferred to regulation because economic 
instruments allow producers to determine how to control pollution at least cost, 
including the least cost distribution of pollution control among producers. These 
instruments also encourage innovation in new pollution control technologies. 
Repetto (1983) shows that the choice between price-based instruments such as 
emission charges and quantity-based instruments stich as tradeable permits should be 
guided by the slope of the MC curve. If the curve is steep (inelastic), p,rice-related 
measures are preferable because an error in setting the emission charge Will have only 
a small impact on the amount of pollution control chosen. If the MC curve is flat, 
quantity controls are less likely to cause large welfare losses from errors in 
calculation. 
Note, however, that if MC curve is "ratcheted" as in the examples shown here, price 
mechanisms will be difficult to get right, and may not work at all. Suppose a 
determination is made that the true MB curve is MB"* as shown in Figure 6, and 
that maximum net benefits are at q**. Sening an emission charge where MB** = 
Me; at p** will not have the desired result because the price line crosses the MC 
curve in three places. 
See OECD (1991) for a general discussion of economic instruments for 
improving environmental quality. 
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Faced with this situation, a polluter will choose to operate on MCI if the average 
costs of control on M~ and Me; are greater than or equal to the effluent tax. This 
situation will be common where a limited number of distinct technologies are 
available. Even if M~ and Me; were entirely above MCI , a similar problem would 
arise if the fixed costs of the second technology were high enough to overwhelm the 
savings in effluent charges that could be realised using the first technology. 
In this situation, quantity based measures would be a much bener option to control 
pollution. However, if location of pollution is important, and therefore finns are not 
allowed to trade emission rights, a variable effluent tax could be used. To 
accomplish this, a higher tax would be charged for pollution up to q**, and a lower 
tax thereafter. Alternatively, subsidies could be offered to firms who achieved 
control at q** or greater. 
As others have pointed out, both of these instruments rely on quantitative information 
Oil emissions. This is difficult enough in the case of dairy sheds and other small 
dispersed sources; it is virtually impossible to obtain in the case of non-point sources 
such as pastures. In these cases, economic instruments could still be used based on 
assumptions about effectiveness of different technologies and management practices. 
This is far from perfect, obviously, because it is difficult to ensure that management 
practices are carned out as intended. Nonetheless, regulations that specify which 
technology is to be used suffer from the same problem. 
When Costs and Benefits Vary bv Location 
If the costs or benefits of pollution control are different in one location than in 
another, the optimal level of pollution control is also likely to be different Whether 
resource policy managers should implement different solutions with different 
standards will depend on both research and administrative costs, which could become 
very large if an authority attempted to determine and then implement a different 
solution for each location. 
Another problem related to economic insnuments is that their use might assume that 
the location of pollution does not matter, that is, that 10 units of pollution at A and 
5 units at B has the same impact as 15 units at A and none at B, or any other 
combination that sums to 15. In fact, the location of pollution usually does matter, 
and so the transferability of any tradable permits may have to be limited or prohibited 
altogether. In this case, an emission standard based on quantity of emissions is still 
preferable to one requiring a cenain type of technology, for it leaves the producer 
with an incentive to seek less costly technology to achieve the emission standard. 
Interactions with Other Water Quality Problems 
Unfonunately, resource policy managers are not dealing with a given water quality 
problem in isolation. As several regional council officials pointed out in the survey, 
for instance, the issue of quantity, ie stream flow, cannot be separated from issues of 
water quality, because reduced quantity means less dilution of pollutants and 
therefore reduced quality. For a given amount of dairy effluent in a stream, lower 
flow will mean greater impacts on use for stock water, fish, cultural and habitat 
benefits, etc. 
This means that to correctly determine the optimal level of control of all pollutants, 
one would need a multidimensional matrix with all combinations of impacts from 
sources showing how each combination affected every use. Another matrix would 
be needed to calculate costS associated with different combinations of control of 
various pollutants. Such an analysis has probably not been attempted anywhere, 
though Braden et al (1991) have shown that using an index of damages from different 
sources can reduce the costs of achieving a given environmental improvement. 
Another imponant caveat is that this analysis is static rather than dynamic. In reality, 
some finns may not be able to afford the cost of pollution control and may exit the 
industry. This will lower the total amount of pollution, which could change the 
optimal level of control for the remaining firms. Depending on the type of policy 
insnuments being used, effluent taxes, total emission permits, or emission standards 
may have to be adjusted. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Pastoral sector in New Zealand accounts for more than 65 percent of the 
value of agricultural production and over 85 percent of the value of 
agricultural based expons. Due to its critical imponance to the New 
Zealand economy, responses of the pastoral sector to relative prices, costs 
and seasonal effects have serious economy wide implications. 
This paper will examine economy wide implications for income and 
employment implications of the likely future prospects for the pastoral 
sector, under a static panial equilibrium framework. It will employ the 
pastoral supply response model developed at MAF Policy Services and the 
input-output relationships derived from the recently released 1986-87 Inter-
Industry transaction tables at the 184 industry level. 
Funher disaggregation now available for the pastoral production, processing 
and input supply sectors, along with the transpon and wholesale/retail 
sectors, enable the capture of the downstream and. UpStream income and 
employment effects under a range of realistic market and production 
scenarios. 
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ECONOMY WIDE IMPLICATIONS OF PASTORAL SECTOR SUPPLY 
RESPONSES TO FUTURE MARKET SCENARIOS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
2 
The connibution of the agricultural production sector to the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of the New Zealand economy has declined from about 14% in 
1966 to about 6% in 1990, while the share of the total agricultural sector, 
including processing, input supply, wholesale and retail trade and transpon 
activities, has also declined from about 20% in 1977 to about 14% in 1990 
(Narayan, 1991). The pastoral sector in New Zealand, on the other hand, 
accounts for more than 65% of the value of agricultural production and over 
85% of the value of agricultural based expons. Due to the critical imponance 
of the paStOial sector (made up of sheep, beef and dairy activities), to the 
agricultural sector in panicular, and the economy in general, output responses 
of the pastoral sector to changes in relative prices, costs and seasonal effects 
faced by farmers, have imponant economy wide implications. 
Changes to the production levels in the pastoral sector, along with the associated 
changes in farm income levels, ripple out from the production sector and the 
agricultural farms to affect other indusnies involved in downstream (ie 
processing, transponation, etc) and upstream (ie input supply, contracting 
services, etc) activities. These changes affect the surrounding economy in twO 
imponant ways. First, a change in agricultural production is related directly to 
changes in the development of the local economy and second, this change 
rebounds throughout the entire economy through output and employment effects 
to produce significant changes in income (White and Miller, 1980). 
Quantifying the inter-industry flows between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors is complex and expensive and have been undenaken in New 
Zealand only every five years in the past, and in the future will be carried out 
only every seven years (Statistics Depanment, Media Release, 1991). Input-
output analysis requires much primary data which is obtained through surveys. 
This frame-work however, provides for a direct and relatively quicker means of 
determining the output, income and employment impacts on the wider economy, 
of changes in the pastor3.I sector output levels. The 1986-87 inter-industry 
transactions tables of income flows, completed recently, and the 1986 population 
census of sectoral employment levels will provide the main data sources for 
undenaking this study. 
OBJECTIVES 
This study was undenaken mainly to facilitate greater use and applications of 
the Pastoral Supply Response Model developed within Policy Services 
(SriRamaratnam and Reynolds, 1989) in order to assess the income and 
employment implications of the pastoral sector output variations. The specific 
objectives of this paper are therefore to: 
(a) establish a suitable framework to link the results of the pastoral Sector 
Supply Response Model with the input-output methodology to facilitate 
funher analysis; 
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(b) investigate the nature and the changes over time in the inter-industry 
rransactions framework, so as to understand the relative importance of 
various sectors linked to the pastoral production sector; 
(c) evaluate the output, income and employment impacts on other related 
sectors of projected pastoral sector output and inventory levels; and 
(d) assess the effects of alternative macro scenarios, such as exchange rate 
movements, which are likely to impact on the pastoral sector, on the 
related industries involved in the upstream and downstream activities. 
METHODOLOGY 
In this section, a brief description of the Pastoral Supply Response Model and 
its outputs will be provided first. This is followed by a discussion of the inter-
industry transactions table available now at a much dis aggregated level for the 
1986/87 financial year and the steps required to transform these flows into direct 
input-output co-efficients (ie transactions matrix) and the inter-dependency co-
efficients, including the open and close inverse matrices. Subsequently, the 
computation of output, income and employment multipliers from the transactions 
matrix are outlined. The literature on the supply side input-output models is 
also reviewed in relation to the more conventional demand side models in use 
for about 40 years, since the original work by Leontief (1951). 
3.1 Pastoral Supply Response Model 
An econometric time series model of the pastoral sector of New Zealand was 
developed to study the impacts of exogenous changes in product prices, cost of 
production and seasonal factors on the output levels of main pastoral sub-sectors 
vis a vis sheep, beef and dairy industries. The pastoral farmers' responses to the 
physical and economic environment at the aggregate level, are modelled first 
with respect to the enterprise mix and then the supply response further 
disaggregated by outputs. These are the joint products of lamb, mUllon and 
wool from the sheep sector, prime and manufacturing beef from the beef andlor 
dairy sectors and veal and milkfat from the dairy sector. 
The pastoral model provides estimates for over 100 endogenous variables related 
to the production and livestock inventory levels of the sheep, beef. and dairy 
sectors, through a recursive dynamic simulation process. Among these, some 
results are related to the intermediate outcomes or decisions such as slaughter 
numbers and weights, binhs, deaths, transfers, promotions and breeding. Output 
in future periods can be increased only by increasing the size of the breeding 
flock or herd andlor withholding stock from slaughter in the current period. 
This requires a block recursive structure and a dynamic simulation framework 
to capture the inter-relationships between the time periods and also the sectoral 
outputs. The physical output estimates for 1991 and those available for each 
year of the forecast period (1992-1995) and their real values in NZS, which 
provide the financial outputs, will be the inputs on the demand side used with 
the 110 framework and the multipliers to derive the economy wide impacts on 
the sectors related to pastoral production. 
3.2 Inter-Industry Transactions 
The Framework 
An inter-industry study is an economic statement of the industrial srrucrure of 
a nation's economy for a given year (eg 1986/87 financial year), It records how 
much each industry purchases from, and sells to, other industries and also 
measures the indirect relationships between industries. It can be used to show 
the probable effect of rises or falls in one industry's demand throughout the 
economy. These tables can also be used to analyse the effect of an increase in 
production for export of an industry (eg livestock slaughtering) in terms of the 
increased supporting production required in all other industries (Department of 
Statistics, 1991). 
Inter-industry study involves the systematic collection, evaluation, and 
arrangement of a vast body of statistical information on production and 
consumption covering, to the extent possible, every area of the economy. The 
main sources of data for the agricultural industries are the economic surveys of 
farm types conducted by the Department of Statistics. Output is valued by the 
actual prices received at the point of sale. The itemisation of inputs for sheep 
and be.ef farming is obtained from the Meat and Wool Boards' Economic 
Services' (MWBES) sheep and beef surveys and for dairy farming obtained 
from the Dairy Board's survey of Factory Supply dairy farms as well as the 
then, Milk Board's survey of Town Milk farms. 
The 1986/87 inter-industry product and capital transactions tables, which are the 
latest available for the New Zealand economy, are disaggregated at the 184 
industry level. This level of disaggregation available now compared to the 
previous 62 industry level for the 1981/82 and prior inter-industry tables has 
enabled, for example, the assessment of impacts of changes in the sheep and 
beef sectors to be undertaken separately rather than as the sheep/beef farming 
system. Similar advantages are also found in both the input supply and 
processing industries related to the pastoral sector. The key industries of 
specific interest are listed in table I, which are in some cases derived from some 
partial aggregation of the 1986-1987 inter-industry tables at the 184 industry 
level into a more manageable 80 industry table. This has been achieved by a 
selective aggregation of the less significant industries as they related to the 
pastoral sector, but while 'maintaining the disaggregation of the pastoral and 
related sub-sectors in the upstream and downstream activities. 
Table 1: Pastoral and Related Sub-sectors in Upsrream and Downsrream 
Activities 
Production 
1 Sheep Fanning 
2 Dairy Fanning 
3 Beef Fanning 
4 Other primary 
Transportation 
Road freight 
2 Other transport 
(rail, air, water) 
Trade 
1 Wholesale and 
retail 
2 Restaurants and 
hotels 
Transformations 
Processine: Input Supplv 
Livestock Slaughtering 1 Pastoral Agric Services (incl 
& meat processing contracting, topdressing, 
spraying, etc) 
2 Milk processing 
3 Dairy products 
4 Wool scouring 
5 Tanneries, Leather-
and footwear 
6 Other food 
manufacturing 
2 Fenilisers & Pesticides 
3 Agric machinery & equipment 
4 Consrruction other 
than buildings 
5 Electricity 
6 Services 
- Repair 
- Machinery & Equipment 
rental and leasing 
- Veterinary 
- Govt administration 
- Advenising and business 
- Banking, finance and 
investment 
- Real Estate ownership 
- Accounting, computing and 
legal 
Once the desired level of aggregation was achieved, the 1986/87 inter-industry table 
which represents the transactions flows berween industries was rransformed fIrst into 
the Direct Input: Output Co-efficients and subsequently into Inter Dependency Co-
effIcients, by invening the Leontief matrix of Direct Co-efflcients. This 
rransformation provided the Open Inverse Matrix, which measures the indirect effects. 
When the household consumption sector was also included as pan of the' matrix to 
be invened, along with all the intermediate demand sectors, the Closed Inverse 
Matrix was obtained, which provided in addition. the consumption induced effects of 
initial impacts. 
The Direct Input : Output Co-efficients (a,j) are computed by dividing each column 
element (x'j) of the Transactions Matrix (A) by its respective column totals of both 
intermediate and primary inputs. These co-effIcients are treated as constants and 
represent the direct purchases of inputs (in cents) from mher industries (represented 
along the rows) for every dollar's wonh of output produced by the industries 
(represented by the different columns) in question. The Inter-dependency co-
effIcients (rij) , on the mher hand, measure both the direct and indirect inputs per 
dollar of sales to final demand from the industry identified. The use of the co-
effIcients in this manner leads to the concept of input-output multipliers, which can 
be derived for each sector using the Inverse Matrix .. 
3.3 Input-Output Multipliers 
Multipliers measure economic consequences in terms of output, income or 
employment, resulting from changes to the final demand within the economy. The 
amount of economic activity that the multiplier measures depends on the categories 
of effects that are taken into consideration. These can be either the initial effect (ie 
impact), the fIrst round effect, the industrial suppon effects (ie, second and 
subsequent rounds), consumption induced effects (arising from changes in household 
income due to the original change in output) or the flow-on effects (ie, total impact 
less the initial impact). 
Employment and income effects are estimated in an input-output model by using 
additional co-effIcients representing the per unit labour inputs or incomes paid in each 
of the sectors in the model. Once the set of activity levels have been estimated from 
the input-output model, the employm.:nt and income effects are assessed by means 
of supplementary calculations. The inter-industry capital transactions table 
aggregated to the same level as the inter-industry products transaction table will 
enable the impacts on capital flows between industries, following changes in pastoral 
sector level of output to be studied. This was however, not carried out for the 
purposes of this study. 
A Simple Output Multiplier (direct and indirect output) can be obtained for each 
sector by summing the columns (Lirij) of the invened, Leontief Matrix (I-A), where 
rij represent the direct and indirect requirement from sector i for a unit increase in the 
Final Demand of sector j. The direct effect on income from an increase in the output 
of a sector can be estimated as the payments to households in sector j (Hj), expressed 
as a proportion of sector output (Xj ) and estimated as a co-effIcient (W). The direct 
and indirect income (Yj) resulting from an increase in Final Demand of a sector can 
be estimated through multiplying the above co-efficient (Wj) by the simple output 
multiplier (L;rij) computed before. As such, Yj is the direct and indirect Income 
Multiplier for sector j, given an increase in sales to Final Demand. 
To derive multipliers that include the consumption induced effects, the household row 
and column, formerly in the Primary Inputs and Final Demand columns respectively, 
must first be moved into the Transactions Matrix (A *), which is the original 
transaction Matrix (A) enlarged to n+ I sectors. This effectively rreats households as 
an industrial sector and means that the household income generated as a result of the 
direct and indirect effects induces further increases in output and income through 
consumer spending. Accordingly, the Total OUfPUl Multiplier will be the sum of the 
elements (L;r"ij) of the invened expanded (n+ I sector), Leontief Matrix (I-A *), which 
includes the household sector (Hubbard and Brown, 1981) .. 
Employment Multipliers can be calculated in a similar fashion to income multipliers. 
As employment is not explicitly included in the inter-industry tables, a vector of 
employment co-efficients (U;) are estimated exogenously, using the 1986 Census of 
Population and Dwellings, Labour Force Survey. These co-efflcients represent, for 
each sector, the amount of employment created by $1 of output. Employment 
Multipliers from the open model are thus obtained through mUltiplying the sum of 
elements (L;fij) by the appropriate employment co-efficient (U;) for the corresponding 
sector. 
3.4 Supply Side Input-Output Models 
Analyses in the area of Inter-Indusny economics have used two types of models; the 
supply-driven model, and the demand-driven model, also known as the Ghosian 
(1958) and Leontief (1951) models, respectively. The supply-driven model allows 
for the determination of gross output for given values of intermediate input usage and 
primary inputs. The demand-driven model, by contrast, enables the determination of 
net output for given values of Inter-Indusny flows and final demand. Under certain 
consistency conditions both models provide identical forecasts and input results for 
inter-indusny analysis (Deman, 1988). 
Typically Input-Output tables and analyses are backward linked, but New Zealand 
agriculture is largely supply driven, with pastoral sector outputs linked forward to 
processing activities and other downstream industries (Nield, 1990). Factor supplies, 
instead of final demands, are viewed as the exogenous driving forces in the supply-
side Input-Output Models, and hence are the complete reverse of the traditional, 
demand-driven Input-Output models. 
Supply-driven input-output models have been considered to be theoretically 
implausible and their straightforward use for impact studies criticised (Oosterhaven, 
1988). Some others have attempted to demonstrate that under certain conditions such 
as perfect substitutability among all inputs imports in each indusny production 
function and cost minimisation in production choices, the supply-side model may be 
able 10 provide a reasonable approximation, when initial changes are small (Gruver, 
1989). Due to these restrictive assumptions and also for operational reasons, this 
approach was not considered for this study, even though it appeared to have some 
conceptual appeal. 
3.5 Impact Analysis 
Once the different multipliers are computed as outlined in previous sections, the real 
value of the pastoral sub-sector (ie, sheep, beef and dairy) output levels for the 
current year (1991) or for the forecast years (1992-1995) can be used to derive the 
corresponding output, income and employment impacts in the pastoral related 
upstream and downstream activities of the wider economy. By computing the 
corresponding impacts for the year (1986/87) in which the last inter-indusny study 
was carried out in New Zealand, the estimates for the current year and the forecasts 
for the next four years can be verified. 
While carrying Out the impact analysis, it is important to recognise some of the 
limitations inherent in the Input:Output frame work. These relate to the assumption 
of a set of fixed average co-efficients for various industries in the economy, since the 
time of the last study (1986/87), representation of a static environment unable to 
account for any structural changes likely in the interim and the restriction of relative 
prices between sectors (eg, agricultural and non-agricultural) to be unchanged. This 
methodology however, possesses the advantage of being: (a) policy neutral; (b) an 
effective measure of economic inter-dependence of various sectors and industries; (c) 
able to produce long-run projections and forecasts of economic impacts; and (d) 
useful when detailed time-series data are lacking (Nield, 1990). 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This economic impact study uses the 1986/87 Inter-Indusny transactions table and the 
1986 Census of Population and Dwellings, Labour Force Surveys, both compiled by 
the New Zealand Department of Statistics. An input-output analysis computer 
software called GRlMP, developed by West (1988), was used to carry out all the 
Input/Output analysis reported in this paper. 
4.1 1986/87 Inter Industry Transactions and Co-efficients 
Appendix table la shows the important flows in $ million of the Inter-Indusny 
transactions matrix which represents the 1986-87 New Zealand economy. This 21 
indusny level table was obtained by collapsing an initial matrix of 184 industries for 
the purpose of presenting the results. The pastoral sector industries and their major 
processing activities were left disaggregated, while the rest were aggregated. The 
matrix shows that the 'service sector' dominates the New Zealand economy in terms 
of output and employment. Other significant industries are 'other manufacturing' and 
'wholesale and retail trade'. The pastoral industries would become significant, only 
if all the pastoral production and processing industries are combined. 
The total output from sheep farming during 1986/87 is shown in appendix table la 
as $2,439m, of which $804m was input into the meat works and $655m into wool 
scouring. Similarly, dairy farming's total output was $I,341m, of which $977m was 
manufactured into dairy products. Beef farming's total output was $655m, of which 
$450m was input into the meat works. 
Sources of Input Supply to Pastoral and Related Industries 
The direct input co-efficients (ie ratio of column totals) in appendix table 2a show 
that the major input source for sheep farming is sheep farming itself (0.15), which 
will mainly be the movement of sheep stock between farms, followed by agricultural 
contracting services (0.06), fertiliser and pesticide (0.05), and the wholesale and retail 
trade (0.04). However, for dairy and beef farming, there appear to be no one 
dominant input source, although contracting services, fertiliser and pesticides, and 
wholesale and retail trade are the more important input sources. 
The processing industries get most of their inputs from the intermediate industries, 
whereas for the farming industries, they are not as important. For instance, 92 
percent of wool scouring's input is from intermediate industries, compared to 53 
percent for sheep farming. Wool souring's total input constitutes only 1.6 percent 
operating surplus and 0.7 percent consumption of fixed capital, whereas sheep 
farming's operating surplus is 28 percent of the total input, and consumption of fixed 
capital is 6 percent. 
Destination of Outputs from the Pastoral and Related Industries 
The direct output co-efficients (ie ratio of row totals) are presented in appendix table 
2b. Outputs from the sheep indusny go into sheep farming itself (0.15), as well as 
into the meat works (0.33), into wool scouring (0.27) and for direct exports (0.22). 
Output from dairy farming mostly goes into the manufacture of dairy products (0.73) 
and the output from beef farming goes mainly into the meat works (0.68). These 
output co-efficients also show that most of our pastoral products are further processed 
before being exported. For instance only 1 percent of dairy farming's output and 2 
percent of sheep fanning's output are directly exported, while 61 percent of meat 
work's output and 89 percent of wool scouring's output are exported. 
Changes in Input and Oumut Co-efficients Over Time (1986/87 v 1981/82) 
A sample of direct co-efficients presented in appendix table 3, show that the input-
output relationships did not change appreciably between 1981/82 and 1986/87, except 
for the output of sheep and beef farming going into meat works, which were reduced 
somewhat. This shows that the 1986/87 <:o-efficients can provide a useful guide for 
an economic impact analysis in 1991 with some degree of <:onfidence, knowing that 
the 1986/87 tables were made available only in 1991. 
Direct Co-efficients 
The direct co-efficients in appendix table Ib were calculated by dividing each column 
element by its respective column total, as given in appendix table lao Examining the 
beef farming column, we note that every dollar's worth of output requires direct 
purchases from other indusnies of: 
1 cent from sheep farming; 
3 cents from dairy fanning; 
8 cents from beef farming; 
7 cents from other primary indusnies; 
4 cents from fertiliser and pesticides manufacturing indusnies; 
2 cents from other manufacturing indusnies; 
I cent from elecnicity generation and disnibution; 
4 cents from wholesale and retail trade; 
6 cents from service sector; and 
6 cents from other intermediate input indusnies. 
Beef fanning spends a further 6 cents on wages and salaries and a further 52 cents 
on other primary purchases (eg imports). 
Inter-Dependency Co-efficients 
(a) Direct and Indirect Effects 
The interdependency co-efficients shown in appendix table Ic, show direct and 
indirect impacts per dollar of sales to final demand. Thus, a million dollars of 
sales to final demand from manufacture of dairy products will require $0.006m 
of output from sheep farming, $0.584m from dairy fanning, $0.028m from beef 
fanning, $1.033m from manufacture of dairy products, and so on. The column 
sums of this open inverse manix shows the total effect on all sectors of the 
economy per unit of output sold to final demand from the column sector. Thus 
the column sums of the manufacture of dairy product industry indicate that for 
every sale to final demand of $1, the economy's output would tOtal $2.488, while 
for dairy farming, sheep farming and beef fanning these figures are $1.845, 
$2.049 and $1.804 respectively. 
(b) Direct, Indirect and Consumption Induced Effects 
The inclusion of consumption induced effects can have major impacts on the 
interdependency co-efficients, as shown in appendix table Id. The income-
consumption link increases all of the co-efficients, but particularly those which 
sell a major part of their output to households (ie services and wholesale and 
retail trade). Manipulation of this closed inverse manix shows the sum of the 
direct, indirect, and induced effects on output resulting from increased 
consumption. 
Employment data were allocated to the respective input-output indusnies, and 
then 1i-ggregated into 21· sectors as in appendix table la. 
4.2 1986/87 Multipliers for the Pastoral Industries 
Appendix table 5 provides a summary of the impacts which the sheep, beef and dairy 
farming, and their processing indusnies, had on the New Zealand economy in 
1986/87. The table shows the direct, indirect, and induced effects of the pastoral 
activities. This presents the linkages between the pastoral sector indusnies and me 
other indusnies, unlike the results in appendix table I a, which show only the direct 
effects. The linkages here involve consideration of input purchasing patterns, output 
flows, consumption expenditure, and capital investment expenditure. In this way, the 
industry'S full impact on the economy is investigated. 
Multipliers are calculated in terms of output and income as the effect per $million 
change in final demand and for employment as the number employed per $million 
of output 
Oumut Multipliers 
The multipliers shown in appendix table 5 should be interpreted as follows. For the 
sheep farming industry each dollar's worth of output generates flow-on output effects 
of $1.68. Flow-on effects are comprised of production-induced and consumption 
induced effects. The production-induced effects make up $1.05 and are associated 
with sheep fanners purchasing inputs (fust round) and the subsequent round effects 
as those sectors that supply these inputs in turn increase their purchases (indusnial 
support). Consumption-induced effects connibuted 63 cents to the flow-on effects as 
those households employed in the sheep farming sector purchase goods and services 
from other sectors within the New Zealand economy. Since the sheep fanning 
industry has high levels of local input purchase, it is expected that the production-
induced effects will be greater than the consumption-induced effects. Conversely, the 
wholesale and retail rrade sector has much greater consumption effects than 
production-induced effects because it has a much larger labour component. 
Income Multipliers 
The above interpretation can be extended to the income multipliers where a dollar of 
sheep farming output leads to 7 cents of household income for those employed in 
sheep farming, and generates a total household income of 42 cents in the economy 
(ie a flow-on of 35 cents). For the 'other manufacturing' sector, however, a dollar 
of output generates a total household income of 66 cents in the economy, and in the 
'service' sector, a dollar of output generates a total household income of 84 cents. 
Emplovment Multipliers 
The employment multipliers indicate the number of jobs per $million of output. In 
the sheep farming indusrry $1 million of exrra output would create 16 additional 
direct jobs and the flow-on effects will create further 20 jobs, creating total additional 
employment for 36 people. This rranslates imo one direct job for each $62,112 of 
indusrry output; the flow·on effects generate further output and employment so that 
in total, one job results from $27,503 of additional sheep farming output The ratio 
of the total effect to the initial employment level is shown by the type IIA ratio. For 
each job in the sheep farming indusrry there are ~other l.26 jobs created in other 
sectors in the economy. 
Consideration of the multipliers in appendix table 5 reveals some important 
characteristics of the pastoral sector. It can be nOted from this table that the pastoral 
sectOr industries generate the lowest output and income flow-on effects compared to 
the other sectors of the economy. Their employment flow-on effects are also much 
lower than that of the manufacturing sector industries, although they create a lot more 
direct jobs than nearly all other sectors for any increase in output. In other words, 
the sector's ratio of total to initial effect is much lower than for the other sectors, 
both in terms of output and of employment. 
4.3 Disaggregated 1986/87 Multipliers for the Pastoral Industries 
A particular vinue of input-output methods is the capacity to provide a sectoral 
distribution of flow-on effects. These shares are estimated from the disaggregated 
multipliers calculated from the input-output table. Such information points to the 
significance of particular linkages and highlights those sectors that may be affected, 
should there be an expansion or contraction of an indusrry. 
The disaggregated output, income and employment multipliers for the sheep beef and 
dairy farming activities are presented in appendix table 6. The service sector has a 
notably large share of the flow-on effects. Others with a large share include other 
manufacturing and the wholesale and retail trade. 
4.4 Pastoral Sector Price Assumptions and Output Responses 
Prices for lamb, munon and' wool from the sheep farming sector, and beef and 
milkfat from the beef and dairy farming sectors respectively, are employed in the 
pastoral model, along with cost and seasonal weather indices for each farming 
activity as exogenous variables to derive the farmer output responses to these price, 
cost and ,seasonal factors. 
Two scenarios are considered in this paper. The fIrst relates to a 'most likely' 
scanario anticipated at present by commodity analysts within MAF, based on overseas 
market prospects for our primary pastoral outputs in major export markets, which is 
referred to as the 'Base Scenario' .. The second is an 'Alternative Scenario', whereby 
an effective devaluation impact on prices at the 10 percent level from 1992-1995 is 
evaluated, as a sensitivity analysis on the Base Scenario. 
Base Scenario 
(a) Price Forecasts 
Under the Base Scenario, nominal lamb prices at the farm-gate level are 
anticipated to decline by more than 10 percent this season (ie, 1991/92) from 
prices received during the 1990/91 season,which averaged 209c per kg (table 2). 
In the subsequent seasons, lamb prices are expected to recover gradually and to 
be above last season's prices, at the end of the forecast period (ie, 1994/95 
season). Nominal mutton prices at farm-gate level are also expected to decline 
somewhat in 1991/92. These recover substantially the next three seasons to be 
about 40 percent higher in 1994/95, compared to the 1990/91 season. Greasy 
wool prices also follow a similar pattern and are forecast to be above 500c per 
kg in 1994/95 compared to about 350c per kg during the 1990/91 season (table 
2). 
Prices for prime and manufacturing beef are also forecast to decline by about 10 
percent in 1991/92 compared to 1990/91 in nominal terms. They improve only 
very gradually the next three seasons to be slightly better (ie less than 5 percent 
higher) in 1994/95 compared to 1990/9l. 
Milkfat prices, on the other hand, are expected to increase substantially (ie by 
about 25 percem) during the forecast period (1992-95), after a small setback this 
season (1991/92) compared to the last season (1990/91). Prices for all major 
pastoral outputs are therefore, forecast to decline this season (1991/92) compared 
to the last season, under the Base Scenario, and recover to varying degrees by 
the 1994/95 season, the last period of forecast (table 2). 
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(b) Output Responses 
Corresponding output responses estimated by the Pastoral Model, to the above 
nominal prices at the farm-gate level are for production to decline substantially 
during 1991/92 in the case of lamb and beef, and also for milkfat and wool 
production to be lower this season, with mutton being the exception and expected 
to remain steady. During the next three seasons, lamb production is forecast to 
decline steadily, but by less than 5 percent annually, while mutton and wool 
production will remain steady with a very marginal drop, due to the significant 
price increases forecast. 
Beef production is expected to increase steadily, but by much less than 5 percent 
annually, during the three forecast seasons following this season (1991/92), while 
dairy milkfat production is forecast to increase somewhat the next two seasons 
and stabilise in the 1994/95 season (table 2). 
(c) Value of Output 
The nominal value of the outputs from these main pastoral activities (ie sheep, 
beef and dairy) are also reponed in table 2, where the outputs are valued at their 
respective farm-gate level and then reponed in real terms using the Producer 
Price Index (PPI) for outputs (NZIER, 1990). Sheep sector values include lamb, 
mUllon and wool production in corresponding years, and the beef production is 
valued using a weighted price for prime (0.20) and manufacturing (0.80) beef, 
which reflects their general share in total beef output (table 2). 
Alternate (Devaluation) Scenario 
(a) Price Forecasts 
This scenario was used for the purpose of sensitivity analysis, whereby the effect 
on nominal farm-gate prices of an effective 10 percent (natural) devaluation in 
the value of the New Zealand dollar was evaluated in comparison to the most 
likely (Base) scenario discussed above. The prices were again forecast by 
commodity analysts within MAF and used in the pastoral supply response model, 
to produce the corresponding output responses which are also reponed in table 2. 
Under this scanario, resulting nominal farm-gate prices for all the various 
pastoral products are naturally higher, but to varying degrees, due to the 
differential impact of currency devaluation on fob returns and costs for products 
from the different industries. Lamb and wool prices are forecast to rise steadily 
after only a small decline this season (1991/92), while mutton prices increase 
with no drop this season. Beef and milkfat prices are also expected to increase 
substantially during the forecast period with no decline this season, in contrast 
to the Base Scenario. 
(b) Output Responses 
Final prices in the alternate (devaluation) scenario for the last year of forecast 
(1994/.95) are about 10-15 percent higher than the Base Scenario for all products, 
with milkfat prices being forecast to be at the higher end of this range. 
Corresponding output results obtained from the Pastoral Supply Response model 
run were higher than the Base run in the case of beef, milkfat, and to some 
extent wool, but in fact were slightly lower in the case of lamb and mutton. 
This is the result of changes in relative prices between lamb (along with mutton) 
and beef (as well as milkfat) being altered in favour of the latter (ie the outputs 
from the cattle sector), due to devaluation. Consequently, the farmer output 
responses also follow this change, since the Pastoral Model Responses are 
sensitive to relative price changes as much as to real price changes. 
(c) Value of Output 
As in the case of the Base Scenario, the corresponding outputs from the 
Alternate Scenario were also valued by farm-gate prices and subsequently their 
real value computed using the PPI (output) Index. These results suggest that the 
real value of outputs from all three pastoral farming activities (ie sheep, beef and 
dairy) are higher both in nominal as well as real terms under the Alternate 
(devaluation) Scenario compared to the Base Scenario, throughout the forecast 
period (1992-95), In the first few years of forecast, the real values of both sheep 
sector and beef sector outputs are in fact lower than in the 1990/91 season under 
both scenarios. Beef sector real output values for the forecast period are lower 
than for 1990/91 (a good year for beef production), but higher than the output 
value in 1986/87, which is also provided in table 2, for purposes of comparison. 
Dairy sector real output value however, is consistently higher during the forecast 
period than in the last season (1990/91) as well as in 1986/87. Sheep sector real 
output values, consisting of lamb, mutton and wool values, are expected to be 
lower during the forecast period than in 1986/87. They are also lower compared 
to the last season (1991/92), for the first 2-3 years of the forecast period .. 
Linkage with Input-Output Multipliers 
The real values of outputs from pastoral sub-sectors, reported in table 2, are used 
along with the output, income, and employment multipliers, reported in the appendix 
table 5, to compute the economy-wide impacts of changes in these outputs. This is 
carried OUl under the two scenarios for the forecast period (1992-95) and compared 
with actual impacts during the last season (1990/91), as well as the season (1986/87) 
during which the last input/output study was carried out. These results are reported 
in tables 3 and 4 and discussed first and then summarised in table 5 in the section to 
follow. 
4.5 Results of Impact Analysis 
In order to examine the economy wide output, income and employment implications 
of likely future prospects for the pastoral sector, Pastoral Supply Response model 
output results discussed above, under two price and seasonal production scenarios 
were used. Resuhs are reported separately for sheep, beef and dairy farming 
activities as initial and total impacts, for economy-wide output, income, and 
employment, where the total impacts included the first round and industrial support 
impacts (known together as Production Induced Impacts) and the Consumption 
Induced Impacts. The difference between total and initial impacts, known as flow-on 
impacts, are also examined. 
Impacts on the Economv in 1991 Compared with 1987 
The impacts of the sheep, beef and dairy farming activities for the year ending 31 
March 1987, on the New Zealand economy are shown in table 3a. These results 
show that these three industries together generated over $11.3 billion of output, 
provided approximately 161,000 jobs and created over $1.74 billion in income for 
households in the total economy, of which $6.83 billion in output, $1.46 billion in 
income and 81,000 jobs were flow-on effects to the rest of the economy, and the 
remaining were initial or direct effects. 
Out of the total impacts of $11.3 billion output in 1986/87, sheep farming accounted 
for 56.5 billion, beef farming $1.5 billion, and dairy farming $ 3.2 billion. In terms 
of total employment (161,000 jobs) generated in the wider economy in upsrream and 
downstream activities, sheep farming accounted for about 89,000 jobs, beef farming 
16,7000 and dairy farming, 55,500 jobs. The share of jobs created from the initial 
impact was about half of the tOlal number of jobs in the total pastoral sector. This 
Table 3a: Pastoral Sector Impacts, Past (1987) 
Seaors/ImpacLS INITIAL FIRST IXDSTRL 
ROL;"U SLl'PORT 
I. OUTPUT (S'm) 
Sheep famUng 2440 1342 1220 
Beef fanning 657 283 243 
Dairy fanning 1342 617 523 
Tolal 4439 2242 t986 
II. INCOME (S'm) 
Sheep farming 171 220 268 
Beef farming 39 46 53 
Dairy fanning 67 121 121 
. Total 277 386 442 
Ill.EMPLOYMENT 
(No of Jobs) 
Sheep fanning 39284 16665 14030 
Beef fanning 6577 3416 2766 
Dairy fanning 33644 6898 5851 
Tolal 79505 26979 22647 
Table 3b: Pastoral Sector Impacts, Current (1991) 
Seaors/ImpacLS NTIAL FIRST lXDSTRL 
ROL;"U SLl'PORT 
I. OUTPUT (S'm) 
Sheep farming 1695 932 848 
Bccf fanning 926 398 343 
Dairy falming 1564 719 610 
Tolal 4185 2050 1800 
II INCOME (S'm) 
Sheep fanning 119 153 186 
Beef fanning 56 65 74 
Daily farming 78 141 141 
Tolal 252 358 401 
II1.EMPLOYMENT 
(:\0 of Jobs) 
Sheep boning 27290 11577 9746 
Beef farming 9269 4815 3898 
Dairy fanning 39209 8039 6819 
Tolal 75768 2-1.a) 1 20464 
PROD=-< C01iST:-r TOTAL FLOW-ON 
I:\UI.:cED I:\UL'CED 
2562 1537 6539 4099 
526 329 1511 854 
1141 752 3221 1879 
4228 2617 11271 6832 
488 390 1025 854 
99 85 217 177 
242 188 497 429 
828 664 1738 1461 
30695 18764 88718 49434 
6182 3988 16747 10170 
12749 9085 55465 21821 
49627 31837 160930 81426 
PRODX CO:-;STh TOTAL FLOW-O=-< 
I:\UI.:cED I:\UCCED 
I 
1780 1068 4543 2848 
741 463 2130 1204 
1329 876 3754 2190 
3850 2407 10426 6241 
339 271 712 593 
139 120 306 250 
282 219 579 500 
759 611 1596 1344 
21323 13035 61630 34341 
8714 5621 23604 14334 
14858 10588 64640 25431 
44895 29244 149874 74106 
ratio was higher for dairy farming and lower for both beef and sheep farming 
activities. 
Corresponding estimates for the most recent year (1990/91) are shown in table 3b. 
These show that the total output ($4,54 b), income ($0,71 b) and employment (61,630 
jobs) generated by the sheep farming sector in 1991 have declined, compared to $6.5 
b, $1 b, and about 89,000 jobs respectively in 1986/87, while that by the beef and the 
dairy farming sectors have increased, However, the increases were nO! large enough 
to offset the decline caused by the reduction in production from sheep farming. 
The total output from all three sectors in 1990/91 was $10.4 b, while the total income 
was $1.6 b and total employment under 150,000, compared to $11.3 b, $1.74 b and 
161,000 jobs respectively during the 1986/87 season. The total employment in 
1990/91 was made up of about 61,600 jobs from the sheep sector, around 23,600 jobs 
from the beef sector, and 64,600 from the dairy sector compared to about 89,000, 
16,700 and 55,500 jobs respectively, in the three sectors. 
Impacts on the Economy Under the Forecast Base Scenario 
The average output, income and employment impacts under the base scenario for the 
forecast period (1992-95) provided in table 4a show that they are below the 1991 
levels for sheep and also beef farming sectors, while being higher for the dairy 
farming sector. There are over 5,000 further job losses indicated in the sheep sector 
and about 4,000 job losses in the beef sector, and less than 4,000 additional jobs 
created in the dairy farming sector. In terms of total output, the decline in sheep 
farming and beef farming sectors,compared to 1990/91, is forecast to be around 
$0.4 b and the gain in total output in the dairy sector estimated to be around $0.2 b. 
Impacts on the Economv Under a Forecast 10 Percent Devaluation Scenario 
Impacts on the economy under a 10 percent devaluation scenario presented in table 
4b, indicate sheep farming's effect on output, income and employment to be higher 
than under the base scenario and also during 1990/91. However, they are much 
lower than that for 1987. For instance, 88,700 people were employed in this sector 
in 1987 (table 3a) compared to 63,800 under a 10 percent devaluation scenario (table 
4b), 61,600 in 1991 (table 3b) and 56,300 under the base scenario (table 4a). Unlike 
the sheep farming sector, the output, income and employment impacts for the beef 
and the dairy farming sectors are higher under the 10 percent devaluation scenario 
than for the base scenario, as well as 1991 and 1987 production impacts. The dairy 
farming sector employed 55,500 people in 1987 and 64,600 in 1991, while it is 
estimated to employ 68,500 under the base scenario and 80,700 under the 10 percent 
devaluation scenario. 
Table 4a: Pastoral SeclOr Impacts, Forecast Base Scenario (1992-95) 
Scctors/ImpaClS l),anAl FIRST IXDSTRl PRODN CONSTN TOTAL 
ROL')iI) SLl'PORT !l\'DUCED !l\'DUCED 
I. OUTPUT (S'm) 
Sheep farming t548 85t 774 1625 975 4149 
Beef farming 766 329 283 613 383 1762 
Dairy faaming 1657 762 646 1408 928 3977 
Total 3971 1943 1704 3647 2286 9887 
n. INCOME (S'm) 
Sheep fanning 108 139 170 310 248 650 
Beef farming 46 54 61 115 100 253 
Dairy fanning 83 149 149 298 232 613 
Total 237 342 381 723 579 1516 
m.EMPLOYlvlENT 
(No of Job.) 
Sheep fanning 24923 10573 8901 19474 11904 56285 
Beef farming 7668 3983 3225 7208 4650 19525 
Dairy farming 41541 8517 7225 15742 11218 68484 
Totat 74131 23073 19350 42423 2m2 144294 
Table 4b: Pastoral Sector Impacts, Forecast 10% Devaluation Scenario (1992-,95) 
Scctors!Impacts l:'.1TIAl FIRST l:'.'DSTRl PRODN CaNST).' TOTAL 
ROL'ND SLl'PORT l:'.'DUCED l:'.'DUCED 
l. OUTPUT (S'm) 
Sheep farming !755 965 878 1843 1106 4703 
Beef fanning 914 393 338 731 457 2102 
Dairy farming 1953 898 762 1660 1094 4687 
Total 4622 2257 1977 4234 2636 11493 
II. lNCOtv1E (S'm) 
Sheep farming 123 158 193 351 281 737 
Beef fanning 55 64 73 137 119 302 
Dairy foaming 98 176 I 176 352 273 723 
Tobl 275 398 442 840 673 1761 
1II.EMPLOYtvlENT 
<-,0 of Job.) 
Sheep farming 23256 11987 10091 22a78 13496 63812 
Beef fanning 9149 4753 3848 8601 5548 23298 
Dairy farming 48962 10038 8515 18554 13211 8a717 
Total 86366 26778 2243~ 49232 32266 167827 
FLOW.Q:-/ 
2601 
996 
2320 
5916 
542 
207 
530 
1279 
31362 
11858 
26943 
70163 
FLOW.Q;-i 
2948 
1188 
2734 
6871 
614 
247 
625 
1486 
! 
35556 ! 
> 14149 
31756 
81461 
Total PaslOral SeclOr Net Impacts on the New Zealand Economv 
Table 5 summarises the net impacts of the tOlal paslOral seclOr on the New Zealand 
economy. The tOlal output, income and employment impacts for the 1992-95 period 
under the base scenario are lower than for the 1990/91 season, (ie current season 
estimates). However, they are higher than the 1990/91 season estimates under a 10 
percent devaluation scenario. An estimate of over 23,000 additional jobs can be 
created from the total pastoral sector impacts under a 10 percent devaluation scenario 
over the base scenario during the forecast period. 
The corresponding comparison of IOtal net output impacts for the total pastoral seclOr 
indicate that the results under the base scenario ($9.9 b) are somewhat lower than for 
the 1990/91 season ($ 10.4 b), while the IOtal net output for the pastoral sector under 
the (Alternate) 10 percent devaluation scenario was slightly higher ($11.4 b). 
! 
Disaggregated Impact from the Pastoral SeclOr Industries 
The disaggregated output and employment impacts arising from the sheep, beef and 
dairy farming seClOrs, presented in tables 6a and 6b respectively, show that the 
greatest flow-on impacts generated by these sectors are in the services, OIher 
manufacturing, and in the wholesale and retail trade seClOrs. Approximately 25 
percent of these impacts are in the services sector. In 1987, the sheep farming sector 
generated $917 million of service seclOr total output, and 12,700 of its jobs. 
--------
Table 6a: Disaggrcgated Output Impacts: Ranked Aow-Orts (S'm) 
SHEEP FAR.'dJ;\G 
Rank Sector Perc...nt Aow-on Row-On Output 
Multiplier 
1987 1991 
I Services 22.4 0.376 917 637 
2 om Manuf 15.4 0.259 631 439 
3 Whl/Retail 11.3 0.190 464 323 
4 Sheep Fnn 11.2 0.187 457(2897)' 318(2013)' 
5 Olh Primary 8.8 0.148 361 251 
6 FertJPest 4.7 0.079 192 133 
7 Others 26.2 0.440 1074 744 
Total 100 1.679 4096(6536)' 2845(4540)' 
BEEF FARMJ;\G 
Rank Sector Percent Row-on Row-On Output 
~ultiplier 1987 1991 
I Services 23.2 0.302 199 280 
2 Olh .Yfanuf 14.5 0.189 124 175 
3 WhJ/Reuil 11.7 0.153 100 141 
4 Oth Primary 9.4 0.122 80 113 i 
5 Beef Frm 6.8 0.088 58(715)' 82(1008)' 
6 FertlPest 4.7 0.061 40 56 . 
7 Omers 29.7 0.386 254 358 
i 
Total 100 1.301 855(1512)' 1205(2131)' 
DAIRY FAR~lIXG 
R:utk Sector Perccfll Aow-on Row·On Output 
!vtultiplier 1987 1991 
I Services 26.0 0.364 489 570 
2 Oth Manuf 16.7 0.234 314 366 
3 WhJ/Reuil 11.8 0.165 221 258 i 
4 Olh Primary 6.6 0.093 125 145 
5 Dairy Fnn 1.5 0.021 28(371)* 33(1597)' I 
6 FertlPest 4.7 0.065 87 102 I 
7 Others 32.7 0.459 616 636 
TOlal 100 1.401 1880(3222)' 2191(3755)' • 
--- ----
---
Table 6b: Disaggrega,ed Employmem ImpOCIS: Ranked Aow-Ons (No.of Jobs) 
SHEEP FAR>\IING 
Rank Seaor Percent Aow--on Row-On Empio)ment 
Multiplier 1987 1991 
1 Services 25.7 0.005 12681 8809 
2 WhI/ReWi 15.7 0.003 7753 5386 
3 Sheep Fnn 14.9 0.003 7357(46631)' 5110(32393)' 
4 0Ih ~lanuf 11.1 0.002 5509 3827 
5 Oth Primary 9.8 0.002 4846 3366 
6 Road Tmspc. 3.0 0.001 1480 1028 
, 7 OIhen 19.8 0.004 9811 6818 
To121 100 0.020 49439(88713)' 34344(61626)' 
BEEF FARMING 
Rank Sector Percent How-on Aow-On Employment 
Multiplier 1987 1991 
1 Services 27.0 0.004 2745 3868 
2 WhllRel3il 16.5 0.003 1675 2361 
3 0Ih Manuf 10.7 0.002 1085 1529 : 
4 Oth Primary 10.6 0.002 1075 1515 , 
5 Daily Fnn 5.8 0.001 585 824 i 
6 Beef F3.nn 5.7 0.001 580(7155)' 817(10084)' ' 
OIhen 23.7 0.003 2425 3420 
Tolal 100 0.016 10170(16745)' 14334(23601)' 
DAIRY FARMING 
Rank Sector Percent Row-on Row-On Employment 
, 
I 
.\rfultiplier 1987 1991 
1 Serviccs 31.0 0.005 6764 7883 
2 WhllRe",il 16.9 0.003 3697 4308 
3 Oth ~1anui 11.6 0.002 2742 3196 
4 Oth Primary 7.7 0.001 1672 1949 
5 Road Tmspl 3...t 0.001 733 855 
6 Dairy Fnn 3.3 0.001 713(34354)' 831(40037)' 
7 Othen 25.1 0.003 5504 6413 
Tot:ll 100 0.016 21825(55466)' 25435164641)' 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was undertaken to enable a better understanding of the economy-wide 
impacts of changes in sheep, beef and dairy farming activities, forecast by the 
Pastoral Supply Response Model operational within MAF Policy Services. The 
measurement of wider impacts in terms of output, income and employment in the 
overall economy, both in downstream (ie processing, transportation, etc) and upstream 
(ie input supply, contracting services, etc) activities, were essential for interpreting 
the output responses produced by the pastoral model more fully, in policy analysis 
as well as in forecasting exercises. 
In order to achieve this, the Pastoral Model results had to be linked to the inter-
industry transactions framework and employment data, which provide the necessary 
output, income and employment multipliers. Latest available Inter-Industry data was 
for the 1986/87 tinancial year and the Full-time Equivalent Labour Force data was 
computed based on the 1986 Census of Population and Dwellings. The original Inter-
Industry data for 1986/87, available at the 184 industry level, was first selectively 
aggregated to the 80 industry level, while maintaining the necessary disaggregation 
in pastoral related industries. These were subsequently further aggregated and 
reported at the 21 industry level in the tables presented in this paper, due to the 
constraints of accommodating larger tables. Nevertheless, the industries with 
significant linkages to pastoral production activities were left disaggregated, so as not 
to lose any important information. 
Two price scenarios for lamb, mutton, wool, beef and milkfat were used with the 
Pastoral Supply Response model to produce pastoral output responses for the forecast 
period (1992-95), and for comparison with the most recent season (1990/91) and a 
past season (1986/87), when the inter-industry data was compiled. The respective 
outputs were valued at the farm-gate level and their real value computed using a PPI 
(output) Index. These real output values for sheep, beef and dairy farming activities 
were used with the respective Output, Income and Employment Multipliers to 
estimate the corresponding impacts on the wider economy. Both individual sub-
sector and the total pastoral sector results are reported in terms of initial impacts as 
well as the total impacts, which included the flow-on effects. 
Overall, the results of the impact analysis suggest that total output, income and 
employment generated in the economy by the key pastoral sector activities were 
lower in 1990/91 in comparison to 86/87. This was due to a sharp decline in sheep 
sector impacts since 1986/87, not adequately compensated by the increase in beef and 
dairy sector impacts. Comparing the impacts in the latest (1990/91) season with the 
average impacts forecast for the 1992-1995 period, under the (Base) most likely 
scenario, suggest that the impacts for the forecast period will be lower for both sheep 
and beef farming, but higher for dairy farming. 
The results from the Alternate 10 percent devaluation scenario for the 1992-1995 
period, used as a sensitivity analysis, indicate that compared with 1990/91, the 
impacts will be much higher for dairy and slightly more for sheep farming, but 
marginally lower for beef farming. This can be attributable to a favourable 
production season for beef farming during 1990/91, when production reached about 
590,000 tonnes, in comparison to 550,000 tonnes in 1987 and forecast range of 535-
541,000 tonnes for the 1991/92 season under the two price scenarios. 
In spite of some of the shOrtcomings inherent in the Input-Output framework, which 
were identified before, the methodology adopted provided some useful indicative 
results (ie trends) of wider output, income and employment impacts in the overall 
economy, arising from the. changing prospects for the pastoral activities during the 
forecast period. These detail results will be useful in evaluating policy options that 
impact on the different pastoral activities. The exact values of the results. cannot be 
used with complete certainty, and only considered as indicative of trends. Further 
refinements of the methodology will be undertaken, to the extent possible, in order 
to obtain more consistent and disaggregated results. 
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APPENDIX APPENDIX 
Table 2 The Characteristics of the 1986/87 Inter-Industry Transactions Matrix Table 3: Changes Over Time in Inter-Industry Relationships 
<a) Pastoral Sector - Source of Input Supply 
Inter-Industry Transfer 
Sheep Dairy Beer Meat Wks Dairy Wool Output Iodustry 
Ioput Source 1981/82 1986187 
Fm Fm Fm Pro Scour Sheep' & Beef Farming Sheep & Beef F'ing 0.15 0.14 
Sheep Farming 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.69 Dairy Fanning 0.01 0.01 
Dairy Fanning 0.00 0.02 0.Q3 0.04 0.54 0.00 Agr Contract Svs 0.05 0.05 
Beef Fanning 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 Fabricated M/Prods 0.01 0.01 
Agric Contracting 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Prep Animal Feeds 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Dairy Fanning Dairy Fanning 0.00 0.03 
PIP.per Prods Pmt Publ 0.00 0.00 0.00 om 0.02 ·Q.OO Agr Conb'act Svs 0.04 0.03 
Fenilisers & Pesticide 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.00 ·0.00 0.00 Fabricated Mthods 0.00 0.01 
Petrol & Coal 0.02 0.02 om 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fabricated Metal Prods om 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Meal Works Sheep & Beef F'ing 0.32 0.28 
Electricity 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 Dairy Farming 0.03 0.04 
Constr other than Bldgs 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 00.0 Road Frgt Trnspt 0.00 om 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 om 
Road Frieght T ranspon 0.02 0.03 0.Q2 0.00 0.02 0.00 Dairy Products Dairy Fanning 0.50 0.53 
Bank Finan & Investment 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 om Sheep & Beef F'ing 0.00 0.00 
Legal Acct Business Svs 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 Road Frgt Tmspt 0.01 0.02 
Total Intermediate 0.53 0.44 0.44 0.73 0.78 0.92 
Household (Wages) 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.11 0.03 Wood & Wood Products Forestry & Logging 0.08 0.11 
Other Primary Inputs 0.40 0.51 0.50 0.08 0.11 0.05 Sheep & Beef F'ing 0.02 0.00 
Basic Metal Indus 0.00 0.03 
(b) Pastoral Sector - Ourput Destinations 
Fabricated MIProduct Basic Metal Indus 0.10 0.13 
Sheep Dairy Beer :'.Ieat :\Iaouf. of Wool Whold Exports 
Fm Fm Fm Wks Dairy Prcdt Scour Coosu 
Machinery NEC 0.01 0.01 
Electrical Mach 0.00 0.01 
Sheep Farming 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.22 
Dairy Fanning 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.73 0.00 0.00 om 
Beef Fanning 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Road Frieght Tmspt Petroleum & Coal 0.05 0.05 
Rubber Products 0.02 0.02 
Meat Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 om 0.10 0.61 
Plastic Products 0.02 0.00 
Milk Plants 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.Q4 
Mnf Dairy Prcdts 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.80 
Wool Scouring 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.89 I 
Source: Inter-Industry Study of the NZ Economy, Dept of Statistics 
Source: Inter-Industry Study of the NZ Economy 1986/87, Dept of Statistics. 
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-IabJ.c...4: FlllI-Timp FI1"iv'lpnl~ Innll<lrv 
Tahle· d· I="II_Timp I=I1"iv"lpnl I ohn", Forop hV Innll<1rv (=rt:d) 
DiDIJSTRY GROUP IDeg;j~Y f.uU,T!P.'''· 
1981 19116. INDUSTRY GROUP ID~~~ FuU,Tlme' 
,Q" IQAA 
~\llNG 
..i -.44ill ..J22:M 
DAIRY FARMING_ ? 
.3ll8.1 ..nMl TNDIJSTRI,1 M. k J:()(lfITr 46 181R? 1~11~ 
BEEF F!\RMlNG 1 
--1I!1lL ..till. 
MIXED & OTHER I.'STOCK F!lRMING 4 9287 
.llli2.. 
FI.FCTRIC, MAr~ k J:()Irn>MJ:NT 47 1~1?7 ,...71 
T1> NSPORT 1'()( rn>MJ:NT 48 ??~'" 10071 
..lI!2Rl1Cill.IR E 5 7950 7279 PROF EOUTP & ()THJ:R MANIlJ:M'TIlRINr. 49 MM~ I<IM 
_6 ..lA.?? 
.3ll4.i 1'1 'r.J:NJ:RATN k m~TRmIJTION 50 1?050 11??1< 
..EB.l.llI. = & FARMINGNEC -'1 .l6l18. . 2l6.ll. GAS &- WATER TI>1'ATMT k m~TI>mlmON 'il ?"O 1150 
~ '\NO IMPRVT CONTRc.sY.GS _8 
..5128 .3424 
 ~GRICULTURAL SRVCS 9 9043 7460 
..GRA.lN.CROPPING & HORTICULTURAl. IO 1127 . 1396 
~PPING 11 1537 
..!MlL 
_ ffiRESIR.Y..&. LOGGING 12 10472 
.Jl2l4 
BUILDINGS ...ll ?01<1<? 1R67? 
I OTHER THAN BlJlLDlNGS 53 24923 23970 
MOwn &- ANCIL CONSTRUCTION SRVCS '..54. 12160 
'" " 
WHO I "<"" &- RETAIL TRAOE ..2i 10m,. ?"0<5 
I>"'TA!JI>ANT' .~ HOT!'I ~ 56 4 71? 51~RR 
FlSHING 13 3669 lli7 I> All WAY TRAN~PORT 57 1117? R794 
.M.Il:ill:I{.i 14 4688 59!? PA~.'J:Nr.J:R ROAD TRANSPORT 58 9'i'iR 9~1R 
~SMAI.LGOODS & POULTRY 15 4727 4138 J:R1'Tr.HTTRANSPORT RY ROAD 59 lR?'iI 17990 
..L:.SIOCK.SL WGHTERING & MEAT PROD 16 34592 30114 ~IIPPORTr. SRVCS TO TRANSPORT 60 19~~1 11446 
.MILK PROCF_~SING PLANTS 17 1321 lU2. WATJ:R TRAN'P()RT 61 4100 I??M 
ICE·CREAM 
-.l&. ..82i ..1fJ2 AIR TRAN~P()I>T 62 71<71< 75M 
MA RING OE.DAIRYl'RODUCIS. 
.-li IlJiL -.6656. 
..ERJ.llI....&. YfQlITAB.LE 
.20 4075 4285. 
~LFlSH PROCFSSTl>G 21 .2ln 2266 
. FOOD.l'RQDl}CTS NFC ?? 
.M62. ..i5.8B. 
STORAGE &- WARJ:H()IISINr. 
...ll 675 1070 
r()MMI 
....6..4 35689 10M? 
BANK <TNANr1' k ~n'r"T, 
....6.i 29984 36305 
r,J:NFI> AI 1N.rIRANCF M "'?~ ~O~? 
...GRAJN.Mlli. PROnlJCTS 21 920 
.Jlli 
..B.AKERY PRODUCTS 24 7246 7m 
PREPARED <\NIMAL FEEDS 25 693 698 
WINES BEER TOBACCO_SOIT.DRlNKS 
.26 6624 _4568 
WOOL SCOURING 27 1096 'l6l. 
.IEXIIl.ES..INCL MADE·UP TEXTLES 28 ~ 74R 
..Kl'ill'Ill'LG \41 LLS 29 4Q2l ill7 
~RIJGS 10 2I19.. ?2'll 
...cDR.l2AGE.RQl>ETWTNF & TEXT ~ 31 ..t79 _67~ 
MAl'!E.QE_CLQIH'G FXC'I.J'QQTI'lEAR l' 23'26 20678 
'T' ",,",Dlt: LEATHER &EOOnVEAR 33 7951 
.JL7Tl 
FUR.DRESSING '" nWINr. 34 374 i8.8. 
WOOD & WOOD PROf)UCIS 35 ?3097 222lB. 
PfP.~I'ER PROD.1'RINT &.J'llBLlSIilNG 16 35158 
..lliM. 
~AL CHFMIC, IS 37 1398 788 
I TJ:J: M1'mrAI INSIJRANrJ: k SIIPFR 
.KL .,7? 7R10 
RJ:AI J:'TATJ: 
....68.. 6676 10150 
LEGAL ArM' i COMPSRVCS 69 23905 29200 
1'Nr.1N k or m n. .1 svr~ 
..1ll 7317 10157 
ADVFRTISING &- RUSTNFSS SVCS 71 10011 1,1\11 
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ABSTRACT 
Uncertainties currently surround New Zealand's live sheep trade. The trade was 
suspended in December 1990 following the rejection of a New Zealand shipment to 
Saudi Arabia for health reasons. The trade has only recently been allowed to 
recommence on a restricted basis. 
It is timely to re-examine the economic value of the trade, both to the New Zealand 
farmer, and to the New Zealand economy as a whole. The latter involves 
consideration of the relationship of the mide to the domestic meat processing 
industry, the potential returns likely to be captured by exporters, and of animal 
welfare implications. 
This paper addresses these issues" by providing an economic analysis of the value to 
New Zealand of the live sheep trade, as well as outlining potential developments 
within the trade which may impact on its commercial viability. These include 
developments in the domestic live sheep export and meat industries and the live 
sheep export industries of competitor countries, as well as the policies and actions of 
importing countries, including Saudi Arabia. 
The opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of Policy Services MAF Policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The live sheep trade for slaughter recommenced in December 1985 amidst 
considerable controversy. The principal opponents of the trade at the time were the 
animal welfare lobby and the meat processing industry. The main concern of the 
animal welfare lobby was the welfare of the sheep during the sea transportation to 
various markets. The meat processing industry feared a reduction in the availability 
of stock for slaughter and consequent unemployment in the industry. There was also 
considerable debate as to whether the live sheep trade constituted a loss of potential 
value-added export earnings. This was often countered with the more pragmatic 
argument of the need to provide sheep farmers with an alternative market outlet (and 
revenue source) at a time of restricted international access for our processed 
sheepmeat products. 
Since the time of its recommencement, the trade has had a chequered development. 
The number of sheep exported annually increased from approximately 382,000 sheep 
in 1986, to 1.5 million sheep in 1990. At the same time exports became increasingly 
concentrated to only one destination, the Saudi Arabian market. This concentration 
of supply to one destination has caused problems for the trade. A rejection by Saudi 
Arabia of a New Zealand shipment in late 1990 resulted in New Zealand suspending 
its live sheep trade with Saudi Arabia and effectively led to a total suspension of live 
sheep exports. The trade has subsequently resumed, but only on a restricted basis. 
The trade has also continued to be the focus of attention for the animal welfare 
lobby, both in New Zealand and abroad. These problems associated with the trade 
have in turn, seen the Government come to play an increasingly large role in 
monitoring, and regulating the trade. 
In light of these recent developments, and with the benefit of hindsight of the last 
five years, this paper sets out to re-examine the arguments on the value of the live 
sheep trade, both to the New Zealand farmer and the New Zealand economy as a 
whole. 
OBJECTIVES 
The principal steps taken in this paper in order to make this assessment are as 
follows: 
(a) to provide background information on the history of the trade, including 
information on participants in the trade, market destinations, competitor countries 
(especially Australia), and recent developments in the live sheep trade; 
(b) to analyse the economic value of the live sheep trade: 
to the farmer; and 
to the New Zealand economy; 
(c) to assess the implication of other factors, both economic and Don-economic, on 
the trade, which includes an analysis of the trade's relationship with the domestic 
meat processing sector, the importance of animal welfare concerns, potential 
future market developments, and the impact of imponer versus exponer market 
power, and 
(d) to present some conclusions about future prospects for the trade. 
BACKGROUND SECTION 
New Zealand Trade in Live Sheep 
The expon of live sheep from New Zealand for slaughter overseas recommenced in 
1985 after several years of a total ban. Expons of live sheep from New Zealand 
expanded from approximately 416,000 head in 1985/86 to around 1,090,000 head in 
1988/89, the first year of unrestricted trade. During this period live sheep were 
exponed from New Zealand to several countries, principally to Saudi Arabia, but also 
to other Middle East countries and the United States. This trend changed in 1990, 
when expons of live sheep from Australia to Saudi Arabia were discontinued as a 
result of disputes over animal health standards. The increased demand within Saudi 
Arabia saw more New Zealand trade being diverted there to take advantage of the 
opponunities which became available. As a result, all of the 1.5 million sheep which 
were exponed in 1990, went to Saudi Arabia. 
New Zealand struck its own problems with the trade to Saudi Arabia when, in 
December 1990, a shipment of 66,500 sheep was rejected on health grounds. New 
Zealand subsequently suspended its live sheep trade with Saudi Arabia, though has 
since renegotiated with Saudi Arabia to resume the trade on a restricted basis. This 
. agreement was reached in late March 1991 in time for New Zealand to be able to 
supply sheep for the Haj religious festival beginning in June. One of the key terms 
of the agreement was the Saudi Arabian requirement that only one ship would be 
allowed on the water at one time. 
There currently remains considerable uncenainty within the industry as to the future 
of the trade. This serves to place both exponers and farmers in a difficult position as 
they attempt to make decisions as to their involvement in the trade. The continued 
absence of Australia from the Saudi Arabian market, however, creates a considerable 
market opponunity for New Zealand exponers, who in turn, have been able to offer 
farmers a premium over the prices the can obtain for their sheep in the domestic 
market. 
The trade has also had a number of other setbacks in this period, the most notable 
being the 12% monality rates suffered by sheep on one shipment to Saudi Arabia in 
1990. This incident refuelled opposition to the trade by welfare groups and 
concerned individuals. With the continued threat of action by consumers in Europe 
against New Zealand products, the question of the live sheep trade's impact on our 
broader trade interests, remains critical. 
Role of the Government 
The controversy which has surrounded the live sheep trade means the Government 
has had a high profile in various spheres of its operation. When the trade resumed 
in 1985, live sheep expons were restricted by quotas set by a Government Advisory 
Committee. The Committee's role in regulating the trade was designed to satisfy the 
concerns of the animal welfare lobby and the domestic slaughter industry. The quota 
system, which was itself the subject of much debate during this period (S 
SriRamaratnam 1988), was abandoned by the Government in 1988. 
The problems which occurred with the Saudi Arabian market in late 1990 saw the 
Government playing a large role in renegotiating the basis for the trade to resume in 
early 1991. The requirement for there to be only one ship on the water at a time 
under this agreement presents Government with the task of administering what is 
effectively a quota market. Government must now (through the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries) receive applications from exponers and allocate only one 
expon permit at a time. The exponer who is granted the expon permit is effectively 
placed in a temporary monopoly position as the only exponer who can expon sheep 
to Saudi Arabia in that period. As a consequence of the application process, the 
exponers do, however, compete in terms of the prices they will pay for sheep .. This 
helps to minimise the monopolistic effect. 
The principal role of the government is to monitor, through the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the welfare aspects of the trade. The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAF) is involved in monitoring all stages of the trade including having a 
veterinarian on board all shipments. One of MAF's objectives in supervising the 
trade in this manner is to bring shipment monality rates to down below one percent, 
thus protecting the welfare of the animals and the future of the trade . 
Market Segments 
There are two distinct end-uses for the expons to the Middle East of New Zealand 
live sheep (table 1). One is the religious slaughter market related t9 the Haj festival 
in Saudi Arabia. The Haj trade is controlled by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
which purchases approximately one million lambs each year from all sources. Al 
Mukairish has been the successful New Zealand exponer since 1990 with the contract 
to supply the IDB with up to 500,000 lambs annually for three years. Previously, in 
1987, 1988 and 1989, this contract to supply the Haj trade was held by Saudi 
Livestock Transpon and Trading Co (SLTTC). This market is limited in terms of 
quantity, but does provide a very imponant niche market for New Zealand as the 
Australians tend Dot to supply this market. 
The second major market is the Middle East consumption (spot) market. It is this 
market which offers the greatest potential for increased expons in the near future, as 
the region's population continues to increase and per capita income rises. However, 
New Zealand will continue to face strong competitive pressure from Australia and 
other exponing counuies in supplying this "greater" Middle East market. 
Table I: Live Sheep Expons and FOB Remms per Head 
Calendar 1988 1989 1990 1991" 
Years No S/head No S/head No $/head No S/head 
1 Total 741,530 27.0 1,037,505 30.9 1,554,452 44.6 1,060,000 NA 
2 Raj 508,000 24.0 475,732 27.4 517,560 40.6 450,000 S40.08 
3 Non-Raj 233,530 33.6 561,773 34.6 1,036,892 46.7 610,000 NA 
Source: DePL of Statistics, INFOS series on Live Sheep Expons - Not for Breeding 
" MAP estimated 
The Raj shipments are estimates based on the months during which shipments were made and their 
destination (Saudi Arabia). 
A more detailed analysis of the background and future prospects for these markets 
is undenaken in Section 2. 
Participants in the Trade 
(a) The Exporters 
The principal exporters of live sheep for slaughter in the past five years have 
been New Zealand Agricultural Exports (AGEX) Ltd, Al Mukairish (NZ) Ltd, 
Animal Enterprises Ltd (AEL) Corporation, Challenge Livestock and Elders 
Pastoral (NZ) Ltd. The latter two have mostly acted as procuring agents. This 
year Manz International Ltd were successful with an export assignment delivered 
to Saudi Arabia in July. 
Following the recommencement of the trade in 1986 until late 1989, Agex Ltd 
exported approximately 2.2 million sheep for slaughter, which was 97 percent of 
the total sheep exported for slaughter during this period (figure 1). This market 
dominance was largely attributable to the fact that Agex was the supplier for the 
Saudi Arabian Raj contract with the IDB during this period. In 1990, AI 
Mukairish secured this contract with the IDB and they have since taken over as 
the principal exporter in the live sheep market. During 1990, Al Mukairish 
exported 67 percent of the total expons, Challenge Livestock exported 19 percent 
and AEL 14 percent. Agex were completely absent from the market during 
1990. 
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Dominance of one exporter in the marlcet is a cause for concern as this gives the 
exponer considerable market power. It is encouraging, therefore, to see several 
companies involved in the trade. Competition between the exponers to supply 
the Saudi trade should result in higher prices being offered to the farmers. 
Most of the exponers belong to the New Zealand Live Sheep Exporters 
Association (LEA). This organisation serves to represent the interests of its 
members at a national level. 
(b) The Imponers 
New Zealand's live sheep trade with the Middle East has been dominated by two 
imponers, Al Mukairish Ltd and Saudi Livestock Transpon and Trading Co 
(SLTTC). 
(i) Ai Mukairish Ltd 
(ii) 
Ai Mukairish operate within Saudi Arabia as imponers of live sheep for 
slaughter. They have also been established in Australia and New Zealand 
as exporters. This is the only importing company which has achieved 
this type of venical integration. The company has a long history in the 
trade, and are believed to be the first to have introduced Australian sheep 
to the Saudi market Al Mukairish established themselves in New 
Zealand (in South Canterbury) after the company was suspended from 
operating in Australia in late 1989. This suspension occurred after the 
company failed to adhere to newly enforced Australian conditions on the 
trade. Since securing the Haj IDB contract, the company has become the 
principal imponer of New Zealand live sheep and has a good record of 
having sheep accepted into Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Livestock Transpon and Trading Co. (SLTTC) 
SLTIC held the Haj IDB contract prior to 1990, and were the major 
imponers of New Zealand sheep into Saudi Arabia during this period. 
SL TIC have operated in association with both Agex Ltd and AEL. 
SLTIC is also widely experienced in the trade. Prior to 1989 they were 
importing approximately 2 million sheep each year. This fum also owns 
several feedlots, a chain of retail shops within Saudi Arabia, and sells 
sheep to a range of wholesalers, small sheep imponers, supermarkets and 
butchers (NZTDB, 1989). However, the company has recently 
experienced some difficulties with the rejection by Saudi Authorities of 
several of their shipments. 
(iii) Other importers which have been involved, or have indicated that they are 
likely to become involved, in the New Zealand trade include: 
Abbar and Zani Ltd; Brothers Commercial Company; Sulaiman Ai Ali Al 
Khalaf; Homoud AI-Khalaf Establishment; and Kuwait Livestock 
Transport and Trading Company. 
The possibility of an increasing number of imponers becoming actively 
involved in the New Zealand trade is also an encouraging development 
This could increase the competitive pressures amongst Saudi imponers 
and possibly improve the trading options and potential returns for New 
Zealand exponers. 
Developments in the Australian Live Sheep Trade 
Australia's live sheep expon trade for slaughter commenced from Western Australia 
in the early 1950s with small shipments of less than 150,000 a year. Trade with the 
Middle East grew steadily during the 1960s and increased significantly from 1974 
onwards following the marked increase in oil prices. Australia's major Middle East 
customer throughout the 1960s was Kuwait, and during the 1970s was Iran. Iran 
exited from the market in the 1980s and the increasingly oil-wealthy Saudi Arabia 
became Australia's largest single market for live sheep. 
Australian live sheep expons peaked in 1983 when they exponed 7.3 million sheep. 
Of this total, 98.8 percent was exponed to the Middle East countries, with Saudi 
Arabia (3.4 million), Qatar (3.7 million) and Kuwait (1.8 million) being the principal 
buyers (BAE, 1983). 
Recent Developments 
The Australian live sheep trade received a series of setbacks in 1989, when six 
shipments to Saudi Arabia were rejected within a shon period of time, each for 
different veterinary reasons. The Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation 
(AMLC) responded by suspending the trade with the Middle East. Australia's live 
sheep trade was in disarray and the country's disease free reputation was being 
questioned. 
The trade resumed in January 1990 after the AMLC and the livestock industry 
produced a new set of stringent regulations covering the age and condition of sheep 
as well as shipping conditions. Following the resumption, half a million sheep were 
exponed until the rejection by Saudi Arabia of 18,000 sheep in April 1990. This was 
followed by the rejection by Saudi Arabia of another three shipments. In each case 
"scabby mouth" was given as the reason for rejection. The rejection of the Al 
Gasseem shipment of 80,000 sheep in November 1990 was the final straw for the 
Australians, who halted the dade to Saudi Arabia thereafter. The Australian 
Government has stated that it will not allow the trade with Saudi Arabia to resume 
until a satisfactory health protocol is negotiated. 
In addition to these problems with Saudi Arabia, trade with Australia's second largest 
Middle East market for live sheep, Kuwait, was halted when the Gulf crisis broke out 
in 1990. As a consequence of these developments, live sheep expons in 1990 fell 
to 3.5 million, the lowest amount since the 1970s, with Saudi Arabia imponing only 
900,000 sheep (table 2). 
Table 2: Australian Exports of Live Sheep for Slaughtering Distribution 
Destination 1988 1989 1990 
Middle East 
Kuwait 1,546,000 1,406,941 790,083 
Saudi Arabia 3,469,900 2,074,300 900,825 
Quatar 534,800 308,242 339,052 
Bahrain 244,300 331,983 249,941 
Yemen 116,800 81,000 79,000 
Oman 228,200 317,036 363,217 
UAE 729,200 806,362 651,766 
Other Middle East 109,800 219,100 168,903 
Singapore 43,600 33,544 27,986 
Other 2,200 248 11,209 
Total 7,054,300 5,359,687 3,530,982 
SOUTce: ABARE, Commodity Statistical Bulletin, December 1990; AMLC, Personal Communication, 
1991. 
Domestic prices received by Australian farmers fell dramatically in the latter pan of 
1990 through to the beginning of 1991 (figure 2). In October 1989 the amount paid 
per head of sheep, weighing less than 50 kg, delivered to the saleyard in Penh, was 
A$27.40. By October 1990 this price had fallen to A$2.60 and by May 1991 had 
somewhat recovered to approximately A$6.00-7.00.· 
Fig 2: Perth Live Sheep Prices 
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Future Prospects 
It appears that the Australian trade bottomed out in March 1991 and is now 
recovering. From the beginning of 1991 until April, more than one million sheep 
were exponed. Live sheep expons to Kuwait resumed in March 1991. It had been 
an imponant trade in the past for Australia and, therefore, predictions for total expons 
in the 1991 calendar year were revised upwards from 2.4 million head to 4.5 million 
head. 
Other positive developments are indications from Iraq, that it is keen to recommence 
buying, and projected increased expons to Jordan. Prices picked up in the middle of 
1991 with hoggets receiving $12-$13 per head in June. 
The Australian trade, however, still remains in a precarious poslUon. The trade 
recently received another major blow with the rejection of a shipment of 70,000 
sheep by Egyptian authorities in early June. Public opinion in Australia has seen this 
latest rejection as "more of the same" for the Australian trade. However, continued 
low prices forecast for Australian wool are expected to result in a significant 
reduction in Australian sheep numbers in the shon-term. With domestic mutton 
prices also forecast to remain low, pressure from Australian farmers to continue the 
live sheep trade, is likely to remain high in the next couple of years. 
MARKET PROSPECTS 
The Haj Market 
The principal market for New Zealand continues to be the provision of young animals 
to the Haj religious festival in Saudi Arabia. The Haj festival sees millions of 
Moslems annually making the Holy pilgrimmage to Mecca when El Al Adhha, the 
Moslem's equivalent of Christmas is celebrated. Each Moslem is required by Islamic 
law to make a sacrifice. Sheep are commonly used to fulfil this religious 
requirement. The specification of animals required for this festival is for entire long 
tail ram lambs of 33-35 kg live-weight. Because of these specific requirements, 
Australia is not an imponant source for seasonal Haj lambs. Consequently, the Haj 
market is a good niche market for New Zealand suppliers. 
There are, however, two factors to be considered in assessing the future potential of 
the Haj trade. Firstly, the market is strictly limited in terms of the quantity of sheep 
which it will accept. Secondly, the Haj festival comes forward by ten days every 
year on the western calendar. In 1991 the Haj festival staned in early June. In order 
to supply this trade, ships had to leave New Zealand by mid-May. This means in a 
couple of years time the Haj animals will have to be shipped by early April, which 
will pose problems for farmers needing to fatten lambs to the correct weight by this 
date. Attention needs to be given to the need to adjust breeding patterns to meet the 
Haj trade, or it will not provide a stable market outlet in the future. The extra costs 
which may be involved also require assessments to be made of potential profitability 
against the background of competition from other sources. 
The Middle East Consumption Market 
History of Live Sheep Imponation in the Region 
Approximately 12-14 million sheep are imponed by the countries of the Middle East 
every year. The majority of these sheep are irnponed for the consumption market, 
rather than for religious purposes. 
Throughout the Middle East region there is a strong tradition of meat (and in 
particular of sheep meat) consumption. However, the Middle East is far from being 
a homogenous market for sheep meat. There are considerable disparities in terms of 
per capita income and also in terms of the populations composition and meat 
preferences. The Islamic faith predominates throughout the region and is an 
irnponant determinant of the demand preferences of the indigenous populations. 
Many of these countries also have considerable expatriate populations. 
.The largest group of consumers of meat is the indigenous Arab population. Within 
this group, there has been a strong traditional preference for fresh or "hot" meat. 
Ignoring price factors, red meat preferences amongst the Arabs tend to be for fresh 
sheepmeat, followed by chilled lamb or beef, while frozen red meat is least preferred. 
Within the sheepmeat market the most preferred sheep on the consumption market 
are the "fat-tailed" Arab sheep. Demand for frozen sheepmeat products is highest 
amongst the western expatriate populations who more commonly purchase their meat 
from supermarkets. Poultry meat is also very popular in most Middle East countries 
and consumption of this is rapidly increasing. 
Prior to the 1970s, the demand for sheepmeat by the indigenous Arab populations 
was essentially met by the consumption of the locally bred fat-tailed sheep. 
However, a tenfold increase in oil revenues in the 1970s led to a massive rise in the 
per capita income of those countries with substantial oil reserves. These newly oil-
rich countries included Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. 
The subsequent development of these countries' oil industries also led to an influx 
of large numbers of expatriate workers into the region and resulted in increased 
population. These developments saw meat consumption within the region increasing 
by 123 percent in the 1970s, with increases in the individual countries of 595 percent 
in Saudi Arabia, 414 percent in Kuwait and 129 percent in Iran. Per capita 
consumption is calculated to have doubled throughout the region during this period 
(BAE, 1983). 
Most of this increased demand for meat was met by impons. Impons of live sheep 
(and goats) for slaughter into the Middle East region increased from three million 
head in 1969-71 to 13 million in 1980. The largest buyer by 1980 was Saudi Arabia 
with one third of this total. The other major buyers were Iran, Libya and Kuwait. 
Impons of frozen sheepmeat into the region also increased significantly from 11,000 
IOnnes in 1977 to 226,000 tonnes in 1980. Once again, Saudi Arabia was a major 
market being second only to Iran in terms of size (BAE, 1983). 
The balance between live sheep and sheepmeat irnpons into the region changed in 
the early 1980s when Iran, previously the second largest market for live sheep, 
announced it would no longer irnpon live sheep fbr slaughter from any source. This 
benefited New Zealand which increased its expoIts of frozen sheepmeat from 27,000 
tonnes in 1977 to 90,000 tonnes in 1981. Against this, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
steadily increased their impons of live sheep for slaughter during the 1980s. 
The Saudi Consumption Market 
Saudi Arabia remains the largest market for live sheep in the middle East, imponing 
approximately 6.8 million sheep in 1987. Of this total, approximately 5.8 million 
sheep were imponed to supply the consumption market. Australia was Othe principal 
supplier of this market until its trade with Saudi Arabia was suspended in 1990. 
The Saudi Arabian consumption market will continue to offer substantial market 
opponunities for live sheep exponers in the near future. The Saudi consumer has Ii 
definite preference for locally bred sheep and this is reflected in the prices these 
sheep receive. In 1991, prices for the local Noaimi sheep were between Saudi Riyals 
(SR) 450-SR500 (NZ$209-NZ$232), and for the fat-tailed Najdi breed, were between 
SR850-SRl000 (NZ$395-NZ$357). In comparison, 1991 retail prices for New 
Zealand sheep on the consumption market are between SR300-SR350 (NZ$139-
NZ$163) (New Zealand Embassy, Riyadh). 
Despite consumer preference for local sheep, the demand for impons of live sheep 
in Saudi Arabia will continue to grow. Attempts by the Saudi Govemment to 
develop the domestic sheep flock have not been particulary successful and increases 
in flock numbers have been far out-stripped by domestic population increases. In 
addition, the price of the domestic sheep is often far above what many Saudi Arabian 
consumers can afford. 
Competing Sources of Supply 
(a) Australia 
Australia is the major supplier of live sheep into the Middle East region, with 
approximately 40% share of the market in 1987. Australia has tended to have 
a major competitive advantage over New Zealand in its ability to supply sheep 
to these markets at lower prices and in far greater numbers than New Zealand. 
For this reason, in recent years much of the New Zealand trade has centred on 
the Saudi Haj market which Australia does not tend to supply. For commercial 
reasons, Australia tends to expon older, heavier sheep. 
While Australia is absent from the trade, there is much excess demand in the 
consumption market and the prospects for New Zealand exponers are very 
positive. If Australia were to re-enter the trade, the situation would be radically 
altered. However, New Zealand has established a couple of competitive 
advantages in the Saudi market. Firstly, New Zealand has fostered good 
diplomatic links with the Saudi Arabia. Secondly, the reputation of the New 
Zealand sheep is very good. In contrast the reputation of Australian sheep has 
been tainted somewhat by the Australians' tendency in the past to supply older 
animals and because of the rejection by Saudi authorities of several Australian 
shipments for veterinary reasons. New Zealand is currently presented with an 
opponunity to further strengthen its market image. Reinforcing an already 
favourable reputation with the Saudi consumer should enable the New Zealand 
product to compete well with that from Australia, were they to return to the 
market. 
(b) Turkey 
Turkey is the second largest supplier of sheep to the Middle East. It's flock is 
of fat-tailed breeds, which are the preferred breed of the Arab consumer. 
Funhermore, it is very close to the major Middle East markets. 
(c) Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Hungary have all exponed live sheep. However, 
only Bulgaria and Romania currently expon to the Middle East. 
(d) South America 
Uruguay and Argentina have exponed small numbers of sheep to the Middle 
East. Expons from these countries are disadvantaged by high freight costs, high 
voyage mortalities, and the poor health status of flocks in many pans of South 
America. 
(e) Middle East Suppliers 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan expon sheep to other Middle East destinations. Expons 
from within the Middle East are expected to be constrained by severe climatic 
conditions. 
(f) China 
China has the potential to become a major supplier of live sheep to the Middle 
East. China has a large sheep industry equal in size to that of Australia, and its 
flock is mostly of fat-tailed breeds. While expons to the Middle East region 
have been limited to date, Saudi Arabia has expressed an interest in imponing 
from this country. 
Substitutability between Frozen, Chilled and Fresh Sheep Meats 
The degree of substitutability between frozen New Zealand mutton and the meat from 
New Zealand live sheep in the Middle East market is an important consideration. 
The argument has been used that New Zealand would be better placed to concentrate 
on exporting higher value added, frozen sheepmeat products to the Middle East. An 
Australian analysis (BAE, 1983) of the same question found that live sheep meat and 
frozen sheep meat are not close substitutes in the Middle East market. This is 
because of the indigenous people's clear preference for fresh sheep meats. Frozen 
mutton impons are, in general, destined for a quite separate market. 
The advent of chilled meat expons to this region, complicates this argument. There 
would appears to be a considerable degree of substitutability between live sheep meat 
and· fresh chilled meat. Australia has been exporting considerable quantities of 
chilled meat into the region, especially into Saudi Arabia, since their cessation of 
their live sheep trade. This is an issue which New Zealand exponers are going to 
have to assess, as the market potential to supply higher value added chilled 
sheepmeat into the Middle East market, appears considerable. Under present 
requirements, Australia has a major competitive advantage in supplying this market 
because of their ability to air freight at a lower cost. 
The Nonh American Market 
A niche market for feeder lambs, mainly in the Western United States, appeared to 
show some promise in 1988, when the live sheep exponers, AEL Corporation, 
(previously Animal Enterprises Ltd) secured a contract for the supply of 240,000 
animals. Nevenheless, only 9,616 feeder lambs were exponed, as the trade ran into 
intense opposition from the US sheep and wool industry and subsequently the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) imposed several non-tariff trade barriers 
in the form of additional quarantine and health certification for the imponation of live 
sheep (SriRamaratnam, 1989). 
More imponantly, since the demand was for young lambs to be fattened on grains, 
adverse price movements for grains, US feeder lambs, and competing meats, such as 
beef, pork and chicken, resulted in a sharp drop in the profitability of this trade. US 
slaughter lamb prices per cwt, dropped from around US$8S-90 in 1987 to below $70 
in 1989, and have funher decliqed to around $50 this year (ie 1991). (USDA; ERS, 
1991). Ptoduction costs, consisting of grain and protein feed supplements, on the 
other hand, are reponed to have increased by almost 10% between 1987 and 1989, 
resulting in a reduction in the net surplus profitability of fattening lambs in the US 
west coast from US$21 to US$8. 
Under these circumstances it is unlikely that the live expon trade to the US will 
become a viable proposition again in the near future. It is unfortunate that the US 
market, which could have developed intO an imponant supplementary outlook for 
New Zealand live sheep, failed to do so. This experience has in some ways 
discouraged the New Zealand exponers from actively investigating new markets 
besides the Middle East. 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF THE LIVE SHEEP TRADE 
Returns to the New Zealand Farmer 
The prime motivators behind the live sheep trade have been the New Zealand sheep 
farmers. They have argued that the live sheep trade either benefits them directly, 
through the premium prices they can receive for sheep supplied to live sheep 
exponers, or else indirectly by applying competitive pressure to the price offered by 
the meat works. This section analyses each of these arguments in tum. 
(a) Direct Benefits - Returns to the Farmer of Supplying the Live Sheep Trade 
Much publicity has been given to the premium price which is paid for sheep 
supplied to the live sheep expon trade over that offered by the meat schedule. 
The prices paid for the 1991 Haj trade averaged approximately $30 for a 32kg 
live weight lamb (although prices were higher in the South Island reflecting a 
higher meat schedule price in the south). This compares to an average national 
price for a 17kg carcass weight lamb (the approximate equivalent of 32kg live 
weight) of $26.05. This represents a premium of $4-$5 for Haj lambs over the 
meat schedule. It should be noted that prices paid for this season's Haj lambs 
are seen as being low due to there only being one company procuring lambs for 
expon during this period and the corresponding lack of competition. 
The above figures do noc give a clear indication of the returns to the fanner of 
supplying the live sheep trade. To estimate fanners' gross margins, several other 
cost and revenue factors have to be assessed in addition to the prices paid per 
head. These are: 
the net revenue from an additional wool shear, which farmers supplying the 
Haj or consumption market have been able to achieve; 
the costs of raising Haj specific animals; 
the costs of wintering over lams to reach two-tooth age and supplying the 
Middle East consumption market. 
An analysis of gross margins to fanners accounting for these factors was 
undertaken for the Hawkes Bay region by MAF Technology consultants. This 
analysis compared the gross margins of a fann with 1000 livestock units, under 
three different scenarios. . 
Scenario 1 has the farmer selling all non-replacement lambs to the meat industry. 
Assuming they received the premium meat schedule paid in the Hawkes Bay 
region during the 1991 autumn season, the gross margin per livestock unit in this 
case was calculated to equal $26.50. 
Scenario 2 has the fanner supplying all non-replacement lambs to the Haj trade, 
(receiving approximately $30 per lamb at feedlot). A gross margin of $28.02 per 
livestock unit was calculat'1d. 
Scenario 3 has the fanner wintering over lambs to reach the two-tooth age and 
then supplying the live sheep trade (receiving approximately $32 per head at 
feedlot). In this case, a gross margin of $23.42 per livestock unit was calculated. 
Conclusions from this analysis are that the farmer supplying lambs to the Haj 
trade can expect to receive an improved gross margin per animal in comparison 
to supplying the meat indusrry. However, these gross margins must also be 
balanced against the risk factors that exist in trying to make farm management 
decisions to supply this trade. This year, in particular, there has been 
considerable uncenainty in the trade as it resumed only shonJy before Haj 
shipments had to be in transit Furthennore, the restricted nature of the trade has 
accentuated' these uncenainties. Consequently, it could be argued that the 
difference between these gross margins of approximately $1.52 per head are the 
minimum required to entice the farmer into the trade. 
Of significance is the fmding that the gross margins to the farmer of wintering 
over stock to supply the Middle East consumption market are lower than those 
that can be earned from supplying the same stock as lambs to the meat industry 
earlier in the year. This indicates that premiums over the meat schedule price 
closer to $10 would be needed for there to be any fmancial incentive for the 
farmer to supply the live sheep trade later in the year. 
(b) Indirect Benefits - The Competitive Effect on the Meat Schedule 
A clear cause and effect relationship between the live sheep prices and the meat 
schedule is difficult to substantiate. Nevertheless, an analysis of prices in section 
3 indicates, that despite the relatively low numbers involved in comparison to the 
meat indusrry, the live sheep trade can be seen to have a competitive effect on 
meat schedule prices when these prices are depressed. This is an indirect benefit 
to all sheep farmers. These benefits are likely to be more significant than actual 
differences in the per head price received at live expon when considering farmers 
as a whole. . 
Cost/Benefit to the New Zealand Economy 
While it may be concluded that the New Zealand sheep farmer benefits from the live 
sheep trade, it is not clear that the trade operates in the wider interest of the New 
Zealand economy. There are several factors which should be taken into consideration 
in trying to address this question. One i~ actual expon earnings. This is perhaps the 
most obvious indicator of the trade's value to the New Zealand economy. However, 
we must also consider the opportunity cost of this trade, namely, the loss of potential 
value added expon earnings. In addition to these considerations, the impact of the 
international animal welfare lobby's opposition to the live sheep trade on New 
Zealand's broader trade interests, also needs to be taken into consideration. 
(a) Expon Earnings 
The live sheep trade earned New Zealand approximately $69 million fob in 1990. 
In the six months to July in 1991, the trade is estimated to have earned $23 
million in fob returns. The live sheep trade is therefore a small earner of expon 
dollars. In 1990 it brought in approximately 0.08% percent of New Zealand's 
agricultural based expon earnings. Other questions need to be examined. Could 
New Zealand expon earnings be increased by ceasing the live sheep trade and 
encouraging these 1.5 million sheep to be exponed as frozen or chilled 
sheepmeat products? Is there potential to improve the return to New Zealand 
from the live sheep trade itself? 
(b) The Value Added Argument 
The value added component in the live sheep trade is small. A comparison of the 
value added per head of sheep in the live sheep trade and the Meat Processing 
Industry in 1991 is shown in table 3. The value added component for the live 
sheep trade is calculated to equal $7.69 per sheep, while the value added 
component for sheepmeat expons is calculated to be $17.03 per sheep. While 
there is a significantly higher value added in the domestic meat industry, this is 
not a justifiable reason to halt the live sheep trade. 
Table 3: Comparison of Internal Value Added per head of Sheep: Meat 
Processing Vis a Vis Live Expons 
Activities Meat Expons Live Sheep Exports 
I Transport 
- to Works 1.34 
-
Railage 0.56 
- Stock to feedlots & to Wharf 2.325 
- Fodder to feedlots 
- Wharfage & Waterside labour 1.070 
3.395 
n Processing 
-
Killing & freezing 10.05 
-
Meat inspection 0.80 
-
Storage 1.30 
12.15 
ill Feedlot Operation 
- Fodder (Lucerne & Straw) 1.445 
-
Pellets (10% Domestic Production) 0.750 
2.195 
N Other Activities 
-
Administration 0.42 
- ME &FFLevy 0.56 
- B&A 0.50 
- Insurance 0.07 
- Interest 1.01 
- Polybag 0.62 
3.18 
- Commision to Stock & 
Station Agents 1.50 
- MAF Services 0.30 
- Other Services 0.30 
2.10 
Total $17.03 $7.69 
Sources: Policy Services MAF Policy, NZ Livestock Exporters Association 
Firstly, as discussed in section 2 there is little substitutability between live sheep 
meat and frozen sheep meat. Therefore, the cessation of New Zealand exports 
of approximately one million live sheep would not necessarily equate to an 
improved market opportunity for New Zealand's frozen products. Related to this 
is the important reality that value-added production can only boost New Zealand 
export returns when there is a market for that product. If not, it is effectively 
adding "cost" to production. Therefore, while the authors of this paper would not 
hesitate in preferring to see New Zealand's sheep flock being devoted towards 
the production of high quality, high value-added sheepmeat products, it is a case 
of exporting a product for which there is a real and existing market demand. 
This is currently the case with the live sheep trade. If it were to be ceased, New 
Zealand would lose a substantial amount of export revenue. 
(c) Improving the Returns from the Live Sheep Trade 
An analysis of the profit margins involved in the Haj live sheep trade is 
presented in table 4. 
Table 4: 1991 Marketing Margins for the Haj Trade (NZ$ per head) 
Item Comments 
(a) Price to the fanner $30 A minimum 32kg live weight lamb has received 
(delivered at feedlots approximately $30/head, excluding rerum from 
wool clip. or stockyards) 
(b) Domestic Marketing 
Costs $7 Based on exporter estimates. 
(c) Cost to the Exporter $37 Derived as (a+b). 
(d) Price to Exponer $40 Based on FOB export values. 
(e) International freight $45 Based on exporter information. 
cost (including feed) 
(f) Mortality Rate (1-2%) 
Mortality Equivalent Cost $1 Derived as (d+c)xf divided by 100. 
(g) Cost to Importer $88 Derived as (d+e+f). 
(h) Price to Importer $138 NZ price charged by the Islamic Development 
Bank, (NZ$J53) less 10% for transportation costs 
and other marketing costs. 
(i) Exporter Margins $3 Derived as (d-c). 
U) Importer Margins $50 Derived as (h-g). 
Table 5: Regional Disa-ibution of Sheep Sourced for Live Exports and 
Domestic Slaughter 
(A) Expons Sourced 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 19911 
(Pan Year) 
No. of sheep sourced/(No. of shipments) 
Region 
NOM Island 124,547 263.722 458.826 519.324 621,295 459.779 
(Napierffauranga) (1~) (3) (6) (7!.i) (7~) (4) 
II Soulb Island 257,144 306.714 203.775 241.844 827.186 197.054 
(Tlffiaru) (4~) (3) (3) (3!.i) (I~) (2) 
------ ----------
TOTAL 381.691 570.436 662.601 761.16!l.448,481 656.833 
(6) (6) (9) (11) (18) (6) 
(B) Slaughter 
(Lambs & adult sheep) 
September Years 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989190 1990m 2 
(Million Head) 
Region 
NOM Island 19.60 18.76 16.15 17.69 12.97 11.57 
II Soulb Island 21.78 22.17 22.19 22.36 19.83 18.78 
TOTAL 41.38 40.93 38.34 40.05 32.80 30.35 
Expons up 10 Ibe middle of August 1991 
For Ihree quarters only 
Sources: MAF Live Sheep Expon Records. Policy Services MAF Policy 
In the longer term, the live sheep trade may have beneficial effects for the meat 
industry. The under-utilisation of meat processing plants. both in the North and 
South Islands, discussed before in this section, is partly ata-ibutable to the peak 
processing capacity to which the meat industry has geared to over the years. 
This peak slaughter capacity requirement in March-April can be reduced 
considerably, if the live trade is able to divert some of the domestic kill to the 
Haj or non-Haj consumption market in the Middle East or elsewhere. Inadequate 
utilisation of slaughtering capacity has contributed to high processing COStS 
within New Zealand and adversely affected the competitiveness of New Zealand 
meat companies on world markets. 
Another important factor is that the live sheep trade is likely to help maintain 
farmer incomes, in times of depressed schedule prices (this is discussed in the 
following section). Subsequently, the farmer will be more likely to maintain 
sheep numbers which is beneficial to the meat industry in the longer term. This 
is an impact which has also been experienced in Australia (BAE, 1983). 
Price Relationships Between the Sheepmeat Industry and the Live Sheep Trade 
The all grades weighted average lamb schedule price in the 1989/90 season was 
$31.08lhead, an increase of 57 percent on the previous season. Lamb schedule 
prices in 1990/91 are projected to decline to around $28.00lhead on average, 
including an average $5lhead premium payment, owing to lower meat and pelt 
and wool prices. Farmers in New Zealand, and especially those in the South 
Island, are benefiting from high premiums being paid for lamb as a result of 
intense competition between South Island meat works for slaughter stock. A 
return to more normal procurement strategies in the 1991/92 season is likely to 
result in a decline in lamb returns to around $23.00lhead (excluding any 
premiums) for an all grades average lamb. 
Mutton prices in 1990/91 and 1991/92 are forecast at around $13.80/hd and 
$12.50/hd respectively. This represents an annual average fall of around 15 
percent compared to the 1989/90 price level, for an all grades average sheep. 
Premiums on top of actual market returns, (as has been the case for lamb). have 
also been paid to farmers for munon in the 1990/91 season. The all grades 
average mutton return of around $14.00/hd, currently being paid, is estimated to 
include a premium of $3 to $4 per head. 
Weighted average sheepmeat schedule prices for the 1988/89 and 1989/90 
(September) seasons and prices up to the June quarter of the 1990/91 season are 
provided in table 6 and are compared with the live sheep prices for the 
corresponding period. The prices at the national level for lambs, hoggets and 
mutton, both on a net carcass basis and total value basis (including payments for 
pelts and wool) are reported. For all three classes of sheepmeats, pelts and wool 
payments made up at least 30 percent (lamb) and over 60 percent (mutton) of the 
total price in the 1988/89 and 1989/90 seasons. These payments have declined 
considerably in 1990/91, thus making the total price less than in 1989/90, even 
though the net carcass prices including the meat company premiums are 
somewhat better. 
More importantly, the regional weighted schedule prices are also included in 
table 6 for the Hawkes Bay and Canterbury regions. Live sheep exported from 
the North and South Islands are sourced mainly from these regions respectively, 
and are shipped from the ports of Napier and Timaru. During the 1989/90 
season. average schedule prices for lambs and mutton were higher in the Hawkes 
Bay region (NI) than in the Canterbury region (SI) by about $2-4, while this 
season (1990/91) the price fortunes favoured the South Island by about $2-6 over 
the North Island. 
The corresponding prices for live sheep in the Hawkes Bay and (South) 
Canterbury regions are also furnished in table 6 for comparison. The weighted 
average schedule price for lambs in the Hawkes Bay region (including wool and 
pelt payments) during the 1989-90 season was about $33.50, while the prices 
offered to the farmers for long tail ram lambs (33kg live weight) in May - June 
1990 was in the range of $33-42. The prices paid for hoggets and two-tooth 
wethers and rams in the Hawkes Bay region by the live rrade, were respectively 
in the $33-37 and $27-35 range. Corresponding price comparison in the 
The mortality rates for each shipment can be broken down into three phases: 
feedlot and loading; the voyage; and unloading. Seventy seven percent of the 
deaths occur during the voyage. The main causes of death are heat stress, 
inanition (failure to eat) and pneumonia 
Australia has experienced very similar mortality rates and very similar causes of 
mortality. Consequently, considerable research has been undertaken on both 
sides of the Tasman on how to reduce these mortality rates. In particular, 
knowledge of the most suitable types of feed to be used during the trip and the 
most adequate conditions for the sheep on board the vessel is now considerably 
advanced on what it Was five years ago. 
Legal requirements to safeguard the welfare of the sheep are also being 
strengthened. A new Code of Welfare has been drawn up by the Live Sheep 
Export Welfare Committee. This code specifies minimum standards affecting 
the welfare of the sheep and has the stated objective of bringing shipment 
mortality rates down to below one percent (the average mortality of the first five 
shipments in 1991 was 1.5%). 
The Potential Impact of the Animal Welfare Lobby 
The World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA) and the Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) have continually stated their 
position that they believe the slaughter of animals should occur as near as 
possible to the point of production. When the trade was re-established in 1985 
there Was vigorous opposition from these animal welfare organisations. 
The WSPA called for a boycott of New Zealand lamb sold in Europe and 
Australia. This opposition intensified greatly with the problems experienced with 
one particular shipment in mid 1990 when 9832 (12.1%) sheep died during the 
voyage. New Zealand's Embassies, in Europe in particular, were inundated with 
letters from consumers saying they would no longer buy New Zealand products 
because of their disapproval of the trade. More recently the SPCA declared at 
their conference at Oxford, England, in June, that they would soon initiate a 
renewed campaign against the purchases of New Zealand products in protest at 
the trade. 
While it is difficult to quantify what the negative value of an adverse consumer 
reaction might amount to, it is fair to assume that a well co-ordinated campaign 
against New Zealand products at the reraillevel could be of considerable damage 
to our broader trade interests. 
The position of the New Zealand Government has been that the live sheep trade 
is an essential trade outlet for New Zealand farmers because of the restricted 
access for our other sheepmeat products in European and other world markets. 
In the longer term, it seems preferable to export high value sheepmeat cuts into 
Europe, rather than live sheep into Saudi Arabia. However, until such market 
opportunities exist, the live sheep trade will continue to be an attractive outlet 
for New Zealand farmers and exporters. 
The opposition of welfare groups will remain, even if mortality rates of below 
one percent are obtained. The extent to which a much broader public reaction 
would be initiated against the trade is dependent upon the trade's welfare record 
and the public's perception. The New Zealand Government, and the industry 
itself, must continue to improve this perception. At the same time, the risks the 
trade presents to New Zealand's broader trade interests will need to be 
continually reviewed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Market Prospects 
The market prospects for the New Zealand live sheep trade are mixed. The fact that 
New Zealand now exports all of its live sheep exports to the Saudi Arabian market, 
means the volatile nature of this market often over-rides the real market opportunities 
that exist. The live sheep trade with Saudi Arabia is likely to remain somewhat 
precarious in the near future. If further shipments of New Zealand sheep are rejected 
by Saudi Arabia, the trade is not likely to continue. This uncertainty surrounding the 
trade will continue to make it difficult for farmers and exporters to plan for a 
medium to long term involvement with any real confidence. 
The underlying market forces for the live sheep trade are positive. The need for 
imported sheep for the Haj festival cannot be met by domestic supply alone, and will 
not be allowed to go unfulfilled. Therefore, the Haj market will remain an important 
niche market for New Zealand suppliers. However, in order to supply this market, 
farmers will have to alter their production patterns as the date of the Haj moves 
forward each year. If this is to occur, the farmer is going to want to be assured of 
some stability in the market. 
The Middle East consumption market for live sheep will increase in importance as 
population growth in the region continues to outstrip domestic food production 
capacity. Consideration needs to be given by New Zealand exporters to the 
possibility of diversifying their market destinations within the Middle East. A 
dependence on the Saudi market is a high risk strategy. Serious consideration should 
also be given to the development in New Zealand of fat-tailed sheep breeds for 
export to the Middle East. There has already been some activity in this area by some 
New Zealand interests. 
The prospects for supplying live sheep to other markets can be considered as weak 
at this stage. The North American market in particular is not likely to re-emerge as 
a significant market. The North African market may offer some possibilities but 
these are very uncertain at present. 
Returns to the Farmer 
The live sheep trade does provide important benefits to the New Zealand sheep 
farmer, not through substantial real profit margins, but by providing farmers with an 
alternative market outlet which provides some competitive pressure on the prices 
offered by the meat industry. 
SriRamaramarn, S. "Prospects for New Zealand Live Sheep Exports and Returns to 
Fanners", Policy Services Discussion Paper 1/89. Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, January 1989, Wellington. 
USDA, Economic Research Service (1991), Livestock and Poultry - Situation and Outlook, 
May 1991. 
World Society for the Protection of Animals (1991), Personal Communication. 
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ABSTRACT 
Recent legislative changes in New Zealand will allow much greater flexibility 
in the procedures currently used by regional authorities to allocate water 
resources. In river catchments such as the Ashburton, where competition for 
water in alternative uses is high, estimates of the economic value of water 
could prove useful in designing a allocation scheme. 
In this paper, we use a mathematical programming approach to estimate that the 
value of water to farmers in the Ashburton catchment is about $15 million. 
Using a contingent valuation approach, we then estimate that the value of in-
stream flows of the Ashburton to residents of the Canterbury region is about 
$9 million. We assess these results for implications in allocating Ashburton 
water between irrigators and in-stream flows. 
I . INTRODUCTION 
Historically, water in New Zealand has been allocated by appropriation for 
beneficial uses. These include primary and secondary industry, local 
authority public water supplies, fisheries, wildlife habitat, and recreational 
use. Responsibility for water allocation has resided with local catchment 
boards, who received authority from central government. 
In a 1990 reorganisation and decentralisation of government functions, 
catchment boards (along with a myriad of other local specialty boards) were 
consolidated into 14 regional authorities. These authorities allocated water 
under the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act and associated amendments. 
This enabled the authorities to set minimum stream flows, establish priorities 
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for utilisation of water, to specify the allocation between in-stream and out-
of-stream uses, to manage applications for ·abstractive water rights and 
discharges into water, and to monitor and enforce abstractions and discharges. 
The Resource Management Act 1991 replaced the 1967 legislation. The 1991 Act 
specifically encourages the use of economic instruments to manage the use and 
quality of natural resources, including water, and provides regional 
authorities with broader powers than previously existed. In particular, the 
Act replaces the concept of "water right" with "water permit" and promotes an 
integrated consent procedure for obtaining water permits. The Act places 
fixed time limits on water permits and allows transfers of permits to occur, 
if authorised by a regional management plan (Resource Management Act, 1991; 
Miller, 1990). 
The Canterbury Regional Council seeks to complete a water management plan for 
the Ashburton River by 1992. Traditionally, the river has been the primary 
source of stockwater and irrigation water for farms in the catchment and much 
of the river has been committed to these uses. But the river also supports 
anadramous and freshwater fisheries, wildlife habitat, and recreation. 
Because of the conflicting interests between continued water abstraction and 
in-stream uses, the management plan must address the balance between 
consumption and nonconsumption of flows in the Ashburton. 
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the water situation in the 
Ashburton catchment and identify issues for economic analysis that can 
contribute to the management plan. In the third section, we report on a 
mathematical programming approach that we used to estimate the economic value 
of water to farmers in the Ashburton. The fourth section reports on a 
contingent valuation approach that we used to estimate the economic value of 
in-stream flows of the Ashburton to residents of the Canterbury region. 
Finally, we discuss our results and raise issues related to allocating 
Ashburton water. 
II. WATER AND THE ASHBURTON RIVER CATCHMENT 
The Ashburton River flows from its origins in the Winterslaw and Moorhouse 
ranges in two branches that meet a short distance above the town of Ashburton. 
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The South Branch of the river is the main branch. It flows through two gorges 
before emerging onto the Canterbury plains. Here, the width of the river bed 
increases and the river wanders over a stony shingle bed enroute to the sea. 
For most of the distance across the Canterbury plains, the river flows in a 
braided channel. Figure 1 shows the location of the Ashburton. 
High stream flows, caused by melt of the winter snow pack, occur from 
September through December. Low stream flows occur from mid-February to mid-
April. At a point about midway between the river source and mouth, high 
stream flows run about 18 cubic metres per second and low stream flows run 
about 6 cubic metres per second. At the town of Ashburton, near the mouth of 
the river, high stream flows run about 40 cubic metres per second and low 
stream flows run about 10 cubic metres per second (Scarf, 1983). 
Water of the Ashburton River is used for municipal supplies and effluent 
disposal, stockwater and irrigation, wildlife and fisheries, and recreation. 
Municipal water supplies (primarily for the towns of Ashburton - population 
about 17,000 - and Methven - population about 1500) use about .3 cubic metres 
per second of river water. Authorised stockwater withdrawals account for 
nearly 10 cubic metres per second of flow, but actual withdrawals account for 
about 4 cubic metres per second of water. Authorised irrigation withdrawals 
total about 9.5 cubic metres per second. About 7 cubic metres per second of 
this amount could be flows diverted from the South Ashburton into the 
Rangitata Diversion Race syphon, which serves irrigators in both the Ashburton 
and Rakaia River catchments. The actual abstraction for irrigation is about 
3-4 cubic metres per second. During the summer, when the stream flows are 
insufficient to sustain that level of abstraction, the intake into the 
Rangltata Diversion Race is restricted to allow 1 to 2 cubic metres per second 
of flow to remain in the river (Scarf, 1983). Irrigation development from the 
Ashburton occurred rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s such that the water 
resources of the Ashburton have been severely taxed. 
The Ashburton River has historically been an important recreational fishery, 
supporting primarily salmon, trout, whitebait, and flounder. Although the 
river attracts both local and nonlocal anglers, the fish resource has declined 
in the last ten years (Hughey, 1991). To flourish, migratory fish such as 
salmon require a continuous surface flow from headwaters to the mouth. This 
has been a problem in the Ashburton for two reasons: extended periods of 
artificially-induced low stream flows and periodic closure 'of the river mouth, 
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Figure 1. The Ashburton River Catchment 
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particularly during the summer months. This occurs when tide and wave action 
move beach sediments into the mouth and when the river stream flows are 
insufficient to scour out this beach material. 
An extensive wetland wildlife habitat is supported by the Ashburton, which 
provides for a large number of bird species, one of which - the black billed 
gull - is considered endangered. Habitat ranges from the headwater lakes and 
their surrounding wetlands to sections of braided river channel with large 
quantities of clean shingle and shingle islands. Recreation activities in 
addition to fishing include boating, swimming, bird-watching, and picnicking. 
Issues for Economic Analysis 
For water allocation, the Canterbury Regional Council can base a management 
plan for the Ashburton River on the economic efficiency of the competing water 
uses, equity and distribution considerations, or pure ecological factors. In 
the past, allocation of the Ashburton has drawn on the latter two of these 
paradigms and the management plan has been based around specified minimum 
stream flows and development of ;egulations for sharing flows above the 
minimum. This has led to regulations that address technical issues of how and 
why water can be abstracted. 
In the current climate that promotes economic efficiency in resource 
management, the Canterbury Regional Council may seek to place more emphasis on 
that criterion in the latest management plan. In that event, the Council will 
need two important pieces of information: the value of water to abstractive 
users (agriculture) and the value of in-stream river flows to regional 
residents. Once these values have been estimated, the Council could consider 
designing an allocation scheme that attempts, in part, to maximise the value 
of the river to regional residents. 
The value of Ashburton River water to agriculture can be estimated by 
considering the changes in farm activities with and without the river water. 
Farmers may alter cropping patterns, livestock activities, or change the mix 
of inputs used, such as labour or irrigation systems. The difference in the 
returns to land, machinery, management, and other fixed investment costs with 
and without river water is the value of that water to agriculture. 
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The value of in-stream flows of the Ashburton River to regional residents can 
be estimated through a nonmarket valuation approach. Although a contingent 
valuation approach is appropriate to estimate the total value of in-stream 
flows, the value of certain uses, such as fishing, might be estimated with a 
travel cost approach. 
Besides allocation of existing water in the Ashburton, the Regional Council 
may choose to decide if development projects to smooth the stream flows 
throughout the year are warranted. One option for development includes 
damming the river near its source in the high country and using the impounded 
water to regulate stream flows. The Council may also choose to decide whether 
technical improvements for abstractive users, which would decrease the amount 
of abstraction required, are warranted. In both of these cases, analysis of 
the economic efficiency of these options would be useful to the Council; such 
an analysis would rely on estimates of the economic value of water for 
agriculture or in-stream flows. 
III. ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF THE RIVER TO AGRICULTURE 
Of the nearly 550,000 hectares in the Ashburton River catchment, nearly half 
is mountains and upland valleys. About half of that is unfarmable. Of the 
280,000 hectares of plains, about 200,000 hectares are shallow soils with low 
holding capacity for water and low natural fertility; 50,000 hectares are 
free-draining cropping sOi:s along the river banks, and the remaining 30,000 
hectares are deep cropping soils with drainage problems. Annual rainfall in 
the region ranges from about 600 millimetres per year at the coast to about 
1000 millimetres per year at the foothills. On average soil moisture deficits 
can be expected to occur for at least 40 days per year (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, 1984). 
Three major irrigation schemes exist in the catchment, with about 55,000 
hectares under irrigation. Technically, as much as another 120,000 hectares 
could be irrigated, but only about 20,000 hectares in close proximity to the 
river has bee~ identified as a high priority, if water becomes available. 
Irrigation systems include border-dyke and spray. 
In 1989, the Ashburton catchment housed about 1650 farms. The farming systems 
employed on these farms vary from predominantly sheep enterprises to all crop 
6 
systems, where the entire farm is harvested every year. Crops grown include 
wheat, barley, peas, oats, grass seed, white clover, linseed, and rapeseed. 
Fertiliser requirements are not high and crop yields with supplemental 
irrigation water average only roughly 30 percent higher than yields without 
water (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1989). 
To estimate the value of water to a farmer in the Ashburton River catchment we 
first specified three representative farms which adequately represent the 
agricultural use of water in the catchment. The primary representative farm 
is a mixed cropping farm of 200 hectares, with 25 - 30 percent of land devoted 
to crop production. The major representative crops include spring sown 
cereals or peas and the stocking rate is 16 units per hectare of pasture, with 
25 percent cattle and 75 percent sheep. Other representative farms include a 
sheep and beef farm with no crops and an intensi)e cropping farm with a wide 
range of crops, such as cereals, peas, and small seeds. 
We obtained variable costs for farm activities using 1989 data (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, 1989) and by conducting a survey of a small sample 
of farmers in the catchment. For product prices, we used an average of the 
reported prices of the past five years (Burtt and Fleming, 1990). We 
estimated production functions for consumptive water use and yield using 
agricultural engineering data (Heiler, 1982). Table 1 shows the prices, 
variable costs, yields, and consumptive water requirements for each crop and 
livestock activity. 
Second, we modeled the expected response of farmers to changing water supplies 
by using mathematical programming. This has been a common approach to water 
valuation in the U.S. and Australia (for example, see Bernardo, Whittlesey, 
Saxton, and Bassett, 1988; Hamilton, Whittlesey, and Halverson, 1989; Hall, 
Mallawaarachi, and Batterham, 1991; Jones, 1991). 
For each representative farm, we developed a model to evaluate the 
profitability of several short-run management alternatives available to 
irrigators responding to water supply limits. Each model maximises net 
returns for a one year period and thus provides an estimate of the short-run 
returns to land, capital, and management. Constraints are the technical, 
economic, and resource constraints imposed by the production setting. 
Supplemental irrigation, crop substitution, reallocation of water among crops, 
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Item Units 
Crop 
Price $/t 
Yield tjha 
NIRb rom 
Variable 
Costs $jha 
Table 1. Production Data for the Representative 
Winter Spring 
Wheat Wheat 
235 261 
5.5 5 
225 300 
762 723 
Mixed Cropping Farm 
Field 
Barley Peas 
183 327 
5 3.2 
225 225 
565 643 
Ryegrass 
Seed 
1125 
1.2 
200 
686 
Pasture & 
Sheep/Beef 
4l/139c 
12a 
377 
43/4/8ld 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a yield ~ 16 stock units per hectare of pasture 
b NIR - net irrigation requirement - crop consumptive use - precipitation 
c sheep and beef price is per stock unit 
d $43 per hectare for pasture/$4 per stock unit for sheep/$8l per stock unit 
for cattle 
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idling land, and the use of alternative irrigation labour practices are 
available to the irrigator responding to water supply reductions. 
By parametrically varying the supply of water available to the farmer, changes 
in the level of production activities and net margins are obtained. Table 2 
shows the results for the representative mixed cropping farm. As water 
availability begins to decrease, the model suggests that the farmer initially 
shifts to dryland pasture and sheep production. As water becomes increaSingly 
scarce, the model shows that the farmer reduces crop irrigation and selects 
those activities with the highest marginal value product of water use. 
We note that the water contraint in the models represents the net irrigation 
requirem~nt (that is, the net consumption required for irrigation) and not the 
amount of water delivered to the farm. This accounts for the fact that a 
certain percentage of water applied (that which is not consumed by the crops 
or evaporated) will return to the river. 
The parametric variation also produces a derived demand curve for water. This 
relates the shadow price of water (which is the average opportunity cost of 
water across all farm activities) to the quantity of water available. As with 
all demand curves, this indicates the farmer's willingness-to-pay for water. 
Third, we estimated an aggregate demand curve for irrigation water in the 
Ashburton catchment. To do this we determined the amount of hectares in the 
catchment accounted for by each representative farm. Then we weighted the 
individual demand curves for each of the representative farms by the 
associated percentage of total agricultural hectares in the catchment. 
Finally, we summed the weighted individual demand curves to obtain the 
aggregate demand curve. Figure 2 shows the aggregate demand curve. 
By integrating the area under the demand curve, we estimate the irrigators' 
total consumer surplus for Ashburton water to be about $15 million. The 
consumer surplus for the amount of water that would increase stream flows in 
the Ashburton by about 1.8 cubic metres per second - a 50 percent increase 
from the approximate low flow - is about $1.8 million. We note that because 
our models are annual, with no provision for estimating the seasonal variation 
in water value, our estimates of consumer surplus can be considered a lower 
bound. 
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Table 2. Changes in Net Returns and PL'odlictlon Activities for the 
Hepr(,RC'IIl:ntl.vn 111.xed C,:oppLlIg Fun" 
Percentage H.eulIct:i.ult in I\pplicu Water: Farm Response 
Item Unit 0 20 40 60 00 100 
Farm Il)~ mixed 
Net Returns $ 112,600 104,410 95,372 86,335 77,033 62,515 
Farm NIR mm 71,550 57,240 42,930 28,620 14,310 0 
Shadow Value - NIR $ 0.00 0.63 0.63 0.63 1. 01 1. 37 
Farm Water Use mm 113,5'11 90,057 6U,143 45,429 22,714 a 
Shadow Value - Water $ 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.64 0.06 
Farm Efficiency t 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 ERR 
Irrigation l~abor Use hr 60 46 36 25 14 a 
Owner Labour hr 1,402 1,266 1,121 975 034 700 
Land Use ha 200 200 200 200 200 200 
W ~Iheil t ha 0 0 0 0 0 0 
.... Water Application % 0 0 0 a 0 0 
0 S Wheat ha 50 50 50 50 48 
~loter: l\pp.liciltlon t 100 ]00 100 100 100 
S rlilrley 118 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Water Application 1; 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peas ha 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Water Application % 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ryegraas ha 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Willer I\pplication t 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paature ha 150 150 150 150 152 200 
Water Application % 100 75 49 24 0 0 
Sheep au 1,630 1,349 1~039 730 454 036 
Beef Sll '160 '160 '160 760 760 760 
Price 
0 0 
l'v 0 ~ f\) u-. u-. .." 0 U1 U1 U1 ,... 
0\ 
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IV. ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF IN-STREAK FLOWS 
As abstractions from the Ashburton increased, in-stream flows have decreased. 
As a consequence, environmental amenities associated with in-stream flows have 
become more scarce. In particular, changes have been observed in fish' 
populations, recreation opportunities, and wetlands (Hughey, 1991). Implicit 
in economic scarcity is the notion that individuals are willing to pay for 
access to or use of a scarce resource based on the value they attribute to the 
resource. In addition, individuals might be willing to pay to provide the 
option for future use of the resource (possibly by future generations) or just 
to keep the resource in existence, regardless of whether the individuals will 
actually use the resource. 
Individuals throughout New Zealand (and possibly even elsewhere) might have a 
positive value for the environmental amenities provided by the in-stream flows 
of the Ashburton. But the values of those who reside in the Canterbury region 
are of the most relevance to the Canterbury Regional Council since, in this 
case, the costs of any decisions on the Ashburton will be borne by those in 
the region. Therefore, we estimated the total economic value (use, option, 
and existence) of the in-stream flows of the Ashburton to residents of the 
Canterbury region. 
To do so, we used a contingent valuation approach. Although we relied on 
hypothetical rather than real market data (we acknowledge that this choice has 
been the source of some skepticism - see for example, Freeman, 1979), the 
hypothetical nature of the method made quantifying the benefits of an 
alternative in-stream flow level feasible. 
We sought to establish the respondents' tradeoffs between having a given 
amount of income or a 50 percent increase in the minimum in-stream flow. That 
is, our method paired alternative income levels with an increased in-stream 
flow such that the respondent is left with the same amount of utility. 
Since its introduction by Davis in 1963, a substantial amount of both applied 
and theoretical research has developed and refined the method (for example, 
see Mitchell and Carson, 1989 or Cummings, Brookshire, and Schultz, 1986). 
The most popular approaches to the method are those based upon respondent 
bidding. In these approaches, individuals are asked to state the maximum 
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amount he or she is willing to pay for the resource. The question can be 
asked open-ended or by an iterative bidding process. Open-ended question and 
iterative bidding approaches have been reported in many studies, including 
Brookshire, Randall, and Stoll, 1980; Randall, Ives, and Eastman, 1974; and 
Walsh, Loomis, and Gilman, 1984. 
Bishop and Heberlein (1979) originally suggested that the open-ended approach 
does not reflect very accurately the way individuals make choices in markets. 
In a market, the price is stated and the person must indicate whether they 
would buy at that price or not. The iterative bidding process is closer to a 
market type of choice. But this procedure may find people allowing themselves 
to be bid up beyond their true willingness-to-pay. In addition, the starting 
point for the bidding game may introduce a bias into the .responses. 
An alternative elicitation method to either an open-ended question or an 
iterative bidding process is the dichotomous choice or take-it-or-leave-it 
approach. A large number of predetermined prices are chosen to bracket the 
expected willingness-to-pay amounts of most respondents. Each respondent is 
quoted one of the prices and asked if he or she would pay that amount, all-or-
nothing, for the resource. Prices are randomly assigned to respondents so 
that each price has an equivalent subsample. Pioneered by Bishop and 
Heberlein (1979), other recent research on the dichotomous choice approach has 
been reported by Hanemann, 1984; Sellar, Chavas, and Stoll, 1986; Loomis, 
1988; Cameron, 1988; Greer and Sheppard, 1990 and Loomis, 1990. 
We used both an iterative bidding and dichotomous choice method of 
elicitation. We used a bracketed iterative bidding procedure, which was 
designed to minimise both starting point and upward bidding bias. In this 
case, a respondent was given either a very low or high initial price; the next 
price given was at the opposite end of the price range as the first, such that 
a high-low bracket was established. Subsequent bidding narrowed the high-low 
range until the respondent settled on a final price. 
We drew a sample of approximately 1000 households drawn randomly from 
telephone books for the Canterbury region and split the sample such that 350 
respondents were questioned with iterative bidding and the remainder 
questioned with the dichotomous choice. In addition, the sample was split by 
geographic location, with 650 respondents chosen from the Ashburton district 
and the remainder coming from elsewhere in the Canterbury region. 
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Ye conducted the survey via phone during June, using phone interviewers 
provided by Information Insight, Ltd. Although this approach precluded using 
pictures or other visual aids to describe alternative in-stream flows, it did 
allow a relatively qUick collection of data and allowed us to use a bidding 
game approach. In addition to the willingness-to-pay questions, we collected 
information on household use of the river, reasons for valuing the river, and 
demographic data of each household. A sample copy of the survey is available 
from the authors on request. 
Of the respondents in the Ashburton district, about 48 percent use the· 
Ashburton River. Picnicking and swimming are the predominant activities, with 
73 percent of river users partaking in these activities. About 33 percent of 
river users are salmon anglers. Other major activities include shooting, 
fishing other than for salmon, and bike riding. Of the respondents outside 
the Ashburton district, only about 8 percent use the river. 
Of the respondents in the Ashburton district who do not use the river, about 
20 percent indicated that they would use the river if stream flows increased 
by 50 percent. Of the respondents outside the Ashburton district who do not 
use the river, about 13 percent indicated that they would use the river if 
stream flows increased. Basically, those activities directly involved with 
water (for example, salmon fishing) show a marked expected increase in usage 
if the stream flows increase. Activities not directly related to water (for 
eaxample, shooting or bike riding) showed a minimal expected increase in 
usage. 
In analysing the responses from the dichotomous choice elicitation, the exact 
magnitude of the respondent's valuation is unknown; all that we know is 
whether that magnitude is greater or less than the price we offered. To 
estimate an equation that infers willingness-to-pay requires a function that 
translates the yes or no responses into a range of probabilities that vary 
with the offered prices. We chose the logit model: it is consistent with 
uti~ity theory (Hanemann, 1984) and it been recently used with success in 
other applications (for example, Sellar, Chavas, and Stoll, 1986; Cameron, 
1988; and Greer and Sheppard, 1990). 
Ye specified two logit models: one for respondents in the Ashburton district 
and one for respondents outside the district. We tested a variety of 
independent variables in each model: bid price, household income, an overall 
river use variable, a fishing variable, occupation. Ye estimated the models 
using the SAS programming package. For the Ashburton district, the best 
estimated model is: 
L prob yes \ 
log~ - prob yes) 
Pearson's Chi square - .72 
.2974 + .7381F - .00575P 
(1.31) (2.89) (5.68) 
where t values are given in parenthesis . 
F indicates whether the respondent fishes in the river 
P is the price offered 
For the respondents outside the Ashburton district, the best estimated model 
is: 
{ prob yes \ 
log\l - prob yes} 
Pearson's Chi square - .77 
.4371 
(1. 39) 
- .00867P 
(4.04) 
Since the yes and no responses to the valuation question are mutually 
exclusive events, the probability of a yes is equal to [1 - prob no] and prob 
no is a cumulative distribution. 
We calculated the expected value of willingness to pay by integrating the 
cumulative distribution function identified by each logit equation. 
Mathematically, 
lITP - fa [ 1 - l!e(Z)] dP 
where Z represents a function of the independent variables, including the 
initial price offer 
For the Ashburton model, the mean willingness-to-pay is about $118 per 
household per year. For the outside Ashburton model, the mean willingness-to-
pay is about $57 per household per year. The difference in means is accounted 
for by location, by fishing activity, and overall utility derived from the 
Ashburton River. 
In analysing the responses from the iterative bidding elicitation, we estimate 
the mean willingness-to-pay for households in the Ashburton district at about 
$84 per household per year. For those households outside the Ashburton 
district, we estimate the mean willingness-to-pay at about $63 per household 
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per year. To accounC for outlier observations, we trimmed the top and bottom 
10 percent of bid responses, as suggested by Mitchell and Carson (1990). We 
estimate the adjusted means to be about $65 per household per year in the 
Ashburton district and $47 per household per year outside the district. 
To estimate the aggregate willingness-to-pay for an increase in Ashburton 
stream flows, we multiplied the mean household willingness-to-pay times the 
number of households in and out of the Ashburton district. Under the 
dichotomous choice method, we estimate the aggregate willingness-to-pay for 
the Canterbury region at about $9 million per year. Under the iterative 
bidding approach, we estimate the aggregate willingness-to-pay at about $9.6 
million per year using the untrimmed means and about $7.2 million using the 
trimmed means. 
V. ECONOMIC VALUES AND AlLOCATING THE ASHBURTON'S WATER 
The economic values of irrigation and in-stream flows provide one basis for 
designing the management plan for the Ashburton. Since the value of water is 
significant for irrigation and in-stream flows, it might appear feasible to 
allocate Ashburton water by establishing a market mechanism, such as a system 
of tradeable permits between irrigators and those concerned with in-stream 
flows. However, the success of such an allocation system over time (as 
measured by the match between values and uses of the river) may depend on 
several issues besides the value of water to participants in a market. 
First, the number and type of participants in the market must be such that the 
conditions for competitive markets are met. This will be hard to do in the 
Ashburton catchment. Although there could be as many as a couple hundred 
farmers who would buy or sell water, it is not clear how many participants 
would act on behalf of the in-stream flows. It is also not clear how the in-
stream participants could avoid the problems associated with the public goods 
nature of their values: collecting payments in a manner that would minimise 
free-riders might be a major obstacle. 
Second, property rights will be important for the transition to the market 
mechanism. At one extreme, farmers initially may be granted permits at 
current (full) water allocation; in-stream users would have to purchase 
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permits from the farmers to increase stream flows. At the other extreme, in-
stream users could initially be granted permits for in-stream flow and farmers 
would face an initial reduction in available water. Although the initial 
allocation would likely fall somewhere between these two extremes, equity 
considerations (such as ability to pay) could affect the success of the 
market. 
Third, water hydrology in the catchment could affect the ability of the 
Regional Council to use a market mechanism for· water allocation. Farmers 
currently have the option of using groundwater to replace river water. Under 
a market mechanism for allocation of river water, farmers would seek to 
substitute groundwater for river water if the former is less expensive than 
the latter. If the hydrology between the aquifer and the stream flow is such 
that there is a high degree of interaction between the two (that is, 
groundwater pumping affects stream flows), then the Council may need to either 
include groundwater water supplies in the market or otherwise control access 
to the groundwater. 
Fourth, the Regional Council will have to consider a host of institutional 
issues to successfully design and implement a market to allocate water. For 
example, the current situation in the Ashburton indicates that a permanent 
water market may be appropriate. Yet, the 1991 Act restricts permits to a 
limit of ten years. Under these conditions, an interruptible water market may 
be appropriate. One example of an interruptible market is when the actual 
transfer of water from irrigation to in-stream flows would occur only when 
stream flows fall below a certain threshold. But regular annual payments 
would be made from in-stream users to farmers to compensate them for the 
periodic loss in income when stream flows fall below the threshold and 
irrigation withdrawals are reduced. 
If the above issues could be satisfactorily addressed, the concept of 
implementing a market mechanism to allocate the Ashburton may not be 
unreasonable. Although the Ashburton River is a relatively small catchment, 
the nature of the issues present could make it an ideal test for a market 
mechanism. Knowledge obtained from a water market in the Ashburton could be 
valuable to developing management plans for other, larger catchments in 
Canterbury or catchments in other regionas. 
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At the moment, water is one of the few resources in New Zealand that is 
allocated by nonmarket mechanisms. This special treatment partly reflects its 
perceived role as crucial to economic development, particularly in a semi-arid 
area such as mid Canterbury. Despite that perception, a move towards market 
mechanisms - as encouraged by the 1991 Act - might prove beneficial. Market 
mechanisms could yield more flexible water use, a voluntary process consistent 
with a philosophy of free choice, a way to convert water rights into money, 
and an incentive for efficiency. On the other hand, market mechanisms could 
prove to be costly and cumbersome to successfully operate. 
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FARM MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 
IN THE 1990's 
A.C. Bywater 
Farm Management Department 
Lincoln University 
INTRODUCTION 
Given that many farmers have experienced several years of poor returns due to economic 
conditions, droughts and other follies of government, with the last year being the worst on 
record for sheep and beef farmers, it seems quite legitimate to ask the question "What 
research should Farm Management academics be doing in the 1990's?". It's a question 
that has been posed at other times as well. 
"Every farmer is looking for the most efficient and economical method of crop arrangement, seed 
production, manuring, seeding. pasture utilisation and stock management: and the problem of carrying 
out each operation to the best advantage and of combining the whole intO a system of farm management 
that will be efficient and economical is a real one." 
There is nothing panicularly extraordinary in that quote, except perhaps that it was written 
in 1932 in an article entitled "Improving Farm Returns" published by the Canterbury 
Chamber of Commerce (Anon, 1932)_ It is included here simply to illustrate the fact that 
in many respects, the issues in farm management seem to have changed very little. It is 
also interesting to note the strong perception of the farm as a whole system in the 1930's, 
at least in New Zealand; the same article contains the following: 
"Alter the grass and you may have to alter the sheep and the cropping and the cows and the horses. and 
perhaps the tractor and the labour: in fact, the whole organisation of the farm." 
At the same time however, Farm Management like any other area of academic endeavour 
has evolved through various periods of development of approach and methodology. We 
carry with us pans - hopefully the best pans - of each of those stages in our evolution. 
So as in any attempt to look forward, it is advisable if not essential to look back first; to 
consider where we are and how we have got here before attempting to consider where we 
might be going. 
A large pan of this paper then is concerned with Farm Management research in the past. 
A thorough review of Farm Management research in New Zealand would be an extremely 
interesting though very demanding exercise, particularly given the New Zealand Farm 
Management academics propensity to publish repons rather than journal articles. 
Unfortunately, no one has published such a review. Fortunately however, LR Malcolm 
has undertaken a review of the last 50 years of academic research in Farm Management in 
Australia (Malcolm, 1987; 1988), and given that there are some similarities between Farm 
Management in Australia and New Zealand, this will provide a useful starting point for the 
discussion here. There are also significant differences however, and these will have to be 
accounted for before proceeding to look at the future. 
TIlE SCOPE AND EVOLUTION OF FARM MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 
If we are to talk about the future of academic Farm Management or Farm Management 
research, we fITSt need to be clear what it is we are talking about. That may not be quite 
as easy as it sounds because there is by no means a clear consensus of what the academic 
discipline (or interdiscipline) of Farm Management involves. Second we need to consider 
the methodological developments that have occurred and the way in which research 
approaches have changed in the past and thus may change in the future. Finally we 
should consider the major issues of the day that have influenced either the sorts of 
questions that have been asked (ie the scope of Farm Management) or the way they have 
been answered (ie the methodology). 
Given that we will take an Australian perspective in the first instance, one place to stan 
may be with JL Dillon in his inaugural address· as the first Professor of Farm Management 
in Australia (Dillon, 1965). 
"The management of a farm involves two fimctions. First there is the decision making fimction of 
evaluating and choosing between alternative strategies. Second there is the consequent tradesman-like 
function of applying routine technical skills to the implementation of whatever strategies have been 
chosen. My concern is not with these routine technical skills of farm management. Rather my concern 
is with the strategy-choice function of management." 
The emphasis is clearly on decision making and primarily at a strategic level; an emphasis 
we will need to re-examine later. Both Dillon and Malcolm take a strong production 
economics viewpoint in their discussions; a viewpoint of Farm Management that is 
perhaps more prevalent in Australia than in New Zealand. Nevertheless, let us stan with 
the assumption that Farm Management is primarily concerned with strategy-choice 
decisions on farms and that the approach to considering that issue is primarily a 
production economics one. 
Malcolm (1988) reviewed four major "Farm Management" journals in Australia and has 
outlined a number of stages through which academic Farm Management has evolved in 
terms of the approaches and methodologies employed_ These are summarised in table l. 
Up to the early 1940's the main preoccupation was with the technology of production and 
this period has been characterised by Dillon (1965) as one in which there was an absence 
of any analytical principles or orientation tp farm management problem solving. 
Nevertheless, many of the fundamental techniques of Farm Management, notably farm 
accounting and farm budgeting, were introduced and promoted during this period, even if 
some of them such as the application of marginal concepts were not taken up again until 
much later. 
The second stage defined by Malcolm is the push for farm recording and accounting 
systems and for comparative analysis of farm standards beginning from the early 1940's 
and at regular intervals thereafter. Despite overwhelming evidence from economists that 
cost of production studies and comparative analyses based on average productivity values 
are of no use in economic decision making, farmers and their advisors continued to 
promote them..jn Australia into the 1970's. In New Zealand, they are still used by farm 
discussion groups and -consultants, but perhaps not for the purposes to which the 
economists object so strongly_ 
Table 1. A Summary of the Major Approaches in Fann Management 
Research in Australia 
Period 
1900 - 1940's 
Early 40's on 
Mid 50's·mid 60's 
Late 50's-mid 70's 
Mid 60's-late 70's 
Early 70's on 
Main Emphasis 
Technology of Production: the IlrSt stage of development of Farm 
Management; agricultural science bias but the introduction of farm 
accounting, budgeting, marginal analysis. 
Farm Recording and Accounting Systems: cost of production studies and 
comparative analysis. 
Production Economics. Framework: Production functions to estimate 
(marginal) resource productivity. 
Operations Research Techniques: Notably LP. 
Decision Theory: Expected utility analysis. 
SyStems Approaches: Systems simulation. 
Source: Malcolm (1988) 
In the mid 1950's research in Fann Management began to emphasise a production 
economics framework with a number of studies attempting to estimate (marginal) resource 
productivities from production functions estimated from fann cost data. Problems with 
this approach emerged because of the year to year variation in productivity due to climate 
and other production factors, the difficulties of applying an essentially shon run 
framework to longer term decision horizons, and the ever present problems associated with 
applying static, cenain and single objective assumptions to a dynamic, uncenain and multi 
objective situation such as farming. 
From the late 1950's and panicularly in the 1960's, the use of linear programming and its 
variants expanded quite rapidly. LP was seen as the successor to budgeting in that it used 
the same information to do essentially the same task except that the profit maximising 
combination of resources was identified automatically and precisely. There was interest 
around the world in establishing fann management service centres to carry out LP 
analyses either of representative fanns or of fanners own properties based on data 
submitted by mail or through fanner workshops. Gradually however, the emphasis on the 
optimal plan was seen as inappropriate given that there are always a range of farm plans 
which may be similar in total gross margin but which differ in technical requirements or 
cash flow and gearing implications so that decisions are usually made on these other 
considerations. 
In summarising the rise and fall of the production economic analytical approach in Farm 
Management research, including both production function analysis and linear 
programming, Malcolm (1988) points to the failure of the approach to address the basic 
attributes of farm management as a process involving continual change and uncenainty, 
requiring mental and financial flexibility to meet changing economic conditions and a 
widely varying climate. He concludes: 
"Economics, like Farm Management. is about decisions; but Economics is about the outcomes of 
decisions, whereas Fann Management concerns both the process of decision making and the outcomes." 
The next major emphasis in Fann Management work was the decision theory approach 
which prevailed in the literature from the mid 1960's to the mid 1970's. This attempted 
to describe fanner decision making by capturing the fanner's objectives and risk 
preferences within a single index of subjective expected utility. Malcolm recounts the 
various criticisms of the approach, primarily concerned with the difficulties of actually 
defining an individuals utility in a practical and useful way and concludes by citing a 
review by McInerney (1979) of the Anderson, Dillon & Hardaker (1977) book, 
"Agricultural Decision Analysis". McInerney refers to the unworldiness of trying to deal 
with the unpredictability of future events by concentrating on the search for "better" pre-
decision optimisation procedures and goes on to discuss the fact that fanners, the majority 
of whom are probably not well versed in decision analysis, never the less make decisions, 
and sometimes quite successfully. He suggests that the success may be as much to do 
with the fact that having made the decision, fanners then make it work as it is with 
making the best decision in the first place. A quote from McInerney cited by Malcolm 
may be of interest given a recent emphasiS on how fanners ought to be behaving in a 
newly deregulated world. 
"Their [farmers) management is a matter of continually reacting 10 where they are, rather than 
periodically trying to determine where they are going. Making a good fist of those initial planning 
decisions is important. sure, but let's also see some emphasis on management as a reactive, rather than 
solely proactive, process." 
The last phase of development described by Malcolm is the systems approach and the use 
of simulation models which gained momentum from the early 1970's. He suggests that as 
research workers began to realise that production economics was not much use to fann 
management other than as a sensible way of thinking, they statted to cast around for an 
alternative approach able to deliver the goods. Some settled on the systems approach; 
Malcolm remains unimpressed: 
and 
" .. the operation of the farm business is so complex, stochastic and unique that even very elaborate 
models of the operation of representative whole filrm businesses are still too general 10 be used to give 
sensible, individual advice." 
"The inadequacy of the farm-systems modelling approaches for farm management purposes is 
compounded when the focus is essentially agriCultural science-systems. with important economic. 
behavioural and technical factors either unheard of, caricatured or considered as an after-thought". 
All in all, Malcolm is clearly of the view that there have been more widdershinst in the 
last 50 years of Farm Management research than there have been watersheds. He 
concludes that most of the useful work in Fann Management (the "low-theory" techniques 
involving basic budgeting of one form or another) were established and published early in 
the piece and moreover that there has been a marked fall off in the publication rate of 
Fann Management research since the mid 1970's. 
1 Widdershin: the wrong way; out of step. A reference to the title of Malcolm's 1987 
paper "Farm Management Research: Watersheds and Widdershins" 
"By the mid to late 1970's academic work in farm management had run its course and there is evidence 
of an increasingly commonly held unease, and oflen helief, that most of the trails blazed in the previous 
long boom of activity in academic fann management did not seem to lead anywhere that anyone 
engaged in fann management at a mon: applied level would want to follow". 
How relevant to the development of Farm Management research in New Zealand is 
Malcolm's review? 
As noted at the outset, the assumptions in both Malcolm's and Dillon's discussion of the 
progress of Farm Management research is that academic Farm Management is primarily 
concerned with strategy-choice decisions on farms and that the approach to considering 
that issue is primarily a production economics one. This is too restricted a view; the most 
obvious omission is the lack of any real discussion of "management". 
Academic Farm Management in New Zealand developed out of the depression and the 
need for productive valuations and sound budgeting particularly following the Mongagors 
and Lessees Rehabilitation Act of 1936 (Pittaway & Plank, 1991). Differences between 
developments in New Zealand and Australia perhaps reflect the roots of the subject here 
and the strong emphasis on the "whole farm approach" pioneered by the agronomist and 
later Farm Management lecturer Alben Flay. Farm Management in New Zealand has 
remained a separate professional discipline which, while obviously related to and drawing 
on production economic theory did not become subsumed by it as it appears to have done 
in Australia. The integration of technical, financial, economic and management 
considerations in a whole system view, as exemplified by the quotations in the 
introduction, remains the central philosophy. 
Thus the basic assumptions about what constitutes academic Farm Management will need 
to be modified somewhat. In addition two other significant developments or stages need 
to be added. Nevenheless, Farm Management research in New Zealand has gone through 
similar stages of evolution to that described; in fact several of the references cited by 
Malcolm are by New Zealand authors. Some of the criticisms regarding the usefulness 
and use of various academic developments in practical farm management apply as well, 
although a broader view of what constitutes Farm Management may cast a different light 
on others. On the other hand, the criteria of usefulness which Malcolm adopts - whether a 
technique has actually been used by farmers in decision making - is too stringent a test; 
academic developments may be useful without necessarily resulting in techniques which 
are applied directly in decision making. 
An expanded view of management is depicted in figure I (from Anthony, 1965). This 
shows three levels of management consideration as opposed to the two described by 
Dillon (1965). More imponantly, the pyramid shape is intended to emphasise the fact that 
farmers actually spend more of their time and effort in the lower levels of management 
control and operational control than they do in strategic planning. Strategic planning, 
although slightly narrower than the strategy-choice function described by Dillon is a 
sporadic, but possibly increasingly frequent, activity which occurs only under a limited set 
of conditions (Martin et al, 1990). 
Several different illustrations of management could have been chosen instead of that in 
figure I, some emphasising the dynamic, cyclical nature of the process; some the types of 
decisions being made or the functions carried out at various levels; and others the 
relationships between various areas of management such as production, administration, 
marketing and so on. The imponant point is that regardless of the particular view of 
management we adopt, the discipline of Farm Management is concerned' with providing 
ideas, information or techniques which assist farmers and farm managers to manage their 
business better; it is not solely concerned with developing an analytical framework for 
decision-making. 
Management 
Control 
Opemtional 
Control 
STRATEGIC PLANNING: Overall objectives and direction of the business; 
policics for acquisition and use of resources. 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL: Concerned with procedures for efficient 
acquisition and use of resources. 
OPERATIONAL CONTROL: Efficiency of routine, day to day tasks. 
Figure 1. Levels of Management (Anthony, 1965) 
Broadening the definition of Farm Management and therefore of Farm Management 
research in this way uncovers a much richer literature which has not ceased since the mid 
1970's as Malcolm (1988) suggests. It includes a great deal of systems work both through 
experimentation and modelling which can provide insights that would be difficult if not 
impossible to gain in any other way (Bywater, 1990). Farm systems models do not have 
to be used directly in on farm decision making to be useful; with or without economic 
content, evaluations of alternative production systems and technologies with farm systems 
models can provide much more complete technical and management information than most 
traditional experimentation. This is a legitimate target of Farm Management research. 
It also includes two additional areas of development, mentioned but discussed only briefly 
by Malcolm. These are developments in information technology and their application in 
agriculture following the advent of the microcomputer at the end of 1970's (eg Kuhlmann, 
1988 & 1990); and the emerging interest in what might be described as the business 
management approach since the mid 1980's. The latter has emphasised particularly the 
perception and management of risk (eg Johnson, 1990) and the concepts and techniques of 
strategic management (eg Martin et al, 1990). Neither of these two areas of development 
are likely to have been published extensively in the Economics Farm Management journals 
scanned by Malcolm but they have been major areas of Farm Management research in the 
last decade nonetheless and are likely to continue as such in the future. In many respects, 
both developments but especially the interest in the business management approach 
represent a major paradigm shift away from the economics approaches of the 1960's and 
1970's discussed by Malcolm. 
Addition of information technology developments and the business management approach 
to the summary of major approaches in Farm Management research in table 1 brings that 
summary more or less up to date. The broader view of Farm Management which results 
from the above discussion leads to an expanded definition of the scope of Farm 
Management research compared to that implied by DiIlon 25 years ago. This is 
summarised as a potential list of legitimate target areas of research in table 2. 
Table 2. Legitimate Target Areas for Farm Management Research 
Farming Systems 
Management Analysis and ContrOl Systems 
Farm Business Management 
The Farmer 
The Farming btdustry 
This view of Farm Management includes not only the on-farm systems and management 
technique oriented components (the systems work, information technology and the 
business management techniques), it also recognises the behavioural and social 
characteristics of the farmer - an area of increasing interest, stemming partly from both the 
information technology developments and the business management approach - and the 
impact of the environment on the management of the farm. 
To what extent have these developments in the scope and methodology of Farm 
Management research been influenced by the major issues of the day rather than simply 
through the normal evolution of research methods? Part of the reason for asking such a 
question is that increasingly research directions' are being determined on the basis of 
political and economic assessments of their wonh. A somewhat loose summary of the 
"major issues of the decade" is given in table 3. 
This is primarily a New Zealand and an agricultural sector perspective. Technological 
advances during the 1950's included the development of aerial top dressing and the 
realisation of the importance of trace elements such as Cobalt. These advances had a 
tremendous impact on the development of new areas of land for agriculture, and for Farm 
Management meant an emphasis on devising farming systems to accommodate the new 
technologies. The next decade saw the continuation of the push for development and an 
increase in national agriCUltural output, particularly following the agricultural development 
conference in 1963. It was during this period that increasing emphasis in Farm 
Table 3. Major Issues of the Day in New Zealand 
1950's Technological Advances 
1960's Farm Development and Agricultural Output 
1970's Energy, Irrigation & the EEC 
1980's Economic Liberalisation and Market Forces 
Management was placed on cost benefit analyses, capital budgeting techniques, etc no 
doubt encouraged by a number of incentive schemes associated with land settlement and 
development. Internationally in the 1960's and into the 1970's, the major issues were the 
inadequacies of world food supplies, concerns over environmental degradation and the 
exhaustion of finite resources such as fossil fuels. The Government-led push for 
development continued in New 'Zealand into the 1970's, particularly with subsidised 
irrigation schemes in both Islands; the South Island with arable and pastoral land and the 
North Island with a much smaller acreage of horticultural land. The UK joined the 
common market and gave fresh impeTUS to the need to expand markets for our agricultural 
products. With the world oil shocks early in the decade, energy became an issue in New 
Zealand not so much in terms of energy use in agriculture, as it did in the US and Europe 
for example, but more in terms of the development of the country's own energy resources 
(eg the "think big" projects) including investigations of alternative energy sources such as 
biomass to which Farm Management contributed. From early in the 1980's, the emphasis 
both nationally and internationally swung quite clearly to a new national economic 
direction and the move to liberalisation and a greater reliance on the market.' This has 
coincided with, and has perhaps been the major cause of, the interest in the business 
management approach in Farm Management research 
Perhaps not surprisingly then, it can be concluded that the main emphases in Farm 
Management research have been influenced by both developments in technology (eg, 
advances in agricultural technology in the 1950's and the advent of the microcomputer in 
the late 1970's) and the major issues of the day (eg, the push for increased national output 
and then economic liberalisation). Compared to the siTUation in Australia, Farm. 
Management has maintained a greater independence in New Zealand and a much stronger 
emphasis on the integration of technical, financial, economic and management concerns 
into a whole farm approach. As a result, or perhaps a major determinant of it, Farm 
Management has retained a closer involvement with the agricultural sector, particularly 
over the period of development from the 1950's to early 1980's. 
FARM MANAGEMENT RESEARCH IN THE 1990's 
Is the scope of Farm Management research described in table 2 likely to change in the 
1990's? What are likely to be the major developments in Farm Management research 
methodology? What major issues can be foreseen which may impact on either? 
Taking the last consideration first, in the short term, the major issue for fanners and 
therefore perhaps for Fann Management academics is the one we staned with in the 
introduction; the economic viability of different fanning systems. Given the low 
profitability of many fanns in the last half of the 1980's and the poor price outlook for 
many traditional products, particularly sheepmeats and wool, there is a real issue as to 
what fanners can do to remain viable. Some fanners are clearly considering whether there 
is any future in sheep at all. Perhaps here is a case where a comprehensive analysis using 
farm systems models of the production circumstances and market prices under which 
sheep production (and other traditional fanning systems) might remain viable may be 
helpful. 
In the medium term, another issue which currently seems to have the potential to remain 
an important issue for more than a few months is the question of sustainable land use. In 
many respects this is a "coming together" of the concerns over world food supplies, and 
environmental and finite resource issues which arose in the 1960's and which have 
reached a new maturity in the US and Europe in recent years. In New Zealand, it has 
been prompted by a number of adverse natural events such as cyclone Bola and the East 
Coast drought and includes such issues as the rabbit problems in the South Island. Many 
in Farm Management might argue that the discipline has always been concerned with 
sustainable land use and in general it can be said that agriculture in New Zealand has not 
been as exploitive as it has in some other regions of the world. But that misses the point. 
The concern over the sustainability of land use is now being driven by a different set of 
considerations and viewpoints. Fann Management academics need to reconsider the issues 
associated with sustainable land use from these· other perspectives, and those coming at the 
issue from the other viewpoints would do well to enlist the support of Fann Management 
academics who have a lot to offer in terms of their experience and knowledge of practical 
fanning systems. 
At this point there seems no reason to suggest that the scope of Fann Management 
research is likely to change in the coming decade. The summary presented in table 2 is a 
much more rounded view of what constitutes academic Fann Management than the 
economic emphasis described earlier. It is also sufficiently broad as to cover most 
eventualities. The question of farming viability is clearly encompassed by the scope of 
issues listed in table 2. The issue of sustainable land use can be seen from the Fann 
Management perspective as involving both farming systems and fann business strategies 
and risk management, although environmental and non-renewable resource issues will need 
to addressed more explicitly within these than they have been in the past. 
With respect to methodological developments in Fann Management. it seems reasonable to 
assume that the major developments in the short to medium term will be a continuation of 
information technology developments and a further exploration of the concepts and 
techniques associated with the business management approach. In the context of the 
former, it seems likely that most of the progress to be made in terms of computerising 
current manual systems of physical and financial record keeping, budgeting and the like 
has been made. though not necessarily adopted fully by fanners. Further developments 
are likely to require research into the process of management and decision making by 
farmers and the flows of data and information within fann businesses and between them 
and their environment. This begins to involve the behavioural and sociological aspects of 
farm management which will become increasingly important for this and other reasons. 
There is still plenty of room in agriculture for information systems to develop through the 
various stages observed in the corporate world (eg Nolan, 1979) to the point where 
information is viewed as a valuable resource to be used throughout the business, not just 
to increase the efficiency of internal operations, but to enhance the effectiveness of the 
business in the market place. Part of this development will require a greater integration of 
functions and software both on and off fann so that the same data, information and 
systems can be used for a variety of different purposes. 
Exploration of the potential use of business management concepts and techniques 
developed over the last decade or so in business schools around the world has only really 
begun in Fann Management. There is no guarantee that these ideas can be transferred 
from the corporate world to farming; they need to be critically assessed to determine this. 
Even if they do appear to have some potential in agriCUlture, it's almost certain that they 
will require some modification to adapt them to something that fanners and their advisors 
can actually use to assist in the management of fann businesses. This will be a major 
area of activity in Fann Management research for the next few years 
There is also a need to integrate these ideas and techniques within the conventional 
process of fann management; in a sense, linking the various levels of management 
depicted in figure 1. In that sense, the various research targets depicted in table 2 are not 
independent of one another. Farming systems research can help elucidate critical 
management factors which need to be monitored and controlled; the nature of the business 
management approaches and techniques used will help determine the sorts of information 
requirements and technologies appropriate to farming as discussed above. Integration, 
both in the sense discussed here and above in the context of computer software and 
systems may be an important feature of Fann Management research in the coming decade. 
REFERENCES 
Anon (1932). ImprOVing Farm Returns: Progress of An Advisory Service. Canterbury 
Chamber of Commerce, Agric Bull No 32, prepared by Canty Agric Coll, Lincoln. 
Anthony R.A. (1965). Planning and Control Systems: A Frameworkfor Analysis. Grad 
School of Bus Admin, Harvard Univ. 
Bywater A.C. (1990). Exploitation of the systems approach in technical design of 
agricultural enterprises. Pp 61-88 in Systems Theory applied to Agriculture and 
the Food Chain. J.G.W. Jones & P.R. Street (eds), Elsevier Applied Science, 
London. 
Dillon J.L. (1965). Farm Management in Australia as an academic discipline. Rev Mktg 
& Agric Econ 33(3):175-189. 
Johnson R.W.M. (1990) Management of Risk in New Zealand Farming, Proc of a 
Workshop on Risk Mgt. Rural Policy Unit, MAF, Wellington. 
Kuhlmann F. (1988). Knowledge Based Systems in Agriculture - Prospects for 
Application, Proc 2nd Int'l DLG Congr for Comp Tech, Deutsche Landwinschafts-
Gesellschaft, Frankfurt. 
Kuhlmann F. (1990). llItegrated Decision Support Systems in Agriculture - Successful 
Practical Applications, Proc 3rd Int'l DLG Congr for Comp Tech, Deutsche 
Landwinschafts-Gesellschaft, Frankfun. 
Malcolm L.R. (1987) Farm Management Research: Watersheds and Widdershins, Paper 
to 31st Ann Conf, Aust Agric Econ Soc, Adelaide. 
Malcolm L.R. (1988) A Record of Fifty Years of Academic work in Farm Managemellt in 
Australia: An Idiosyncratic View, Paper to 32nd Ann Conf, Aust Agric Econ Soc, 
Melbourne. 
Martin S., S.F. Pittaway & P.R. McCrea (1990). Strategic Plannillg Techniques and their 
Potential Application to Fann Management Problems, Paper to 33rd Ann Conf, 
Aust Agric Econ Soc, Brisbane. 
Nolan R.L. (1979). Managing the crisis in data processing. Harvard Bus Rev 57(2):115-
126. 
Pittaway S.F. & R.D. Plank (1991). Farm management teaching and the development of 
professional farm management at Lincoln University. Pp 184-198 in Proc 8th llItl 
Farm Mgt Congr,lnvited Papers, J.W.M. Gardner (ed). Int'} Farm Mgt Assoc. 
FINANCIAL LEVERAGE AND FARMLAND PRICE 
G.A.G. Frengley, G.A. Anderson and B.D. Ward1 
ABSTRACT: 
Theories of land price determination consistently centre on the expected economic rent 
as the principal value determining agent. In most studies, investigations have focused on the 
estimation of rent, rather more than the rate of interest used to capitalise the surplus to 
establish land value. Financial leverage impacts on the capitalisation rate, and through tax 
deductibility reduces the effective cost of interest. This affects the apparent price that buyers 
can afford to pay if they finance land purchases using borrowed capital. Inflation adds to the 
advantage of using debt to assist land purchase and increases the incentive to use financial 
leverage. An econometric srudy of the relationship between financial levera@.andJand prices 
in Southland between 1962 and 1987 supports the hypothesis that financial leverage has a 
positive influence on land price. 
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FINANCIAL LEVERAGE AND FARM LAND PRICE 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Variations in land price through time frequently appear to defy sound investment rules. 
As land prices are forced upward, outstripping commodity price movements and depressing 
the yield on capital invested in land below the market rate of interest, buyers are commonly 
accused of irrational investment behaviour. Certainly this was so in New Zealand in the three 
decades prior to 1985. 
Observations about inexplicable movements in land prices lead to the abandonment 
of the practice of productive valuations of land in New Zealand and elsewhere. Comparative 
sales, which simply reflected current price trends with similar parcels of land, became the 
norm. Presumably buyers continued to make calculated decisions and buy land at a price 
which firstly they could afford and secondly was rational, at least from their point of view. 
The apparent irrationality of buyers actions, reflected by movements in the price of 
land nO! supported by changes in land rent, has caught the attention of economists, beginning 
with observations by Scholfield (1961) and described later as a "land price paradox" by 
Chryst (1965). Both suggested land prices were increasing more rapidly, on a percentage 
basis, than increases in farm incomes seemed to warrant. Much of the apparent capital gain 
was therefore unsupported by productive increases. This issue was later challenged by 
Melichar (1979) who questioned the validity of the paradox. 
Schools of thought reflecting views of causality of land price movements have 
subsequently developed along a number of lines. Seed (1986) suggested that three 
empirically testable theories have emerged as determinants of land price; net farm income, 
inflation expectations and capital gains. We suggest they could be appropriately expanded 
to five by including consumptive uses and financial leverage. However many there are, all, 
including the consumptive use of land (here utility based) are advanced from the Ricardian 
theory of economic rent as affected by expectations. 
The Ricardian view established expected land rent as the sole determinant of land 
price. Perceived world-wide divergences between the time paths of farm incomes and 
farmland prices since the 1960s lead to alternative theories. Melichar introduced expected 
increases in rent, suggesting that farm land buyers include expected earnings growth in their 
pricing decisions. While his proposition that expected income growth was important won 
approval, his assertion that the expected growth was constant and perpetual did no!. Bergland 
and Randall (1984) showed that any positive increase in expectations could generate a one-off 
increase in land price. Using a framework based on the decomposition of a dynamic 
regression model, Burt (1986) questioned the validity of these theories as well as others 
described below. His paper, along with Just (1988) and Alston (1985), provide useful 
reinterpretations of the importance of net ren!. 
Clearly inflation expectations will affect land buyers' decisions. Feldstein(1980a,b) 
proposed that where the tax system is not neutral between gains in income and in capital. the 
land buyer's decision will be affected by inflationary expectations. Feldstein's hypothesis that 
the rate of intlation would directly affect land price won little empirical suppOrt until JUSt 
introduced the effect of debt erosion induced by inflation. A firSt order time-lagged 
accounting equation of motion can be used to demonstrate the effec!. Borrowers are ind~;ed 
to borrow more heavily in the expectation that inflation will reduce the real cost of debt 
servicing through time, as well as the capital sum to be repaid. As the rate of intlation in 
New Zealand was consistently high through the mid 1970s and early 1980s, its impact may 
have been considerable. 
Evidence of the importance of expected capital gains has been mixed. Capitalised 
asset appreciation ambiguously involves inflation expectations as welI as debt erosion, 
confounding econometric models and proofs. Major proponents of expected ,capital gains as 
a determinant of land price have been Plaxico (1979) and Castle and Hoch (1982). Bergland 
and Randall refute the theory, pointing out that Melichar's constant growth of income model 
can just as readily account for growth in capital gains. 
Consumptive values for land are becoming increasingly important. The theories above 
relate land to its income earning potential. With diminishing quality of life in urban 
environments, land is increasingly purchased for its enjoyment. Pope (1985) attempted to 
measure the consumptive demand for land in Texas finding that in that environment, net farm 
income explained less than a quarter of the change in land value. In New Zealand, pressures 
for consumptive land use are located around major centres of population and of geographic 
beauty, and outside those centres this factor is unlikely to significantly influence land values. 
Research into the productive value of land concentrates on factors which may 
influence economic returns; current and expected income growth, inflation and asset 
appreciation. While the econometric studies implicitly incorporate a discount rate with which 
to capitalise expected returns, the examination of factors influencing the discount rate has 
been largely overlooked. Of central importance is the effect of tax deductions for interest 
COStS which gives rise to financial leverage. 
2. LAND PRICE ESTIMATION: ACCOUNTING FOR FINANCIAL LEVERAGE. 
The value of land purchased for its productive use must relate to its expected future 
income. With perfect market competition, the classical formulae for the capitalisation of net 
rents from land identify land price Po, as 
n 
Po = L R, / [1 + Ttl .................... (1) 
t=1 
where Po is land price at the end of year zero, r, is the real discount rate for 
year t, and R, is the expected net rent as at the end of year !. 
More simply, the equation is often given as 
Po = Ali ........... - . . . . . . . . . . .. (2) 
A being the expected and constant annuity from the land and i is the 
capitalisation rate. 
The equations introduce expectations and all the difficulties attached to forecasts of 
commodity and input prices, technological change and yield as well as other personal and 
financial factors. Econometric devices used to represent the formulation of expecrations for 
these equations have all been restricted to the use of historic rent. As the techniques are in 
a sense artificial, they may be expected to introduce bias into the analysis. Nevertheless the 
issue of how best to account for expectations must be addressed. 
In equation (2), i can now be identified as the rate of return that a marginal land buyer 
requires from the invested funds. If the investtnent is entirely funded from equity, then i 
should be the investor's opportunity cost of capital. But when debt is introduced, this no 
longer holds. It is argued that the appropriate discount rate then becomes an average of the 
two required rates of return, weighted by the proportions of debt and equity capital. Even if 
the impact of taxation is ignored, the required returns from debt and equity capital are likely 
to differ because of their differing risk attributes. We identify equation (3) to account for 
this. 
K, = (EtA * K~) + (DtA • Kd) ................ (3) 
Here. K. is the weighted average cost of capital, E/A and D/A represent the 
proportions of assets. A. funded from equity and debt. and Ke and Kd are the pre tax returns 
required on those funds. 
The principal advantage obtained by using debt to fund land purchase.is that the 
effective cost of servicing debt is reduced by the average rate of tax on net farm profits. 
With marginal income tax rates as high as 67.5% in the last 25 years marginal debt servicing 
costs may have been reduced by as much as two thirds in several years. The advantage 
induced by the reduced cost of debt servicing is reflected in the capitalisation rate, Kt. 
Accounting for the taxation advantage gives 
K, = (EtA * K~) + [DtA • (Kd (l - T»] ............ (4) 
The variables are defined as previously and T the investor's marginal tax nite 
is introduced. 
If the marginal tax rate is greater than zero. taxation reduces the overall required rate 
of return and allows the investor to force up the land price through the increase in the 
capitalised value of the annuity. Note however that this equation does not yet account for all 
taxation effects. Required returns to debt or equity are not subject to the same taxation 
treatment. Personal drawings from farm income are the major source of returns to equity 
funds. These are subject to taxation before being obtained. By contrast, interest payments 
on debt are not taxed. The weighted average cost of capital must allow for this differential 
tax treatment and is accounted for below by partitioning returns to both debt and equity funds. 
VA = [ (l-T) (EtA· YAE)] + D/A .. YAE .......... (5) 
I 0, Ml (l - T) 
In this equation, V Al is the asset value at the beginning of income year t. Oe 
is the post-tax opponunity cost of equity funds. Mi the interest rate on mortgage securities 
used to obtain debt funding and Y AE the pre-tax expected net farm profit. Other variables 
remain as before. 
Equation (5) now reveals explicitly the possible impact of financial leverage on land 
price but does not account for the additional advantage conferred on the borrower by inflation. 
Debt erosion induced by inflation cannot be ignored. as New Zealand has experienced 
prolonged periods of high inflation in the 1970s and 80s. As any reduction in the real value 
of debt is transferred directly to the land owner's wealth. it is an impOrTant advantage 
conferred by the use of borrowed funds to purchase farmland. The apparent advantage of 
debt erosion can be incorporated in the discount rate calculation for debt financed assets by 
fUrTher reducing the post-tax mOrTgage interest rate. as below. 
DCR = Mi(l - T) 1 ... IE .... ,. .. (6) 
where DCR is the discount rate affecting debt financed assets and IE the 
expected rate of inflation. From equations (5) and (6) we now obtain the comprehensive 
equation (7) which includes the effects of \loth financial leverage and debt erosion. 
[(1 - T) (EtA .. YAE,)] DtA * YAE, 
VA = + (7) 
I 0, (Mi (1 - T) J ........ . 
1 + IE 
All variables are defined as before. 
This equation was used to test the validity of the hypothesis that financial leverage is 
a determinant of farmland prices. 
3. FINANCIAL LEVERAGE AS A DETERMINANT OF LAND PRICE. 
Market value of land is set by the purchaser whose particular circumstances create a 
value to him which is the highest of all potential purchasers. This person is the marginal land 
purchaser. It is the motives of the marginal land purchaser which drive land price. As there 
is no information concerning those purchaser's proposed debt/asset ratio. mOrTgage interest 
rate or marginal tax rate. direct econometric estimation of equation (7) is not possible. 
An alternative procedure was adopted. Equation (7) was used to calculate four series 
of expected land prices from a given base year. Subsequently the series were compared 
statistically with the proxy series of actual land prices for the same period. Any strong 
statistical relation between each calculated land price series and the proxy series for actual 
land price would provide evidence of the impOrTance of financial leverage. 
Important restrictions affected the sample of farms. The impact of the consumptive 
use of farm land had to be minimal to avoid the influence of non market rents. In order to 
avoid a plethora of conflicting value determinants, a homogeneous data set was also needed. 
Fixed resources, production systems and potential productivity should desirably be identical. 
Few regions in New Zealand meet these criteria. Southland farmland was finally chosen, as 
it approximates these requirements. The region is relatively homogeneous, has a stable 
catalogue of farms and an accessible data base for the period 1962 to 1987. 
Four debt/asset ratios were used in the study to reflect likely attitudes to borrowing 
and the associated effects of financial leverage. Case I. no borrowing; 2, average Southland 
sheep and beef farm debt; 3. maximum mOrTgagee borrowing as set by the then Rural 
Banking and Finance Corporation; 4, no equity, 100 percent debt financing. (The land pricing 
equation (7) was recalculated to provide an estimated land price series for each of the four 
assumed levels of debt.) 
Moreover. the importance of financial leverage is thought to have changed in the 
period studied. Changes in government policy and a higher level of intervention is likely to 
have influenced borrowing after 1968. Government introduced input intervention in 1969, 
commodity price support 1978 and abolished both with progressive deregulation after 1984. 
All empirical studies of land value include expectations. Assumptions about the 
anticipated levels of the principal variables thought to be influencing land price necessitate 
this. Carter and Maddock (1984) suggest four expectations hypotheses which are potentially 
applicable to this study; static, extrapolative, adaptive and rational. Account was taken of 
these. The latter three hypotheses were held to be inapplicable in this study as they assume 
farm buyers behave in the manner of fully informed economic agents. As [here is some doubt 
of this, undue sophistication was questionable. Hebden (1983) reinforces the point; on 
occasions the most naive model can perform as well as any other. Nevertheless, expectations 
of future marginal taxation rates, interest rates, income and inflation rates are known 10 have 
important influences on farmer investment decisions. Incorporating these expectations inlO 
the land price model is therefore logical. 
A variety of proxies were adopted to represent the variables in equation (7). Problems 
inherent in these stem principally from the distinction between marginal factors influencing 
the land price setter and the unavoidable averages compiled from aggregate data. Despite 
recognition of these problems, no other consistent information set is available to beller 
represent the required farm data base than the New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' 
Economic Service data. 
4. RESULTS OF TIlE ANALYSIS. 
Descriptive statistics were needed to measure the ability of the calculated value series 
10 represent the proxy series of actual values. Interpretive suitability lead to the choice of 
Theil's inequality coefficient and the correlation coefficient as the statistical measures of 
importance. The time series econometric package T.S.P. was used to test each of the four 
financial leverage series. 
The objective of this analysis was to identify the data set which most accurately 
represented the observed time series data. As the land price equation (7) is a non-parametric 
deterministic formulation, it suffers from the limitation that it was not possible 10 establish 
the relative impact of each variable on the calculated land price. Conclusions to the study 
must therefore rely on the assumption that the specified land price equation realistically 
represents the true but unknown land price determining process used by those who invest in 
farm land. 
Results of the analysis are given in Table 1. Interpretation using the correlation 
coefficient, suggests that as fmancial leverage is increasingly used to assist the financing of 
land purchases the estimated land price more closely replicates the proxy series. Theil's U 
statistic however, gives an alternative perspective as the optimum value should be zero. Case 
3, (which imposes Rural Bank limits on mortgage size) may be a closer representation 10 the 
proxy series of actual values. Although the correlation coefficient is reduced from .89 10 .8, 
Theil's inequality coefficient improves from .87 to .38. In view of the escalating risk 
imposed by increased debt, and the renowned stolid conservatism of the Scottish South, case 
3 may indeed be realistic. 
As 36 percent of the explanation for land price lies outside the model ret1ected by case 
3, other faclOrs are important. Not the least of these may be deficiencies with the data. 
Perhaps with better data and a data sample from the brash North, a stronger statistical relation 
between land price and financial leverage could be shown. 
Table 1. 
Summary Results: Comparison of Actual and 
Estimated Series, 1962-1987 
Case Case Case 
I 2 3 
Assumed Debt Levels Nil Average Max. 
Correlation 0.1800 0.6956 0.7983 
Coefficient 
Corr. Coeff. 0.0324 0.4839 0.6372 
Squared 
Mean Absolute 80.31 74.59 40.15 
Error 
Theil's U 0.8269 0.5429 0.3778 
Statistic 
Fraction of Error 0.4899 0.1868 0.0033 
Due 10: Bias 
Due To: Difference 0.0021 0.1845 0.0841 
From Unity 
Due To: Residual 0.5080 0.6287 0.9127 
Variance 
Case 
4 
100% 
0.8925 
0.7965 
110.58 
0.8684 
0.8684 
0.0337 
0.0980 
Graphical representation of the four cases is shown in Figures Al to A4, where each 
one is compared to the proxy series of actual values. Cases 1 and 2, representing no leverage 
and restricted leverage, begin to fail when commodity price support was introduced. Case 
3 representing the borrowing allowed by the Rural Bank. fails in the early 1980s when the 
Supplementary Minimum Prices began 10 change. Case 4 overestimates values throughout. 
Division of the time period 1962-87 into four separate periods, to account for possible distinct 
changes in expectations in response to government initiatives, has not increased the accuracy 
of the estimates. Fewer observations increases statistical error and each leverage case is 
statistically less Significant than before (Anderson 1990). 
5. SUMMARY. 
There is evidence that land buyers are influenced by financial leverage in their land 
purchasing decisions 10 bid up the price of land. Because the effective cost of debt is reduced 
by the marginal rate of taxation, the capitalised value of expected future rents is increased. 
With price suppOrt policies which reduced market risk, farmers may have been induced 10 
borrow more heavily than prudent policies would allow. With the fall in net farm incomes 
in the mid 1980s, following deregulation, opportunities for financial leverage coUapsed. Land 
prices fell. Returns 10 farm-land investment have now improved and with it the potential for 
financial leverage to drive up land prices again. How quickly this may occur wiIl depend on 
land buyers' expectations. 
, 
Exactly how farmers' expectations affect their land pricing decisions is a challenging 
problem. To what extent do both recent and past historic events affect their future decisions? 
How far should we lag former conditions in these models? How big does an historic event 
have to be to influence future decisions? And will marginal land purchasers have learned 
from the experience of deregulation? Perhaps in another fifty years we will know. 
REFERENCES 
ALSTON, J.M. (1985). "An Analysis of the Growth of U.S. Farmland Prices, 1962-82". 
Contributed paper presented at AAES Conference, Armidale, February 12-14. 
ANDERSON, G.A. (1990). "Financial Leverage and Farmland Values in New Zealand, 
1962 - 1987". Unpublished Masterate Thesis, Depanment of Farm Management, 
Lincoln University. 
BERGLAND, OLVAR AND ALAN RANDALL. (1984). "Land Prices, Capital Gains and the 
Returns to Farmland Ownership". Selected paper at the summer meetings of the 
AAEA, Cornell University, August 5-8. 
BURT OSCAR. (1986). "Econometric Modeling of the Capitalization Formula for Farmland 
Prices". AlAE 68, pp 10-26. 
CARTER, M. AND R. MADDOCK. (1984). Rational Expectations: Macroeconomics for the 
1980's. Macmillan Houndmills. 
CASTI..E, E.N. AND I. HOCH. (1982). "Farm Real Estate Price Components, 1929-1978". 
AJAE 64, pp 8-18. 
CHRYST, W.E. (1965). "Land Values and Agricultural Income: A Paradox?" JFE 47, pp 
1265-1273. 
FELDSTEIN, M. (1980a). "Inflation, Tax Rules and the Stock Market". JME 6, pp 309-331. 
___________ (l980b). "Inflation, Ponfolio Choice and the Prices of Land and Corporate 
Stock".AJAE 62, pp 910-916. 
HEBDEN. J. (1983). Applications of Econometrics. 
Philip Allan, Oxford. 
JUST, R.E. (1988) "The Explanation of Farmland Prices". Prepared for Agricultural 
Economics Seminar, August 1988, Davis University, California. 
MELICHAR, E. (1979). "Capital Gains Versus Current Income in the Farming SectOr". AlAE 
61, pp 1085-1092. 
NEW ZEALAND MEAT AND WOOL BOARD ECONOMIC SERVICE. Sheep and Beef 
Farm Survey, 1960/61 - 1986/87. 
PLAXICO, J.S. (1979). "Implications of Divergence in Sources of Returns in 
Agriculture". AJAE 61, pp 1098-1102. 
POPE, C.A III. (1985). "Agricultural Productive and Consumptive Use Components of 
Rural Land Values in Texas". AJAE 67, pp 81-86. 
SCHOFIELD, W.H. (1961). "The Land Price Paradox". Contributed paper presented 
at the American Agricultural Economics Association meeting, August 1961, 
Ft Collins, Colorado. 
SEED, P.G. (1986). "A Study of the Deterninants of Fattening and Grazing FarmLand 
Prices in New Zealand, 1962-1983". Unpublished Masterate Thesis, Department ' 
of Agricultural Economics, Lincoln College. 
STATISTICS DEPARTMENT, Abstract of Statistics, (Various) .. 
Government Printer, Wellington. 
Figure A1. 
Case 1 : No Leverage 
Figure A3. 
Case 3: Rural Bank Maximum Leverage 
Value I S.U. 
300,1 ------------------------------------------------~ Value I S.U. 300r'-----------------------------------------------------, 
~ Actual Values -t- Calculaled Values ~ Actual Values -t- Calculated Values 
250 250 
200 200 
150 150 
100 100 
50 50 
01 I I I I I I I I 
1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 
o~IJ-~-L~~~~-LJ-LJ~J-~-L~~~~ 
1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 
Year Year 
Figure A2. 
Case 2: Average Leverage Figure A4. Case 4: 100% Leverage 
Value I S.U. 
300 11 --------------------------------------------~ Value I S.U. 5001.-----------------------------------------------~ 
- Actual Values 250 
-t- Calculated Values ~ Actual Values 
-+- Calculated Values 
400 
200 
300 
150 
100 200 
50 100 
0~1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~_+-L~~~+_~~-L~ 
1962 o I I I 
1962 1967, 1972 1977 1982 1987 
Year 
1967 1972 1977 
Year 
1982 1987 
BACKGROUND STUDY TO DOWNLAND NORTH OTAGO 
BACKGROUND 
R Green, H Jagger, C Kearney, P Burborough 
Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries Staff 
Oamaru & Invermay 
This study was sponsored by the Rural Affairs Unit to look at farming in North 
Otago. Information was collected from many other commentators who have looked 
at the area in the past. 
INTRODUCTION 
Downland North Otago is the area from Kurow in the West along the Kakanui 
foothills to the coast. The Waitaki River is the northern boundary. The area is split 
into three distinct land types. 
Irrigated Plains 16000 hectares incorporating dairy cows, sheep, 
arable and horticulture 
Downlands Average farm size is 240 hectares running 2000 
stock units. Predominantly breeding ewes with 
replacements. A limited area of cropping and 
merino sheep can also be found 
Kakanui Hills Grazed up to 1100 metres in altitude. Halfbred or 
Merino sheep are common 
North Otago was first settled by the Europeans when a whaling station was set up in 
Moeraki. Land settlement did not occur until the 1850's when the areas with the best 
soils and communication were balloted off (Currie 1975). Some large estates were 
therefore established in the area. 
During the early 1900's the Government broke up these estate~ by acquiring the land 
and balloting out the farnls. 
Many of these fanns were too small especially after the decline in the dairy industry 
in the early 1900·s. 
North Otago is now recognised as an area of fanners with low levels of average gross 
farm income. 
North Otago's population is 21500. Oamaru has a population of 12600. 
Unemployment stands at 15 % of the workforce, similar to the national average. 
The three large employers in Oamaru are all under constant threat from restructuring. 
They are Alliance Freezing Works, Alliance Textiles, and the Hospital. The town is 
very reliant on these industries continuing. 
Over 50%· of farming families have at least one member working off farm. Average 
off farm income of $12000/year is generated. 
Huge fluctuations occur in the areas climate. Average rainfall per year is 540 mm. 
however the range in two consecutive seasons has fluctuated from 270 to 830 mm. 
In these two years the potential stocking rate for the year changed from 3 to 16 
su/ha. With the inflexible feed demands of breeding ewes huge feed surpluses and 
deficits are created. Fanners are forced to sell stock or graze out stock during 
droughts. With 3 droughts in the last 10 years the genetic quality of breeding stock 
has declined. This is a result of insufficient feeding and low selection pressure. 
Over the last 80 years there have been 20 drought years recorded (a ratio of 1:4). 
Average hours of sunshine are recorded 'at 2095 with 155 days average of ground 
frosts. 
FINANCIAL 
Government input into the North Otago area over the last decade has been 30 million 
(Table I). 
The effect of this has been to interfere with market forces on land sales. North Otago 
has had fewer land amalgamations over the 1980's than South Otago where drought 
assistance was not received (Burborough. 1991). 
Farm Monitoring data from North Otago describes an average or representative farm 
in the area (Table 2). 
Table I. Government Climatic assistance provided to North Otago in the 1980·s. 
Year Type of Relief $ million 
1982 Drought Relief 1.4 
Concessionary Rural Bank Loans 
1985 Drought Relief 17.0 
Suspensory Loans 
1986 Flooding 0.46 
1988 Drought Relief 11.44 
Drought Rehabilitation Loans 4.00 
Adverse Family Income Support 4.20 
Exit Grants 3.00 
Fann Appraisals 0.24 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT INPUT $30.30 million 
Table 2. Fann Monitoring 7A - Downland North Otago. 
Gross Fann Income 
Adverse Events Family Support 
Off Fann Income 
TOTAL INCOME 
Fann Working Expenditure 
Drawings 
Tax 
Debt Servicing 
Capital Purchase 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
CASH RESULT 
1987/88 
74672 
74762 
37470 
7640 
3060 
23709 
71879 
$2883 
1988/89 
50770 
7410 
6000 
64180 
34840 
12000 
1500 
22831 
71171 
($6991) 
The property is 240 ha with a stocking rate of 2000 su/ha. 
1989/90 1990/91 
54283 76150 
6920 
7000 6000 
68203 82150 
41128 41761 
11500 12500 
2500 
24474 24728 
1200 3500 
78302 84789 
($10099) ($2639) 
The average annual cash deficit has been $4200. This includes the addition of 
average off fann income of $4750 pa and Government assistance of $3600 pa. 
Without these inputs the average deficit would have been $12500 per year. 
At the same time that equity in these properties is decreasing the physical production 
base of the fann has deteriorated. Maintenance expenditure to fully sustain physical 
production and replace all capital items over their life time needs to be $30000 
higher than at present (Green. 1991). 
For this to occur Gross Income per hectare needs to be lifted from an average level of 
$317 to $450/ha. 
SUMMARY 
The North Otago Downlands area incorporates some 450 fanners. Over the last 
decade many of these fanns have been recognised as unviable. The area is 
characterised by a large number of fanners with low average gross income. 
Past Government assistance during droughts has interfered with the natural transition 
and amalgamation of properties. The area is used to huge fluctuations in climate and 
pasture production. Potential carrying capacities can vary from 3-16 su/ha/year 
between two seasons. The inflexible breeding ewe system allows huge feed surpluses 
and deficits to be created. 
The $30 million invested by the Government in the area over the past decade has 
saved many fanners from leaving the land. The present Government initiatives is to 
reduce communities dependence on the state. 
This combined with the below maintenance inputs back into the fanns will mean 
average profitability will continue to decline. 
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FARMER RISK PERCEPTIONS AND MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO 
RISK IN A NEW ZEALAND DRYLAND FARMING SYSTEM: 
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 
S R Harris!, S K Manin!, C G Lambz & S F Pittaway! 
I Farm Management Department 
and 
Z Department of Economics and Marketing 
Lincoln University, New Zealand 
SUMMARY 
The environment facing New Zealand farmers is much more risky than it was a 
decade ago. A survey of farmers in a dryland farming system was undenaken to 
detennine the importance which farmers attached to different risk sources and 
strategies for managing risk and to investigate whether groups of farmers differed in 
the importance which they attached to different risk sources and management 
strate gies. 
The three most important risk sources were rainfall, livestock/product prices and the 
world economic and political situation. Feed reserves were clearly considered to be 
the most important risk management strategy, followed by production flexibility, 
market information and pacing of investments and expansion. Three groups of 
farmers were identified who differed in their perceptions of risk sources, the 
imponance which they attached to different risk responses and some socioeconomic 
characteristics. These were labelled low debt farmers, marginal operators, and larger 
rationalists. 
Key Words: Risk Perceptions, Risk Sources, Risk Management 
Strategies, Cluster Analysis, Dryland Farming 
INTRODUCITON 
The env~onment facing farmers is now fundamentally different from a decade ago. 
Prior to 1984. New Zealand agriculture was characterised by high levels of 
intervention and assistance. Since deregulation input and output subsidies, 
development incentives and taxation deductions have been removed. In addition, 
state assets have been sold, a user-pays philosophy to the provision of government 
services has been introduced, and government has announced its withdrawal from 
adverse events assistance. Wide-ranging reforms of other sectors such as the labour 
market and impon-substituting manufacturing industries have also impacted on 
agriculture. 
As a result of these changes in the regulatory environment, agriculture is much more 
exposed to external forces than it was in the past. For some industries in some 
regions, the impact of these changes is likely to have been panicularly pronounced. 
For example, in the last six years, producers in the sheep industry have experienced 
both buoyant and depressed markets for their main products of sheepmeat and wool. 
As well as being more exposed to this market turbulence through the removal of 
price suppon programmes such as the SMP scheme, sheep farmers in some regions 
of the country such as Canterbury and Marlborough faced a p,rolonged drought in the 
late 1980's. 
These changes in the environment facing farmers are likely to have had an impact 
on how they perceive the risks which face them. They are also likely to have 
generated a range of management responses to cope with this changed risk 
environment. It is also probable that these risk perceptions and the responses used 
to combat risk will vary with different types of producer. 
This paper presents the results of a survey of a dryland sheep farm type on the 
Canterbury Plains. The objectives of the study were to determine the importance 
which farmers attached to different risk sources and strategies for managing risks and 
to investigate whether groups of farmers differed in the imponance which they 
attached to risk sources and risk management strategies. 
REVIEW 
Sources of Risk 
Gabriel and Baker (1980) classify risk into business risk and financial risk. In 
business risk they include production risks which impact on yields, and market risks 
which impact on price. This business risk is reflected in the variability of the net 
operating income (or net cash flows) of the business. The term financial risk is 
applied to the added variability of the net cash flows to the owner of equity, into 
which they incorporate the risk of being unable to meet prior claims with cash 
generated by the farm. Debt servicing usually accounts for a large component of 
these prior claims. 
Sonka and Patrick (1984) maintain that risk to the farm business may emerge from 
a wider number of sources than production, market and financial risk sources. 
Additional risk sources include technological risk (which may arise when it is 
possible for current decisions to be offset by future technical improvements), legal 
and social risk (which may be associated with the use of non-farm sources of capital 
and contractual mechanisms such as forward contracts, or may result from broader 
forces such as changes in government policy), and human risk (which may include 
the vulnerability of a sole farm operator, and the availability and reliability of 
labour). 
This expanded classification of risk sources has been used in a survey of farmer risk 
perceptions and risk management strategies in the United States reponed by Boggess 
et al (1985) and Patrick et al (1985). This study identified farm type differences 
between producers in the importance which they attached to different risk sources. 
For livestock producers in Nonh Florida and South Alabama, Boggess et al found 
that commodity prices were ranked as the most imponant risk source followed by 
weather variability, diseases and pests and input costs. For the first three of these 
risk sources, this was the reverse to the rankings of crop risks. Patrick et al observed 
a broadly similar pattern for livestock over a wider geographical area, but also noted 
differences between different types of livestock enterprises. 
Boggess et al also attempted to relate the importance attached to different risk 
sources to a variety of socioeconomic characteristics using Chi-square tests. For 
most risk sources, they were unable to identify any such relationship. However, size 
of farm, experience, education and state of residence were related to a number of risk 
sources. 
Management Responses to Risk 
Various production, marketing and financial strategies can be used to reduce risk. 
These are discussed in detail by Sonka and Patrick (1984) and Barry and Fraser 
(1976). Production responses include enterprise diversification, selecting enterprises 
or regions with a low yield variabilitY, geographic dispersion of farming activity, 
diverse and flexible production practices, and a modification of technical practices 
including excess investment in machinery, maintaining feed reserves and 
precautionary animal and plant health measures. Marketing responses could include 
selecting enterprises with a low price variability, spreading product sales over time 
by staggering production or on-farm storage, forward contracting and hedging on the 
futures market, and the use of improved information on prices and market 
requirements. Financial responses include maintaining additional liquidity by holding 
more liquid assets, matching the debt repayment structure of an asset with its income 
generating capacity, increasing the ratio of equity to total capital by injecting internal 
or external capital or reducing debt, leasing assets, insurance, investing capital off-
farm and off-farm employment 
In the U S survey, Patrick et al found that the most imponant risk management 
strategies used by farmers across all farm types were pacing investment and 
expansion, and market information. This was followed by enterprise diversification, 
spreading sales and financial reserves. In the more limited sample of livestock and 
crop producers analysed by Boggess et al, the first three of these strategies were also 
found to be the most important ones, although enterprise diversification ranked most 
highly, followed by pacing investment and expansion and then market information. 
Patrick et al also noted that there were differences among farm type categories in the 
importance attached to different risk management responses. Farmers in the 'Ranch' 
category ranked market information as the most imponant response, followed by 
[mancial reserves, credit reserves, feed reserves and maintaining flexibility. 
Boggess et al attempted to relate socioeconomic characteristics and the use of 
management responses to risk using a logistic regression model. They found that 6 
of the 21 risk management responses showed a significant relationship with at leas! 
one of the socioeconomic variables used in the model. In particular, the use of 
[mancial management practices, such as government credit programs, credit reserves, 
debt restructuring, off-farm income and maintaining financial reserves were shown 
to vary significantly with leverage ratio, farm size and farmer experience. The 
analysis tentatively identified two groups of producer. F;umers in the first group 
were older, more experienced, better established, with smaller farm areas and little 
leverage. Although not highly profitable, they were financially secure. On the other 
hand, the second group were younger farmers with larger areas and higher leverage 
resulting in more tenuous financial positions. 
SURVEY ME1HOD 
A dryland sheep farm type on the Canterbury Plains was chosen for study because 
the sheep industry has faced massive restructuring in the last few years, and in this 
particular locality, farmers have just passed through their worst drought in over a 
century. It was considered that farmers in this area would have a good awareness 
of risk in their farming operations. 
The area surveyed was defined by a single soil type, and lay within the geographical 
boundary of two rivers. The soil type is Lismore stony silt loam characterised by a 
low water holding capacity. Rainfall varies from 287mm in the critical spring 
growth period down to 78mm. Warm Nonh West 'foehn' winds can exacerbate this 
variability by drying the soil out, and consequently, pasture growth can be very 
variable. The farm systems were predominantly breeding sheep flocks producing 
prime lambs. 
A copy of the survey instrument used by Boggess et al (1985) was obtained and 
modified for the New Zealand farm type being studied. Questionnaire structure was 
based on Dillman's Total Design Method (Dillman, 1978). Questions on risk 
sources, management responses to risks and demographic factors were asked. The 
relative imponance which respondents attached to different risk sources and 
management responses was captured by ordinal scaled questions using a 1-5 scale. 
Information was also sought on OIher aspects of risk, which are reponed by Harris 
(1990) and are not incorporated in Ihis paper. 
A personal interview technique was chosen, because the questionnaire was relatively 
long and quite complex (Fowler, 1984). A census survey of the tightly defined area 
previously described was adopted for practical and economic reasons. Farms were 
located by farm location map, telephone directory and questioning neighbours. It is 
estimated that 85 per cent of farmers in the region were interviewed. The [Dtal 
number of respondents was 34. Pretesting and interviewing were done in March and 
May 1990 respectively. 
The results of the survey were analysed using the SAS(ver 6.06, 1989) statistical 
package. Means and standard deviations were calculated for the importance which 
respondents attached to different risk sources and risk management responses. 
Multivariate cluster analysis was carried out using the Fastclus procedure on SAS 
(ver 6.06, 1989). This is an iterative partitioning procedure using nearest centroid 
sorting computed on a Euclidean distance basis. The variables to cluster on were 
determined on the basis of logical grouping and discriminatory power. The sources 
of risk in the market, fmancial and socia-economic sphere were used. Three clusters 
were chosen on the basis of variance reduction and interpretability. The procedure 
was run with a number of different calculation options and outliers identified and 
discarded. Validation was obtained by running 2 hierarchical agglomerative options 
(Kaine-Jones and Simpson,1990) and using external validation techniques 
(Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984), which both strongly indicated non random 
groupings had been obtained. 
The small sample size limited analytical options available. Differences berween group 
were assessed visually in the case of socioeconomic information and using ANOV A 
for risk management strategies. Where ANOV A is used a 10% level of significance 
is taken to indicate strongly supported evidence and a level of 25% is interpreted as 
weakly supported evidence of difference. 
SURVEY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Sources of Risk 
The three most important risk sources were rainfall, livestOCk/product prices and the 
world economic and political situation. These were followed by other weather 
factors such as wind and disasters (which includes fire, flood or eanhquake), personal 
safety and health, variation and uncertainty in government policy and then diseases 
and pests. Mean values and standard deviations for the importance which respondents 
attached to different risk sources are shown in Table 1. 
The results of this survey support those of the U S surveys by Patrick et al and 
Boggess et al who both found that weather and livestOCk/product prices were the two 
most important risk sources in their livestock and ranch categories respectively. 
However, this study differs in the importance which is attached to the world 
economic and political situation. In this study, this risk source was ranked third with 
a mean value of 4.06, whereas in the Patrick and Boggess studies it had rankings 
(mean values) of tenth (2.73) and seventh (3.16) respectively. This may reflect the 
export dependence of the New Zealand sheepmeat industry relative to U S livestock 
industries. An awareness of such dependence is likely to have been heightened in 
recent years as farmers have become more exposed to international markets with 
economic deregulation and restructuring of the meat industry. 
Table 1 ; Mean Importance Rankings and Standard Deviations of Sources of 
Risk by Respondents in a Canterbury Dryland Farming System 
Rank Sources Mean l s.d 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
**********Extremely Important********** 
Rainfall 4.74 0.62 
Prices 4.24 1.07 
World Economic and Political Sitn 4.06 1.10 
Wind 3.85 1.21 
Disaster 3.78 1.13 
Personal Safety and Health 3.74 1.29 
Government - Overale 3.65 1.54 
Diseases and Pests 3.59 1.08 
Interest Rates 3.29 1.61 
Inflation 3.26 1.14 
Government - Regulations4 3.06 1.37 
Temperature 2.68 1.45 
Input Costs 2.50 1.11 
Government - Ag. Policiess 2.38 1.44 
Theft 2.24 1.05 
Other Weather Factors6 2.00 0.88 
Availability of Loan Funds 1.74 1.31 
Changes in Family Plans 1.50 0.90 
*************Not Important************** 
Hired Labour 0.91 1.22 
**************Not Applicable************ 
1. Ranking from 1 = Not important to 5 = Extremely Important; 0 = Not 
Applicable is included in the mean. 
2. Fire, flood earthquake etc causing severe damage. 
3. Variability in the direction of government policy. 
4. Changes in tax laws, environmental regulation, Local Body requirements, 
labour regulations 
5. Changes in government agricultural programmes, eg drought relief. 
6. Hail, snow, etc. 
Although both U S studies rankell fluctuations in input costs as one of the more 
important sources of risk facing livestock producers, this observation was not 
supported in this particular New Zealand context. Fluctuating inpllt costs had a mean 
value of 2.50. in comparison with 4.00 and 3.19 observed by Panick et al and 
Boggess et al respectively. It is difficult to comment on this difference without 
further information on the U S livestock systems. It may reflect differences between 
livestock types. differences in the variability of input costs in the two counnies or 
differences in the types and costs of inputs used. 
A further difference with the U S studies is the importance attached to hired labour 
as a source of risk. This was much lower in the New Zealand situation. which may 
reflect less reliance on hired labour. Other risk sources showed reasonable 
comparability between the different studies. 
Given the impact which interest rate changes combined with leverage levels are 
purported to have had on farm profitability in New Zealand in recent years. it was 
. surprising to find that interest rate variability did not feature more prominently as a 
risk source. The reasonably high ranking attached to changes in government policy 
as a source of risk will reflect the changes which have occurred in government policy 
in recent years. 
Management Responses to Risk 
Respondents were presented with a description of a number of risk management 
strategies and asked how important each strategy was for their farming operation. 
Table 2 shows the mean values and standard deviations for the importance which 
respondents attached to different. methods of managing risk. It also shows the 
proportion of respondents who used each method. 
Feed reserves were clearly considered to be the most important risk management 
strategy. followed by production flexibility. and then market information and pacing 
of investments and expansion. These strategies were then followed by a range of 
. other financial and production responses. Other than the use of market information. 
marketing responses did not appear to be important responses to risk. 
These results show some contrast with those of Panick et al. In their 'Ranch' 
category. market information was clearly the most preferred strategy. followed by 
fmancial reserves. credit reserves. feed reserves and flexibility. Another difference 
was that under utilisation of production capacity was considered to be reasonably 
important in this study. but not important in the Panick et al study. Although there 
appear to be differences in the importance attached to individual responses. both the 
New Zealand and the U S studies appear to emphasise some form of flexibility and 
the use of market information to manage risk in livestock systems. 
Table 2 shows that there is considerable variation in the proportion of respondents 
using a particular strategy. All respondents used feed reserves and insurance and 
over 90% of respondents used market information and production flexibility. Pacing 
investments and expansion. organ:sational flexibility. enterprise diversification and 
risk balancing were used by 60% to 90% of respondents. Not surprisingly. other 
strategies were used by fewer respondents. and on the whole the percentage using 
each strategy reflects its ranking in importance. 
Table 2: Mean Importance Rankings and Standard Deviations of Management 
Responses To Risk. and Proportion using Each Response in a Canterbury Dryland 
Fanning System. 
Rank Management Response Mean (s.d.) % using 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
this method 
**********Extremely Important********** 
Maintaining Feed Reserves 4.82 (0.46) 100 
Production Flexibility! 4.21 (1.20) 91 
Market Information 4.00 (1.04) 97 
Pacing Investments .and Expansion1 4.00 (1.32) 82 
Insurance 3.79 (1.27) 100 
Debt Managemen~ 3.62 (1.95) 59 
Enterprise Diversification 3.56 (1.54) 62 
Organisation Flexibility4 3.44 (1.52) 65 
Overdraft Reserves5 3.38 (1.84) 59 
Under - use of production 'capacity 3.24 (1.65) 62 
Liquid Reserves6 3.11 (1.90) 50 
Spreading Sales 2.71 (1.46) 53 
Risk balancing' 2.39 (1.77) 61 
Contracting Produce 2.00 (1.37) 49 
Work off farm - family 1.85 (1.91) 44 
Off Farm Investment8 1.68 (1.91) 18 
Contracting Inputs 1.47 (1.21) 21 
Occasional Cropping 1.35 (1.77) 27 
Work - respondent 1.26 (1.75) 29 
*************Not Important************* 
1. Keeping production as flexible as possible so that the weather and other variables do not 
have as great an effect 
2. Plan capital spending to avoid becoming overextended!. 
3. Working with lenders to carry over loans. defer payments, restructure debts etc. 
4. Flexibility in fann organisation so changes can be made in what is produced. 
5. A reserve of unused borrowing to draw upon. 
6. Holding easily converted financial assets (bank accounts, shares, debentures) as reserves. 
7. Consciously balancing a high risk in one area against a low risk in another area. 
8. Off farm investment in more permanent assets (eg real estate) 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
Cluster analysis was used to detennine groups from within the sample. A summary 
of cluster characteristics is shown in Table 3. The information on which this 
summary is based is presented in the Appendix. The means by cluster of sources of 
risk used in the clustering procedure are shown in Appendix Table AI. the farm size 
and work off farm are shown in Appendix Table A2. and risk management responses 
by cluster are shown in Appendix Table A3. Appendix figures Al to A4 show 
Educational level. Debt levels. Debt servicing and Gross income breakdown 
respectively of each cluster. 
Table 3: Summary Table of Sources of Risk. Demographic Characteristics. and 
Management Responses to Risk by Cluster for Respondents (Dryland Sheep Farmers 
in Canterbury) 
Cluster I Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Risk concerns Govt. Prices Most Regulations. 
interest rate 
Farm Size Medium Small Large 
(mean ha) 456 ha 247 ha 530 ha 
Debt Low High High 
Gross Income Low - High Low - Medium Medium - High 
Education Medium Low High 
(% with only some 56% 70% 0% 
secondary schooling) 
Management Insurance Most. espec. Market Inf. 
strategies more Debt Mgt and Conservative 
important Off farm work fanning. 
Management Flexibility. Market inf .• Insurance. 
strate gies less old reserves Conservative 
important fanning. 
Based on these results a profIle of each of the clusters is described below. Care 
should be taken in interpreting the~e descriptions because of the small sample size. 
They represent the significant trends that are apparent within each group. which have 
considerable explanatory and intuitive appeal. 
Group Profiles 
Cluster 1. - 'Low Debt Farmers' 
These farmers were relatively less concerned about external sources of risk such as 
input costs. interest rates. loan availability and government regulations. although their 
ranking of price and government sources of risk was close to the high for the 
clusters. 
They were in a more stable financial position with low debt levels, and their farms 
were in the middle range in terms of size of farm (hectares) and gross income. 30% 
of them had some form of tertiary education. but the majority (56%) had only some 
secondary schooling. 
There is weak evidence that respondents ranked insurance more important as a risk 
management strategy than the other two clusters did, while production and 
organisation flexibility, debt management and overdraft reserves were less important 
than the other two clusters. While the low ranking of debt management and overdraft 
reserves is probably due to their generally better financial position, a tentative picture 
emerges of a management style which relies on an ability to absorb adverse events 
as a means of combatting risk. 
Cluster 2 - 'Marginal operators' 
This group considers the sources of risk external to the farm/family unit to be of 
major concern - their ranking being highest for all of them with the exception of 
interest rates. It appears that this group is concerned about all external sources of 
risk. 
This group had high levels of debt and debt servicing, the smallest farm size, the 
lowest gross income, and lowest net worth. Only 30% of these farmers have 
University Entrance/Bursary or above. While their debt position is similar to that of 
the third cluster. their net assets are considerably less. 
Noticeably this group ranked Debt Management very important as a risk management 
response. This is not surprising considering that many in this high debt group would 
probably have had some experience of debt problems during the recent drought. 
Work off farm by the respondent and family constitutes a considerably more 
important practice for this group than for the other two. Interestingly they do not 
rank market information very highly. Their low ranking for under utilisation of 
production capacity perhaps reflects a feeling that they are forced to utilise as much 
of their already marginal operation as possible. 
Cluster 3. - 'Larger Rationalists' 
These people appeared to be more discerning in their analysis of external sources of 
risk. They have a lower concern than the other two for prices and government 
sources of risk but show considerable concern for government regulation and interest 
rates. This perhaps reflects an awareness of areas where unexpected threats could 
arise. 
Their debt levels and debt servicing are high, but their farm size is the largest of the 
three clusters. They are on average better educated than the other two groups, having 
all attained UE/Bursary or higher. 
The management r!!sponses this group of farmers uses seems to reflect the greater 
farm resources they have available. The under-use of production capacity is a 
response which they ranked very highly, with all farmers in this group using this 
technique. This may relate to the larger scale of their farms. Market information is 
also an important response for these farmers with its ranking being the highest of the 
three groups. 
Cluster summary. 
The clusters appear to identify three distinct risk perception and management profiles. 
There is a marginal group of farmers who are very concerned about all the external 
sources of risk and are trying to reduce risk by any means available to them. 
However they appear to be constrained by the small farm size and high debt levels. 
The group of secure farmers seem only concerned about the more readily apparent 
sources of external risk, and do not consider many strategies to be as important in 
their situation, particularly options relating to flexibility. The third group of large 
farmers appears to be more analytical with respect to the external risk situation, being 
aware of the problems that could arise in the field of government regulations even 
though they do not consider the overall government policy to be such a great risk at 
present. These farmers have high debt levels, and they consider many risk 
management strategies as important, but perhaps because of their large farm size 
seem to consider they are able to make use of strategies such as conservative 
stocking. 
These clusters seem to have considerable explanatory and intuitive appeal and the 
results concur generally with those of Boggess et al (1985) who found significant 
relationships be~een fmancial management strategies, farm size and leverage. 
CONCLUSION 
Because a relatively small number of respondents within a reasonably small area 
were interviewed in this survey, caution against inappropriate generalisation from the 
results of the study is warranted. Notwithstanding this caveat, a convincing degree 
of consistency in farmer perceptions of risk sources and the importance attached to 
alternative management strategies was observable between the results of this study 
and those for the Ranch and Livestock categories in similar U S studies (Boggess, 
et al 1985; Patrick et al, 1985). 
Cluster analysis tentatively identified three distinct groups of farmers who differed 
in their perceptions of risk sources, the importance which they attached to different 
risk responses and some socioeconomic characteristics. Despite the narrow base of 
this survey, this observation is once again supported by the broad conclusions of 
Boggess et al (1985). 
An obvious progression from this study would be to extend the survey to different 
regions and for different farm types. This would provide valuable background 
information on producer risk perceptions, which could then be used to guide further 
research and policy initiatives on risk management. 
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APPENDIX 
Table Al : Sources of Risk by Cluster. 
Sources of Risk 
Prices 
Input Costs 
Interest 
Loan Availability 
Govt Risk Overall 
Govt Agric Programmes 
Govt Regulations 
World Economy and Events 
Inflation 
Cl1 
4.25 
I.SQ2 
1.58 
1.17 
4.17 
1.75 
2.67 
4.08 
3.00 
Mean 
Cl2 
4.89 
:f441 
4.56 
3.11 
4.00 
4.00 
3.44 
4.67 
4.11 
1. Underline represents high cluster for each source of risk. 
2. Bold represents low cluster 
Cl3 
3.20 
2.80 
4.40 
1.40 
1.00 
1.20 
3.60 
4.00 
2.80 
Table A2: Farm characteristics by Cluster for Dryland Sheep Farm Respondents in 
Canterbury 
Size of Farm 1990" 
Days worked off farm: 
- respondent' 
- other family' 
* = signiflcant at the 10% level 
** = signiflcant at the 5% level 
CLl 
456ha 
0 
58 
CL 2 
247ha 
68 
172 
*** = signiflcant at the 1 % level. Tested by ANOV A on SAS. 
CL 3 
530ha 
52 
35 
Table A3 : Management Responses to Risk by Cluster for Dryland Sheep Farmer 
Respondents in Canterbury. (Ranked according to overall importance). 
Method 
Feed Reserves 
Production Rexibility 
Market Information . 
Pacing Investments'" 
Insurance 
Debt Management .. 
Enterprise Divn. 
Organisation Rexibility 
Old Reserves '0 
Under Utilisation 
(conservative farming) 
Liquid Reserves 
Spreading Sales 
Risk Balancing 
Contracting Produce 
Work Off Farm - family" 
Off farm Investment 
Contracting Inputs 
Occasional Cropping 
Work Off farm -
respondent ... 
* = signiflcant at the 10% level 
** = signiflcant at the 5% level 
Mean 
CL 1 CL2 
4.82 5.0· 
3.8 4.8 
3.7 3.4 
3.2 4.9 
4.3 3.6 
2.5 5.0 
3.3 3.6 
2.8 4.1 
2.6 4.6 
3.3 2.7 
3.4 3.1 
2.5 3.2 
12 1.1 
1.5 2.3 
1.8 3.6 
2.3 1.6 
1.2 2.0 
1.0 2.0 
1.0 2.8 
*** = signiflcant at the 1 % level tested by ANOV A on SAS. 
1. Underline represents high cluster. 2. Bold represents low cluster. 
CL 3 
4.82 
4.4 
4.4 
4.6 
3.4 
3.4 
4.4 
4.0 
3.4 
4.4 
2.8 
3.0 
1.2 
1.8 
1.0 
1.8 
1.2 
2.0 
1.6 
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D1VERSIFIABLE AND NON-D1VERSIFIABLE RISK IN FARMING 
Prakash Narayan and Robin Johnson· 
MAF Policy, Wellington 
SUMMARY 
Modem Portfolio Theory (MPT) provides methods by which to consnuct ponfolios which 
will generate the greatest possible return for any desired level of risk. Unlike other methods 
of assessing risk, MPT provides a measure of risk which is both objective and quantifiable. 
Two approaches to portfolio planning are discussed in this paper; the Markowitz total risk 
approach and the Capital Asset Pricing Model approach. 
A Markowitz risk efficient frontier was derived for the Lincoln University Mixed Cropping 
(LUMC) farm, using a risk simulation package. Results show that although risk can often 
be reduced by increasing the number of farm activities in a portfolio, choice of the right 
combination of activities is also crucial. However, further work is required to identify where 
farmers would place themselves on the risk efficiency frontier. Some recent studies 
(McCown et. ai, 1991) suggest a rule-of-thumb of 2:1 as the slope of an iso-utility or 
indifference line to determine the optimum combination of activities . 
The above results are based on a toni! risk approach to farm portfoliO planning. However, 
a second approach using a farm sector Capital Asset Pricing Model was used in this study 
to partition the total farm risk into two components: diversifiable and non-diversifiable risk . 
The proponion of both these types of risk in the LUMC farm activities were significant. 
This panitioning of risk is useful in selecting appropriate on-farm and off-farm 
diversification strategies to reduce exposure to risk, while maintaining income. 
Key Words: Risk, Diversifiable Risk, Beta, Efficiency Frontier, Correlation Coefficient. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the deregulation of the New Zealand economy in 1984, agriculture has changed from 
a highly regulated sector to one which it is subjected to few interventions. Feniliser 
subsidies, land development encouragement loans, the agriCUltural investment allowance, 
the livestock incentive scheme and supplementary minimum prices have all been abolished. 
Other forms of agricultural suppon have either been removed or greatly reduced. At the 
same time, the financial markets have been decontrolled and the exchange rate floated. 
A complex risk environment has emerged, reflecting the farm sector's growing sensitivity 
to forces in the general economy, international market forces, government policy and 
financial markets. The recent crisis in the wool industry serves as a reminder that nothing 
is assured in the business world. 
Thus, the business of farming has become much more risky and, not surprisingly, farmers 
are now placing greater emphasis on the management of risk. Manin and Lee (1990) define 
risk and discuss sources of risk facing New Zealand farmers. 
Farmers can adopt various management strategies to reduce their exposure to both financial 
and business risks. One such management strategy adopted by some farmers is 
diversification. 
Modem Pomolio Theory (MPT), which is about diversification, provides a measure of risk 
which is, in theory, both objective and quantifiable. It provides a framework in which risk 
and return are considered at the same time. Further, MPT provides a method to construct 
pomolios which will generate the greatest possible return for any desired level of risk. MPT 
tries to identify the most efficient diversification set. 
One framework in which MPT is expressed is called Markowitz diversification. Markowitz 
(1952) drew attention to the common practice of asset diversification in a share ponfolio 
and showed exactly how an investor can reduce the standard deviation of returns by choosing 
assets whose returns do not move exactly together. Standard deviation or variance is the 
usual measure of spread of the possible returns of individual assets. There are always gains 
from diversification in terms of reducing risk, provided that the returns of the assets included 
in the pomolio are not perfectly positively correlated, ie the correlation coefficient must be 
less than one. The greatest diversification payoff comes when the two assets are negatively 
correlated. When there is perfect negative correlation, there is always a pomolio strategy 
which will completely eliminate risk. 
In the study discussed here, a risk simulation package, Agricultural Risk Management 
Simulator (ARMS), developed by the University of Minnesota and the Minnesota Extension 
Service, was used to analyse different combinations of farm activities on the Lincoln 
University Mixed Cropping (LUMC) farm data. This package was thus used to derive the 
Markowitz risk efficient frontier for the LUMC farm. 
A theoretical risk-efficient frontier for a share pomolio is presented in Figure 1. It shows 
the highest expected returns for given standard deviations, for different combinations of 
assets. Ponfolios lying on the frontier are efficient because no other ponfolio lies to the left 
of this curve, which means that no other combination has a higher expected return for a 
given level of risk. An investor who likes high expected returns and dislikes high standard 
deviations will prefer portfolios along the heavy line. The Markowitz risk-return criterion 
requires that decision makers select a portfolio based on a decision rule that minimises the 
risk for a given level of expected return. The shaded area in Figure 1 shows the range of 
attainable combinations of assets. 
Figure I: Risk Efficiency Frontier and Attainable Pomolios ( A Theoretical lllustration) 
Expect.ed Rcrurns 
Risk. Efficiency Frontier 
/I-.. ----J -- ,.---... - . . ,. ... 
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./. - -
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Attainable Pon:folios 
Standard Deviation 
A second approach to pomolio planning in MPT discussed in this paper, called the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), partitions total risk of individual assets into diversifiable and 
non-diversifiable components. The CAPM approach takes account of the contribution that 
each farm activity makes to the standard deviation of the farm ponfolio, whereas the 
Markowitz ponfolio choice problem is based on the total variance of the farm plan relative 
to the expected returns. A theoretical presentation of the two components of risk is given 
in Figure 2, where risk reduction through increasing the number of assets in a share portfolio 
is also illustrated. Although the benefits of diversification increase as more and more assets 
are added to a pomolio, there is a limit to the amount of total risk reduction that is attainable. 
Figure 2: Limits of Diversification (A Theoretical lllustration) 
Po~olio Standard Deviation 
Total Risk 
Diversifiabl~ Risk 
Non-divcrsifiablo Risk 
Number of Assets 
A know ledge of the magnitudes of the tWQ components of risk is useful in decision making 
with respect to on-farm and off-farm diversification (see Equation 3). This paper concludes 
that on-farm diversification strategies should be selected on the basis of diversifiable risk 
and not total risk. 
METI!ODS 
The Lincoln University Mixed Cropping (LUMC) farm was used in this study to illustrate 
the Markowitz risk efficient frontier for a farm ponfolio, the imponance of pattitioning risk 
into diversifiable and non-diversifiablecomponems, and the benefits of diversification . 
Eleven farm activities were chosen for analysis on the basis that they did not incur any 
expenditure on fixed assets and had commonly been grown on the farm since 1970. The 
chosen activities were: 
(a) wimer wheat, sown in late Autumn; 
(b) barley, grown for feed mills; 
(c) field peas; 
Cd) process potatoes, grown on contract for processing by Watties; 
(e) process beans, grown on contract to Wanies for processing; 
(f) process peas, grown on contract to Watties for processing; 
(g) white clover, flrst grazed and then closed for small seeds; 
(h) ryegrass, fIrst grazed and then closed for small seeds; 
(i) ryegrass and white clover combination, for grazing and small seeds; 
(j) sheep (BOR), corriedale ewe flock, breeding own replacements; 
(k) sheep (PR), corriedale '2 year flock', replacement by purchase of 5 year old ewes 
annUally. 
Historic gross margin retiuns of these farm activities are given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Lincoln University Mixed Cropping Farm Activity Gross Margins ($/ha) 
Feed Field Pro Pro Pro. Rye· Will. Ryegr Sheep Sheep 
Year Wheal Barley Pcas Pcas Bean Potato grass OOY IClv Bn:edn Purchs Mean 
1970m 126 94 113 142 415 1106 44 239 291 75 57 245; 
1971172 119 75 153 142 319 882 f08 150 267 73 40 211 
1972/73 157 54 178 212 199 515 196 224 428 110 143 225, 
I 
1973174 134 138 513 68 1125 930 555 607 1173 188 144 506 
1974175 201 221 396 348 617 353 5 130 151 99 122 240 
1975176 392 207 147 237 28 821 90 299 411 160 145 267 
1976/71 432 275 219 489 847 1531 261 466 753 257 208 521 
1977178 319 196 124 486 770 737 569 392 992 221 150 450 
1978179 380 129 223 575 962 1176 116 448 657 246 184 463 
1979/80 475 257 242 807 757 203 467 286 861 293 160 437 
1980/81 589 193 412 836 1683 529 22 706 856 306 274 582 
1981/82 354 348 446 925 1806 ·1105 262 691 1089 358 402 506 
1982183 731 272 676 1099 2271 470 228 319 720 335 415 599 
1933/84 714 294 839 834 1393 286 383 576 1132 383 453 662 
1994/35 830 267 525 751 2521 1993 541 14 786 526 745 863 
1 
11985/86 937 268 404 1300 3571 938 480 359 1092 371 439 923 
! 1986/87 869 235 815 1103 2883 ·98 963 312 1528 449 552 873 
, 
j~EAN ~56 207 378 609 1304 607 3\1 366 776 265 272 504 
; SID.DEV 268 81 228 371 984 712 250 190 365 126 189 223 
Over the last decade, no snict cropping pattern or rotations have been adhered to on this 
farm. For instance, between 1981 and 1984, over half the farm was in wheat and barley, 
and the rest was in clover and grass seed, with very little livestock; whereas during the 
1988/89 season, 19% of the farm was in small seeds, 16% in grazing, 33% in wheat and 
barley, and 32% in process crops. Crops were mostly selected on the basis of expected net 
returns. 
(a) The Markowitz Total Risk Approach 
Using a risk simulation package, Agricultural Risk Management Simulator (ARMS), 
combinations of up to four different farm activities were analysed in terms of total 
farm portfolio risk and returns. The following farm management constraints were 
imposed when using the package. 
(a) Total Farm Area: 620 Acres 
(b) Overhead Costs: $50,000 per farm per year 
(c) Anyone process crop . :1>15% 
Anyone small seed crop :I> 10% 
Anyone cereal crop :t>25% 
Total Livestock (Sheep) 1::50% 
(d) Yield data: 16 year historic LUMC farm (see Table 1) 
(e) Price data: 1986/87 Lincoln College Financial Budget Manual, with standard 
deviation reflecting variability over the previous 16 years. 
(f) Variable Cost data: 1986/87 Lincoln College Financial Budget Manual. 
(NB: The ARMS package assurnes variable costs to be deterministic). 
Each combination o(farm activities analysed was plotted on a risk-return trade-off 
graph to derive the Markowitz risk efficient frontier. Tbese results were also used to 
illustrate the beneflts as well as the limits of diversification, and to illustrate the 
imponance of choosing the right combination of farm activities in order to benefit 
from diversification. When two or more activities whose returns were not fully 
correlated are combined, the combined volatility would be less than that of each 
activity taken separately. That is, the standard deviation of farm ponfolio returns, 
with two or more activities in a ponfolio, would decline for rising expected returns if 
the returns of the chosen activities are not fully correlated. 
This approach, using the ARMS package, provides a relatively inexpensive, 
straightforward and ponable set of guidelines for using in actual farm situations of a 
comparable soil type. In terms of the efficient frontier the aim of MPf is to discover 
the ponfolio on the efficient frontier best suired to an investor's risk tolerance. 
However, using the concept of expected utility seems an abstract way of approaching 
the problem of assessing risky farm management choices. Additionally, it is not 
generally feasible to transform a utility curve into mean-variance or mean standard 
deviation space (McCown et ai, 1991). According to McCown et ai, some recent 
studies conducted in developing countries suggest a vast majority of farmers having 
moderate degrees of aversion to risk. Under these circumstances, a rule-of-thumb of 
2: 1 as the slope of an iso-utility or indifference line to detemrine the optimum 
combination of farm activities has been suggested (McCown et all. Optimisation, in 
this study, is indicative rather than absolute and can be demonstrated without a linear 
programming package. 
(b) The Capital Asset Pricine- Model Approach 
Unlike the Markowitz total risk approach. the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
which emanates from the fmance literature was used to partition total risk into 
diversifiable and non-diversifiable components. The model generates a set of beta 
coefficients. which measure the expected responsiveness of an activity's returns to 
changes in returns on a farm sector ponfolio (a market index) free of any diversifiable 
risk. The model can be used to determine the proponion of diversifiable and 
non-diversifiable risk associated with each activity. and the expected return for each 
activity. Narayan and Martin (1990) discuss the application of the model to a New 
Zealand mixed cropping farm. 
The CAPM. initially developed by Sharpe (1964) and Linmer (1965). assumes that 
each activity's return can be related to the return on a 'market' ponfolio which is 
considered to be free of any diversifiable risk. Hence, the risk associated with this 
market ponfolio is all non-diversifiable. On the other hand, the risk associated with 
an individual activity i, where i = 1,2, ....... ,n, in the ponfolio, includes both a 
diversifiable and a non-diversifiable component. The non-diversifiable risk 
component corresponds to the extent to which the return on an activity Rib 
corresponds to the return on the ponfolio, Rmb over the time horizon, t = 1,2 •.... ,T. 
This relationship is known as the characteristic line, and is estimated by OLS 
regression of Rit on Rmt. That is: 
Ri/ = a. + ~i RmJ + eit (1) 
The intercept term of the characteristic line, ai, measures the expected return on an 
activity i when the rerum on the ponfolio is zero, and represents the average value 
over time of the diversifiable returnS of the asset (DobbinS and Win, 1983). The 
parameter ~i is the beta coefficient, and is a relative measure of the non-diversifiable 
risk associated with an activity i. The beta coefficient gives an indication of the 
riskiness associated with an activity relative to the market portfolio. For example, a 
beta coefficient of 2.0 for an activity would indicate that an activity was twice as risky 
as the portfOlio, whereas a beta coefficient of 0.5 would signal that an activity was 
half as risky as the portfolio. 
The relationship between the beta coefficient of an activity i, ~i, and the 
non-diversifiable risk associated with that activity can be demonstrated as follows: 
~i = BRil = COV (Ri,Rm ) rim Oi Om 
Mml VAR (Rm) Om2 
where run is the correlation coefficient between Rit and Rmt; 
Oi is the standard deviation of Rit; and 
Om is the standard deviation of Rmt. 
(2) 
Levy and Sarnat (1982) have shown that the non-diversifiable component of the 
standard deviation ofan activity, Oi, is given by rim Oi, and the diversifiable component 
is given by (1 - rim) Oi. Hence, 
(Ji= rimOi + (I-rim) Oi (3) 
That is, total risk as measured by ai, can be partitioned into that explained by 
systematic (non-diversifiable) risk and the residual (diversifiable) risk. Thus, 
Equation 3 can then be used to determine the proportion of di versifiable and 
non-diversifiable risk associated with an activity i. 
Thus, two setS of data are required to operationalise this routine, the returns for each 
activity (see Table I), and the return on the market portfolio. The market portfolio 
used in this srudy was an unweighted index of returns (ie simple average) of all the 
LUMC farm activities (the very right hand column in Table 1). Narayan (1990) and 
Narayan and Martin (1990) evaluate the use of gross margins to measure individual 
activity returns and the unweighted index as the market portfolio. For the purpose of 
comparing the different farm activities in terms of their risk and return characteristics. 
the use of gross margins and the unweighted index are adequate. 
RESULTS 
(a) The Markowitz Total Rjsk Approach 
Under the total risk approach, as the number of farm activities in the ponfolio is 
increased, from one to four, the standard deviation of farm returns as well as the 
coefficient of variation declined. while the farm returns increased, if not maintained 
(see Table 2). The sheep purchase activity has a higher return as well as a higher 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation, than the sheep breeding activity. 
However, combining the two activities gives areturn lying between the two individual 
activity rerums but the risk is much lower than when the two activities are taken 
separately. Thus, risk reduction through diversification is achieved when the two 
sheep activities are combined. As more activities are added. total risk declines further. 
Results presented in Figure 3 illustrate this. 
Table 2: Risk Reduction Through Diversification on LUMC Farm 
Fann Activiles in the Portfolio Ratio Meat Return Standard Coeff. of 
Deviation Variation . 
Percent $/Fann $/Fann 
1 Sheep (Purchs) 100 95,000 99,000 1.04 I 
2 Sheep (Breedn) 100 71,000 64,000 0.90 
, 
3 Sheep (Purchas + Breedn) 50/50 90,000 57,000 0.63 
4 Sheep (Purchs + Breedn) + 
Wheat 40/40/20 97,000 53,000 0.55 
5 Sheep (Purchs + Brdn) + 
Wheal + Pro. Peas 30/30/25/15 106,000 53,000 ' 0.50 
6 Sheep (Purchs + Brdn) + 
Wheal + Pro. Beans 30/30/25/15 147,000 70,000 0.48 
-'- ~--
Figure 3: Limits of Diversification on LUMC Farm 
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BOR = Sheep, breeding own replacement ewes. WHT=Wheat 
PR = Sheep, purchase 5 yeat old replacement ewes. CL V = White Clover 
Although risk reduction can often occur by increasing the number of farm activities 
in a portfolio, it also is imponant to select the right combination of activities. Those 
farm activities should be chosen whose returns do not move exactly together, ie their 
correlation coefficient being less than one. Results in Table 3 show that a farm 
portfolio comprising a sheep and three cereal crops (Portfolio 5 in Table 3) gives low 
returns with very high levels of total risk than say a farm ponfolio comprising two 
sheep activities, a cereal crop and a process crop (Ponfolio 1). 
Table 3: Risk Return Characteristics of Activities on the Lincoln University Mixed 
Cropping Farm 
Farm Activities in the Portfolio Ratio Mean Rerum Standard Coeff. of 
Deviation Variation 
Percent S/Farm S/Farm 
I Sheep (Purchs + Brdn) + 
Wheal + Pr Beans 30;30125/15 147,000 70,000 0.48 
2 Sheep (Brdn) + Wheat + 
PrBeans+PrPeas 50/20/15/15 146,000 66,000 0.45 
3 Sheep (Brdn) + Wheal + 
Clover + Pr Beans 50125/10/15 132,000 74,000 0.56 
4 Sheep (Brdn) + Wheat + 
15 
Ryegrass + Clover 55125/10/10 82.000 56,000 0.68 
Sheep (Brdn) + Wheat + 
I Barley + Field Peas 50125/10/15 77,000 58.000 0.75 
I 
, 
I 
I 
Combinations as presented in Table 3, and a selection of other possible combinations 
are ploned in Figure 4, where a Markowitz risk efficient frontier is derived for the 
LUMC farm. Any portfolio lying on the efficient frontier will give the highest 
expected rerum for a given standard deviation of farm returns. 
Employing the 2:1 rule-of-thumb as suggested by McCown et al, for moderate degrees 
of aversion to risk, the farmer's level of utility or satisfaction would be maximised by 
operating on that part of the efficiency frontier where the 2: 1 indifference line (line 
g-h in figure 4) is just tangent to the efficiency frontier (curve e-f). This point is 
represented by 'a' in figure 4. 
Figure 4: LUMC Farm Risk Efficiency Frontier & 
the 2: 1 Indifference Line 
Net Cash $: ·OOO/f'arm 
170 i k 
a 
ISO 
9 
130 
I 
I ". 
110 1 
'. 
90 ~ .' 
70 ~ 
I SO ~ 
30 40 SO 60 70 80 90 
Standard Deviation S"OOO/farrn. 
100 
At present the ARMS package does not allow programming the LUMC farm using 
the regression components of risk. Such an analysis would require a stochastic 
quadratic programming package which is not currently available in New Zealand. 
(b) The Capital Asset Pricjn~ Model Approach 
Using the CAPM, with an unweighted index representing the market ponfolio, 
diversifiable and non-diversifiable risk components were determined for the LUMC 
farm activities. These farm activities were than ranked by the different measures of 
risk. Results in Table 4 show that the ranking offarm activities depend on the measure 
of risk used. A farmer selecting activities based on di versifiable risk would choose 
sheep breeding, wheat, process beans and sheep purchase. These activities lie in the 
far left quadrant of Figure 5. However, he would choose barley, sheep breeding and 
two grass crops if he based his decision on total risk. 
Table 4: Ranking of Enterprises by Different Measures of Risk (Least Risky First) 
Least Diversifiable Risk Least Tora! Risk 
Sheep breeding Barley 
2 Wheat Sheep breeding 
3 Process Beans Grass crop 
4 Sheep Purchase Clover catchcrop 
5 Grass crop Wheat 
6 Process Peas Field Peas 
7 Field Barley Process Peas 
8 Field Peas Sheep Purchase 
9 Grass calChcrop Process Beans 
10 Clover catchcrop Grass catchcrop 
11 Process POIaIO Process PotatO 
Figure 5: Mean Returns and Diversification Risk 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The business of farming in New Zealand has now become much more risky than say a decade 
ago, as there is it greater exposure to market forces and fewer inbuilt collective stabilisation 
measures. Risk management strategies, such as diversification, are therefore being given 
more attention by farmers. 
Risk reduction occurs as the' number of farm activities in the enterprise porrfolio is increased. 
For instance, the tota! risk is much lower with two sheep aGtivities in a porrfqlio than with 
one. Further reduction in risk occurs when a third activity, such as wheat, is added to the 
fann porrfolio. When a farm portfolio of two imperfectly correlated activities is formed, 
the overall risk of the portfolio will usually go down. Diversification works, as shown in 
this study, because prices and yields of different farm activities do not move exactly together, 
ie their correlation coefficient is less than one. 
This study has also shown that not only increasing the number of farm activities is important, 
but the right combination of activities must be chosen. The lower the correlation berween 
the activities the greater the benefits of diversification. For instance, a farm portfolio 
comprising twO sheep activities, wheat and process beans, has a much lower total risk than 
a portfolio comprising one sheep and three field crops. Depending on the correlation 
between farm activities, some combinations are more risk efficient than others. A risk 
simulation package, such as the Agricultural Risk Management Simulator (ARMS) 
developed by the Minnesota Extension Service and the University of Minnesota, can be a 
useful tool for this purpose, though it is not an optimisation package like linear programming. 
However, a more useful approach would be to use a farm sector Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) which partitions total risk into diversifiable and non-diversifiable components. If 
the results generated by this model suggest non-diversifiable risk to be a major component 
of tot a! risk, then opporrunities for activity diversification within the farm are limited. Farm 
activities should be chosen on the basis of least diversifiable risk, as this risk component 
can be reduced by on-farm diversification, and appropriate off-farm strategies be selected 
to reduce non-diversifiable risk. For determining the magnitude of diversifiable and 
Ilon-diversifiable risk for individual farm activities, CAPM is a powerful tool. 
The results in this study depend on the past variability continuing into the future. Some 
judgement is therefore required, using known parameters such as prices along with 
know ledge of expected variation based on past experience. 
Based on above, the following is suggested: 
(a) This technique could be tested further in the field with farmer cooperation . 
(b) The analyst could design an experiment where different measures of risk were 
assessed in the field situation. 
(c) For the LUMC farm a combination of both sheep activities, wheat and process 
peas and beans gives a secure low risk output with high returns. 
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Derek L. Newman, Lindsay S. Saunders, Stewart F. PiUaway and Greg A. Anderson 
Multidiscriminant Analysis of Farmers' Risk Responses 
ABSTRACT: 
The multiple discriminant analysis technique was applied to farmer responses to questions 
relating to their perceptions of risk and to their individual farm data. Three different farming 
systems (sheep, dairy and crop) were surveyed in three different geographical locations 
representing those industry types. The objective of the study was not to identify the important 
sources of risk, but rather to identify the factors that characterise the groups (and their 
differences). The study was not used to verify the model used. The study showed that group 
differences to relate not only to industry specific variables such as technology, but also to 
some widely held predictors of risk such as the debt ratio. It also showed there to be more 
differences of perception associated with financial risk than with· business risk. 
INTRODUCTION: 
1.1 Background to the Study: 
In 1990 Newman et all studied farmer attitudes to risk. In that study, three groups of 
farmers were surveyed by questionnaire. Within each geographic region selected, farmers of 
a specific farm type were chosen. The three groups comprised farmers in Southland (sheep 
and cattle), Canterbury (mixed cropping) and the Waikato (dairy). Within the groups, 
fanners were subjectively selected to provide a representative cross-section of life cycle stage, 
Newman D.L., L.S. Saunders, S.F. Pittaway and N.G. Gow. Risk Management at the 
Farm Level. Report for the Ministry of Agriculature and Fisheries Rural Policy Unit. 
1990. 
ability, and an ex ante estimate of attitude to risk. A fourth group (Wanganui) was sUlveyed 
as part of the original study, but has been ignored for the purposes of this study due to. doubts 
about the sample selection process. 
The major findings of that study (presented by Newman et al in an earlier paper to this 
conference2) were that: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
The theories relating to farm level risk and to risk responses do not provide a 
comprehensive explanation of these factors. Problems identified within the 
literature related to definitional and measurement difficulties, the frustration of 
the risk balancing hypothesis by behavioural inconsistencies and the lack of a 
secondary market for agricultural equity, the individuality and dynamic nature 
of farm level responses, and the perception of the impprtance of risk and its 
changing nature over time. 
The goals of farmers are not purely economic. i.e. economic utility does not 
necessarily explain farmer decision making processes. The aspiration of 
individual farm ownership appears to dominate decision making; this is 
perhaps more related to family security than to profitability factors. Financial 
risk is peICeived to be less important when viewed in this context, with very 
few farmers prepared to consider the use of outside equity to reduce financial 
risk. The level of debt used to finance the initial farm pUIChase appears to be 
a necessary residual given the farmer's personal aspirations. Under these 
circumstances, the risk balancing hypthesis breaks down; the ability of farmers 
to trade-off a reduction in financial risk against an increase in business risk is 
constrained by their personal and family oriented goals. 
Major souICes of risk are preceived to include climatic. market and 
macroeconomic factors. however farmers do not believe that they have much 
ability to ameliorate the effects of these risks. Production responses appear the 
most likely strategies. with financial responses (e.g. hedging) being not 
considered important. Diversification and specialisation are both considered 
appropriate risk reducing strategies. Despite these responses. however, any 
reduction in farm risk seems to be of secondary importance compared to 
family goals. 
Farmers peICeive that the risks associated with production agriculture have 
increased in the past two decades. 
Most farmers would not have adopted their past diversification and 
development strategies with the wisdom of hindsight, but most would prefer 
to expand their farming operations through horizontal acquisition and a large 
number would prefer specialisation to diversification. Few farmers would 
Newman D.L.. L.S. Saunders. S.F. Pittaway and G.A. Anderson. Farmers' Perceptions 
of Risk. Presented to the New Zealand Association of Economists and Australian 
Agricultural Economics Society Conference. 1991. 
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f) 
consider borrowing to diversify, and most would in fact diversify only if their 
existing levels of income are at least guaranteed. Farmers perceive a total 
level of risk that they are prepared to live with, and they will implement 
strategies to reduce total risk, but not to trade-off business and financial risks 
while maintaining total risk. 
The use of funds is not independent of the source; from an economic utility 
perspective irrational behaviour exists with respect to investment decision. 
g) Both farmer goals and farmer peICeptions of risk vary with farming type. 
The authors' conclusion from this study was that policy instruments that increase the 
unsystematic ris12 of farming (including the responsibility of the farmer for the control of 
"dread" events) therefore are not likely to do anything other than to further increase the 
business risk of farming, and (in a very residual way) to reduce the value of the farm asset 
thereby increasing the financial risk aspect of the farm business. Farmer responses to such 
instruments are likely to include further consolidation and specialisation, further horizontal 
expansion by the survivors, and very little other change in approach because of the 
predominance of non-economic goals. Interestingly, most farmers intend to assist their 
children to farm if possible. 
With respect to point g) above, farmers from the different farming systems (or geographic 
areas) were observed placing different emphases on identified risk characteristics. While the 
study identified the peICeptions of individuals towards sour<;es of risk and the adopted 
management responses to those risks, it did not address the perceptive differences between 
the groups. Accordingly, the authors decided to re-examine the dataset with the aim of 
determining not those factors that are important. but instead those factors that distinguish 
between the farm groups that were surveyed. 
1.2 The Aim of the Study: 
The aim of the study was to to identify those responses to the survey that contributed most 
to the differentiation of the three groups of farmers characterised by their geographic location. 
their type of farming and their responses using multiple discriminant analysis. 
Unsystematic risk is the risk that is diversifiable Le. is not associated with the 
economic system under consideration. 
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1.3 The Data Base: 
From the outset, the authors acknowledge that the questionnaire design and the elicited 
responses were not facilitated with multiple discriminant analysis in mind. This is not to say 
that the reported results are incorrect, but merely to place a caveat on the interpretation of the 
results. TIle authors consider this study to be of an exploratory nature rather than being 
definitive. 
It must also be stressed that the dataset under consideration included not only farmers' 
perceptions, but also actual events (e.g. financial ratios), and so the results of the analysis also 
includes a mix of the actual and the perceptive. 
METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Multiple Discriminant Analysis: 
Multiple discriminant analysis provides a method of dividing populations into groups that will 
be characterised by their differences, many of which are not obvious without such an analysis. 
For example. if we were to examine three different farm types (sheep, dairy and crop) and 
we were to also examine the contributions of sheep product, dairy product and crop product 
to the gross incomes of the total set of observations, it should come as no surprise to see that 
a high proportion of sheep income will separate the sheep fanner from the rest. In other 
words, the proportion of sheep income differentiates between the groups. While this 
relationship is obvious. other relationships are not so obvious ex ante. It is these relationships 
that multiple discriminant analysis explores. 
Green and Tull (l978t list the objectives of discriminant analysis as being: 
I. To develop linear composites of the independent variables enabling the researcher to 
separate groups maximising the ratio of among groups to within groups variation. 
2. To detennine which variables account for the most intergroup differences in mean 
profiles. 
4 Green P.S. and D.S. Tull. Research for Marketing Decisions. 4th edition. Prentice-
Hall. 1978. 
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3. To test for significant differences between the mean predictor variable profile for 
separate groups. 
4. To establish a criterion by which to assign new individuals to a group, when the level 
of input-outcome is known, but the group not. 
In other words, multiple discriminant analysis is a technique used to classify objects into two 
or more categories. 
This study concentrated on the first three of these objectives. and did not test the model by 
attempting to place additional individuals into appropriate groups. 
Multiple discriminant analysis weights and linearly combines discriminating independent 
variables (questionnaire responses in this case) so that the objects (the individual farmers) are 
forced to be as statistically distinct as possible. It derives a set of weights (discriminant 
coefficients) that when applied to the set of independent variables will maximise the ratio of 
the between groups sum of squares and cross products (SSCP) to the total (i.e. pooled) within 
group SSCP. This process results in the computation of a discriminant "score" which can be 
used to characterise an individual object (i.e. farmer in this case). 
The resultant function takes the fonn: 
~ = bo + blXu + b2X21 = ... b.X .. 
where XJI is the i
lb individual value of the jib independent variable. 
bJ is the discriminant coefficient of the r independent variable. 
Z. is the ilb discriminant score. 
The number of functions that can be derived using multiple discriminant analysis is either one 
less than the number of groups being categorised or equal to the number of discriminating 
variables if there are more groups than variables. (In this study there are three groups and 
therefore two functions). 
If the discriminant functions are ploued through an origin located at the grand centroid (i.e. 
total sample centroid), then the discriminant functions can be considered as axes defining a 
geometric space in which each individual object is a point. If there are three or more groups, 
an n-dimensional plot (where n is the number of discriminant functions) of each data case can 
be prepared (Green and Tull, 1978). If there. are only two possible discriminant functions, 
then a two dimensional graphical representation is possible. 
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Individual scores within a group can be averaged, enabling a group mean (being the mean 
discriminant score of the individuals comprising the group) to be located within the n-
dimensions. This feature enables the researcher to identify the basis of discrimination. The 
spatial orientation of these axes is arbitrary except for the property of descending orders of 
maximum separation. 
The results of such an analysis show that the greater the difference between groups with 
respect to a particular variable (i.e. perception of a source of risk), the more important that 
variable is in contributing to the dimensions (Le. the axes) of the perceptual 'space' (Le the 
n-dimensional geometric space) in which each group is located. 
If the independent variables are ploued onto the n-dimensional space utilising the bj values, 
the absolute direction and length of the vectors (Le. the matrix of the bJ coefficients of each 
variable) reflect the basis on which the groups are discriminated, and can be utilised to 
interpret the discriminant functions. 
Discriminant functions are derived such that the first function separates the groups as much 
as possible. Then the second function separates the groups as far as possible in a direction 
orthogonal to the first function. The third function then separates the groups in another 
orthogonal direction and so on until the groups are as distinct as possible given the original 
discriminating variables. Therefore as discriminating functions are computed from the data, 
the capability of the remaining information to discriminate between the groups is reduced. 
Wilks' Lambda provides a measure of the discriminating capability of information within the 
independent variable dataset. It is an inverse measure of the discriminating power in the 
original variables; the larger Wilks' Lambda is, the less the amount of discriminating 
information remaining. Wilks' Lambda can be transformed into a chi-square statistic for an 
easy test of statistical significance, thereby determining the statistical significance of 
computing further discriminant functions from the remaining information. TIle initial value 
of Wilks Lambda provides a measure of the discriminating information in the data set prior 
to computation of any discriminating functions. 
The process of computing discriminant functions involves factorising the independent variable 
variances to provide a covariance matrix from which the characteristic (eigen or latent) roots 
Le the coefficients that solve the polynomial equations derived from the analysis can be 
calculated. Each characteristic root (eigenroot), is represented by a columnar vector known 
as the characteristic vector (eigenvector) from which characteristic values (eigenvalues) equate 
each columnar vector. The sum of the eigenvalues equals the total variance within the 
discriminating variables. 
Thus the ratio of the eigenvalues associated with a discriminant function (eigenvector) 
expressed as a percentage of the total sum of the eigenvectors, gives a measure of the 
importance of the associated function. 
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If the variance of the individual discriminant scores computed from a discriminant function 
is analysed, and the resulting "between group sum of squares" is expressed as a proportion 
of the "total sum of squares". the square of the canonical correlation (R2) for the discriminant 
function can be obtained. Since discriminant functions are orthogonal, both of these measures 
can be used to judge the importance of individual discriminant functions. 
2.2 Application of Multiple Discriminant Analysis to Farm Risk Data: 
In this study multiple discriminant analysis was applied to a three way matrix being the 
geographic groups (represented by dummy vaiiables), the sources of risk (as defined by the 
questionnaire) and the individual responses (i.e. either the individual perceptions with respect 
to those sources of risk, or, alternatively the actual values associated with that source of risk). 
Questionnaire responses by farmers became the independent variables, and the technique was 
used to develop linear composites (discriminant functions) of the independent variables. 
The three groups allowed a maximum of two discriminant functions to be derived, with the 
first function derived accounting for the highest proportion of the among to within-groups 
variance, and the second function, the next highest. 
The resultant discriminant functions are presented in both tabular llnd graphical fornl. 
RESULTS OF TilE ANALYSIS 
3.1 The General Application: 
Data from the financial and business risk components of the previous risk survey (Newman 
et aI, 1990) were utilised for the discriminant analysis. The responses (independent variables) 
were added via a stepwise procedure based on each variable's ability to discriminate between 
the geographic groups. 
Table I shows the discriminating power of the 10 variables that discriminate most between 
the groups utilising the responses for all three geographic groups. The value of the F-statistic 
is obtained from an analysis of the variance of the individual variables, and represents the 
contribution of that variable to the discriminating power of the overall independent variable's 
datasel. 
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Table 1: Discriminating Power of Individual Variables. 
Variable Wilks' F Significance 
No Description Lambda Statistic pS 
1 Land values - Profitability. effect 0.7385 7.340 0.0001 
2 Land values - Development potential 0.5707 7.056 0.0003 
3 Land values - Proximity to amenities 0.4642 5.434 0.0020 
4 Manageable debt levels 0.3871 4.645 0.0051 
5 Seasonal finance/total debt 0.3286 4.091 0.0099 
6 Equity partner use (additional land) 0.2920 2.838 0.0444 
7 Enterprise diversity 0.2661 2.174 0.0992 
8 Land development programme 0.2401 2.384 0.0772 
9 Using own equity 0.2177 2.232 0.0928 
10 Land value~ - Flexibility effect 0.1999 1.894 0.1395 
The variables represent farmers' perceptions of the sources of risk in most cases, and in other 
cases represent actual critical ratios. Appendix 2 describes the actual questions on which the 
responses were based. 
Table 2 presents the coefficients obtained for each of the discriminant functions derived (Le. 
the b/s). 
Table 2: Standardised Discriminant Function Coefficients. 
Variable Function Function 
No Description One Two 
1 Land values - Profitability effect -0.947 0.578 
3 Land values - Proximity to amenities -0.817 -0.145 
4 Manageable debt levels 0.616 0.199 
7 Enterprise diversity 0.483 -0.289 
9 Using own equity 0.378 0.442 
5 Seasonal finance/total debt 0.376 -0.054 
2 Land values - Development potential 0.336 -0.894 
10 Land values - Flexibility effect 0.315 0.225 
8 Land development programme -0.226 0.451 
6 Equity partner use (additional land) 0.169 0.724 
5 The P-factor refers to the significance of the F-statistic. Highly significant 
discriminating power at the 5% level or less (Le. P is less than or equal to 0.05) was 
displayed by the first six variables. 
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The absolute value of the discriminant coefficients indicates the degree to which each variable 
is weighted within each discriminant function, with the sign of the coefficient indicating a 
positive or negative loading. 
Table 3 presents the statistics obtained for each of the discriminant functions derived. 
Table 3: Discriminant Functions. 
Discriminant Functions 
None One Two 
Wilks'Lambda 0.1999 0.514 0.903 
Significance (P) 0.0001 0.003 0.532 
Percent Variance n/a 64.52 31.06 
Canonical Correlation n/a 0.611 0.430 
Eigenvalue n/a 1.571 0.756 
Prior to the derivation of any of the discriminant functions, Wilks' Lambda was 0.1999 
(significant at the one percent level), indicating that considerable diSCriminating power exists 
in the independent variable set. 
The first function accounted for 64.52 percent of the total variance in the dataset, with the 
residual discriminating power remaining better than the one percent level (lambda = 0.514). 
The second function accounted for an additional 31.06 percent of the total variance in the 
dataset, so that a total of 95.58 percent of all variance was accounted for by these two 
functions. This reduced the residual discriminating power of the dataset to the 0.532 
significance level which is non-significant (Lambda = 0.903). 
The most important variables in the first discriminant function are farmers' beliefs concerning 
the determination of land values (land values - profitability effects, and land values -
proximity to amenities effects) and the manageable debt level for their operation. This can 
be interpreted as meaning that these factors are significantly different across the three groups. 
Land values - development potential effects and equity partner use (additional land) are the 
most important variables in the second discriminant function. 
Table 4 exhibits the mean discriminant scores for the three groups. These mean scores are 
calculated by averaging the individual discriminant scores of the respondents, and can be used 
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to position each group within the geometric space defined by the discriminant functions. As 
such they provide a summary statistic of the individuals comprising that group. 
Group 
Canterbury 
Southland 
Waikato 
Table 4: Group Means. 
Discriminant Function 
One Two 
-1.797 
0.006 
1.320 
0.597 
-1.184 
0.715 
Figures 1,2 and 3 exhibit the two significant discriminant functions from this analysis. The 
discriminant functions represent orthogonal axes within which the independent variables are 
mapped using their discriminant coefficients as coordinates. The discriminant functions 
therefore define the geometric space for all the individuals comprising the groups. The first 
(most powerful) discriminant function is exhibited on the X-axis, the second on the Y-axis. 
Figure 1 shows that the first discriminant function (Le. the X -axis of figure 3) orders (from 
negative to positive) Canterbury, Southland, and Waikato farmers. Figure 2 shows that the 
second discriminant function (i.e. the Y-axis of Figure 3) orders (from negative 10 positive) 
Southland, Canterbury and Waikato farmers, but appears to separate Southland from the other 
two groups. The positioning of the groups on these axes reflects the group mean scores 
exhibited in Table 4. 
The first discriminant function (Le. the X-axis in Figure 3) is highly correlated to the variable 
numbers 1 (land values - profitability effects), 3 (land values - proximity to amenities effects), 
4 (manageable debt levels), and 5 (the percent of total debt represented by seasonal finance). 
The second function correlated most strongly to variable 2 (land values are affected by the 
development potential) and to variable 6 (the use of an equity partner to purchase additional 
land). Figure 3 shows these individual relationships. 
Figure 1: The Ordering of the Groups on the First Discriminant Function. 
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I 
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Figure 2: The Ordering of the Groups on the Second Discriminant Function. 
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Figure 3: Discriminant Analysis for All Sources of Risk. 
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The correlation of each variable to the discriminant function is determined by the magnitUde 
of the vector (of the Bj values) from the centroid and the direction of the vector relative to 
the axis (or discriminant function). 
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It can be concluded from Figure 3 that on the first function the Canterbury group perceives 
the variables land values - profitability effect and land values - proximity to amenities effect 
differently from the other groups. Southland farmer perceptions are relatively neutral on the 
frrst function while the seasonal debt/total debt relationship and the perception of manageable 
debt levels were considered very differently by the Waikato group resulting in a positive 
orientation on this axis. This is shown in Figure 3 by the coordinates for the variables being 
closely aligned to the coordinates associated with the group means. This suggests that 
financial risk (as determined by the exposure to debt and the composition of the debt) is 
considered to be imponant among Waikato dairy farmers while Canterbury cropping farmers 
are more strongly of the belief that land value issues are imponant. The land values issues 
could relate closely to financial risk factors (interest and security) associated with the 
capitalisation levels required for entry to farming in that area, and to the recent focus on land 
value issues (especially collateral security values) in that region. It appears that the X-axis 
is therefore associated closely with financial risk characteristics. 
Figure 3 also suggests that Southland farmers are more aware of the relationship between land 
values and the development potential of land, while the perceptions of the other two fgroups 
with respect to this factor were defferent. This may reflect the perception that Canterbury and 
Waikato farmers believe their land to be fully developed in its existing state. 
3.2" Sources of Risk: 
While these results are of themselves of interest and prove that the technique could be validly 
applied to the dataset, the predominance of land value issues does not provide many leads to 
the perceptions of farmers with respect to financial risk and business risk per se. The fact 
that the groups feel differently about land issues does not provide a great deal of policy 
guidance. It must be remembered that the variables in the analysis are those that farmers 
consider differently; the variables are not necessarily those that are considered to be most 
imponant. For example the climatic risk variable was held to be consistently imponant across 
all groups, and therefore held little discriminating power (Newman et ai, 1990). 
Accordingly, the authors decided to investigate differences in the perceptions towards specific 
sources of financial risk and business risk, and a funher series of analyses was undenaken 
to investigate how each of the different regional farming systems varied according to their 
different considerations of both financial and business sources of risk. 
In this subsequent phase of the analysis, only those variables that were associated with the 
sources of financial risk and business risk were included in the discriminant analysis. A total 
of three analyses were completed, one for each of the financial and business sources of risk 
and one for both financial and business" sources of risk considered together. 
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3.2.1 Sources of Financial Risk: 
Table 5: Discriminating Power of Individual Variables 
Representing the Perception of the Sources of Financial Risk. 
Variable Wilks' F Significance. 
Description Lambda Statistic P 
Manageable debt level 0.8173 5.437 0.0020 
Seasonal finance/total debt 0.7084 3.688 0.0003 
Total debt position 0.6170 3.468 0.0001 
Interest/expenses 0.4906 6.031 0.0010 
Principal repayments presence 0.4384 2.741 0.0010 
Financial risk exposure 0.3965 2.394 0.0010 
All six variables in Table 5 display highly significant discriminating power (at the 1 % level 
or less i.e. P is less than" 0.01). 
Table 6 presents the discriminant coefficients obtained for each of the discriminant functions 
derived (ie. the b/s). 
Table 6: Standardised Discriminant Function Coefficients. 
Variable Function Function 
One Two 
Manageable debt level 0.811 0.156 
Seasonal finance/total debt 0.461 -0.260 
Total debt position -1.187 0.690 
Interest/expenses 0.886 0.182 
Principal repayments presence -0.059 0.784 
Financial risk exposure -0.091 0.988 
Table 7 exhibits the statistics obtained for each of the discriminant functions derived. 
The raw data is highly significant in discriminating between the groups with the significance 
reducing to the 1.4 percent level after the removal of the first function. The second function 
removes all the significant discriminating power and with the ftrst discriminant function 
explains 95.36 percent of the total variance in the independent variable dataset. 
The ftrst function accounts for a total of 70.55 percent of the" total variance within the 
discriminating variables, while the second function accounts for only 24.81 percent. The 
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variables that load most heavily onto the flrst function are the percieved level of manageable 
debt, interest as a percentage of total expenses, and total debt position. 
Table 7: Discriminant Functions. 
Discriminant Functions 
None One Two 
Wilks' Lambda 0.3965 0.731 0.947 
Significance (P) 0.0001 0.014 0.430 
Percent Variance nJa 70.55 24.81 
Canonical Correlation nJa 0.676 0.478 
Eigenvalue nJa 0.843 0.296 
The variables associated with the presence of principal repayments and the perceived financial 
risk exposure load most heavily onto the second function. This suggests that the debt level 
and the structure of debt may describe the overall meaning of the flrst function, with the 
obligations associated with debt describing the second. 
Table 8 presents the group mean data and indicates that the first function orders the groups 
as Canterbury very negative, Southland neutral and Waikato very positive. This indicates 
that. the total debt .position of Canterbury farmers is significantly different to the other two 
groups. Southland farmers are associated most closely to the variable the percent of total debt 
represented by seasonal finance whilst the Waikato group is closely associated with the 
variables interest as a percent of expenses, and perceived manageable debt level. 
Table 8: Group Means for Sources of Financial Risk. 
Group 
Canterbury 
Southland 
Waikato 
Discriminant Function 
One Two 
-1.274 
0.067 
1.021 
0.281 
-0.808 
0.355 
Figure 4 presents a graphical representation of the data from Table 6 and Table 8. 
14 
1 
O.B 
0.6 
0.4 
I 
0.2 
0 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-0.6 
-O.B 
-1 
-1.5 
Figure 4: Discriminant Analysis for Sources of Financial Risk. 
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3.2.2 Sources of Business Risk: 
Table 9: Discriminating Power of Individual Variables. 
Representing the Sources of Business Risk 
Variable Wilks' F Significance. 
Description Lambda Statistic P 
Business risk exposure 0.787 6.572 0.0005 
Technology t:xposure 0.675 3.962 0.0001 
Change in risks 1978-84 0.568 4.483 0.0001 
Marketing exposure 0.488 3.80 0.0139 
Change in risks since began farming 0.381 2.619 0.0578 
Level of risk (own farm) 0.351 1.859 0.1449 
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The discriminating power of the independent variables is presented in Table 9 which identifies 
the variable - perceived business risk exposure for the particular farm type - as having the 
greatest discriminating power, and all variables other than change in risks since began 
farming, and level of risk (own farm) displaying significant discriminating power. 
Table 10 presents the coefficients obtained for each of the discriminant functions derived (ie. 
the b/s). 
Table 10: Standardised Discriminant Function Coefficients. 
Variable 
Technology exposure 
Marketing exposure 
Business risk exposure 
Change in risk since began farming 
Change in risk 1978-84 
Level of risk (own farm) 
Function 
One 
0.825 
-0.622 
0.533 
-0.486 
-0.341 
0.346 
Function 
Two 
-0.199 
-0.195 
0.449 
0.365 
0.494 
0.446 
The first discriminant function identifies exposure to technology risk and exposure to 
marketing risk as being the most imponant discriminatory risk variables. The second function 
is characterised by the perception of the changing degree of risk over time. 
Table 11 presents the statistics obtained for each of the discriminant functions derived. 
Table 11: Discriminant Functions. 
Discriminant Functions 
None One Two 
Wilks' Lambda 0.3519 0.6729 0.8866 
Signif.(P) 0.0001 0.0057 0.1317 
Percent Variance nfa 67.18 23.40 
Canonical Correlation nJa 0.690 0.491 
Eigenvalue nJa 0.9119 0.3176 
The first function accounts for 67 percent of the variance and a funher 23 percent being 
explained by the second function so that 90% of the total variance is explained. 
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Table 12: Group Means for Sources of Business Risk. 
Group 
Canterbury 
Southland 
Waikato 
Discriminant Function 
One Two 
-1.517 
0.529 
0.580 
-0.008 
-0.285 
0.607 
The ordering of the groups on the first function is Canterbury (loading very negatively) with 
the other two groups loading similarly positively. The conclusion that can be drawn from this 
ordering is that the Southland and Waikato groups perceive the business sources of risk in a 
similar way. Canterbury farmers. on the other hand. perceive these risks significantly 
differently. especially the marketing source of risk. This is to be expected given that 
marketing decisions are made more regularly and present a greater set of options in the case 
of arable crop farmers than is the case with marketing decisions' made by sheep or dairy 
farmers. 
Figure 5: Discriminant Analysis for Sources of Business Risk. 
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The second function ordered the groups (from negative to positive) as Southland. Canterbury. 
and Waikato evenly separated along this dimension and is dominated by the perceived 
changes to the degree of risk faced by farmers in different time periods (which differ for all 
groups). This can be explained by differences in the economic environments faced by the 
different farm groups, for example the deregulation of the wheat industry can be compared 
with the relative stability of the dairy industry during the time periods specifIed in the 
questionnaires. 
Figure 5 depicts graphically the relationships with respect to farmer perceptions of business 
risk. 
3.2.3 Sources of Total Risk: 
This section of the analysis combined the variables used in the business sources of risk and 
the fInancial sources of risk analyses. 
Table 13 presents the discriminating power of each of the variables entered and represent 
perceptions of total risk sources. 
Table 13: Discriminating Power of Individual Variables. 
Representing the Sources of Total Risk 
Variable 
Description 
Business risk exposure 
Manageable debt level 
Change in risk 1978-84 
Technology exposure 
Change in risks since 1984 
Marketing risk exposure 
Seasonal finance/total debt 
Total debt position 
Interest/expenses 
Principal repayments presence 
Financial risk exposure 
Change in risk since began farming 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
0.7873 
0.6421 
0.5426 
0.4695 
0.4101 
0.3610 
0.3234 
0.2916 
0.2411 
0.2168 
0.2119 
0.1974 
F Significance. 
Statistic P 
6.572 
5.427 
4.341 
3.635 
3.329 
3.021 
2.656 
2.398 
4.539 
2.396 
l.548 
2.060 
0.0005 
0.0020 
0.0072 
0.0169 
0.0245 
0.0356 
0.0555 
0.0759 
0.0060 
0.0736 
0.2109 
0.1145 
It should be noted that the variable - change in risk since 1984 - which did not enter the 
analysis of business risk variables alone, has now entered the analytical framework. This is 
due to its interaction with one or more of the other variables thereby increasing the 
discriminating power of the independent variables as a set. 
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Within the overall sources of risk analyses, the fIrst six variables have significant discriminant 
power. 
Table 14 presents the discriminant weights for each of the signifIcant variables for the two 
derived discriminant functions. 
The variable - iQterest as a percent of expenses, perceived business risk exposure, and 
perceived level of manageable debt load heavily in a positive sense onto the frrst function 
whilst tOlal debt position loads heavily in a negative sense. This suggests that this function 
could be labelled as generally representing the fInancial sources of risk. 
Table 14: Standardised Discriminant Function Coefficients. 
Variable 
Total debt position 
Manageable debt level 
Principal repayments presence 
Interest/expenses 
Technology exposure 
Marketing exposure 
Business risk exposure 
Change in risk since began farming 
Change in risk 1978-84 
Change in risk since 1984 
Function 
One 
-0.924 
0.534 
0.066 
0.750 
0.499 
-0.515 
0.616 
-0.213 
0.009 
0.067 
Function 
Two 
-0.254 
0.557 
0.472 
0.459 
-0.532 
0.285 
0.111 
0.509 
0.717 
-0.397 
The second function has the perceived change in the level of'risk faced during 1978-84 and 
the change in risk since the respondent began farming loading in a positive sense with 
technology exposure loading in a negative sense. This would suggest that this dimension 
could be labelled as a business risk dimension. 
Table 15: Discriminant Functions. 
Discriminant Functions 
None One Two 
Wilks'Lambda 0.2119 0.4976 0.7880 
Signif.(P) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0369 
Percent Variance n/a 6l.23 26.54 
Canonical Correlation n/a 0.574 0.369 
Eigenvalue n/a 1.3472 0.5840 
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Table 15 shows that both functions are significant at the 5 percent level with the amount of 
variance accounted for by these functions being 87.77 percent. 
Table 16: Group Means for Sources or Total Risk. 
Group 
Canterbury 
Southland 
Waikato 
Discriminant Function 
One Two 
-1.274 
0.067 
1.021 
0.281 
-0.808 
0.355 
Table 16 presents the group means with respect to all sources of risk and indicates that the 
groups are ordered as ·follows; Canterbury negative, Southland slightly positive and Waikato 
very positive. This is similar to the ordering from the financial risk sources analysis. This 
reinforces the view that the fust function generally represents the fmancial sources of risk. 
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The ordering on dimension two is for Waikato and Canterbury to be positive and Southland 
to be negative which is significantly different to the business risk analysis which identified 
Southiand and. the Waikato groups as having similar perceptions, and Canterbury as having 
very different perceptions. Further work is required to detennine whether interaction between 
the sources of risk is responsible for the different ordering of groups. 
Figure 6 exhibits the graphical representation of the infonnation included in Tables 14 and 
16. 
CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Summary of Findings: 
Previous studies (Newman et al, 1990) have shown that there i:s a set of consistently held 
beliefs by farmers. This study shows Ihat there is also a range of important beliefs that are 
held inconsistently; different groups of farmers (defined either geographically of by fam 
type) perceive the. relative importance of a number of risk causing variables differently. 
Group differences appear to relate not only to industry specific variables, but also to some 
widely held predictors of risk such as the' debt ratio. 
Despite the fact that the dataset used provided a mix of factual (e.g. debt level) and perceptive 
responses, the study shows that multiple discriminant analysis can be an effective tool in 
agricultural risk analysis when hypothesising that farmers have similar perceptions. 
With respect to financial risk sources: 
1. All groups differ in their perceptions. 
2. Different components of financial risk are important 10 different groups.' 
3. Capital structure seems more important in Southland. 
4. InterestlExpenditure ratio seems more important in the Waikato. 
5. Land value issues seem more important in Canterbury. 
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With respect to business risk sources: 
1. Pastoral farmers and arable farmers have different perceptions. 
2. Perceptions of the risks associated with marketing and technology appear to 
differentiate the groups. 
With respect to the combined sources of risk: 
1. There are more differences of perception associated with financial risk than with 
business risk. 
2. The ordering of groups was not that which might have been predicted by a separate 
analysis of the sources of risk independently. The nature of the interaction cannot be 
established 'from this study. 
These findings raise a number of important questions: 
1. Why do farmers' perceptions differ? Is it due to differing levels of knowledge, or do 
they merely fit with the farmer's relevant operating environment? 
2. If farmers' perceptions of risk are not a direct result of their individual relevant 
operating environments, what should the perceptions be? 
3. Can the business risk perception-- be altered independently of the financial risk 
perception (and vice versa)? 
4. How do these perceptions relate to the actions and responses of the individual farmer 
in an uncertain environment? 
4.2 Policy Implications: 
With respect to the implementation of nationwide policy instruments, the conclusions to this 
study can be interpreted in a policy framework as meaning that the responses of individuals 
and groups of individuals to generalised policy variations will differ. This will occur whether 
the policy innovation relates to business risk, to financial risk or to a combination of the two. 
Nationally based policy instruments and extension programmes may therefore not be as 
effective as predicted; regional policies may be more suitable. For example, the Waikato 
group has a different interest/expenses ratio to the other two groups, whereas Southland has 
a different debt structure, and Canterbury farmers are more concerned with land value issues. 
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Differences in finl4lcial risk perceptions appear to dominate those variables studied, which, 
considering the lack of industry specificity of fmancial risk, perhaps points to a wider lack 
of understanding of financial risk with perhaps a relatively better understanding of business 
risk being evident. Extension mechanisms to reinforce the nature of especially financial risk 
is one policy direction that could be pursued. 
FUTURE RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
The authors hypothesised that the significant discriminant functions would order the groups 
in a consistent manner, and that failure to do so would suggest a degree of interaction and 
provide initial support for risk balancing theories. 
Significant personal and regional farming system group differences with respect to risk 
perception were identified in this study. As yet, no one has asked "what do farmers actually 
need?" Different risk amelioration packages may be necessary for different people, not 
merely for different circumstances. Suggestions for fl!ture research fall into four areas: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
We need to determine the basis for the differences in the risk perceptions between 
regional farming systems (for example with respect to marketing risk exposure). 
The determination of the desireability of policy instruments that change the nature of 
the risk environment, and the ways in which the risk environment can be both 
effectively and efficiently improved. The social impact of such instruments has yet 
to be effectively examined, for example an ex post evaluation of the rural debt 
discounting scheme. 
As yet, no one has determined how risk is incorporated behaviourally into decision 
making. Neither has it yet been proved that risk perception actually determines 
behaviour. 
The risk balancing hypothesis remains untested in application in New Zealand. 
5. The difference between actual risk and expected risk (Le. unanticipated risk) has not 
been identified in a New Zealand context. 
6. The use of standard deviation to express risk is probably not an appropriate measure 
of risk given that upside and downside risk are viewed differently and lead to very 
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7. 
different strategies. Funher work is needed to detennine how fanners view these two 
sides of the risk equation and the strategies that they follow. 
Analysts use such ratios as interest coverage to detennine risk exposure. Fanners 
appear to have indifferent views about such measures. What are fanners' attitudes 
towards such critical ratios? Do fanners perceive these ratios as being meaningful, 
or is it only the fann service sector that uses them? 
In summary, despite a vast amount of national and international research into agricultural risk, 
we neither know what risk means to a fanner, nor do we know how they impact on the 
decision making process. We do know that perceptions are volatile though, and attitudes 
change continuously. We also know that economists and statisticians (both in a parametric 
and a non-parametIjc sense) have defmed risk in their tenns. The behavioural aspects remain 
unknown. 
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DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
The following variables were identified in this study. The parentheses following the name 
of the variable contains the question number from the 1989 survey instrument (Newman et 
al, 1990). A brief description (usually the question itself) follows the parentheses. 
Change in risks 1978-84 (3/11): With respect to [this] time period(s), how do you believe 
that the risks associated with your system of fanning have changed? 
Change in risks since 1984 (3/11): With respect to [this] time period(s), how do you believe 
that the risks associated with your system of fanning have changed? 
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Change in risks since began fanning (3/11): With respect to [this] time period(s), how do you 
believe that the risks associated with your system of fanning have changed? 
Enterprise diversity (2/19): When (if ever) did you last significantly diversify your enterprise 
mix? 
Equity partner use (additional land) (2/62a4): This question asked the respondents to rank 
various sources of finance (including "not interested") in the economic purchase of adjoining 
propeny. 
Financial risk exposure (2/39): With respect to your FARMING assets and liabilities alone, 
do you believe that the present level of your fann debt places your fanning operation in a 
situation of high risk? 
Interest/expenses (2/44): What proportion of your total fann expenses does fann related 
interest comprise? 
Land development programme (2/25): When (if ever) did you last embark on a significant 
land development programme? 
Land values - development potential (2n3): With respect to land values, what importance 
would you place on this variable? 
Land values - flexibility effect (2n3): With respect to land values, what imponance would 
you place on this variable? 
Land values - profitability effect (2n3): With respect to land values, what imponance would 
you place on this variable? 
Land values - proximity to amenities (2n3): With respect to land values, what imponance 
would you place on this variable? 
Level of business risk (3/8): How risky is the business for fanning YOUR TYPE of fann? 
Level of risk (own fann) (3/10): Do you believe that the risks associated with YOUR FARM 
IN PARTICULAR are: Responses were scaled from Far too High, to Low. 
Manageable debt level (2/36): What level of debt do you consider manageable for your 
fanning operation? A scale of debt/asset ratios was provided. 
Marketing exposure (3/6d): How imponant are the marketing (i.e. prices and products) risks 
to the viability of your fanning enterprise? 
Principal repayments presence (2/41): With respect to your permanent long term debt mix, 
how much of that debt [%] carries the reqirement to repay principal on a contractual basis? 
Seasonal financeltotal debt (2/46): With respect to your seasonal financing, at your peak 
overdraft requirement period, what proportion [%] of your total debt is represented by 
seasonal finance? 
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Technology exposure (3/6c): How important are the technology (e.g. chemicals, machinery, 
infonnation) risks to the viability of your farming enterprise? . 
Total debt position (2/34): This question asked for the debt asset ratio at last balance date. 
Own equity (additional land) (62al): This question asked the respondents to rank various 
sources of finance (including "not interested") in the economic purchase of adjoining property. 
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FARMERS PERCEPTIONS OF RISK 
NAIVE OR IRRATIONAL? 
L.S. Saunders, D.L. Newman, S.F. Pitta way and G.A. Anderson l 
ABSTRACT 
Any agricultural assistance policy promulgated to reduce or limit the risk involved in 
farming implicitly assumes that farmers will, in aggregate, react to the policy in a rational 
mann-:r .• lowever, the responses to a survey of Southland, Canterbury and Waikato farmers 
suggest that the farmers' perceptions of their business and financial risk environment may not 
match those of the policy analyst. As a result, this paper will contend that the prediction of 
any response to a policy necessitates a better understanding of the risk perceptions currently 
held by fanners. 
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Agricultunil Economics Society, Christchurch, 26-28 August 1991. 
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FARMERS PERCEPTIONS OF RISK: 
NAIVE OR IRRATIONAL? 
1. INTRODUCTION. , 
The New Zealand agricultural industry has experienced significant structural changes 
since the election of the Labour Government in 1984. During the late 1970's and early 
1980's a raft of input subsidies and product price supports were introduced. farm 
development was actively encouraged through the provision of concessionary finance and 
suspensory loans and a number of Producer Board income smoothing schemes were set up 
which were both supported and guaranteed by Government. Not only were these support 
measures immediately removed or phased out by the new Labour Government, but the farm 
business was also seriously affected by the equally dramatic changes made to the direction 
of fiscal and monetary policy. As a result. farm incomes became directly exposed to such 
variables as international commodity prices and a floating exchange rate. 
The subsequent increase in income volatility since deregulation has attracted 
considerable interest from agricultural economists and Government policy advisors. More 
emphasis has been placed on first identifying and measuring farm risk sources and second. 
developing some strategies the farmer may take to ameliorate that risk. Government policy 
since 1984 has encouraged farmers to become more self reliant. to be more aware of the 
potential risks which they face, and to take more resonsibility for dealing with that risk. As 
a result, attempts are being made to apply some financial management risk measurement 
models to the farm business. In the models derived from Markowitz portfolio theory. such 
as the Capital Asset Pricing Model and Arbitrage Pricing Theory, risk is commonly defined 
in terms of cash flow variability. It is then quantified by statistically comparing that 
variability through time to the volatility of cash flows from other assets in the economy. 
The validity of such an approach is however questionable. All asset pricing models 
impose a number of important assumptions to make them operational. Of most consequence. 
financial theorists assume that all economic agents have homogeneous expectations. are risk 
averse and are primarily concerned with wealth maximisation. While it may be accepted that 
ihese assumptions hold for agents operating in the financial markets. little evidence could 
be found to suggest that this is the case in the New Zealand agricultural industry. If risk is 
to be measured using these models. and policy advice formulated on the basis of the derived 
results. it is obviously important to establish whether or not the model's underlying 
assumptions are appropriate. That is, do all farmers have homogeneous objectives and 
expectations, do they perceive and measure risk in the same way as the policy analyst and 
will they react to it in a theoretically rational manner? The results received from a survey 
of Southland. Canterbury and Waikato farmers offer some (mainly anecdotal). evidence to 
suggest that many of the implicit assumptions made by researchers are inappropriate. 
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2. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF RISK. 
Finance theorists have long regarded the expected variability of cash flows as a 
suitable definition of investment risk. Patrick et al (1985) have however challenged the 
relevance of this definition when applied to a farm level risk analysis. They suggest that 
while farmers are concerned with income variability, and the sources of that variability, they 
are also concerned with personal consumptive goals which cannot be adequately reflected in 
such a measure of risk. These 'family' goals include factors such as family ownership and 
control of the business, the health and lifestyle of the of the farm operator and providing 
educational opportunities for the operator's children. 
Thus, although researchers appreciate the deficiencies of income variability as a proxy 
for farmer's risk perceptions, many appear to persevere with it due to a lack of suitable 
alternative measures. As Patrick et al note, the income variability interpretation of risk 
makes risk analyses manageable and mathematically tractable. 
It is also convenient to expand the income variability definition of risk !'oy explicitly 
partitioning it between business and financial risk. Gabriel and Baker (1980) make the 
distinction by stating that business risk is reflected in the variability of net operating income, 
or the variability of net cash flows before interest and taxation commitments are met. A high 
(low) coefficient of variation of net cash flows, for example, would indicate high (low) 
business risk. This source of risk can also be thought of as the expected variability in cash 
flows that results from the enterprises undertaken, and the numerous market and 
technological factors which affect their outcome. The degree of business risk is therefore 
independent of the way in which the firm is financed. 
Financial risk is defined by Gabriel and Baker as the added variability of the net cash 
returns to equity which results from the fixed financial obligation associated with debt 
financing and cash leasing. They suggest that such a definition of risk encompasses the risk 
of cash insolvency. Obviously the way in which the business is financed will affect risk, 
whether risk is defined in terms of cash flow variability or as the probability of the 
occurrence of a dread event such as cash insolvency. In this context, total risk is simply the 
product of business and financial risk. 
An objective and consistent measurement of total risk can be made if the definition 
outlined above is accepted as adequate. In New Zealand, time series data, which are 
available from a number of sources, can be used to calculate historical net incomes from 
various agricultural sectors. Descriptive statistics such as the coefficient of variation can then 
be derived from the time series data and presented as a measure of risk. 
However, it should be emphasised that such a measure of risk can only be useful if 
it is accepted that the variability of income received from an individual asset acts as an 
adequate proxy for the perceived risks of the economic agent being studied. One of the main 
advances of Markowitz's (1959) portfolio theory was to suggest that the risk of holding an 
asset should not be measured in isolation from all other assets in the economy. Markowitz 
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showed that some of the risk associated with investing in an individual asset could be 
diversified away by investing in other assets with returns which are less than perfectly 
correlated. He argued further than since this 'diversifiable' risk could be avoided by investing 
in a portfolio of assets, a rational investor would do so and therefore only be concerned with 
that risk which could not be negated. This non-diversifiable, or systematic risk is caused by 
economy wide factors which affect the cash flows from all assets. Examples of systematic 
risk include uncertainties over future Government monetary policy and its subsequent impact 
on future interest rates, or any potential changes to the trade policies of other countries. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which was developed from portfolio 
theory, is a single index model which offers a simple measure of risk. It is computed by 
statistically comparing the variability of returns from an individual asset to those from the 
market. Arbitrage Pricing Theory (AP1) expands the CAPM into a multiple factor model by 
relating individual asset risk to not only the market portfolio of all other assets but also to 
other factors which are considered relevant. APT therefore provides a number of risk 
coefficients as opposed to the one derived from the CAPM. 
Both of these models are predominantly used to assess both the risk and required 
return of financial assets, and each is reliant on a number of simplifying assumptions to make 
them operational. In the context of financial assets, Brealey and Myers (1991) suggest that 
the violation of many of these assumptions is not crucial to the derived results. It is generally 
accepted that participants in capital markets are risk averse, have reasonably homogenous 
expectations regarding future rerum and its potential variability and are attempting to 
maximise the value of their investment. If either of the two models are to be used to measure 
the risks faced by fanners, the efficacy of these same assumptions in the fanning sector 
needs to be assessed. 
3. EXPECTED RISK RESPONSES 
The number of options available to a fanner to change"the risk profile of the business 
are limited. Because of the nature of the fann business, most risk responses are necessarily 
aimed at reducing business risk. Anderson (1990) notes that the high cost of entry into 
fanning usually requires the use of a high level of debt finance, and this requirement limits 
the fanner's ability to significantly alter their degree of financial risk. 
Barry and Fraser (1976) describe the more common expected risk responses as being 
either a production strategy or a marketing strategy. Production strategies include the 
selection of enterprises with low yield variability, enterprise diversification, avoiding 
concentration of production in one geographic area and technical responses such as 
maintaining feed reserves, increasing input levels and taking precautionary animal and plant 
health measures. A producer's marketing strategies to limit risk may involve combinations 
of inventory management and forward commitments on prices and production with other 
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participants in commodity markets. This includes participation in producer cooperatives, 
holding buffer stocks to spread sales, and the use of the futures and options markets. 
Dent and Beck (1985) suggest a number of possible fmancial responses to avert risk. 
These include participation in Government sponsored schemes for averaging income tax 
liability, holding assets which can be liquidated easily, holding credit in reserve, planning 
the capital structure of the firm, establishing appropriate ownership entities and setting 
guidelines for debt repayment terms. The authors note that not all of these strategies are 
compatible, while it can also be argued that many of them may not be achievable given the 
previously mentioned high cost of entry to fanning and its concomitant requirement to use 
high levels of debt. 
However, of all the hypothesised responses to fanning risk, the one of most interest 
to policy analysts may be the theory of risk balancing. Gabriel and Baker (1980) suggest that 
most fanners identify both flI1ll survival and profit maximisation as goals, where survival is 
of primary importance. Thus, the decision maker will maximise net returns subject to the 
constraint that total risk does not exceed a specified level. They argue further that if a change 
in an exogenous source lowers the business (financial) risks faced by a fanner, the most 
likely response is to increase the financial (business) risk of the flI1ll so that total risk IS 
unchanged. Examples of exogenous changes to risks include changes to price support policy, 
foreign trade policy and input price subsidisation. 
4. SURVEY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Survey Basis 
The purpose of the survey was to gain some appreciation of the way fanners define and 
perceive the risk environment in which they are operating. The survey was applied to 24 
livestock fanners in Southland and 24 arable farmers in Central Canterbury during January 
1990. A slightly modified survey instrument was also given to 32 Waikato dairy farmers. (26 
owner/operators and 6 sharemilkers) However, it is important to emphasise that the selection 
of the fanner respondents was not made on a random basis, but rather was intended to 
provide a sample of fanners that conformed to a predetermined and objectively assessed 
selection criteria. As a result, the findings of the survey and any conclusions drawn from 
their analysis are not expected to be representative of the entire population. The following 
discussion should be viewed with that limitation in mind. 
The selection of fanners was made by experienced agriculturalists in each region in 
an attempt to cover all of the relevant combinations of three seperate criteria. First, the 
fanners were divided according to the stage of the business life cycle with the categories of 
new entrants, developing fanners and mature or consolidating fanners. The second criterion 
was fanner ability with the four possible categories being well above average, above average, 
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average and below average. Third, the group of respondents was seperated with reference 
to their apparent attitudes towards farm risk. This dimension is obviously the most difficult 
to accurately identify on an ex ante basis due both to the problems of defining risk aversity 
and then subjectively assessing each of the farmers' attitudes towards risk. Nonetheless, an 
attempt has been made to describe each respondent as being either a risk seeker, risk neutral 
or risk averse, with the decision based mainly on the intensity of the farming system adopted 
and the level of debt funds used to finance the business. 
The original analysis of the survey results, given in Newman et al (1990 a,b), 
attempts to emphasise the importance that farmers accord the various sources of risk, the 
most likely reponses to that risk and any significant differences which may exist between the 
sheep, cropping and dairy groups. However, for our purposes the emphasis is different. 
Many of the survey responses can also be used to raise some other important 
questions, two of which will be concentrated on here. First, do farmers think they are 
exposed to the same level of risk that would be suggested by a policy analyst? And second, 
will they react to it in a 'rational' manner? Or, stated another way, are the risk 
measurement models used by fmance theorists applicable to risk analyses in a farming 
context? The answer to this question is dependent on the accuracy of the assumptions 
implied by the models, with respect to the risk perceptions and objectives of the economic 
agents being considered. 
4.2 Survey Implications 
In order to address these two issues, the responses to three of the groups of questions 
put to the farmers are thought to be most relevant. These questions have attempted to identify 
the farmers' attitudes toward, first, alternative ownership structures, second, diversification 
and farm enlargement and third, the price and production risk which they are exposed to. 
4.2.1 Attitudes to Farm Ownership 
The survey finding of most consequence suggests that the nature of farm asset 
ownership remains of paramount importance to the farmer, at the exclusion of virtually all 
other apparently beneficial alternatives. Freehold and individual land ownership appears to 
be the primary objective of the majority of farmers, and their acceptance of various strategies 
which are designed to ameliorate financial risk may be limited by this factor. All respondents 
consider the level of debt to be very important to decision making, and on average the 
existing level of debt was higher than that which is considered manageable. But if given the 
opportunity to replace debt with outside equity, either in return for greater profitability or 
lower income variability, o~ly a small number of respondents would do so. Further, one half 
of the respondents would definitely not replace debt with outside equity even if they could 
repurchase the equity share at a price they considered fair, and only 2% of the surveyed 
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farmers would consider this option if the repurchase price of the equity share was set at 
market levels. Thus, the opportunities for reducing financial risk afforded by alterations to the 
existing farm ownership structure appear to be restricted by farmer attitudes. 
The rejection of alternative financing schemes may also be interpreted, at least in part, 
as farmer ignorance of the possible benefits provided by a new financial instrument. Over 
three quarters of respondents would not consider trading an increase in the size of their debt 
for lower annual servicing charges. Such a reaction to 'balloon' loans may be more a result 
of unfamiliarity of their characteristics rather than a dislike of their terms. Additionally, 
more than three quarters of the respondents would not consider trading an increase in debt 
for lower annual servicing charges, despite the fact that the majority claim that their fixed 
interest obligations are one of the most significant sources of risk. 
These results predicate the conclusions drawn by Patrick et al (1985). Most farmers 
do incorporate some non-economic, or consumptive goals into their management of the 
business, and the apparent importance accorded to these objectives appears to violate the 
critical assumptions on which the portfolio theory risk models rely. Compared to the assumed 
behaviour of investors in financial assets, farmers may be argued to act in an irrational 
manner. That is, they are not solely concerned with maximising the value of the asset. In 
most cases, the surveyed farmers would reject the chance to reduce financial risk without 
altering their expected return, because accepting outside equity participation would violate 
the aim of sole ownership. It is suggested that because many of the farmers' decisions are 
not solely based on a trade-off between expected risk and return, the use of either CAPM or 
APT to measure risk is inappropriate in a farming context. 
4.2.2. Attitudes to Diversification and Farm Enlargement 
Approximately half of the Southland and Canterbury respondents either purchased land 
additional to their first farm, significllntly diversified their enterprise mix or completed a land 
development programme during the past 20 years. However, when given the benefit of 
hindsight only about 50% of those who did diversify would do so again today, and under half 
would now consider land development. That nearly 75% of those who purchased additional 
land would do the same thing again today may indicate that farm expansion is considered to 
be a better response to increasing risk levels than the other two alternatives. 
Of the Waikato farmers, approximately one half of the owner/operator group have 
purchased land additional to their first farm while one third of all respondents have 
significantly diversified their enterprise mix. All but one of the farmers who purchased extra 
land did so during the 1980's and, on average, financed the acquisition with 80% debt. 
Interestingly, 36% of the expanding farmers considered at the time that they were 
overcommitting themselves financially, 27% considered themselves overcommitted with the 
benefit of hindsight although 81 % would make the same decision again today. Given that 
only 50% of the farmers who chose to diversify would do the same again today, these results 
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may suggest that the Waikato farmers also view farm expansion as a more effective method 
of obtaining some reduction in farm risk in the long term. 
Risk reduction was not, however, explicitly suggested by Fairweather (1985) as one 
of the main motivating factors for farm enlargement. In that study, improving opportunities 
for capital gains, increasing profitability, and to help settle a son in farming were given as 
the major reasons for purchasing additional land. The results of this survey suggest that the 
farmers who did buy more land were both aware of, and prepared to accept the increase in 
financial risk which resulted from the need to use high levels of debt to help make the 
purchase. But they were prepared to accept this as a consequence of meeting other, not 
necessarily economic objectives. 
Overall, the attitude of the farmers towards diversifying their mix of enterprises does 
not appear to be consistent with an important assumption of portfolio theory. Only a small 
number of the respondents appear to regard diversification as a successful way of reducing 
potential cashflow variability. Some believe that the risk reducing advantages of 
diversification are overshadowed by a more than CQmmensurate reduction in profitability, 
caused by a lack of specialist knowledge of the new enterprises and loss of size ecomomies 
from their existing enterprises. In fact, some of the farmers perceive that this unfamiliarity 
may actually produce an increase in production risk and that diversifica~;on actuaily lowers 
profitability and increases risk. For a number of other farmers, the possible advantages of 
diversification are overlooked in order to maintain a simple management system, control 
costs or to limit the required workload. 
The risk measurement models derived from ponfolio theory assume that a rational 
investor will hold a diversified portfolio of assets, as such diversification should negate the 
potential risks which are specific to each individual asset. The measurement of ponfolio risk 
is therefore based only on the sensitivity of the investors' portfolio returns to those from a 
portfolio of all assets within the economy. This ~oncept could, at least in theory, be applied 
to a farm by considering each seperate farming enterprise as an 'individual asset' with risk 
being measured by comparing the sensitivity of returns from thi~ 'portfolio' of enterprises to 
that from a ponfolio of all possible farming enterprises. Using this approach, the only 
relevant sources of risk are those which are not specific to any individual enterprise, but 
which have an impact on the returns from all agricultural.products. 
However, if for any reason farmers do not significantly diversify their farming 
operation. it can be argued that models such as the CAPM will understate the risks faced by 
a farmer, even if potential income variability is accepted as an appropriate definition of that 
risk. Sources of risk which are specific to each individual enterprise are obviously important 
to a farmer who is reliant on a small number of such enterprises. Thus, the validity of any 
measure of risk derived from these models must be questioned as they do not incorporate 
'non-diversifiable' risk. 
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4.2.1 Perceptions of Price and Production Risk 
The survey instrument used in the Waikato region was modified slightly to incorporate 
some questions which attempted to identify the dairy farmers perceptions of price and 
production risk. It was felt that the farmers in this region should have reasonably 
homogenous expectations as their farming systems are essentially the same, with the majority 
of their income derived from a single product. 
The survey results do concur with what was expected regarding production risk with 
the dairy farmers suggesting that the impacts of climatic and technological factors are 
relatively small. The amount of variation in expected production is similarly low. During 
an excellent season the farmers on average expect an increase in total production of just 
12.6%, while a poor season should only depress production by 12.7%. Additionally, if the 
farmers were offered a hypothetical guaranteed level of production both their existing 
farming strategies and the level of debt servicing that they would accept do not alter 
significantly from their current positions. 
The respondents attitudes toward product price variability are apparently quite 
different, with marketing perceived as a very important source of business risk. The farmers' 
ability to individually affect or limit this product price risk is obviously small as all promotion 
and sales of milk products is done on their behalf by the Dairy Board. As a result, the 
capacity to sell their product to a specified standard is the only marketing strategy considered 
important. However, some of the responses to other price related questions are not entirely 
consistent with this observed perception of price. risk. If the milkfat price were to be 
guaranteed at a 'reasonable' level, the relative importance of the respondents existing farming 
strategies would change, but not as significantly as could be expected. On average, the 
owner/operator would becom~ slightly more likely to purchase additional land, increase debt 
repayment, undertake farm ·development or alter their current level of personal consumption. 
Such a price guarantee would have a negligible effect on both the level of off-farm 
investment and enterprise mix decisions, and induce an increase of only 20% in the level of 
debt servicing thought to be sustainable: 
Also of interest were the farmers' final milkfat payout expectations for the next two 
seasons. The farmers were surveyed immediately prior to the start of the 1990/91 season, 
before the Dairy Board had lowered the advanced payout from $4.00 per kg/MF to $3.70. 
With that in mind, the average ·prediction for the 1990/91 season was $5.30 per kg/M.P., 
with $5.60 expected in the 1991/92 season. Although one half of the respondents did not 
think that the 1991/92 payout will be any higher than their estimate for the c~ming season, 
no respondents believed it will be any lower. The most pessimistic milkfat price estimate for 
the 1990/91 year was, on average, $4.60 with a range between $4.00 and $5.30. Of the total 
32 respondents only 8 gave the announced advance payout of $4.00 as their most pessimistic 
price prediction. Both these responses and those relating to the hypothetical price guarantee 
scenario may suggest that the market risk perceptions of the Waikato farmers are significantly 
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lower than those that are actually faced. 
Individually, the respondents did not appear to hold the perception that milkfat price 
volatility has historically been as high as 16.6%, as measured by Zwart and Lattimore (1990). 
Indeed, many of the farmers suggested that they had given little thought to the price they 
could expect in the future, but rather relied mostly on the information provided to them by 
the Dairy Board. The wide range of future price estimates given by the respondents also 
indicates that they do not hold as homogeneous expectations as was expected. 
These results do have imponant implications for the policy analyst. If, as the survey 
results suggest, income expectations are generally heterogeneous and in most cases based on 
it very limited amount of information, any attempt to predict the likely aggregate response 
to any given change in policy will be difficult. 
5. SUMMARY,. 
Government agricultural policy has changed significantly over the pas I six years. It 
has moved from actively encouraging production through product price suppon and the 
provision of concessionary finance to the point where farmers are now encouraged to become 
more self reliant in a 'deregulated' market. As a consequence of these dramatic changes, 
researchers and policy analysts have become more concerned with ways in which the risks 
associated with farming can be reduced at an individual farm level. 
Any analysis of farming risk necessarily'requires an appropriate way of defining and 
measuring that risk. In the context of financial assets, it is generally held that potential 
cash flow variability is an appropriate definition which, when a number of assumptions are 
made, can be measured using two models derived from Mark<,>witz ponfolio theory. The 
ability of either the CAPM or APT to adequately describe farming risk is dependant on the 
relevance of these assumptions to the farm business. 
Some of the responses from a survey of 80 Southland, Canterbury and Waikato 
farmers suggest that neither model is appropriate as several of the required assumptions are 
violated. Farmers do not operate their business with the sole objective of impr~ving their 
risk/return profile. Several non-economic objectives appear to have an imponant impact on 
decision making, with individual, freehold farm ownership the most imponant. As a result, 
future imcome volatility may not be a satisfactory way of defining the risk perceptions of 
farmers. While the non-economic goals have been noted consistently in previous research, 
their implications are imponant to emphasise. 
Ponfolio theory also assumes that investors will diversify their ponfolio of assets so 
as to eliminate sources of risk which are specific to each individual asset. The measure of 
risk derived from the CAPM is therefore based solely on systematic risk sources which affect 
the cashflows from all assets. However, for a number of reasons, the surveyed farmers 
reject diversification as a suitable way of reducing their cash flow risk. Sources of risk which 
are specific to an individual enterprise must subsequently be relevant to the farmer and should 
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be included in any measure of risk. The violation of this diversification assumption reinforces 
the argument that farming risks cannot be adequately measured using the same approach taken 
to measure financial asset risk. 
Finally, any policy implemented to reduce farming risk must be based on an adequate 
understanding of the risk perceptions held by farmers. Even if potential income volatility is 
accepted as a suitable definition of risk, the survey responses of the Waikato farmers suggest 
that their risk perceptions of product price risk are quite different from those which were 
expected. That price expectations varied significantly between the surveyed farmers may act 
to funher frustrate any '~ltemptto predict the most likely response to any policy initiative. 
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A METHODOLOGY TO CUSTOMISE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. 
L.S.Saunders, R.J. Townsley' 
Abstract: 
Knowledge of beliefs and attitudes Of individuals, and groups of individuals, enables 
technology transfer to be targeted, increasing the effectiveness of the adoption process. 
The Galileo measurement and representation system of farmer and expert cognitive 
structures with respect to high fecundity sheep management is presented. Attitude 
measures were positively correlated to the level of of experience with the management 
system as predicted. Significant differences were reported in the cognitive structure of 
all groups. Experts held similar attitudes as the inexperienced group but different 
cognitive structures. Extension messages based on the concepts of multiple lamb growth 
rates and summer pasture control were predicted to strengthen farmers' overall attitude 
toward high fecundity management. 
Paper Presented to· the Annual Conference of the New Zealand 
Branch of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society 
Christchurch, 26-28 August 1991 
Introduction: 
Reform of public research and development through the introduction of competitive 
bidding for funds, and funding allocations based on expected outcomes are central to the 
formation of Crown owned research institutes (Cri's). The ability to efficiently deliver 
outcomes, that are adopted within the relevant sectors of society will provide a measure 
of the value of science funding. The transfer of technology - or extension as it was 
known - has for some time dealt with the issues of how to efficiently communicate with 
Lindsay Saunders is the Research Manager for the Centre for Resource Management, Lincoln 
UniverSity. Professor Bob Townslcy is associatcd with the Agricultural Faculty Massey University. 
target groups and how to measure the achievements of such communication. As with 
most social sciences this has largely been considered an 'art' due to the largely subjective 
and qualitative nature of the discipline· Nix 1979. Recent advances in the measurement 
of communication techniques within the Psychometric discipline has advanced the 
discipline away from the 'art' to that of 'science'. This paper describes an application of 
such methods to the agricultural extension, management information field and it is 
proposed that the application of such techniques would enable a more efficient 
technology transfer process resulting in an increased ability to attract funds within a 
competitive environment. A potential application for this methodology would allow 
monitoring of the effectiveness of technology transfer processes, and feedback on client 
perceptions regarding constraints to change. 
Soft systems 
The research presented in this paper deals with soft systems management where soft 
systems are considered to be the achievement of objectives through learning, and 
management of the process of learning (Checkland, 1979). Soft systems are involved 
with the problems of management in the sense that human activity involves planning, 
doing and monitoring, and that some aspects of what is seen as a problem are likely to 
be a mismatch between intention or expectation and outcome. 
Hard systems attempt to aid decision making to efficiently reach defined objectives 
utilising physical and financial concepts for the systematic appraisal of alternatives. They 
are hard in the sense that they involve tangible variables. The relation between the two 
is that the hard systems are a subset of the soft system. 
Soft systems involves an individual developing a perception of the world that provides a 
reference for the determination of behaviour. In effect an individual interacts with two 
systems, the real world system, and a perceived interpretation of the real world, with 
separate individuals differing in their interpretation as a function of their experience and 
cognition. 
Technology transfer is associated with the process of adjusting the determinants of 
behaviour. The development of soft system management information systems offers the 
potential for improved management of extension activity via the targeting of beliefs and 
2 
attitudes to be changed (i.e.to increase the managers'level of knowledge) and evaluation 
of a range of potential strategies that can be utilised to create the change. 
Efficient technology transfer requires an understanding of the determinants of behaviour 
and how these are likely to respond to various communication strategies. This paper 
outlines a process by which this would be achieved, and highlights the need to better 
understand an individuals' knowledge beyond an experts' view if desired outcomes are 
to be achieved. 
Behavioral models 
Early behavioral models (Allport, 1935) were based on the measurement of attitudes 
towards a behaviour in question. These models did not consider the determinants of 
attitudes and as such were of limited value. 
Fishbein and Azjen - model of reasoned action 
Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, developed their model of reasoned action in an attempt to 
predict and understand behaviour and changes to behaviour. Specifically, their model 
comprises the determinants of behavioral intention (i.e. the likelihood of implementing 
an act) which comprises of an o,,:erall attitude and a subjective norm. The subjective 
norm has since been found to add little to the predictive power of the model and is not 
advanced further here. 
The overall attitude towards an act is given by some function of the subjective probability 
that an outcome associated with the act will occur and the positive/negative measure of 
the evaluative attitude towards the same outcome. These are summed across all 
outcomes associated with the act. The evaluative attitude is a measure of the utility 
associated with an outcome, whilst a belief is the subjective probability of a perceived 
outcome associated with the act. This model definition is represented in Figure 1.0. 
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Figure 1.0: Fishbein and Ajzen Model 
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The authors extended this model into a management framework with the separation of 
constructs associated with the act into both inputs and outcomes associated with the act 
(see Figure 2.0). 
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Figure 2:0: Management Version Fishbein and Ajzen Model 
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The advantage of the Fishbein and Ajzen decoinposition of behaviourial intentions is that 
individuals may hold similar overall attitudes towards an act, but may have differing 
belief and/or evaluative attitude structures. Knowledge of these differences is necessary 
to understand an individual's ,overall attitude and to target where influence could result 
in a: desired change. 
Galileo inodel 
Woelfel and Fink 1980, presente9 a theory of behavioral determinants, and proposed a 
system of measurement to represent these determinants within a theoretical framework 
labelled 'Galileo theory'. Whereas Fishbein and Ajzen consider each input and outcome 
as being independent of each other, the Galileo model allows for a dependence between 
all concepts, including the act and a self concept representing the respondent (see 
Figure 3). The inclusion of peripheral beliefs in the Galileo model increases the 
complexity modelled within the overall attitude framework. 
Input 
Concepts .... 
(Self) 
Figure 3.0: Galileo Model 
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The objective of the Fishbien and Ajzen model is to derive a single im;!ex of the overall 
attitude towards an act, derived from a series of input-outcome concepts, whilst Galileo 
derives measures for each belief, evaluative attitude and overall attitude resulting in 
(n+2)(n+ 1)/2 interpoint measures (where n equals the number of input-output,concepts 
and 2 represents the additional concepts of the act and self), which provide a means 
toward explicating a multidimensional representation of behavioral determinlJnts. A 
univariate representation is only useful if it can capture all the variance contained within 
the relationships. The measures of association between reference concepts can be 
utilised to spatially array the (n+2) points within a (n+2) dimensional space. No prior 
knowledge of the dimensions or their correlation is necessary as these are determined by 
the factoring technique utilised to spatially array the concepts. 
It was hypothesised that the Galileo model offered the opportunity to represent the 
determinants of the overall attitude and therefore the likely behaviour towards an act. 
The models as presented reflect a static representation of these determinants at the time 
of measurement but do have the potential to represent the dynamic learning processes 
associated with technology transfer through the application of time series analysis. 
Measurement of cognitive structures comprises of three separate components 
The elicitation of reference concepts using an unstructured interview technique that 
defines the act for a subset of respondents, enables development of a listing of input and 
outcome concepts perceived to be relevant to an act. This listing is then reduced by 
content analysis involving the grouping of similar and the most commonly used concepts 
across respondents. 
The second task involves measuring the association between each of the reference 
concepts plus the concepts of self and the act. The Galileo method uses a direct 
measurement system based on an open ended ratio level scale. This scale is anchored 
by a criterion pairing of concepts which are assigned an association of 100 units. Total 
similarity is assigned the scale value of 0 units. 
Given these reference similarity measurements, respondents are then asked to give their 
measures of the (n+2)(n+l)/2 interpoint similarities using a paired comparison format 
designed to minimise the difficulty of the task to the respondent. 
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This results in a matrix of interconcept association measures which can then be spatially 
arrayed ~tilising metric multidimensional scalillg techniques. The purpose of the spatial 
model is to develop a reference frame within which the reference concepts are located. 
Without this reference frame it is impossible to determine where a body is or how it may 
be changing through time. 
The spatial model used derives all eigenvectors for the elicited similarity matrix (scalar 
products with an origin at the centroid - see Young and Householder, 1938), where each 
subsequent eigenvector represents a dimension accounting for the maximum residual 
variance in the dataset. Most spatial models only account of for the real dimensions 
i.e. those with positive eigenvalues (sum of squares of the coordinates on each 
eigenvector). However Woelfel and Fink claim that the imaginary dimensions should also 
be incorporated as these represent the fact that triads of similarity data may disobey the 
triangular inequality rule. Traditionally this has been overcome by assuming the 
imaginary dimensions were a result of errors of measurement and this was addressed by 
forcing a Euclidean solution by transforming the data. The Galileo theory claims that 
inconsistency is in fact real and does exist and should be accommodated by moving away 
from Euclidean space based on a flat plane to a c!lflled plane which has a basis in 
Rhiemannian Manifold mathematics (see Figure 4). 
c 
r?\ 
A B 
Figure 4.0: Three Points on a Rhiemann Plane 
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Galileo assumes that the likelihood of behaviour towards an act as depicted by the 
overall attitude is an inverse function of he distance between self and the act. Similarly, 
those input concepts located closest to the Act are perceived as being most essential to 
the act, while those output concepts located closest to the act are perceived as being the 
most likely results of the act. The inter-concept association (distances) is a function of 
their perceived inter-dependence relative to the act. 
Within a technology transfer framework the objective is to predict how changes to belief 
constructs and evaluative attitudes affect the overall attitude towards the act (self-act 
relationship), in order to increase the likelihood of an individual or groups of individuals 
adopting the act (see Figure 5). This in tum raises the question of alternate strategies 
and their associated costs and outcomes, designed to change belief/attitude perceptions. 
Act 
Figure 5.0: Theoretical representation of the simple message later lambing is essential 
to high fecundity sheep management 
Within a technology transfer framework the objective is to change the concept-self, 
concept-act relationships and to predict how these affect the self-act relationship, in order 
to increase the likelihood of an individual or group of individuals adopting the act. 
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Each reference concept is considered to be an information entity with changes to the 
position of each concept being the result of information input or loss. Information can 
be derived from internal consistency forces or from external sources such as the 
observation of a production system outcomes or information received from a third party. 
External information is assumed to exist in the form of messages which are in fact 
statements of similarity or association e.g. an observed outcome is a message that the 
outcome is related to the particular inputs put in place. 
Galileo theory considers a simple message to be two reference concepts ie A is B, to 
create two equal and opposite forces resulting in each concept converging along a line 
segment joining them. On this basis it is mathematically possible to' determine which 
pairing of concepts would result in the self-act distance being minimised, by relating the 
reference concepts to each of these. According to the mathematics of the Galileo theory 
this combination is predicted to be the most effective message or communication strategy 
however it does not consider how to deliver the message and the costs of doing so. 
In situations where more than two concepts are involved the underlying assumption is 
that the series of simple messages ie between two concepts would average like vectors, 
from which the predicted resultant motion from each combination can be determined and 
the most effective message identified. 
This assumes that all concepts have similar inertia mass ie resistivity to change; that 
messages are instantaneous and independent of the distance to be moved; that other 
concepts do not anchor each other; and that the content and method of delivery are 
independent of the outcome. These assumptions need to be evaluated. Galileo theory 
potentially offers the opportunity by which extension techniques can be evaluated through 
time. 
To measure the impact of predicted messages a time series analysis can be operated with 
the recommendation that the resultant spatial arrays are rotated to a best fit based on 
a group of concepts that are not involved in the message process. This same process can 
also be applied in a cross sectional research design to relate the cognitive maps of 
differing target groups and also of experts themselves. 
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Case study application 
The Galileo model was applied to the farm management 'act' of high fecundity sheep 
production systems in 1985. The act of high fecundity was adopted since in 1984 a 
commercial drug - Fecundin - was released to promote the artificial stimulation of 
fecundity levels. This release was associated with a major public awareness campaign 
involving most mass media sources, and a number of seminars with expert veterinary 
inputs. In spite of the coordinated approach of providing information, very low drug 
sales were achieved and the product has since been withdrawn from the market. This 
raised the question, "why did the promotional campaign fail and just what are the 
determinants ofb,ehaviour towards adopting a high fecund sheep management system?" 
Class five properties, being intensive high producing grassland farmers, in the Dannevirke 
region were identified for the purpose of elicitation of the behavioral determinants. This 
involved two postal surveys, and a series of interviews with the respondent group. The 
initial survey was applied to 163 properties within the class five categorisation to identify 
performance levels and a willingness to participate in the research. The performance 
data was collected to enable a cross sectional research design to be applied. The 
hypothesis being that farmers that have experienced a high fecund lambing system 
(i.e. achieving a lambing percentage in excess of 116% of lambs weaned to lambs born 
(LW/LB» would hold different beliefs and attitudes to those farmers that have not 
experienced the act. Respondents were categorised if they had achieved this 
performance in anyone of the three preceding years. 
In addition a group of 'experts' were surveyed to represent what would be considered to 
be their perception of the real world. The experts were scientific or consultancy staff 
that had been actively involved with the high fecundity act. The hypothesis here was that 
this groups perception would align more closely with those farmers that had experienced 
the act but may be more closely aligned with the real world. 
A total of 10 reference concepts were identified from a series of concept elicitation 
interviews involving a group of randomly selected respondents (see Table 1.0). These 
reference concepts were tested, and adjusted by adding an interpretation of the meaning 
to each one. The reference concepts were then organised into a paired comparison 
survey and applied to the various groups. Respondents were given the criterion that all 
sheep farming and all crop farming were 100 units apart on the open ended scale and 
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then requested to scale each of the parings against this on the basis that 0 units equates 
to total similarity. A total of 80 complete data sets were returned amounting to a 68% 
return rate comprising of 61 sets of data from the farmer groups and 19 sets from the 
expert group. 
This data set was analyzed at Melbourne University using the Galileo (RPI version,1979) 
software package. 
Table 1.0: Eicited Reference Concepts 
Concept 
1. High fecundity management 
2. Reduced stocking rate (I) 
3. Multiple lamb survival (0) 
4. Self 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Maintaining ewe body condition (I) 
Higher birth weights of multiple 
lambs (0) 
Growth rates of multiple lambs (0) 
Later lambing/high lactation 
feeding (I) 
Controlled set stocking from 
lambing 10 weaning (I) 
Summer pasture control (I) 
Definition 
Running fewer but higher prOducing ewes 
. i.e. larger, heavier mature weights resulting from 
improved hogget rearing 
Survival of multiple lambs, especially over the first 
3 - 5 days after birth 
How favourably inclined toward or against the 
practices you are 
Maintaining body condition over pregnancy at its 
tupping weight, plus allowing for increased feed 
requirements during mid to late pregnancy for 
foetal growth (up til 15 - 17 kg Iiveweight gain for 
twin bearing ewes) 
Birth weights that minimise the risk of starvation -
exposure deaths 
High growth rates to reach weaning weights of 
20 kg Iiveweight at 10 weeks of age 
Set stocking immediately prior to or at lambing 
lime to assist mothering and to control pasture 
cover to 2-3 inches (1000 kg DM/ha) 
High pasture quality by controlling summer growth 
(by stock or lOpping) to provide lamb fattening 
feed reserves 
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Results 
The mean of all measures obtained from the expert and farmer groups was 44 and 42 
units respectively which indicates that both groups have used similar scales of measure. 
The separation of the two performance strata in the farmer group revealed that the 
mean measure for the experienced group was 51.5 units and 36.5 units for the 
inexperienced group. 
Overall attitude - act - self measure 
The overall attitude displayed increasing favourableness with increasing experience of the 
act. The mean separation for the expert group being 11.3 units. The experienced group 
displayed a stronger attitude (21.8 units) than the inexperienced group (41.8 units). The 
relative overall attitude measures obtained supported the cross sectional design of the 
research. 
Principal beliefs (Act - Reference) and evaluative attitudes (Self - Reference) 
These measures are presented in Figures 6 through 8 and indicate that the expert group 
displayed principal beliefs and evaluative attitudes that were closely aligned i.e. a strongly 
held belief was associated with a strongly held attitude. The only reference concept not 
held at least moderately strongly was reduced stocking rates. The concepts most strongly 
associated with the act were later lambing, controlled set stocking, and multiple lamb 
growth rates. Less strongly associated were the concepts of ewe body condition,and lamb 
birthweights. Experts associate very closely to lamb survival and lamb birthweight but 
these are not as closely related to the act i.e. are not as important. 
Experienced farmers reported less alignment in their attitude and beliefs. The concepts 
of controlled set stocking, reduced stocking rates and multiple lamb growth rates were 
closely aligned, although lamb growth rate was not strongly associated with the act or self. 
Multiple lamb survival was totally out of alignment with other concepts. They believed 
High Fecundity would reduce Multiple Lamb survival rates and held a strong positive 
attitude towards Multiple Lamb survival (i.e. a negative attitude tow~lfds high multiple 
lamb mortality). The attitude towards lamb birthweight, summer pasture control and bopy 
condition were less positive indicating that these concepts would have less impact on the 
overall adoption of the act. 
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Figure 6.0: Principal belief - evaluative attitude measures for the expert group 
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Principal belief - evaluative attitude measures for the inexperienced farmer 
group 
Inexperienced farmers generally held weaker attitudes, and beliefs that were generally 
closely aligned. Summer pasture control was the exception to this being very weakly 
associated with both the act and self. 
Inter group comparisons are presented graphically in Figures 9 and 9a which indicate that 
experts differ relative to Experienced and Inexperienced farmers, with respect to their 
perception of reduced stocking rates, however for the other concepts the expert group 
is more closely in alignment with the perceptions of the inexperienced group, with the 
experienced group differing in their attitude towards ewe body condition, multiple lamb 
birthweights and lamb growth rates. For multiple lamb survival they hold a very different 
belief but similar attitudes. 
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Spatial arrays of all distance data 
Figure 10 is the three-dimensional spatial representation for the expert group. This data 
subset required a total of five real and five imaginary dimensions to account for the 
variance in the dataset i.e. this requires a large warping of the euclidean space suggesting 
that this group has a large degree of inconsistency in their responses. On average the 
experts associated themselves closely to lamb survival, later lambing, high lamb 
birthweights and summer pasture control. The act being most closely aligned with later 
lambing birthweights and lamb growth rates. 
xr l'1.li« 
xl rlAN£ 
Yl rt.R~EX 10A 
Figure 10.0: Spatial representation of expert cognitive structure 
The experienced farmers required fewer imaginary dimensions (4) indicating greater 
consistency in their cognitive structure. It was hypothesised - but not tested, that this 
was a result of this groups experience resulting in a greater capacity to discriminate 
between the concepts. 
The inexperienced group associated themselves closely to lamb growth rate, later lambing 
dates and ewe body condition concepts in contrast to the experienced group which 
associate with both survival and growth rate concepts. A total of six real and four 
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imaginary dimensions were required to represent the dataset which is comparable to the 
experienced group. Attitudinal relationships were most favourable towards the concepts 
involving lamb growth rates. 
The comparison of the spatial arrays between groups identified that the experienced and 
inexperienced groups have greatest agreement on later lambing dates but disagreed on 
lamb survival and summer pasture control. 
Experts and experienced farmers were not in close alignment, although the concepts of 
later lambing and growth rates were moderately in alignment. The experts were more 
closely aligned with the inexperi~nced group although they disagreed with respect to 
stocking rates, ewe body condition,and lamb birthweight. 
The above relationships were also tested by applying multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA) to the principal beliefs and the evaluative attitude data sets. This identified that 
the expert group was closely aligned with the inexperienced group based on the principal 
beliefs but less so for the evaluative attitudes. 
Communication messages 
The message which is predicted to most closely align the act to the self concept was 
determined for each group. For the experienced farmers the predicted 'best' message 
would involve lamb survival, lamb growth rates,later lambing dates and summer pasture 
control. 
Alternate messages would involve the replacement of later lambing and growth rates with 
reduced stocking rates and the maintenance of body condition during pregnancy. 
The inexperienced group message involved the concepts of multiple birthweights, growth 
rates, later lambing and summer pasture control and is very close to the second best 
message for the experienced group. It was concluded that failure to differentiate the 
groups may have little impact. 
The concepts included in the three best messages of reach group are presented in 
Table 2.0. 
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Tobie 2.0: Best predicted Messages for each Group 
Concept Experts Experienced 
Reduced stocking rate 
Multiple lamb survival 
Maintaining ewe body condition 
Higher Birthweights 
Growth rates of multiples 
Later lambing 
COntrolled set stocking 
2,3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1,2,3 
2 
3 
1,3 
Summer pasture control 1, 3 
Conclusions 
1 '" concept included in best message 
2 = concept included second best message 
3 '" concept included third best message 
Inexperienced 
2 
3 
2 
1,2,3 
1,2,3 
GaliIeo methodology identified and portrayed the relationships amongst and between the 
attitudes and beliefs of the differing respondent groups. The hypothesised relationship 
between the expert, experienced and inexperienced groups was not conclusively 
supported. Indications are that the expert group placed increased emphasis on outcome 
concepts whilst practitioners placed emphasis on input concepts. 
As such it could be hypothesised that all farmers have similar perceptions (beliefs) of the 
real world relationships, and that the reason for non-adoption was due to differences in 
evaluative attitudes between the farmer groups. 
Knowledge of farmer behavioral determinants may have significantly increased the 
likelihood of adoption. The experts' derived communication strategy involving comments 
such as "there is no need to reduce stocking rates in situations of high fecundity" do not 
fit the beliefs of the farming community. 
Under the CRI structure the utilisation of an expert derived technology transfer process 
may provide very limited results if there is no cognisance taken of the attitudes and 
beliefs that are held by the respective target groups. The methods presented in this 
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paper are one alternative that offers greater precision and therefore opportunity to target 
technology transfer. Where this methodology has been applied (Cary, 1988) the results 
have been significantly enhanced compared to expert or randomly derived processes. 
The ability to evaluate the performance of technology transfer processes would enable 
CRrs to develop improved methods of achieving measurable results. 
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Abstract 
The Economic Performance 
of 
Sharemilkers 
1970·1990 
by 
Frank Scrimgeour 
Department of Economics 
University of Waikato 
Sharemilking has historically been a significant part of the New Zealand dairy industry. In recent years 
the economic environment in which share milkers operate has significantly changed. This paper 
examines the financial resuns of sharemilkers between 1970 and 1990. 
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Introduction 
Share milking has historically been a sign~icant part of the New Zealand Dairy Industry. Sharemilking 
has provided an entry pOint Into the industry for many younger farmers. This has helped maintain a 
younger age profile of farmers which has possibly enhanced productivity. The historical development 
and the nature of sharemillking had been described elsewhere (see Maughan et al.) The importance 
of sharemilkers can be seen in that in 1984/85 18% of New Zealand's factory supply dairy herds of 
30 or more cows were milked by 50:50 sharemilkers with 7% milked under 29% sharemilking, 39% 
share milking or contract milking while 65% were milked by owner operators (N.l. Dairy Board). 
However the economic environment has changed and the question must be asked, how are the share 
milkers faring? The popular farming press gives conflicting signals: For instance in the New Zealand 
Dairy Exporter, June 1990, Roger and Prue Rangi, 1990 Manawatu·Rangitikei Share milkers of the Year 
'reckon their return on investment is 24%·30% 'not counting labour' which is about the average for 
sharemilkers' and again in the Dairy Exporter, January 1991, George Chambers a N.Z. Dairy Group 
Field Representative argues that the 1991/92 season is a good opportunity to start sharemilking. In 
contrast at the Ruakura Farmers Conference 1987, Richard Hutton presented a budget for the 1986/87 
showing a net loss before tax. Included in that paper was a survey showing 11 % of share milkers were 
intending to leave the industry while the majority still considered farm ownership via herd ownerShip 
as the goal. He concluded this is an increasingly difficult goal to attain. 
In looking at the reasons for sharemilkers lIuctuating incomes it is appropriate to consider the changes 
in the economic environment. Not least among these is the change in interest rates. Historically 
sharemilkers have been heavily indebted. Table 1 shows a typical situation in 1985/86 with a 
sharemilkers debt equity ratio being 0.68. During the 1970s and early 1980s inflation was continually 
eroding this debt and in this way sharemilkers made progress. However in recent years share milkers 
have had to face up to positive real interest rates. This is shown in figure 1. Debt has a price and the 
obligation of repayment. 
A large proportion of sharemilkers have a goal of farm ownership. However throughout the 1 ~70s and 
early 19805 farm prices were continually escalating at a rapid rate as shown in figure 2. The 
inflationary environment which reduced their debt also continued to raise the target they had to aim 
for. 
At the beginning of the 1991/92 dairy season there appeared to be a shortage of sharemilking 
openings In the Waikato dairy industry. This raises questions as to whether or not there is some 
disequilibrium in the Industry. 
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Herd size (# cows) 
Effective (ha) 
Total milkfat (kg) 
Assets 
Land and buildings 
Plant 
Livestock 
Table 1: Capital Structure of Dairy Farms 1985·86 
Owner Operator 
137 
79 
22,009 
411,012 
Total plant and livestock 
33,894 
66,119 
100,013 
Dairy Co Shares 
Current Assets 
Other 
TOTAL ASSETS 
Liabilities 
Term 
Current 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
~ 
DEBT/EQUITY 
Income 
INCOME/DEBT 
810 
9,819 
13,622 
535,276 
135,748 
17,651 
153,399 
381,877 
0040 
26,291 
0.17 
Source: NZ Dairy Board 
3 
50:50 Sharemilkers 
176 
73 
27,468 
o 
23,683 
76,835 
100,318 
22 
6,295 
11,994 
118,629 
39,092 
8,979 
48,071 
70,558 
0.68 
20,939 
0.44 
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The performance of sharemilkers Is also of interest in terms of the role of share arrangements as 
discussed in the wider economics literature. Cheung (1969) started a stream of research which has 
examined contractual relationships to determine their relative efficiency and to explain their existence. 
His explanation focused on risk aversion. Recent work has tended to consider share farming in the 
context of the more general principal-agent problem. Some of the recent literature includes, 
Roumasset (1979), Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) and Sappington (1991). 
The long history of sharemilklng in New Zealand and the relative amount of information available 
makes it an ideal area for investigation given that many of the other examples of share farming 
discussed in the literature occur in third world contexts where data about technical and economic 
relationships is scarce. This paper seeks to put together a time series of information on the 
performance of the New Zealand Sharemilkers as a prelude to further research. 
Before examining the performance of share milkers ,it is important to note that sharemilkers on average 
milk larger herds than owner operators and produce more milkfat in total with a similar per cow 
performance. Figure 3 shows that total production per farm has increased'over the last twenty years 
with the gap between sharemilkers and owner operators increasing. 
Figure 3 
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Developing the Data Set 
The construction of a time series of sharemilkers incomes was quite a challenge given the vagaries 
of the data available. The New Zealand Dairy Board has in the past published an Economic Survey 
of Fac/ory Supply Dairy Farms in New Zealand. Unfortunately the last year the survey was published 
was 1985/86, As part of this survey, data was collected on sharemilkers with 50:50 agreements. From 
this source data was available for the period 1977/78 to 1985/86. Prior to this, this survey collected 
data on the income of farmers who had sharemilkers operating on their properties. This data was 
adjusted to give estimates of sharemilkers incomes for this time period. To complete the twenty year 
time series data from the Ministry of Agricultures's Farm Monitoring Repons was adjusted to a 
consistent form. The result is a time series which may have some irregularities but does give some 
indication of performance over the twenty year time horizon. 
Another challenge was to obtain data that was geographically consistent. The N.Z, Dairy Board data 
provided the baSis for a time series of New Zealand share milkers. However it has not been possible 
as yet to develop a consistent time series of New Zealand dairy farm incomes. However it seems 
reasonable to assume that Waikato dairy farm incomes are a good proxy of New Zealand dairy farm 
incomes given that approximately one third of New Zealand's dairy herds are located in the South 
Auckland or greater Waikato area. 
The time series as presented In figure 4 shows that both gross and net farm incomes have increased 
in nominal terms over the twenty year period. Gross sharemilker income increased from $7,185 in 
1970/71 to $81,012 in 1989/90. Similarly net share milker income in 1970/71 was only $2,695 but by 
1989/90 this had increased to $27,460. Figure 5 shows that in real terms sharemilker returns were 
quite consistent from 1971/71 through to 1985/86 but that since the returns have been lower than at 
any other time in the twenty year period. The average for the first five years was $12,128 but in the 
last five years it was $8,547 in 1981 dollars, 
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Figure 4 
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In considering the performance of sharemilkers it is appropriate to compare their performance with 
owner-operator dairy farmers. Figure 6 shows Waikato owner-operator gross incomes increasing over 
the twenty years from $15,208 to $125,962 and net income increasing from $5,504 to $32,361 in 
nominal terms. In real terms there is a significant fall shown in figure 7 with the first five years 
averaging $23,455 net while in the last five years the average real net income is $9,022 in 1981 
dollars. However interpretation of farm incomes is always complicated by the fact that farmers make 
asset gains or losses on the value of their farms which are not included in the income statement. 
Figure 8 shows real farm incomes including the change in value of land and buildings over the 12 
month period. This shows significantly more variation in farm income and a steeper decline in income. 
No account is taken of the change in value of livestock. This would exacerbate the swings. 
Figure 6 
Waikato Farm Incomes 
(Nominal) 
140 
120 / 
100 
:2; -e 10 ~ :; 
« ~ !::: ~ 60 (,q 
40 
20 
1971197219 J) 197,19751976197119711979191019111912191)1914191 519161911191119191990 
YEAR 
_____ Gross Income ....... Exp + depn 
Scrimgeour: Share milkers 
~-l! 0:: • 
< ; 
t'-o 0 --~ W 
Figure 7 
Waikato Farm Incomes 
(Real) 
30 ,-------------------~--~--------__________ ~ 
10 
! 971 19121973 197 4197 5197,1'77197419791910191 \ 912191319141915191,1"719,,19191990 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
-50 
YEAR 
.... Net Income 
Figure 8 
Waikato Farm Incomes 
(Real) 
____ Net Income 
-+- Net Inc + Land Value 
8 Scrimgeour: Sharemilkers 9 
Figure 9 compares the real nellarm income lor New Zealand share milkers and Waikalo owners over 
the twenty year period. It shows that the gap between farm incomes and sharemilker incomes has 
nearly been completely eroded over this time period. 
Figure 9 
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Another issue of concern to share milkers is how their incomes have compared to the cost of land. 
Figure 10 indicates how land prices have varied over the twenty year period. During the first five years 
New Zealand dairy land averaged $2,903 per hectare and in the last five years averaged $2,474. This 
shows a real decline in land prices of 15% during the period that their incomes declined by 30%. 
Whereas Walkato owner operator farmers had an income fall of 62% and a decline in the real value 
01 their properties of approximately 25%. 
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Conclusions 
It appears that the profitability of share milking has declined over the last twenty years. However it must 
be noted that in real terms sharemilkers have done better than owner operator farmers who have had 
a greater decline in profitability. In hindsight this is not surprising because although sharemilkers have 
a higher debt to equity ratio than owner operators as shown in table 1, they also have a higher 
income to debt ratiO. It seems the lower absolute level of debt has favoured share milkers vis·a-vis 
owner operators with the advent of positive real interest rates. 
This suggests that it is not surprising that larmers would seek to improve their share 01 income relative 
to that 01 sharemilkers. No doubt this is part of the reason why new and more flexible sharemilking 
agreements are emerging as is possible under The Sharemilking Agreements Order 1990. 
It would seem appropriate lor further research to be done to document the number of each type of 
sharemilking contract and their variation through time. 
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Table 2: New Zealand Interest Rates Table 4: New Zealand Sharemllkers Incomes 
(source: Dalziel and Lattimore) 
NOMINAL REAL GROSS TOTEXP NET REAL NET YEAR INCOME + DEPN INCOME INCOME 
1970 7.15 1.89 1971 7185 4490 2695 8483 1971 7.32 -2.24 1972 10097 5654 4443 12723 1972 7.90 -6.99 1973 11153 6248 4905 12962 1973 8.10 -1.82 1974 12157 6839 5318 13226 1974 8.23 -0.31 1975 13763 7877 5886 13245 1975 8.88 3.05 1976 14851 8236 6615 13159 1976 9.68 -3.98 1977 17218 9870 7348 12516 1977 10.62 -10.06 1978 18675 10852 7823 11676 1978 11.17 -1.35 1979 22920 12335 10585 13792 1979 11.81 -1.24 1980 28037 15917 12120 14318 1980 12.53 -1.37 1981 33353 19369 13984 13984 1981 14.30 -1.01 1982 41839 23305 18534 16079 1982 15.79 0.47 1983 48518 28851 19667 14736 1983 17.04 5.38 1984 51221 31994 19227 12782 1984 16.09 8.64 1985 63843 39613 24230 15560 1985 14.69 7.30 1986 61573 40634 20939 11878 1986 18.51 4.75 1987 47958 35245 12713 6383 1987 18.58 0.73 1988 53598 40407 13191 5599 1988 19.71 9.36 1989 71011 48944 22067 8593 1989 16.00 6.15 1990 81012 53552 27460 10282 1990 14.97 8.42 
Table 3: Dairy land Prices Table 5: Walkato Dairy Farm Incomes 
($/HA) YEAR PRODN GROSS INC EXP+DEPN NET INC REAL NET REAL NET 
+ REAL LAf'.O 
NOMINAL NOMINAL REAL REAL 
YEAR WAIKATO NZ WAIKATO NZ 1971 15160 15208 9704 5504 17325 17702 
1972 16490 20471 11701 8770 25115 209822 
1971 na 736 na 2316 1973 16991 23565 13578 9987 26393 61594 
1972 1075 808 3079 2314 1974 16027 24792 15020 9772 24302 142751 
1973 1297 969 3428 2561 1975 17794 27296 16567 10729 24143 63603 
1974 2053 1406 5105 3496 1976 18970 28956 17619 11337 22552 28596 
1975 2327 1702 5237 3830 1977 18163 31815 20215 11600 19758 50126 
1976 2376 1809 4727 3599 1978 16908 33249 21512 11737 17518 19984 
1977 2659 2117 4529 3606 1979 15468 33639 20912 12727 16582 38976 
1978 2687 2056 4010 3069 1980 17914 42207 28419 13788 16288 47605 
1979 3024 2411 3940 3142 1981 18024 52752 37241 15511 15511 99415 
1980 3506 2659 4142 3141 1982 17912 63798 45323 18475 16028 125883 
1981 4978 3686 4978 3686 1983 18644 77408 53807 23601 17684 23558 
1982 7323 5380 6353 4667 1984 19199 81250 58239 23011 15298 21957 
1983 7463 5544 5592 4154 1985 19767 94592 67316 27276 17516 54240 
1984 7652 6214 5087 4131 1986 20484 94536 69861 24675 13997 -56113 
1985 8711 6009 5594 3859 1987 18944 74399 64226 10173 5108 9148 
1986 6379 5377 3619 3050 1988 19712 83148 72885 10263 4356 7106 
1987 6528 5097 3278 2559 1989 19608 110374 86162 24212 9429 24086 
1988 6648 5018 2822 2130 1990 19500 125962 93331 32631 12218 40908 
1989 7345 5561 2860 ' 2166 
1990 8764 6583 3281 2465 
Serlmgeour: Sharemilkers 
Table 6: ComparIson of Sharemllker and Owner Operator IndIcators 
YEAR SHAREMILKER FARM SHAREMILKER FARM 
PRODN PRODN REAL NET REAL NET 
kg kg INCOME INCOME 
1971 16044 15160 8483 17325 
1972 17952 16490 12723 25115 
1973 17550 16991 12962 26393 
1974 17326 16027 13226 24302 
1975 18894 17794 13245 24143 
1976 20250 18970 13159 22552 
1977 19750 18163 12516 19758 
1978 19307 16908 11676 17518 
1979 20836 15468 13792 16582 
1980 22559 17914 14318 16288 
1981 22602 18024 13984 15511 
1982 22979 17912 16079 16028 
1983 23473 18644 14736 17684 
1984 25835 19199 12782 15298 
1985 26732 19767 15560 17516 
1986 27468 20484 11878 13997 
1987 24360 18944 6383 5108 
1988 25368 19712 5599 4356 
1989 25181 19608 8593 9429 
1990 24990 19500 10282 12218 
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1.0 Introduction. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s farmland prices rose dramatically. The increase in 
land prices has been attributed to relatively high inflationary expectations, output price 
subsidies and other measures designed to transfer risk away from farmers, Seed el al (1986). 
However, from 1984 to 1988 the value of arable farmland fell by about one third. Over the 
same period dairying and fattening land prices also fell significantly. The fall in land values 
coincided with the removal of most government support measures designed to reduce farmers' 
business and/or fmancial risk. At the same time 'agricultural commodity prices fell and many 
areas of the country were struck by drought. By 1988 a significant number of farmers, many 
of whom were Rural Bank mortgagors, were technically insolvent. However, the real problem 
for many farmers was debt servicing. Many of the high debt farmers were paying interest 
rates which had doubled since they had incurred the debt. 
The Rural Bank debt discounting scheme, as the name implies, discounted existing low 
interest rate debt at a yield of 17.5 per cent. Although the present value of the debt remained 
the same the face value of the debt would have been cut by over 35 per cent in the case of a 
20 year loan l . The mechanics of the scheme were quite simple. The old loan was repaid by 
a new loan with a lower face value and the difference written off by the Rural Bank and 
other lenders. Johnson el al (1989) reports that of the 8,099 applicants for discounting, 4,706 
were successful in having some portion of their debt written off. In total $234.7 million was 
forgiven - an average debt reduction of $49,879 per successful applicant. The debt 
discounting scheme also applied to other lenders who were expected to bear some of the costs 
of reducing farmers' debt. Although not as broad in its effect the intent of the debt 
discounting scheme was similar to the Mortgagees and Lessees Rehabilitation Act 1936, in 
which the Government cancelled farmers' mortgage liabilities without compensating the 
mortgagees or lessors. 
What were the Government's motivations for introducing the policy? The Government and 
the major banks with large balance sheet exposures to agriculture were concerned about the 
effect of the rural downturn on the financial sector. In particular the banks were unsure about 
their ability to absorb the bad debts arising from widespread defaults on agricultural loans. 
The rural downturn also coincided with the restructuring of the Rural Bank as part of the 
ongoing state sector reform programme. The state sector reform involved the corporatisation 
and sale of many government departments. However, it is unclear whether this was the prime 
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motivation for introducing the debt discounting policy. Nevertheless, increasing the yield on 
the Rural BaIik's existing low interest loans and writing off bad and doubtful debts would 
cenainly have made the Rural baIik more attractive to prospective purchasers and would have 
helped to speed the sale process. 
Although the scheme increased successful applicants' solvency, the discounting did not 
address fanners' debt servicing problems which were the lenders' major concern. Therefore, 
farmers still had to make ad !we arrangements with lenders to resolve what was often the 
original problem. Although the discounting made no difference to the present value of the 
mongage, successful applicants could easily realise an increase in equity roughly equal to the 
cut in the face value of their debt if they sold their propenies, or refinanced their debt, shonly 
after their debt was ,discounted. Rising land prices resulted in many farmers benefiting fro~ 
both a market lead capital gain on their assets and a cut in their debt due to the debt 
discounting policy. 
Figure 1.0 
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The debt restructuring programme was introduced at a time of high interest rates and falling 
fann land values. However, although market mongage interest rates have subsequently fallen 
from the high levels prevailing when the restructuring took place. the present values of the 
discounted mongages have not been revised upward to take account of the increase in the 
present value of the mongage2• Funhermore. land values, which react to fanners' 
expectations of product prices and likely capital gains, have risen considerably. For example. 
dairy fann prices rose over 50 per cent between 1988 and 1990 and in some pans of the 
South Island cropping and pastoral fann prices rose by around two thirds. Therefore, 
farmers' equity positions would probably have improved anyway given time. 
Seed et aI (1986) suggest land prices change in response to expectations of inflation and 
incomes. Furthermore. product prices and returns on agriculture are dominated by commodity 
price cycles. Eventually, low commodity prices improve and asset values rise to reflect the 
improved outlook. This is the intuition behind Longstaff's (1990) hypothesis that extending 
obligations. such as debt. in situations of near insolvency benefits both the borrower and the 
lender. In other words. at the bottom of commodity and asset price cycles. lenders are foolish 
to use mongagee sales to recover debt. Instead it would be logical for lenders to extend 
obligations to avoid the high costs incurred in recovering the debt. Longstaff derives an 
extension gain function for lenders from which the optimal debt extension period may be 
determined. In general the optimum extension period is longer, and the payoff to lenders 
higher, when liquidation and legal costs are higher. The reason for this is that by extending 
the debt. the fees otherwise paid to receivers and lawyers are spilt between the borrower and 
lender. Funhermore. Longstaff's analysis suggests that if land prices are more variable and 
interest rates higher. the optimal extension period is shoner. 
2.0 Incorporating option pricing theory. 
Much of the earlier research on option pricing concentrated on deriving a theoretically robust 
pricing model and culminated in the explicit general equilibrium model derived. and 
discussed, by Black and Scholes (1973) and Menon (1973)1. As well as proposing a general 
equilibrium pricing equation for equity and commodity options Black and Scholes 
demonstrated that a firm's equity could be valued using the call option pricing model. More 
recent applications of option pricing theory to valuing financial contracts include work by 
Menon (1977), Leung (1989). Shilton and Webb (1989) and Schwanz and Van Order (1989), 
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The studies use the Black and Scholes option pricing model to value debt, or the guarantees 
conferred on some classes of debt by central agencies. 
While the Black and Scholes model could be used to value farmer debt, this study 
concentrates on valuing the change in value of a farmer's equity due to the lender forgiving a 
ponion of the debt. Farmers' equity can be valued prior to the debt's maturity using the Black 
and Scholes call option pricing model. The option pricing approach to valuing equity values 
the shareholders' "accounting" equity and adds to it the value of potential for increases in the 
asset value. That is, the value of the shareholders' equity equals the intrinsic value of the 
option - the market value of the firm's assets less the value of the debt - plus the option's 
time value - which reflects the potential for the option to expire "in-the-money". This 
approach can be applied to valuing farmer equity and the impact of reducing farm debt. A 
farmer's equity, S, can be likened to a call option on the farm's assets, V, with a strike price 
of, B, the value of the farm's debt. The value of the call option is the value of the equity 
position. The payoff to the farmer in this case is max[ 0, V - BJ. That is, zero or the 
farmer's equity. The value of farm equity (S) prior to maturity of the debt may be evaluated' 
using the call option pricing specification: 
where N(z) is the cumulative normal distribution function evaluated at z, and d, and ~ 
are defined as: 
As well, 
d " , 
and, 
In(VIB') + h+(o//2)]r 
oJf 
V = total value of farm assets, 
B = face value of the debt, 
cf v = variance of the total value of farm assets, 
rr = the risk free interest rate. 
T = time to maturity as a fraction of a year. 
5 
(2) 
From (1) we know that the value of farmers' equity is positively related to the value of farm 
assets, V, the risk free interest rate rr' the time to maturity,T,and the variance of farm 
assets,crv. Intuitively, when the risk free interest rate rises the present value of the debt falls. 
Likewise if the volatility of the underlying farm assets rises we know the probability of 
technically insolvent farmers becoming solvent, before the debt matures, increases. We also 
know that the value of equity is negatively related to the value of the debt, B. Therefore any 
reduction in debt will unambiguously increase the farmer's equity. 
Intuitively the term N(d,) is the probability that the value of the farm assets will be greater 
than the face value of the debt at the maturity of the debt. The probability that the farmer's 
equity will be positive depends on the current value of farm assets, the face value of debt, the 
time to maturity of the debt, shon term interest rates and the price volatility of farm assets. If 
the farmer has a strong equity position the probability, N(d,), that farm equity will be positive 
at maturity is close to one. Conversely, if the farmer is technically insolvent, N(d,) is close to 
zero. Another interpretation of equation (1) is that the fust term V.N(d,) is the present value 
of farm assets, if and only if, V > B at the debt's maturity. The second term Be"rT.N(d2) is the 
pre~~::t value of paying back the debt, if and only if, V > B at maturity. Therefore the value 
of equity is the difference between the present value of the assets and the present value of 
debt. 
3.0 An application of the theory. 
Assume that a hypothetical farm has $400,000 of debt due for repayment in two years and 
that the debt is a continuously compounded zero coupon bond. Also assume, that at the end 
of two years the farm will be sold and the farmer will receive anything over and above the 
face value of the debt. Therefore at maturity the farmer's equity will be the difference 
between the value of the farm assets and the value of the debt. The value of farm assets is 
currently $300,000, and the annual standard deviation of the value of these assets is 10 per 
cent. The risk-free rate is assumed to be 10 per cent. We now have sufficient information to 
value the farmer's equity. 
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Table 1 
Black and Scholes Estimates of Farmer Equity 
100,000 0 0 0 (300,000) 
200,000 0 2 2 (200,000) 
300,000 , 0 7,227 7,227 (100.000) 
400,000 0 74,323 74,323 0 
500,000 100,000 172,530 72,530 100,000 
600,000 200,000 272,508 72,508 200,000 
700,000 300,000 372,508 72,508 300,000 
Table 1.0 illustrates the difference between the conventional accounting e'stimates of farmer 
equity and the value of farmer equity as suggested by the Black and Scholes call option 
pricing model. The Black and Scholes estimate is higher as it incorporates the value of the 
potential for further future capital gains. We assumed initially that the value of farm assets 
was $300,000 and the outstanding debt was $400,000. Therefore the farmer had negative 
equity of $100,000. However, despite this the Black and Scholes model estimates the time 
value of the option, ie the potential for future capital gains, to be worth $74,323. Note that 
the potential for capital gains, is greatest when the farmer is at or close to insolvency.' That is, 
when the value of the farm assets equals $400,000 - the value of the debt. For farmers who 
are very insolvent or those who have a strong equity position, the time value is less. Figure 
2.0 illustrates the relationship between the farmer's equity, the value of the potential for 
future capital gains and value of farm assets. 
4.0 Valuing the benefits of the debt discounting policy to farmers. 
The estimates of farmer equity used in this study differ from the usual Black and Scholes 
estimates as the time value of the option - the potential for future capital gains - is assumed 
to be zero when the farmer's equity position is negative. How can this be 50? 
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Figure 2.0 
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Consider the case of a farmer who is insolvent, ie the value of the farm assets (V) is less than 
the face value of the farm's debt (B). The creditors have lost the security margin for their 
loan and therefore have two choices open to them. First, the creditors could realise the losses 
on their loans by forcing a mortgagee sale. As pointed out by Longstaff, the creditors could 
make the losses larger by holding a distressed sale and also by incurring extra legal costs. 
The farmer's liability for the remaining debt will depend on whether a limited or unlimited 
liability ownership structure is used. We have assumed the farm is owned by a limited 
liability company without personal guarantees'. If the mortgagee sale takes place the farmer 
is forced to realise a capital loss. In effect, the farmer is forced to exercise an out -of- the-
money option. That is, the value of the debt or the exercise price of the farmer's option, is 
more than the value of the farm assets, or market price of the underlying asset. 
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In this case the intrinsic value of the option, ie the conventional measure of equity, is zero. 
Furthennore, the potential to benefit from future capital gains is also zero as the fanner will 
be sold up in a mortgagee sale if the discounting application is unsuccessful. Therefore, the 
time value of the fanner's equity option is zero as the fanner has no choice over the outcome. 
If the discounting application is unsuccessful the fann will be sold at the creditor's 
discretion and the fanner will, effectively, be forced to exercise an out-of-the-money option. 
On the other hand the creditors could agree to take pan in the debt discounting scheme. In 
return for writing off a pan of the principal the creditors would at least continue to receive 
interest, albeit on a reduced principal. If the fanner's discounting application is successful he 
or she receives an injection of equity equal to the amount of debt written off by the creditors. 
This capital injection is reflected in the increase in the intrinsic value of the option. However, 
the fanner may now also benefit from future increases in land prices. This ability to benefit 
from future capit;tl gains is reflected in the time value of the equity option. Therefore the debt 
discounting scheme was wonh more to fanners than simply the increase in equity. The 
fanners potential to benefit from future capital gains also increased. 
Obviously, from the fanner's point of view, the debt discounting scheme is the far better 
approach. If the fanner is successful in his or her debt discounting application, the fann will 
not be sold. On the contrary, the fann remains in operation, the debt is reduced by a 
significant amount and the fanner is restored to a positive equity position. Therefore, the 
fanner will also be in a position to benefit from future capital gains due to any improvement 
in the general level of land prices. In option pricing tenninology the exercise price - the value 
of the debt - has been reduced. This has the effect of making an out-of-the-money option into 
an in-the-money one. 
Assume the fanner successfully applies for the debt discounting scheme and that $100,000 of 
the debt is written off. Therefore the exercise price of the option has been reduced from 
$400,000 to $300,000 which will increase the intrinsic value of the option and also have an 
effect on the potential for future capital gains. Table 2 sets out the estimates of the fanner's 
equity after the $100,000 is written off. As the debt has been reduced to $300,000 this is the 
new strike price. 
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Table 2 
Adjusted Black and Scholes Estimates of Farmer Equity after discounting 
100,000 0 0 0 
200,000 0 1,020 1020 0 
300,000 0 55,743 55,743 55,743 
400,000 100,000 154,384 54,384 54,384 
500,000 200,000 254,381 54,381 54,381 
600,000 300,000 354,381 54,381 54,381 
700,000 400,000 454,381 54,381 54,381 
In our simple example the fanner is initially insolvent by $100,000. After discounting the 
fanner's accounting equity position is $100,000 better off. However, option pricing theory 
suggests that this measure understates the true value of the scheme. In fact the true value of 
the debt discounting scheme to individual farmers is closer to $155,743. The adjusted Black 
and Scholes estimate (column V) captures the value of the potential for future capital gains 
given that the fanner is successful in applying for debt discounting. In effect, the adjusted 
Black and Scholes estimate is simply the usual Black and Scholes estimate truncated when 
the value of the fann assets is less than the value of debt. From table 2 we can see the value 
of this potential for future capital gains when the value of the debt and the fann assets equals 
$300,000 is $55,743. From the discussion above we know that the major detenninant of the 
value of this potential is the volatility of the underlying asset. The example serves to 
demonstrate that the conventional accounting measure of equity understates the value of the 
Rural Bank debt discounting scheme to the successful applicants. 
5.0 Extensions of the methodology. 
In this example we have assumed the fanner's debt is simply a zero coupon bond, repaid in 
full at maturity. Where table mortgages, or other instalment type debt is used, the farmer in 
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effect holds an option on an option - also known as a compound option. For example, the last 
mortgage instalment effectively buys the property back for the farmer. The second to last 
instalment buys the farmer a call option to pay the last instalment. The rpird to last instalment 
buys an option to pay the second to last instalment, and so on. Geske(1979) has proposed a 
methodology for valuing such options. 
The example also limited the maturity of the zero coupon debt to 2 years. A less ambiguous 
measure of maturity is a concept known as duration. Duration measures the cash flow 
weighted maturity of a security and the duration of a zero coupon bond is the same as its 
maturity. Therefore the duration of the rwo year zero coupon bond is two years. However, the 
duration of a 12 per cent 20 year table mortgage is around 7 years reflecting the weighting 
given to the earlier cash flows by the duration calculation. Duration is also known as a "zero 
coupon e~uivalence" measure. That is, a mortgage with a duration of 7 years has identical 
interest rate sensitivity or risk to a zero coupon bond with a maturity of 7 year. Thus, in our 
simplified example, a table mortgage with a duration of two years would probably have a 
maturity of around 5 years. This may be a reasonable assumption to make about the holding 
period of farm mortgages given repayments and refinancing patterns. However, estimates 
would have to be made of the average effective terms of farm mortgages. 
6.0 Summary and policy implications. 
This paper has developed an approach to evaluating the Rural Bank debt discounting policy 
incorporating option pricing theory. The option pricing theory estimates are based on 
corporate liability applications suggested by Black and Scholes. Unlike conventional 
accounting based estimates of the value of the scheme, option pricing theory takes into 
account the potential for future capital gains. Conventional accounting estimates equate 
borrowers' benefits to the value of the debt written off by the lenders. However this 
understates the true benefits of the scheme to the borrowers. Option pricing theory values the 
potential for future capital gains as well as the value of the debt written off. 
Clearly the debt discounting policy gave successful applicants considerable benefits while the 
taxpayer assumed the downside risk for the borrower for little or no cost. The debt 
discounting policy was justified on the basis that many farmers were having difficulty 
meeting loan repayments. However, the logic behind the policy was flawed. Although the 
policy response was to write off debt the debt servicing commitment of farmers remained the 
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same after discounting. The present value of the loan was reduced when the loan was 
discounted at the higher market based yield of 17.5 per cent. However, the repayments and 
term of the loan remained the same. Therefore the policy actually did nothing to address the 
major debt servicing problem. As mentioned previously, writing off bad debts and increasing 
the yield on existing Rural Bank mortgages may have done more to improve the Rural Bank's 
balance sheet and earnings yield ( and therefore saleability) than improve farmers' debt 
servicing ability. 
The analysis suggests several implications for policies which attempt to reduce or modify 
farmers' levels of financial risk. However, the major implication is that any policy should be 
fairly priced. That is, the taxpayer needs compensation for assuming the fmancial risks of 
farmers. Rather than writing off debt, when interest rates rise and borrowers encounter debt 
servicing difficulties, future policies should consider: 
reducing the dollar amount of current debt repayments to give borrowers a temporary 
interest payment "holiday". The future value of the foregone interest payments may be 
calculated and added to the principal of the loan as a form of balloor. payment later in 
the maturity of the mortgage. This value of the interest repayment deferment may be 
estimated and the future value of this "right" also added to the principal of the loan. 
extending the maturity of the debt to reduce the current debt servicing commitment but 
maintaining the same yield and present value of the loan. As above the value of the 
maturity extension may be estimated and paid at some date in the future. 
Rather than selling up insolvent borrowers in times when asset prices are depressed, lenders 
in cyclical industries, such as agriculture and real estate, should consider: 
extending the maturity of an insolvent borrower's debt. There is little point in selling 
up an insolvent borrower when market prices are already depressed. In exchange for 
an extension fee the maturity of the debt should be renegotiated and interest payments 
made in the interim. This approach is suggested by Longstaff (1990). 
Longstaff suggests that policies should concentrate on fairly pricing risk reduction policies 
that extend or modify obligations. Longstaff points out that there may be an optimal 
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extension period for any given range of equity and debt values. The optimal extension period 
depends largely on the volatility of the underlying asset the level of current equity. Funher 
research in this area would provide policy makers with guidelines for formulating financial 
risk management policies. For example. should different fmancial risk management policies 
be formulated for different farm classes? Longstaff's work suggests that the optimal extension 
period should be less for farm classes where the values of farm assets have more variability. 
If this is the case how should policies be formulated to take account of: differing variability 
and what guidelines can option pricing theory give policy makers? 
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Endnotes 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
For example. a Sloo.OOO 20 year loan. with an inrerest rare of 10 per cent. paid quarrerly has 
repayments of S2.902.6O per quarrer or $11.610.40 per year. U this mongage was sold at a yield of 17.5 
per cent the present value. or price.would be S64.187.05. Therefore the discount on the book or face 
value would be 35.81 per cent In general the discount wiu be grearer for mongages with longer 
maturities and where there is a bigger gap between the yield on the mongage and the "market" discount 
rare. These factors increase the duration of the mongage . ie its cash flow weigh!ed rnarurity. 
A simple example demonstrates the asymmetry of the policy. In the previous example the present value 
of the $100.000. 10 per cent. 20 year mongage was S64.187.05 when discoun!ed at 17.5 per cent. To be 
consisrent with the with the notion of revaluing mongages at the market inrerest rare the discounted 
mongages should have been revalued upwards when interest rares feU below 17.5 per cent Say that 
mongage rates feU to 14 per cent. At a yield of 14 per cent the value of the monga~e rises to 
S77.641.12. This is SI3.454.07 more than the value of the reduced mongage. 
For a very good discussion and survey of the earlier option pricing theory literature see Smith (1976). 
For a survey and discussion of more recent applications of option pricing theory to pricing other 
contingent claims see Seed and Anderson (1991). 
In the case where the farm is owned and managed in a sole proprietorship the liability of the farmer is 
limi!ed to the level of the farmer's personal assets. For example assume the farmer had non·farm assets 
equivalent to the shortfaU between the value of the assets and liabilities. In effect. this changes the 
proftle of the equity· call option payoff diagram in that the downside for the farmer is truncated at a 
lower level of farm asset value. However, as most farmers have the majority of their assets tied up in 
their business. this effect is minimal and for the purpose of this illustration is ignored. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the accepted 
methodology for determining the cost of equity as a precursor 
to calculating the required rate of return on capital 
investments. This paper reviews New Zealand literature on the 
CAPM, briefly outines the textbook methodology, with a note on 
imputation, and then surveys the application of the model in 
New Zealand agribusiness. The results of the survey indicate 
a wide variation in application largely as a function of the 
scale of the entity and the investment opportunity being 
appraised. 
Key Words: CAPM, Agribusiness, Imputation 
INTRODUCTION 
The Capital Asset pricing Model (CAPM) is now generally 
accepted in academic circles as the best way of determining 
the cost of equity for a firm assuming a given level of risk. 
This is required to determine the weighted average cost of 
capital which in turn is a precursor to calculating investment 
returns. 
Investment decisions could include - which projects should a 
company invest in? Projects might include buying equipment, 
building a new plant, acquiring a company, or launching a new 
product. The major technical question to answer is: will the 
investment bring the company high enough returns to justify 
the expense. In capital budgeting it is assumed that the 
investment is being considered in order to maximise 
shareholder wealth. 
This paper briefly reviews the literature associated with the 
CAPM and in particular the New Zealand literature. It then 
outlines the basic methodology before reviewing the 
application of the model in New Zealand agribusiness. 
• This paper was commissioned by Dr R.W.M. Johnson, Senior 
Policy Consultant, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The 
views expressed are those of the author. 
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A telephone survey was carried out to determine the extent of 
the model's application. The results of the survey are 
presented and conclusions drawn. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Risk and Return 
The foundations for the Capital Asset Pricing Model were laid 
by Markowitz (1952) in the early 1950s when he developed the 
basic portfolio model. He derived the expected rate of return 
for a portfolio of assets and an expected risk measure. He 
showed that the variance of the rate of return was a 
meaningful measure of risk. Under certain reasonable 
assumptions, he showed that 
a single asset or portfolio of assets is considered to be 
efficient if no other asset or portfolio of assets offers 
higher expected returns with the same (or lower) risk, or 
lower risk with the same (or higher) expected return. 
An individual, such as a farmer making on-farm investment 
decisions should utilise the Markowitz Portfolio Theory to 
trade off risk and return between the various feasible farming 
alternatives. 
Systematic Risk 
This does not go far enough for decision making for a listed 
company. The company when making its investment decisions 
should assume that its owners are holding widely diversified 
portfolios. In this case Sharpe (1964) showed that the 
relevant risk for the company was its "systematic" risk with 
the market. 
The systematic risk for a stock is determined by the 
relationship between the rates of return for the security 
and rates of return for a market portfolio of risky 
assets. 
Systematic risk, often called market risk, is defined as 
economy wide perils which are likely to threaten all 
businesses. Systematic risks include: changes in the money 
supply; interest rates; the exchange rate; commodity prices; 
government spending; and international growth rates. 
The firm faces other risks of course, but these residual or 
non systematic risks are irrelevant to investors (Rosenberg 
and Rudd, 1986). 
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The reasoning underlying the CAPM is that, because 
residual risk can be eliminated cheaply through 
diversification, capital markets will not reward 
investors for bearing such risks. Consequently stocks 
are priced as if investors expected (and, on average and 
over long periods of time, their actual) returns are 
related only to the systematic risks of their portfolios. 
New Zealand Literature 
There is now a large body of overseas literature on the theory 
and practise of the CAPM. The methodology is standard in 
corporate finance texts, see for example Reilly (1985) or 
Brealey and Myers (1988). In New Zealand, however, a search 
of the Accounting and Finance Journal abstracts revealed no 
articles mentioning the CAPM. Furthermore, a key word search 
in Kiwinet, found only four articles as follows: 
Webb (1987) writing in a computer journal briefly 
described the CAPM along with several other models for 
valuing shares in the context of computer applications. 
Lowe (1989) argued that the CAPM and the Securities 
Market Line (SML) is superior to the traditional Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital WACC approach because it 
explicitly considers the difference in risk between 
alternative investments. 
Ross (1989) outlined the arguments that led the High 
Court to give its blessing on the use of the CAPM to 
determine the accounting rate of return for the setting 
of bulk gas prices, a controlled price under the Commerce 
Act 1986. In the Court's view: 
... it is a sensible theory, logically rigorous, 
consistent with accepted and acceptable economic 
thinking and appropriate given the limited 
statistics available in the small New Zealand 
market. 
Grimes (1990) used the consumption CAPM in an analysis of 
how alternative tax systems impact on consumption 
patterns and hence on individual utility. 
The CAPM and Government 
Recent emphasis has been given to the CAPM through the 
Treasury's programme leading to the definition of incentives 
for government departments. This programme has included a 
project on capital charges (Moore, 1989). A central part of 
the discussion is on the determination of the appropriate rate 
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of return for departments. For Mode C departments (where 
outputs are contestable) the CAPM methodology is applied on 
the basis that it: 
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is an established and orthodox methodology for 
establishing rates of return for a firm operating in 
normal commercial markets, although measurement problems 
are non-trivial. 
Lally (1989) was asked by the Treasury to address, inter alia, 
the question of the procedure for measuring the cost of 
capital. Lally gave the cost of capital as the required rate 
of return on its investments and for the government this 
should be that of a comparable private sector firm. The 
degree of financial leverage was given as the same as that 
observed in the private sector. The logic behind this is that 
the government is investing on behalf of taxpayers. The 
return should therefore reflect that return which the business 
would be expected to achieve if it were privatised and shares 
issued to taxpayers. 
The question of appropriate Betas to use was raised by Lally 
(Op. cit.), and Bowman (1989). Lally states that estimates 
based on US firms would be applicable to New Zealand. In his 
view they would not need to be adjusted for leverage as 
private sector leverage is taken to be optimal. 
Bowman provides some comparative Betas drawn from both New 
Zealand and the us. While the New Zealand Beta's are provided 
for local interest, Bowman sees the us Beta's which are based 
upon large databases in large, actively traded markets, as 
being more useful. There is considerable variation between 
the two Beta sets, for example, the Beta for Agriculture is 
0.5 from New Zealand data and 0.99 from us data. Similarly 
the Beta for Forestry and Forest Products is 1.0 and 1.16. 
As a result of the above study, ·the Treasury had applied an 
across the board capital charge for departments of 13% real 
for 1991/92. This represented the mid point of the range of 
rates that were looked at. In 1992/93, each department will 
be expected to provide for a capital charge based on the Beta 
associated with its own industry group. 
Application to Agribusiness 
The application of the CAPM to investment decisions in the 
agribusiness sector in New Zealand has only been addressed 
recently. In June 1989, the Rural Policy Unit (RPU) of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) instituted a Risk 
Management Programme. This is a long-term programme which 
focusses on the analysis and management of adverse events in 
the agricultural sector (Johnson, 1990). 
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Among the topics in the programme was farm investment 
appraisal and risk. Here, McCrea et al (1990) concluded that 
while the CAPM has intuitive appeal for the determination of 
discount rates, in farming it has serious limitations in the 
practical context. Most importanly, one of the underlying 
assumptions of the CAPM - that the owners hold diversified 
portfolios - does not hold. Most often the farmer is the 
owner and the farm is the only significant asset. In the 
authors' view, there is little prospect of determining 
accurately a farmer's cost of equity and at best one can only 
hope to be in the right 'ballpark'. They go on to say that: 
since the financial viability of farm investment 
projects are often to be of greater consequence than pure 
profitability, perhaps greater emphasis should be placed 
on the estimation and riskiness of the cash flow 
components. 
The CAPM has also been applied to the management of risk on a 
mixed cropping farm (Narayan, 1990). Narayan found there were 
high levels of systematic risk associated with activities on 
the farm. As a result he concluded that off-farm investment 
might be a more feasible strategy than on-farm diversification 
for reducing risk on the farm. 
Johnson (1991), in the most recent writing on the application 
of the CAPM, reached the conclusion that it was unclear 
without further work whether risk-free interest rates should 
be used on the farm for discounting or the CAPM variant 
adopted. He also considered it was unclear whether discount 
rates used as capitalisation rates should be on a pre or post-
tax basis in the weighted average cost of capital calculation. 
He considered further work is needed to exactly understand how 
these conceptual constructs operate in the agricultural sector 
and how much the tried and true models of the past can 
continue to be useful in the future. 
without expressly addressing these questions raised by Johnson 
for the agricultural sector, an example of the CAPM methodlogy 
is now given below (summarising from Lally, op. cit.). 
CAPM METHODOLOGY 
The required rate of return on investment for the firm is the 
cost of capital. The cost of capital is a weighted average of 
the costs of equity and debt finance, using market value 
weights. The cost of equity is the expected rate of return to 
equity holders which ensures that demand equals supply for the 
firm's shares. 
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Using the CAPM the cost of equity over a chosen time is: 
Cost of equity 
where 
Beta 
the certain rate of return on government 
bonds over the chosen period 
the expected rate of return on the 
"market" portfolio of risky assets 
the covariance between equity and market 
returns divided by the variance of the 
market return. 
For investments over time it is suggested that for practical 
purposes the variables are taken to be the same for each year: 
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Rf is taken as the annual rate for a term corresponding to 
the average duration for the cash flows in question. 
The sharemarket is chosen as a proxy for Em' which gives a 
risk premium (Em - Rf ) on the basis of past experience of 
around 7%. 
Betas are estimated from regressions of equity returns on 
sharemarket returns and average 1.0 with most lying in 
the range of 0.5 to 1.5. While individual firm Betas 
may be unreliable as a guide because of measurment 
errors, industry averages are considered to be quite 
reliable and Lally suggests that estimates based on US 
firms would be applicable to New Zealand. No adjustment 
is required for leverage. ~ 
Having estimated the cost of equity, the next element is to 
calculate the cost of debt finance. This is given as the 
current yield to maturity of the debt for the time period 
implicit in the cost of equity. It must be reduced by the tax 
rate (0.33) to give the after t~x cost of debt of 67% of the 
yield to maturity. 
Leverage is given by: 
B 
B + S 
where 
B 
s 
the sum of the market values of the firm's 
debt types 
the market value of its equity. 
It should be noted here that Tax Imputation raises the 
question as to whether corporate tax exist anymore. The 
imputation issue is discussed at the end of this section. 
The cost of capital is the weighted average of the cost of 
equity and debt. For example: 
For a particular firm, take Rf as the 5 year government 
bond rate (say 12.5%), a risk premium of 7%, and Beta of 
1.2 then the cost of equity is: 
K. = 12.5 + 7 * 1.2 = 20.9% 
Assume, the firm has 700,000 ordinary shares issued and 
the current share price is $4.00. Therefore the market 
value of the firm's equity is: 
S = $4 * 700,000 $2.8 million 
Further assume, debt comprises an overdraft of $1.0 
million at 16%, and a fixed rate term loan with three 
years to maturity with a face value of $3.0 million and a 
coupon of 20% paid annually. The current yield for such 
loans is estimated at 17%. 
The market value of the overdraft is face value (ie 
$1.0m) and the market value of the term loan is given as: 
$0.6m 
1.17 
+ ~ + S3.6W 
(1.17) (1.17) 
$3.2m 
Thus the market value of debt is $4.2 million and hence 
leverage is : 
4.2 
60% 
4.2 + 2.8 
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The cost of capital K with a cost of debt of 16.8% and 
tax deduction for interest (ie taking into account the 
tax shield effect) is: 
K 20.9 * 0.4 + 16.8 * (1 - 0.33) * 0.6 15.1% 
Thus the required rate of return for this firm in capital 
budgeting decisions is 15.1%. This rate should be used as the 
discount factor applied to the free cash flow in order to 
evaluate investment alternatives. Accepting all projects with 
positive net present values at this discount rate will lead to 
the maximisation of shareholder wealth. 
The above assumes that the risk profiles of the proposed 
investment are similar to that of the firm's existing 
business. If the investment has different risk 
characteristics then the beta should be modified. 
Imputation Tax 
The above represents the text book solution to the capital 
budgeting decision. Tax imputation, however, has changed the 
rules of the ball game. A core ~ssumption of the CAPM is that 
there is no tax. Imputation means that there is a need to 
make explicit the treatment of tax, because after all, it is 
the post tax cashflow that the investor is interested in. 
At present there is no concensus about how imputation tax 
should be treated. Work has been done in the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand and a number of variants have been 
developed, but with no specific amendment to the general model 
advocated. Lally (1991) concludes that the implications of 
imputation for the cost of equity are a reduction of 2% at 
most. For the majority of companies, however, the difference 
may be negligible. Estimation errors in the market risk 
premium are likely to have a far greater impact. 
While the above is stretching the intellect of the academics 
among us, it is probably fair to state that there is undue 
enquiry into discount rates. At the end of the day it is the 
cashflows that need the attention. 
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SURVEY OBJECTIVES 
The survey aimed at determining the extent of the application 
of the CAPM to investment decisions in New Zealand 
agribusiness. Questions to be answered included: 
when did firms begin using the CAPM 
how strict is the application of the CAPM 
how people interpret Beta 
what data is used to calculate Beta 
what are the faults in the CAPM 
what common indexes are used for the CAPM 
what are the broad result of utilising the CAPM 
what application does the CAPM have in risk analysis. 
The results of the study were expected to provide important 
feedback on the extent to which sound investment appraisal 
techniques are used in the agribusiness sector. This was 
considered to be important information for targeting MAF 
policy and consultancy services. 
SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
A telephone survey of 20 financial controllers and analysts of 
major agribusiness companies and corporate advisors was 
undertaken to answer the above questions related to the 
application of the CAPM. The survey focused on determining 
the state of the art in appraisal methodology and investment 
decision making in New Zealand agribusiness. 
The sample was chosen to reasonably represent a cross section 
of views within the agribusiness industry. 
Analysts were questioned on the basis that no result would be 
identified with a particular respondent or company. 
Aggregated results and conclusions, however, would be 
published and presented at the August 1991 meeting of the 
Australian Agricultural Economics Society at Lincoln 
University. 
The survey was carried out over the period from 18 - 27 June 
1991. 
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RESULTS 
Initial analysis centred around sorting the respondents on the 
basis of: 
1 Whether they used the CAPM 
2 
3 
4 
The advisors were separated from the corporates 
The key decision criteria used to justify the investment 
Those using the CAPM, the number of years the technique 
had been applied. 
The Advisors 
Four advisors were surveyed. They included two merchant 
banks, a management services division of a chartered 
accountant and an independent financial consultant. 
All showed a detailed understanding of the technique although 
one made the point that on complex projects they called in an 
"expert" to help. 
They used the Net Present Value (NPV) criteria, discounting at 
the required rate of return relevant to the particular 
industry in question. 
The government stock rate was used as the proxy for the risk 
free rate with one specifying in,addition that it was the 
after tax return that was relevant. 
The market return was estimated taking into account both New 
Zealand and overseas data. Offshore markets included the 
Australia, USA, united Kingdom and Europe. 
Resulting market risk premiums ranged from 6.0 to 8.5%. 
Betas were also derived using local and offshore data, but the 
emphasis was on data from offshore. All did their own 
regressions, but took into account Betas produced by brokers 
in the major offshore markets. 
The number of years that the CAPM had been used ranged from 
24, 20, 6 to at least 5 years. As the people interviewed at 
the shorter end of the spectrum had only been with their 
respective firms for short periods it is likely that the firms 
had actually been using the technique much longer than the 
respondents were aware. 
Techniques used prior to the CAPM included accounting based 
rates of return, PIEs and underlying asset values and 
discounting without explicit risk adjustment. 
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Advantages seen in the CAPM were that it allowed for the 
explicit systematic treatment of risk, objectivity, logic and 
was defensible to clients. One respondent commented that the 
days where results were presented from a "black box" were long 
gone. Clients expected a detailed exposition on how the 
conclusions were arrived at. 
The model was seen to help in assessing risk by focusing on 
systematic risk and ignoring residual or non-systematic risk 
which can be diversified away. In this way it concentrates on 
the risks that investors regard as important, ignoring the 
rest. One respondent commented that when the technique was 
described to clients it helped remove confusion surrounding 
risk assessment. 
General comments made about the management of risk in 
investment decision making focused on taking into account 
other factors apart from the CAPM itself. One commented that 
very few analysts were using the technique correctly. There 
was often confusion over which cashf10ws should be discounted. 
It was considered that most analysts incorrectly specified the 
after tax free cashflow which is the relevant one in order to 
maX1m1se shareholder wealth. They considered themselves to be 
right up with the play internationally. 
Corporates Using CAPH 
Of the 16 corporates, 7 said they used the CAPM in order to 
establish the required rate of return on equity for 
investments. of these, 4 used the NPV as the primary decision 
criterion. The remaining 3 used the Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR). Secondary criteria included: the IRR or NPV; payback; 
free cashflow; and peer review. 
All these corporates would rank in the top 50 companies in 
terms of assets, but the list included two cooperatives and 
one private investment company. 
Required rates of return used ranged from 10% real to 45%. 
Intermediate rates were 12, 15, 20, 22 and 28%. It was clear 
that there are a number of different definitions in use for 
the required rate of return. Answers indicated that companies 
were using accounting and economic based rates of return, both 
pre and post tax returns and real and nominal rates. Little 
can be assessed from the results to this question because 
often the respondent did not know which return he was 
referring to when this aspect was explored. The top rate of 
45% was used as a capital rationing devise in an environment 
of extreme capital scarcity. It will be no surprise that the 
entity involved was a cooperative. Such practise is a good 
example of a bad approach. 
Only one company was prepared to name the Beta they used. One 
other regarded this variable as being extremely commercial. 
This was a forestry company currently involved in a bid for 
the Kaiangaroa Forest. All the other companies were not able 
to state their Betas. 
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When questioned about their interpretation of Beta all but one 
respondent was able to correctly specify systematic risk. The 
odd one out thought it referred to business risk, until 
prompted. Three of the companies said they did their own 
regressions to derive Betas, two said they used standard 
indexes. Five said they used expert advice to assist. These 
percentages are not mutually exclusive. 
Methods used prior to the CAPM were quite variable. They 
included the following: 
Internal assessment then used consultants 
Discounted cashflow and payback 
No specific formula, general accounting rates of return 
Return on assets not a major consideration 
Qualitative assessment 
Rule of thumb ie 20% pre tax 
Capital expenditure approval model. 
Advantages of the CAPM over other methods of assessing the 
rate of return included: 
Very sophisticated staff are right up with the play 
internationally in order to make competitive decisions 
It's common sense 
Enables the comparison of alternatives better 
Enables maximum return on capital 
Absolutely basic and necessary 
Provides a common basis of comparison. 
As an aid to assessing risk respondents said: 
It is very important due to the sensitive nature of the 
market they operated in 
It enables the assessment of risk relative to the market 
It depends on the Beta used 
Agr;co New Zealand Ltd 
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It is done through the risk premium 
It makes an explicit assessment of risk through Beta. 
General comments on risk management from the respondents using 
the CAPM were wide ranging as follows: 
While top executives are very clued up on the technique, 
Board members had proved to be extremely difficult to 
bring around. Use of the model had proved to be very 
successful in highly competitive markets over recent 
times. Board members still placed most weight on 
intuition and experience as to whether a proposed 
investment was a "good deal" or not. 
While good, bad and indifferent decisions had been made 
on major investments the performance could not 
specifically be put down to the discount rate used or the 
specification of the cashflows. Disasters were a result 
of the six most critical factors all going wrong together 
over a two year period. This could be enough to wipe out 
shareholders funds. On the other hand the converse had 
occurred. 
Risk was minimised by analyzing low, base and high 
scenarios, plus sensitivity analysis. 
One firm regarded the CAPM as only a very small element 
in the overall assessment of risk in investment decision 
making. Management structures were seen as very 
important. This entity had only recently taken a strong 
commercial approach to its business. 
Very high risk weightings were used to dampen demand 
under an extremely tight capital constraint. 
Use very active treasury management for currency and 
interest rate risk. Stick to the industries that 
management knows intimately. 
The company is not risk averse, but limits risk on new 
ventures so as not to jeopardize existing business. 
Corporates not using CAPM 
Nine of the surveyed companies did not use the CAPM 
methodology. Six of the nine of these respondents used 
discounted cashflows analysis to evaluate investment decisions 
and of these all but one used NPV as the criteria. The 
remaining one used IRR. Other criteria included payback, 
accounting rate of return and lastly cashflow. 
Agrico New Zealand Ltd 
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Required rates of return ranged from 7% to 25%. Two of the 
respondents used two rates of return: one for investments 
related to the current business; and the other for new or blue 
skies ventures. In the first case the rates were 15% and 25% 
and in the second case they were 8% and 12%. Both these were 
real, post tax returns. Other rates used were 7, 10 and 20%. 
These companies described the way they handled risk on large 
investments in the following terms: 
Apply through the discount factor. Look at the range of 
possible risks and do a worst case scenario 
Risk is very subjective and comes through political 
factors including access and export subsidies 
Lower the required rate of return if the venture is less 
risky 
Do a 5 year DCF and incorporate risk in the discount rate 
Risks are associated with established business cycles 
which are monitored, otherwise ignore risk 
Major investments are in farm properties and here risks 
are associated with such things as location, climate, 
soils, pests and diseases and proximity to infrastructure 
Assess the advantages and disadvantages of the proposal. 
Investments are mostly to secure market access. Assess 
whether future profit will be greater than the investment 
in the target company 
Don't use discounting but are more interested in times 
interest covered 
Do sensitivity analysis and have an ongoing review 
committee. 
Of the nine firms that did not use the CAPM five said they 
were aware of the technique. Four of these used discounting. 
The fifth did not have a significant capital investment 
programme. Their reasons for not using CAPM included: 
Used a consultant two years ago but have not used since 
Internal assessment is more effective 
Methodology is derived from the parent 
It is not relevant to the agricultural business, but have 
used in forest valuations. 
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Of the three businesses that did not use DCF, one was aware of 
the technique but said it was not relevant to their type of 
business. Of the two who were not aware of the technique one 
said that the theory was left to head experts and the other 
said it was not relevant to the business. 
General comments on the handling of risk in the company's 
decision making were as follows: 
Expansion was in two main fields of activity and they had 
not tried to diversify beyond that. Both activities have 
controlled marketing so try to influence the areas where 
some control is possible. 
Use good financial controls and planning tools and 
monitor the bottom line. 
We are not a high risk investment company, rather we take 
a very conservative approach 
There are enormous uncontrollable factors particularly 
output prices compared to five years ago. This means 
gearing has to be lowered to manage interest payments 
Major investment is in working capital not long term 
assets thus the cost is determined by the borrowing rate. 
Risk is very subjective . 
Don't like risk but it is in all aspects of the business. 
the effort in analysis is dependent on the size of the 
investment 
Survival is the key issue so reduce risk by retiring debt 
Risk management has a very high priority. We don't take 
on risk at all. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This survey allows a number of generalisation to be made about 
the application of the CAPM to New Zealand agribusiness 
investment decision making. 
1 The degree of penetration falls into three areas: 
1.1 The Advisors 
The key advisors are expert and rigorous in their 
application of investment decision making tools. 
How to take account of tax imputation is a current 
issue~ 
They talk with offshore analysts and apply 
internationally accepted methodology. 
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They consider that the application of the tool below 
their own top level is poor. 
1.2 Large Corporates 
The large internationally trading corporates have 
specialist investment planning groups in their head 
offices. Application of the CAPM is rigorous 
particularly where there are long term investments 
such as forestry. 
They do their own analysis, but utilise offshore and 
local expertise to a high degree. 
senior finance executives appear to be very much up 
with the play. But there is great difficulty at the 
Board level to get economic analysis accepted and 
given due weight in decision making because 
directors often don't understand it. Attitudes are 
changing slowly, however, and several analysts said 
they had run seminars for board members on 
investment theory. 
Where international competition is fierce for 
i,nvestment this forces rigorous application in order 
to prosper. 
1.3 Medium to Small Corporates and Subsidiaries 
Financial controllers and analysts at this level in 
general have a basic understanding of the tools, but 
their application lacks rigour. 
There is a significant group that is unaware of the 
benefits of economic decision tools. They either 
regard them as irrelevant or have not been exposed 
to them. 
2 The actual process of deriving an appropriate required 
rate of return takes only a short time. The three key 
variables: the risk free rate; the market risk premium; 
and Beta are all readily available. 
As New Zealand data is thin, Betas are derived from large 
offshore markets with consideration of local special 
factors. 
Agrico New Zealand Ltd 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Adoption of the CAPM 
systematic or market 
wealth is ~aximised. 
risk is irrelevant to 
by diversification. 
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ensures that the analysis focuses on 
risk. This ensures that shareholder 
Non-systematic or business specific 
investors as it can be eliminated 
Effort should focus on the derivation of the cashflows as 
this is where the greatest margins of error occur. There 
is considerable variation in the specification of the 
cashflows. The specification which maximises shareholder 
wealth is the free cashflow (the after tax net cashflows 
from operations including net working capital 
requirements, assuming the firm has no debt and net of 
gross investment). 
An intimate understanding of the industry is required to 
ensure that the project formulation is both efficient and 
feasible. This requires the input of industry experts. 
Removal of conscious and unconscious bias from the 
cashflows generated from project champions is essential 
for making valid comparisons between viable alternatives. 
The following quote from Jerry Bowman, Professor of Finance at 
Auckland University sums up the capital investment process: 
Take a half an hour to explain your business to me. Give 
me a half an hour to work out your required rate of 
return. Then go away and spend the next year working on 
your cashflows. 
Agrico New Zealand Ltd 
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INTERNA TIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF 
LAND-BASED INDUSTRIES: APPROACHES TO RESEARCH 
Wayne Cartwright 
Professor of Strategic Management 
University of Auckland 
This paper discusses approaches to research aimed at identifying the determinants of the 
international competitiveness of land-based industries. 
The 'Porter Project' that was completed earlier this year (Crocombe, Enright, and Porter, 
1991) has demonstrated one such approach. A review of this methodology and comments on 
the results of the study occupies a major part of this paper. Unfortunately the value and 
applicability of the findings of the Porter Project has fallen short of expectations, and it is 
appropriate to consider alternative paradigms for research in this area. 
Concepts and Definitions 
The concept of international competitiveness used here is based in the literature of strategic 
management rather than international trade. A recent review paper by Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1991) explains the intellectual origin of these two fields and the linkages between them. 
A firm or industry is said to be internationally competitive when it has a sustained capability 
to generate wealth at a level higher than the average of its competitors - also firms or 
industries - in specified international markets. 
Several aspects of this concept require elaboration. 
First, the unit of analysis may be an individual firm, or it may be an industry, which is the 
set of firms controlled in the home-base country that compete internationally with other sets 
of firms that have bases in other countries. This concept of an industry follows earlier work 
by Porter (1980, 1986). See Figure I for this 'five-forces' model of industry structure. 
Second, international competitiveness arises from firms having positions of sustained 
competitive advantage within panicular markets. but it also results from firms being 
successful competitive innovators. This happens when firms generate wealth by changing 
fundamentally the way in which value is delivered to buyers and by finding entirely new 
opportunities for business development. Third, when it is viewed from a national perspective, 
the concept of international competitiveness must include the notion of capturing the net 
value generated by business activity by either the residents of the country or by its citizens 
located offshore. 
The final important concept is that of a land-based industry. Such an industry consists of a 
value chain - owned and managed by one firm or several - that is based on products derived 
from land resources. For such industries, this linkage back to the land resource is an 
important source of competitive advantage and innovation. It may also be the instrument by 
which a nation actually captures the value produced from the value chain. 
Based on these concepts, examples of New Zealand land-based industries can be classified 
according to their international competitive performance. 
Several of these industries are building positions of competitive advantage. Examples are 
consumer whole milk powder, fresh apples, and varietal wine. 
Others are recovering competitive advantage after a period of erosion. The fresh kiwifruit 
industry is an example in this category and the radiata wood products industry is embarking 
on a recovery strategy. 
The most exciting industries are those engaged in competitive innovation to provide new 
functionality, or even entirely new businesses. Examples here are specialised dairy 
ingredients and 'food systems', immunological milk, and portion controlled venison. 
New Zealand also has land-based industries that have steadily lost competitive position and 
profitability. Examples are consumer lamb, bulk butter, and cross-bred wool. 
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It should be noted from these examples that industries are defined quite specifically. For 
example. it is pointless to consider the international competitiveness of the New Zealand dairy 
industry as a whole. The appropriate unit of analysis is more disaggregated because that is 
the level at which buyer segments are defined and at which competition takes place. 
However, linkages between related industries are also important to understanding the 
competitiveness of each one. 
The Porter Theory 
The theory upon which the methodology of the New Zealand 'Porter Project' was based is 
described in Porter (1991). This large book is based on a study of more than 100 industries 
located in 10 countries. Although it is tempting to interpret the findings of this research as 
firm conclusions, this is not valid because the entire data set was used to develop the theory, 
which was not subsequently tested with independent data. Indeed, it appears that the New 
Zealand study provided the first opportunity to test the theory. However, this opportunity 
was not realised because a test of the theory was not among the objectives of the study. 
This theory of the determinants of international competitiveness is specified at the level of a 
particular industry in a specific home-base country. It has been popularised as the 'Diamond 
Model', as shown in Figure 2. The diagram summarises a complex set of hypothesised 
relationships of interdependency between all combinations of four sets of variables, with 
further 'background' interrelationships between each of the four sets and government policy 
variables, and the exogenous influence of 'chance' variables that are outside the scope of the 
industry itself. A brief description of each category of variables follows: 
• finn strategy, structure and rivalry - the presence of vigorously competitive and 
customer conscious domestic competitors. 
• 
• 
• 
factor conditions - the presence of human and physical resources, the importance of 
a good technical and educational infrastructure, and continuous creation of advanced 
factors of production. 
demand conditions - a sophisticated and demanding home market. 
related and supponing industries - the presence of internationally competitive, home-
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based suppliers and associated industries. 
Much of this framework is drawn directly from theory that has been available for some time. 
Porter's novel contribution lies more in the means by which the relationships are expressed. 
The most notable aspect of the diamond model is that it is a home-base theory of international 
competitiveness. That is, the hypothesised variables that determine the competitiveness of the 
firms of a national industry in international markets are all located in the domestic market 
environment. In essence, the customer requirements and competitive pressures faced by firms 
at home are held to be the principal reason for offshore success; similar stimulation and 
learning processes achieved by firms offshore are viewed by the theory as competitively 
neutral or even as rectifying a weakness if they substitute for absent home-base conditions. 
This is one of the more contentious implications of the theory. 
The selection of industries in Porter's original study should also be noted in relation to 
representation of land-based industries in his sample. Although a small number of 
'technologically intensive naturally-resource-related' industries were included (Swedish 
newsprint, U.S. agricultural chemicals, Danish dairy products), Porter states: "We avoided 
industries that were highly dependent on natural resources". (Porter 1991, p.28). This 
selection policy suggests that the applicability of the theory to land-based industries anywhere 
- including New Zealand - should not be accepted without question and should be contingent 
upon testing with data from land-based industries. 
The 'Porter Project' Methodol02Y 
The process of investigation undertaken in the New Zealand study was said to have followed 
generally the approach taken in the original 10-country research. It is summarised by the 
flow diagram in Figure 3. Three aspects of the methodology merit specific comment. 
Although detailed analysis of world trade data was undertaken to produce industry cluster 
charts that were intended to be the basis of industry selection, this was actually undertaken 
more judgementaIly. (Crocombe, Enright and Porter 1991, pp.94, 209, 2\0). This was 
done in order to ensure inclusion of small emergent industries and also because trade data 
does not capture all important measures of international competitiveness of industries, such 
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as foreign direct investment that adds value offshore to exported products. 
The second notable aspect of the methodology was that data was collected through the case 
study method. Although case reports had required sections, based essentially on the Harvard 
business case study tradition, there was no specification of theory-related variables for which 
data should be obtained. Data was not collected for the purpose of investigating or testing 
the theory. This approach leads directly to the third comment on the methodology: the 
diamond theory was accepted as a firm conclusion and as a desired benchmark condition for 
industries, which were then evaluated according to it. The theory was used to test the 
industries, rather than industry data being used to test the theory. 
Comments on Selected 'Porter Project' Results 
The published summary of the sources of competitive advantage identified by the case studies 
of the 'Porter Project' is presented in Figure 4. In this summary, the determinants are 
evaluated in terms of the variable sets specified by the Porter 'diamond' model. Remember 
that this model analyses only those conditions found within New Zealand. On this basis, all 
land-based industries are characterised as 'factor driven', with essentially zero influence from 
sophisticated demand, and only weak influence from rivalry and the structure of firms. Even 
the factor conditions emphasise natural factor endowments rather than innovation. 
If the Porter theory is accepted as a diagnostic instrument, one would conclude that the 
international competitiveness of all the land-based industries studied is seriously flawed and 
probably weak. The 'diamond' analysis of the New Zealand dairy industry shown in Figure 
5 would appear to support this view, but recall again that this diagram reflects only the 
domestically-based part of the industry. 
However, there must be some doubt that the analysis represented by Figure 5 provides a 
comprehensive and unbiased identification of the sources of competitive advantage for the 
dairy industry. To explore this further, it is useful to analyse another 'diamond' for an 
offshore industry segment in which the N.Z. Dairy Board is a leading competitor. This 
analysis of the U.S. specialised food ingredients industry is shown in Figure 6, the firm MPI 
being the N.Z. Dairy Board subsidiary in that market. The deficiencies of the home-base 
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analysis appear to be remedied when the offshore determinants of advantage are recognised. 
The stimulation and pressure of vigorous competition and sophisticated buyers - essentially 
absent in New Zealand - are very evident. Further, the innovation in milk production and 
processing that takes place in New Zealand is complemented by more specialised research and 
development undertaken close to customers. At least for this industry segment, the Porter 
theory alone appears not to account well for international competitiveness. When the theory 
is augmented by specific offshore market variables, the revised model provides more useful 
insights. 
Further research that is in progress and will be reported elsewhere (Cartwright, 1991) has 
used a scoring model to quantify 'diamond' variables identified in each of the 'Porter Project' 
case studies. This work suggests that for several large land-based industries there is a 
negative relationship between these determinants and measures of international 
competitiveness. For example, lamb and wool have several moderately strong Porter 
determinants but are actually dismal performers internatio~ally. Conversely, the casein/whey 
. protein industry and fresh apples have lower-scoring Porter determinants but are impressive 
international performers. Further, exploratory study of an alternative model that is 
augmented by offshore 'diamond' variables appears to be supported by the coded case study 
data. 
The 'Porter Project' as a whole has probably made useful contributions to economic and 
corporate debate in New Zealand. However, the ability of this research approach to identify 
strategies for enhancing the international competitiveness of land-based industries - especially 
those that have supply capacity substantially in excess of domestic demand - appears to be 
very limited. The specification of the 'diamond' theory in terms of strictly home-base 
variables results in important offshore sources of competitive advantage being at best treated 
peripherally and at worst ignored. Critical aspects of the international business environment, 
such as trade barriers, are not explicitly modelled except perhaps as indirect 'chance' events. 
An alternative approach to international competitiveness research for land-based industries is 
required. 
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An Alternative Research Paradigm 
A current focus of development in international business management research is the so-called 
'process school' led by Prahalad and his colleagues (Doz and Prahalad, 1987; Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1989, 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Prahalad and Doz 1991). Unlike the 
Porter approach, which has its roots in industrial economics, this model focuses specifically 
on the strategic management processes of competitively successful international firms. The 
key ideas embraced by this model are long-term strategic intent, the critical requirements to 
build core competencies, the importance of competitive innovation, and the way in which 
organisational leadership and structure supports competitively successful strategies. Research 
based on this approach could provide producers and firms in land-based industries, as well 
as policy advisers, with a valuable source of guidance for continuous improvement of the 
international competitiveness of these industries. Some areas of the propositions that this 
research could investigate are provided Figure 7. 
Conclusions 
This paper has considered approaches to research in the field of international competitiveness 
of land-based industries. It has argued that the theoretical basis and methodology of the 
recent 'Porter Project' severely limited the value of this work with respect to land-based 
industries. An alternative approach, based on the Prahalad 'process school' would appear to 
offer the potential for rich insights for producers, corporate managers, and government 
policy. 
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AGRICULTURAL MARKETING POLICY 
Recent Developments in Producer Board Legislation 
Sharon Cottrell and Victor Walker 
Policy Services, MAF Policy 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
PO Box 2526, Wellington 
New Zealand 
ABSTRACT 
Appropriate structures for export marketing New Zealand's primary produce have 
been the subject of considerable debate in recent years. During a period of 
widespread liberalisation of the New Zealand economy, the roles, functions and 
structures of the statutory producer and marketing boards, and indeed their continued 
existence, have been the focus of much attention both inside and outside the 
Government. This paper outlines developments in the legislative environment 
regulating the export marketing of agricultural and horticultural products in recent 
years, it comments on the affects of these changes and makes some suggestions about 
the future direction of Government policy in this area. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
BACKGROUND 
The marketing of New Zealand's pastoral sector expons has been subject to 
Government intervention in one way or another for most of this century. More 
recently horticultural exports have also been regulated to varying degrees. Today 
more than 80% of the value of New Zealand's agricultural and horticultural exports 
are subject to the influence of statutory marketing boards or licensing authorities 
(Zwart and Moore, 1990). 
The Boards, all of which have a producer majority regardless of their title, have their 
genesis in periods of marketing difficulty for the product concerned when there was 
a perceived need to better match the strengths of overseas buyers. They have 
developed on the apparent premise that in order for producers to better manage the 
risks inherent in producing primary commodities for export, legislated disciplines and 
controls remain necessary. 
As a number of commentators have noted (Woods, 1988; Zwart and Moore, 1990), 
the powers invested in producer boards are very wide-ranging, providing varying 
degrees of regulatory and control functions, commercial activities and industry 
support and leadership functions. 
The Apple and Pear Marketing Board acquires all domestically grown pipfrnit and 
markets it both within New Zealand and overseas. The Board also has an import 
monopoly except for pipfrnit from Australia. The Dairy Board is empowered to 
purchase all dairy produce intended for export and the Kiwifruit Marketing Board 
(established in 1988) has a monopoly on the export of kiwifruit except that destined 
for Australia. 
The Meat Producers Board and the Wool Board license exporters and maintain 
controls over their activities. The acts relating to these boards also enable them to 
take control of or acquire the product. The Game Industry Board, reformed in 1985, 
is enabled to licence game exporters following the passage of an Order-in-Council 
to activate this section of the Regulations. To date, this power has not been invoked. 
The recently formed Horticultural Export Authority is enabled to license exporters of 
prescribed products, although its licensing powers cannot be used restrictively. 
In addition to the powers authorising the boards to intervene in the marketing of 
primary products boards, except the Kiwifruit Marketing Board, are empowered to 
levy producers and in the past many were required to maintain stabilisation accounts 
funded either by the retention of earnings or compulsory payments (levies). The 
boards also perform a range of industry support functions such as research, 
technology transfer, promotion and quality control. 
Because of their statutory status, the boards were provided with a number of 
privileges not available to normal commercial entities. For example, boards were 
exempt from paying income and land ta"l( and they were provided with concessional 
access to Reserve Bank funds to finance stabilisation and trading accounts. Their 
statutory status and their wide range of functions also provided a useful conduit for 
the Government to implement policy decisions, such as the Supplementary Minimum 
Prices Scheme. 
THE REFORM PROCESS 
The advent of the Labour Government in 1984 saw the beginning of a greatly 
accelerated programme of economic liberalisation. The programme's initial focus 
was to reduce the level and range of Government interventions in the economy with 
the aim of increasing the efficiency of resource allocation and hence an improved 
growth rate. 
As part of this process producer board access to Reserve Bank funds was removed 
in 1986. (The terms of access to these funds had been altered in 1983 when the 1 % 
concessional rate of interest had been replaced by a market rate.)The Government 
subsequentially negotiated with the Dairy Board and the Meat Producers Board for 
the concessional settlement of outstanding debts in their Resr.rve Bank accounts. 
The producer boards' tax exempt status was revoked from the income year beginning 
on 1 April 1988, with the boards being required to operate under the same taxation 
rules as companies. However, given that the boards do not have a normal 
commercial structure the relationship between the boards and their 
suppliers/shareholders has necessitated a somewhat different treatment for tax 
purposes (see King, 1990). 
Amendments to the Acts under which the Wool Board, the Dairy Board and the 
Apple and Pear Marketing Board operate were completed in 1988. The Meat Export 
Control Act was amended in 1989. The primary purpose of these amendments was 
to formalise the Government's decisions regarding access to Reserve Bank funding. 
As a corollary, the amendments reduced the extent of the Government's involvement 
in the financial affairs of the boards. Price fixing committees were abolished and 
provision made for greater industry consultation in the setting of acquisition prices. 
The requirement to operate price stabilisation schemes was removed and in the case 
of the Meat Producers Board prevented. Provisions were made to enable the boards 
to run in the same way as other commercial entities in their financial dealings, 
although certain constraints relating these powers to the boards' functions were 
maintained. 
The significantly increased commercial autonomy these amendments gave the boards, 
coupled with their moves into a wider range of commercial activities, has allowed the 
boards to develop to a position where they are considered in many circles to be the 
only authoritative voices on behalf of the industries they participate in. This is 
particularly so with the single seller boards where access to information by any other 
party is so restricted that it is extremely difficult to monitor their performance in any 
effective way. 
"THE PRODUCER BOARD REVIEW" 
At the same time as the abovementioned changes were being made, the Government 
announced its intention to make a more fundamental review of producer boards and 
their place in the economy. The review was to be undertaken by officials and was 
to include the Dairy Board, the Wool Board, the Meat Producers Board, the Apple 
and Pear Marketing Board and the (then) Kiwifruit Authority. Officials developed 
the following broad categories to guide their investigations: 
the need for statutory backing in the organisation and marketing of primary 
products; 
• the need for, and desirability of, limiting access to certain markets for certain 
products; 
where limiting access is seen to be desirable, the appropriate methods for 
allocating trade access rights and providing for new entrants and innovation; 
the need for controls over certain activities in the marketing chain, such as freight 
rates and grading; 
the appropriate composItIon and accountability mechanisms for organisations 
funded by producers, but with controls over other players; 
• the costs and benefits from the pooling of returns from markets; 
• the appropriate ownership structures for organisations with statutory backing 
undertaking the marketing of primary products. 
In carrying out their investigations officials consulted widely with parties in the 
agricultural sector affected by the legislation contained in the various producer board 
acts and made a number of reports to Ministers. 
At the same time widespread public debate on the costs and benefits of statutory 
intervention in the export marketing of agricultural and horticultural products was 
taking place. Views quickly became polarised with the boards themselves vigorously 
defending their current positions. Those advocating reform did so from the 
perspective that the original conditions that had led to the formation of the producer 
boards no longer existed and that their current roles and structures were less and less 
relevant to the international marketplace. It was argued that in today's competitive 
environment there were few opportunities for increasing returns to New Zealand by 
restricting access to the marketplace, and that the costs of statutory control, in 
particular single seller privileges, which included bureaucratic inefficiency, limitations 
on innovation, inadequate accountability mechanisms and the masking of market 
signals, were significant (The Treasury, 1984 and Woods, 1988). 
At the other end of the spectrum controls on the exporting of primary products were 
seen to be justified as a means to improve returns by allowing the development of 
coherent marketing strategies and price discrimination practices, thereby eliminating 
or reducing "weak selling". The increased power of the overseas retail multiples was 
seen to be more adequately balanced by New Zealand exporters of a size and degree 
of vertical integration that could only be achieved by intervention (NZMDB, 1988). 
The producer boards themselves argued that their statutory underpinning did not 
prevent them from adapting to a changing market environment and that they were 
obliged by the very nature of that market to perform efficiently and to continually 
innovate. The boards saw themselves as being very accountable to producers and in 
general suitably structured to carry out their functions. They also pointed OUt that in 
the wake of the 1987 stock market crash, the commercial models being advocated did 
not in many cases appear to have served their shareholders or the economy well (The 
Producer Board Seminar Papers, 1988). 
TIrroughout this period the Government made no public moves towards more 
fundamental reform of producer boards. The benefits of altering the producer 
marketing board system were not able to be clearly demonstrated to the Government 
and the apparent costs of the system were vigorously disputed. At that time returns 
for most New Zealand products on international markets were low and the risks of 
further disruption in the short-term resulting from reduced intervention were seen by 
the Government to be high. Producers continued to support the system and had 
successfully petitioned the Government for the creation of a new single seller board. 
It was against this background that in the middle of 1989 the Minister of Agriculture 
announced thar the Government did not plan to make significarit changes to the 
structures and functions of the producer boards. He described the review process as 
a turkey that had lost its feathers and died of the cold, only later to clarify the 
position by saying that rather than dying altogether the turkey had become several 
smaller birds. This statement took some of the heat from the debate, provided some 
reassurance for the boards and led to officials being asked to concentrate on 
developing proposals to fine tune the legislation under which the individual producer 
boards operate. 
OTHER LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES 
Kiwifruit Marketing Board 
As market returns for kiwifruit deteriorated dramatically from 1986 onwards and as 
orchard profitability was severely reduced, the existing system for the control of 
export kiwifruit marketing came under increased scrutiny. The Kiwifruit Marketing 
Regulations 1977 had provided for a system of.licensed exporters under the auspices 
of the producer dominated New Zealand Kiwifruit Authority. The Authority was 
empowered to license exporters on a restrictive basis, to set quality standards, to 
control promotion and to co-ordinate marketing. As the supply of fruit grew and 
competition from other suppliers in the marketplace increased, the belief that licensed 
exporters, in competing to secure crop, were not making the returns in the 
marketplace that could be achieved became commonplace. The commission selling 
practices operated by most exporters were seen by many in the industry as 
inappropriate in that they mitigated against investment and penetration in overseas 
markets. The structure was also considered not to provide a sufficient base on which 
the development of market power to effectively compete with large importing firms 
could be achieved. 
The Kiwifruit Authority commissioned a detailed investigation on options for the 
future marketing arrangements for kiwifruit (Coopers and Lybrand, 1988) and at the 
behest of growers chose to advocate the option of a single seller. In making its 
decision to introduce a more interventionist regime for the export marketing of 
kiwifruit the Government appears to have been persuaded of the merits of such a 
system by the high degree of suppOrt advanced for it by growers. Growers were 
clearly influenced by the promises of increased returns that the Authority stated could 
be achieved by a single seller in its fIrst year of operation. However, growers also 
saw advantages in increased control and greater stability of returns. 
The Government in choosing to accede to the wishes of growers did not however 
completely ignore the concerns that were being raised about the place of producer 
boards in the economy. The Regulations establishing the Board provide for a greater 
commercial orientation in the Board's composition than was apparent in other 
producer boards at that time. They provide for more direct panicipation in the 
election of grower members than the legislation governing the other boards and they 
require that a performance and efficiency audit of the Board's operations be carried 
out. In addition, the board has no powers of acquisition on the domestic market and 
does not ~ave control over kiwifruit exports to Australia. 
The performance and efficiency audit required by the regulations is currently being 
undertaken. It is intended to provide some measure of the Board's success in 
achieving higher prices and greater penetration in the marketplace and in reducing 
costs of on-shore operations since its establishment. It will also indicate those areas 
where the Board's strategies can be improved and where the regulatory environment 
could be adapted to better enable the Board to perform in the best interests of 
growers. The Review is due to be completed by I November 1991 in time to allow 
any agreed improvements to be in-place by the beginning of the next season. 
The complete deregulation of exporting to Australia provides for a more directly 
market related indication of the Board's performance. For the two seasons following 
the establishment of the Board returns from the Australian market followed the same 
trends as returns achieved by the Board in other markets although exports to that 
market have grown at a faster rate. Indications are that this may not be the case in 
the current season and as a result pressures to control access to Australia are 
increasing. 
The Horticulture Export Authority 
The Horticulture Export Authority Act was passed by Parliament in 1987 after a 
lengthy period of development and debate. Again, the impetus for intervention came 
from growers who considered that the returns on their investment in new products 
would be improved by co-ordinated marketing and development and that risks could 
be better managed with greater control. The Act attempts to strike a balance between 
the integrated marketing and free market economic theories current during its 
development. The Act establishes an Authority, with representation from 
representative grower groups and from exporters, which has as its primary function 
the promotion of the effective export marketing of horticultural products. 
Provision is made for the prescribing of products and for the recognition of product 
groups by Order-in·Council and for the licensing of exporters when the Ministers of 
Agriculture and Overseas Trade and Marketing are satisfied that certain conditions 
have been met. The conditions largely relate to the representativeness of product 
groups and the degree of consultation with those involved with a particular product. 
Need is not required to be demonstrated. 
Where a product is prescribed and licensing required, the AuthOrity licenses exporters 
of the product in accord with criteria laid out in the Act. The criteria do not allow 
the Authority to limit the numbers of licenses issued for a product or to restrict their 
extent in any way. The Authority must be satisfied that potential exporters are of 
sound financial standing, that they have expertise in export marketing and that they 
have not been convicted of an offence under the Act. Provision is made for the 
issuing of provisional licences where the expertise criterion cannot be satisfied. The 
Authority also has powers which it is able to use to restrict or revoke licences in 
certain conditions. Detailed appeal provisions are included in the Act. 
The Act requires recognised product groups to develop export marketing strategies 
which are approved by the Authority and are intended to form the basis of the 
industry's export market development. 13 product groups have come under the REA 
since its inception. The products covered range from significant, such as squash, to 
barely emerging, such as wasabi. The product groups have to date largely 
concentrated in the development of their export marketing strategies on improving 
grower information, better quality control and defining research needs. Theemphasis 
has been on the characteristics of the product rather more than on the market and in 
some cases significant gains have been made in these areas. The product gro~ps 
have however increasingly felt that the gains made on-shore are being undermined 
by the behaviour of exporters off-shore and have petitioned the Government for 
amendments to the Act to provide for restrictive licensing and greater freedom for the 
Authority to use its delicensing powers. The Government has yet to make decisions 
in this area. 
FINE TUNING PRODUCER BOARD LEGIS LA TION 
In developing proposals to amend legislation on a board by board basis MAF officials 
have been keen to ensure that there is as much consistency between boards as 
possible. 'The following objectives were agreed with the Minister of Agriculture and 
have been used to guide the development of amendments to the Dairy Board Act, the 
Apple and Pear Marketing Act, the Meat Export Control Act and the Wool Industry 
Act: 
that the composition of boards better reflect the sort of expertise needed to help 
the boards to compete in an increasingly complex international marketplace; 
• that Government involvement in the day to day decision making of the boards be 
reduced; 
• that the systems for electing/appointing producer members to boards be as direct 
and as representative as possible given the characteristics of the industry; 
that, as a consequence of reduced Government involvement in the boards 
activities, the boards be made more accountable to producers for their decisions 
and investments, for the use of coercive powers and for the expenditure of levy 
monies; 
that the boards regulatory decisions and actions be made more transparent; 
that regular perfortnance reviews be introduced; 
that where certain actions undertaken by boards were affecting the operation of 
market forces domestically. the legislative backing for these actions be reviewed 
and that they be removed where it could not be demonstrated that they were 
necessary for the boards to achieve their export marketing roles; 
that the amendments be workable from the boards' point of view and politically 
acceptable to the Government. 
Priorities were not set alongside these objectives and whether they will all be 
achieved is still open to question. In practical terms, if agreement cannot be reached 
between the Minister and the board concerned, a proposed change is unlikely to 
become part of an amendment bill. 
Progress on proposed amendments to the Dairy Board's legislation has been made at 
a faster rate than with the other boards, largely as a result of the Board's wish to see 
certain changes made to its Act. A Dairy Board Amendment Bill was introduced in 
September 1990 and referred to the Primary Production Select Committee. The new 
Government has decided to continue with the Bill, however it would be reasonable 
to expect some alterations as the Bill advances through the legislative process. 
ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE DAIRY BOARD AMENDMENT BILL 
The following paragraphs do not detail all the provisions in the Bill but outline the 
major changes being proposed to meet the objectives mentioned previously where 
they relate to the Dairy Board. It can be expected that changes of this nature will 
also be made to the legislation of other boards in due course. 
Board Composition 
The Bill replaces the two Government appointees on the Dairy Board with two 
Directors with commercial expertise appointed by the Minister on the 
recommendation of the Board. This change to a large extent fortnalises current 
practice and recognises that the role of the Government appointees had become 
somewhat confused. 
Independence from Government 
The B ill removes the requirement that the Audit Office carry out the annual financial 
audit of the Board. With the ending of the Board's access to concessional Reserve 
Bank funds a major justification for the Audit Office to conduct the fmancial audit 
was removed. The Bill provides for the dairy industry to select its own auditors, and 
makes the auditors responsible to the industry. 
The Dairy Board is one of the seven boards whose chief executive officers' salaries 
are set by the Higher Salaries Commission. Again this constraint is considered to be 
no longer justified. Through the Dairy Board Amendment Bill a consequential 
amendment to the Higher Salaries Commission Act is made that will remove all 
producer boards from the Commission's control. 
Currently the Act requires that before acqumng or marketing dairy produce 
manufactured overseas, the Board must first consult the Minister of Agriculture. In 
the present trading environment this requirement is impractical and recently has been 
honoured more in the breach than the observance. The Bill therefore repeals this 
section. 
Accountability 
At present the Act requires the Board to repon annually to the Minister of 
Agriculture on the operations of its subsidiary and associate companies. No repon 
on these investments needs to be provided for producers, although the Board has in 
recent years made available a financial summary of its subsidiaries. The Bill requires 
that statements of the financial performanr.e of the Board's subsidiary companies be 
provided to the industry. 
The Bill inserts a section in the Act requiring a review of the Board's performance 
and efficiency every five years. The objectives of such an audit are to assess whether 
the Board is carrying out its managerial, operational and financial functions 
effectively and efficiently; and whether the Board has in place appropriate policies 
and strategies to effectively accomplish its objectives in the context of the powers and 
functions set out in its Act. The review will provide information for the Government 
to assess whether the legislative framework in which the Board operates remains 
appropriate and to producers to enable them to better assess the performance of their 
board. 
The Board has the power to fix levies so that it can secure funds to undertake 
industry support functions. It currently enjoys total freedom to set or raise any levies 
to a regulated maximum. To improve accountability in this area, the Bill amends the 
levy provision to require the Board to consult, and reach agreement, with the dairy 
industry ,Prior to setting or raising a levy. 
Transparencv 
The Board has the power to prohibit, restrict and control the export of any export 
dairy produce other than by itself. The Board does permit other panies to expon 
dairy products and has developed a mechanism whereby prospective exporters apply 
for permission to expon a cenain consignment or product type to a cerrain market. 
If the Board consented to the application it would then issue a licence for a maximum 
period of one year (renewable). The Board contends (and this has been supported by 
information made available to officials) that it refuses very few applications and that 
it would only do so in the overall interests of the dairy indus tty. 
However the assessment process and criteria used by the Board in reaching a decision 
on whether or not to approve an application are not available to other prospective 
exporters. Lack of clarity in this area could result in reduced investment and 
innovation by individual dairy companies as they cannot be absolutely certain of 
being able to capture the potential benefits of their investments. 
The Bill therefore provides for formalising the assessment process and for greater 
ttansparency in the criteria that are used in making decisions about the export of 
dairy produce by other panies. 
FURTIIER ISSUES 
There are a number of issues which have not been addressed in the Dairy Board 
Amendment Bill and have yet to be developed in detail with regard to other boards. 
In our assessment they will require consideration and resolution in the future. They 
are outlined briefly below. 
The Domestic Market 
The Dairy Board is empowered by its Act to operate' an equalisation scheme for 
product sold on the domestic market. The Board is enabled to make price 
adjustments for any class of dairy product where the local price is not the same as 
its acquisition price. The Board fixes a "notional" price for each product in the 
scheme which is intended to be equivalent to the average export return for that 
product. Depending on whether the Board's actual acquisition price is higher or 
lower than the "notional" price the difference is either paid by the manufacturing 
dairy company to the Board or vice versa. 
By its nature the scheme allows for cross subsidisation. Depending on how closely 
the "notional" price relates to expon returns over time, producers could subsidise 
consumers or vice versa. The Board contends that the scheme provides assured 
supply and price stability for the domestic consumer and considers that the 
availability of imported dairy produce and substitutes such as margarine provide 
sufficient price competition. The value of these benefits is arguable and because the 
scheme masks price signals for both consumers and producers, choice is restricted. 
The Apple and Pear Marketing Board acquires all pipfruit grown in New Zealand 
except for limited quantities allowed to be sold at the orchard gate. The Board's 
domestic monopoly has been the subject of several reviews in recent years. The 
Board contends that control of the entire pip fruit crop is necessary for it to obtain the 
best returns for New Zealand in the international market. The continuation of the 
monopoly is widely supported by growers, however retailers and consumers regularly 
advocate its removal. It is questionable whether control of the total market is the 
only way in which the Board can maintain phytosanitary standards at a level 
sufficient to ensure it access to overseas markets. While this level of control no 
doubt assists the Board in planning and implementing marketing sttategies, the costs 
in reduced choice are borne by growers, retailers and consumers. 
The Privy Council's decision in the case of Applefields and the Apple and Pear 
Marketing Board' opens up the question of a wider range of producer board actions 
within New Zealand being considered to be anti-competitive or to have an 
anticompetitive effect in terms of the Commerce Act 1986. The implications of the 
Privy Council's decision will be addressed as part of a review of the Commerce Act 
which has as one of its objectives an examination of the Act's application to 
prohibitions and anticompetitive behaviour in primary products markets. 
Applefields Limited and Styx Mill Orchard Partnership No.6 versus the New Zealand 
Apple and Pear Marketing Board and the New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation (No. 
15/1990), Judgement of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 3 
December 199Q. 
Asset Ownership 
The development of an increasing range of commercial activities by the boards 
highlights the fact that they do not have a commercial ownership structure that allows 
producers tO,identify their individual shares in the assets built up. While amendments 
made to the legislation in 1988 and 1989 state that board assets belong ultimately to 
producers and are for the time being held and administered for their benefit, this 
provision is only intended to place a moral obligation on the Government should it 
decide to dissolve a producer board at some time in the future. 
In the case of the single seller boards the inability to distinguish berween the supplier 
and the shareholder means that producer returns are a combination of payment for 
product and a dividend on investments managed by the hoards. This masking of 
market signals makes it difficult for producers to monitor how efficiently their 
investment is being managed and could result in inappropriate production responses. 
While accepting that this is not a major difficulty for the Dairy Board and the Apple 
and Pear Marketing Board yet, a mechanism to distinguish berween payment for 
product and returns on investment will become increasingly necessary as these rwo 
Boards further develop as multi-national traders. It can also be anticipated that 
producers, especially larger producers with significant amounts of capital tied up in 
board assets, will want to more closely monitor how these assets are being managed. 
It has been suggested (McKinlay, 1988) that the introduction of a type of share 
structure would enable both the boards' and producers' objectives to be met and also 
provide a means for attracting equity capital from potential investors outside the 
system. The boards and producers however see difficulties in such a structure 
maintaining producer control over time. They also consider that the creation of a 
commercial type structure would lead to the demise of the special privileges accorded 
them by legislation, in particular their monopoly status. As long as the maintenance 
of statutory powers remains of prime importance to the majority of producer 
shareholders, changes in board structures and relationships to more accurately reflect 
the types of entities the boards have grown into are unlikely to be of a radical nature. 
CommerciallRegulatory Conflicts 
The development of commercial operations by the Meat Producers Board and, to a 
lesser extent, by the Wool Board in the indusoies which they regulate has led to 
claims that the boards may not be impartial in the exercise of their statutory powers, 
but seek to advance their commercial interests at the expense of other participants. 
As these boards extend their commercial activities they appear to be increasingly only 
using their resoictive powers with the consent of industry participants. The Wool 
Board, for example, licenses all prospective wool exporters. In licensing meat 
exporters, the Meat Producers Board is now required to consult with the Meat 
Industry Association prior to making licensing decisions. The Board allows industry 
participants to decide on how the allocation of quantities for quota and single buyer 
markets are to be managed. Both boards administer their controls over shipping and 
freight rates via specially established bodies which are representative of all industry 
participants. 
While it could be said that the legislative backing to allow the boards to regulate 
participation in their indusoies is unnecessary in these circumstances, both boards 
have indicated that they see a need to maintain control powers in their Acts. The 
concern is that boards and current participants may use these powers to exclude new 
entrants. Should the boards be seen by other participants or prospective participants 
in the meat and wool indusoies to be using these powers in a discriminatory or 
unreasonable manner, the Government will come under increasing pressure to take 
some action to separate commercial and regulatory roles. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The description of how the legislative framework governing the export marketing of 
New Zealand's agricultural and horticultural products has evolved in recent years 
outlined in this paper, indicates that it is unlikely that fundamental reform of existing 
structures will be undertaken by the Government unless either producers desire it, or 
the costs of current structures andlor the benefits of alternatives can be demonstrated 
more satisfactorily to politicians than has been achieved to date. Given that the 
export of primary products still provides the majority of New Zealand's foreign 
exchange earnings, and the risk that alternatives might not in the event perform as 
well as current systems, decision makers are most likely to continue to make changes 
in an incremental manner. 
The impetus for changes will come from a variety of sources. As in the past 
producers can be expected to seek to extend their control at times of low returns. 
The boards themselves will wish to ensure that the legislative environment in which 
they operate allows them to adapt to a rapidly changing international marketplace, 
while seeking to protect the control mechanisms they currently have at their disposal. 
Other participants will want to ensure that the activities of the boards and the way 
in which they use their statutory powers do not impinge on their own commercial 
strategies and choices. In this context, greater use of the legal system to define the 
boundaries of the boards' statutory authority can be expected. The Government will 
continue to attempt to balance competing rights and expectations and amendments to 
the legislative framework for the export marketing of agricultural and horticultural 
products are likely to reflect how that balance is perceived at a particular point in 
time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world likes poultry meat. Between 1987 and 1989 annual meat 
production worldwide averaged 162.2 million metric tons. Pork 
showed the highest production rate. with a volume of over 64.4 
million tons per year, the pork sector achieved a share of almost 
40% of total meat production. 
Poultry meat, with a production of 36.9 million tons, accounted 
for 22.5% of world meat production. This can be read in a report 
"The world meat market" recently published by the Economic 
Research Department of the Rabobank in the Netherlands. 
On a worldwide scale, the United States, the EC, the Soviet Union 
and china are the leading meat producers. Together these 
countries account for more than 60% of the total world meat 
production. The combined share of these four producers, 
according to the report, has fallen slightly over the years. 
This is a consequence of the advent of non-traditional producers; 
more and more developing countries started producing their own 
meat during the Seventies and Eighties, so that they would no 
longer be dependent on imports. 
Poultry shows the greatest expansion 
The production of poultry meat has undergone the greatest 
expansion in the past 20 years. Between 1970 and 1988, its share 
of total production rose from 15% to 23%. A notably sharp growth 
in the production of chicken and turkey meat occurred in the 
United States, the latter increase being more or less unique in 
the world. The volume of the poultry sector in the USA grew by 
more than 40% during the Eighties. Other countries also showed 
a substantial production increase. 
Changing patterns of poultry meat consumption are responsible for 
this growth. The relatively low fat content, its healthier image 
and its simple preparation were important factors. 
The trends in consumption first appeared in the United States and 
later on, to a growing extent, in other countries. On the supply 
side it appears that the production of poultry meat, particularly 
compared with beef and veal, is much less land-related. This 
meat can therefore be produced close to the centres of 
consumption. There is no need to move out to large open rural 
areas for extensive production. As a result, transport costs are 
relatively low and poultry meat has a cost advantage (and hence 
a price advantage), compared with the other types. 
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Another attractive aspect of poultry meat production is the 
birds' good feed conversion. Compared with the other types of 
livestock, poultry convert a certain quantity of feed into extra 
meat to a much greater extent. This also implies a cost 
advantage compared with other meat. The low cost price makes 
poultry additionally attractive as a food source. 
The main producers 
The main poultry meat producers are shown in Figure 1. 
A striking feature here is the sharp rise in the share of the 
"other countries" in total world production. It is explained by 
the limited dependence on land. This also explains the small 
share of world trade in poultry meat compared with its 
production. 
Figure 1: 
Rgure 1: The main poultry meal producers 
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Consumption pattern 
The production of various types of meat is closely related to the 
trends in their consumption. Meat consumption however - like the 
demand for other agricultural products - is also strongly linked 
with traditional preferences for a particular type of meat, and 
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also with the availability of meat and the consumer's familiarity 
wi th it. As a result, there are great differences in the 
consumption of meat worldwide. Figure 2 shows the per capita 
meat consumption of several important countries. 
Figure 2 
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Total per capita meat consumption is highest in the United states 
- almost 116 kg of meat per year. This is the result of major 
consumption of both beef and veal as well as poultry meat. On 
average, Americans eat more of poultry meat than consumers in any 
of the countries mentioned in the table (and possibly the world) . 
The increased consumption of poultry meat in that country has 
been greatly to the disadvantage of beef consumption. Australia, 
Argentina and Canada follow the USA with a total meat consumption 
of almost 100 kg per year. New Zealand also falls into this 
grouping with similar changing trends in meat consumption. 
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NEW ZEALAND INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT 
As outlined above, the poultry meat industry has made tremendous 
strides throughout the world during the past few decades into a 
multi-billion dollar world wide industry with great effect on the 
eating habits and nutritional trends of today's consumers. 
New Zealand, in the last 10 years, has seen the refinement and 
development of the level of sophistication of its poultry meat 
industry to the equivalent, and in most cases superior, status 
to those found overseas. Improvements in production and 
processing have been achieved through improved management, 
nutrition, genetics and greater processing efficiency. 
The maintenance of strict quarantine regulations and the unique 
and superior health status of the New Zealand poultry flock have 
also been important factors. 
Prior to the chicken meat industry being established in New 
Zealand, consumers only had access to end-of-Iay birds or 
fattened cockerels, both being by-products of the egg industry. 
At that time, New Zealanders relied almost entirely on red meat 
as a source of animal protein, consuming annually over 80 kg per 
capita along with ,approximately 12-14 kg of pork per capita. 
Annual poultry meat consumption was at this time about 1.0 kg per 
capita. 
In the late 1950's, the Tegel breed of poultry livestock was 
imported into ~ew zealand from Australia. This was a special 
stock bred for its high growth rate and quality meat. Three 
chicken meat production companies were established in these early 
years of operation; however, demand far outstripped supply. 
In 1966, after considerable research and well-founded confidence 
in the untapped opportunities of the NZ chicken meat industry, 
General Foods Corporation took the first major steps to become 
involved in the industry, wishing to add chicken to its frozen 
food lines. The Company acquired four companies, three of which 
had processing plants and the other which held the Tegel breeding 
franchise for New Zealand. 
This was the first large-scale 
industry and provided capital 
development. 
corporate involvement in 
to ensure its growth 
the 
and 
The 1970's saw many new entrants into the chicken meat market, 
with processing plants being established throughout the country. 
This expansion was based on chicken stock either bred in New 
Zealand from Australian imported strains, or imported directly 
from Australia as day-old chicks. All stock from other countries 
were banned on quarantine grounds because of diseases prevalent 
in those areas. New Zealand was largely free of any poultry 
disease. 
/5 
5. 
In 1972 this policy changed and NZ banned the importation of live 
chicks and permitted the importation of egg and meat breeding 
stock in the form of fertile hatching eggs from limited sources 
other than Australia. This was due to improvements in 
technological methods guaranteeing against disease transfer. 
This action resulted in a watershed for the New Zealand industry 
as it introduced top international strains of chicken livestock 
which were more efficient in converting feed to meat. 
The New Zealand poultry meat industry thus occupies a unique 
status in the world in that we are able to import top genetic 
stock under strict quarantine conditions. Once this has 
satisfied the MAF criteria, it is then able to be released from 
quarantine and to enhance the NZ poultry flock, bringing it to 
the same genetic status as the leading world companies. 
These vigorous controls, together with the preventative approach 
to poultry health and high standards of husbandry and management, 
have meant that New Zealand poultry flock health is superior in 
status to all other countries in the world, and this enables very 
good performances to be achieved and has contributed to 
significant improvements in productivity during the last 21 
years. 
Examples of this are breeder hen production and broiler growth 
rate. In addition, it has ensured the superior health status of 
the flocks and the highest quality and health product for the 
con·sumer. Thus, in a period of 30 years, New Zealand has 
developed a sophisticated meat chicken industry. In 1959 no 
specialised meat chicken production existed. In 1989, 45.5 
million meat chickens were produced and marketed in a variety of 
forms. The industry today consist of some 25 companies, 
employing in excess of 2,000 people and more than 160 individual 
farmers who rear broilers in their own facilities under 
contractual agreements. Further details are contained in Figure 
3. 
Figure 3. N.z. CHICKEN MEAT INDUSTRY -1991_ 
Estimated Capital Investment S170 million 
Number ot Employees 2000 
Number of Company Farms (BroilersIBreeders) 56 
Number of Contract Growers 167 
Number 01 Processing Plants 22 
Number of Hatcheries 16 
Tolal Number of Breeders 540,000 
Totel Broiler Production 45 million 
Average dressed weight of broilers 1.29 kg 
Tolal dressed welghl 58,050 lonnes 
AV(!rage value 8t wholesaleJk9 S4.10 
Total wholesale value $238 million /6 
Estimated Total value Retail $357 million 
6. 
Ownership structure 
The New Zealand poultry meat industry differs from other primary 
livestock industries in the country in that it is a basically 
vertically-integrated operation, that is, one operator owns and 
controls all production and marketing operations from the initial 
importation of breeding material (fertilised hatching eggs) 
through quarantine farms, primary breeding farms, hatcheries, 
breeding farms, hatcheries, broiler production, processing 
plants, product development and marketing, and also the feed mill 
and distribution. The major companies have total integration and 
others partial. 
The industry is also a closed domestic one with no importation 
permitted under existing quarantine regulations for any fresh or 
frozen poultry products, livestock and commercial eggs. Also 
currently, due to high internal feed costs - local grain in 
relation to USA and Australia - (Feed is around 50-60% of total 
cost of production), the industry is not a player in the 
international export markets. . 
90% of the industry is owned and controlled by four companies 
with approximately 20 smaller operators producing the remaining 
10%. The major player is Goodman Fielder Wattie who currently 
owns 100% of Tegel Poultry Company, Golden Coast Poultry 
Industries Ltd, Sandy Lodge Ltd, Tendabird Poultry Ltd, and 50% 
of Table Talk Chicken Ltd. Ingham Enterprises Ltd from Australia 
owns 100% of Harvey Farms pty Ltd. PH van den Brink Ltd owns the 
Chubby Chicken brand. The other 50% of Table Talk Chicken Ltd 
is owned by Poultrymens Cooperative Ltd. (Ingham's and PH van 
den Brink are both private family companies.) 
Production 
In New Zealand, in only 25 years, annual chicken meat consumption 
has increased from 1.0 kg to over 17.0 kg per capita. 
Figure 4. 
NEW ZEALAND MEAT CHICKEN CONSUMPTION 
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10 
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o 
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nn"nnnnHW~u~ua~~~aoo 
YEAR 
Source: Poultry Industry Assn NZ (Inc); 
NZ Dept Stats, Quarterly Production Survey 
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Consumption is extrapolated directly from the quarterly 
production statistics as the industry is a closed domestic market 
and there are very few stocks held in store. 
A bird can now be marketed in half the time compared with 20 
years ago. Where it took 3 kg of feed to produce 1 kg of chicken 
20 years ago, it now takes less than 1.9 kg. Breeder performance 
has also increased dramatically. 
Figure 5. 
Figure 6. 
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Figure 7. 
LIVESTOCK PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 
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The Market 
8. 
Retail sales for poultry meat in New Zealand are now in excess 
of $350 million per annum. The industry, in. addition, provides 
SUbstantial markets for other industries involved in supplying 
products and services, particularly in the areas of: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
feed, in the supply of wheat, barley, 
bone meal, to name but a few, 
packaging, 
energy, and 
local industries supplying trade 
electricians and plumbers. 
maize, peas, meat and 
services such as 
The industry is 99% value-added in New Zealand. Total feed 
consumed, including the egg industry, is estimated at 299,000 
tonnes with a value of $141 million. Grain purchases from NZ 
arable farmers is estimated around $40 million. 
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Figure 8. 
POULmv FEED CONSUMPnON 
Meat Chicken 
60% Grain 
40% Protein 
Breeding Flocks 
Commercial Layers 
50% Grain 
15% Protein 
10% Umestone 
25% Bran, Pollard 
Grain oHals 
Replacement Layers 
TOTAL 
APPROX TOTAL 
VALUE 
(ESnMATES ·1991) 
.liS. Sm. 150,000 tonnesl$S25 
O.Sm. 39,000 lonnes/S475 
2.2m. 100,000 tonnes/S.:IOO 
9,1501onnes/S42Q 
298,750lcnnes 
$141 million 
Source: Poultry Industry Assn NZ (Inc) 
9. 
i 
By the end of this year, New Zealanders are expected to be 
annually consuming 18 kg of chicken meat per capita and another 
2.0 kg of turkey and other poultry. 
When compared with the United states, which has a poultry 
consumption rate of 43.0 kg, Britain which has more than 30 kg, 
and Australia where consumption is currently 25.5 kg per capita, 
it can be seen that the poultry meat industry in New Zealand and 
particularly the chicken meat industry has considerable potential 
for future growth. The average American is now eating more 
chicken than beef for the first time since record-keeping began 
in 1900. Poultry is also the main meat consumed in the U.K. at 
the present time. 
This potential for future growth in the New Zealand market is 
clearly illustrated in the following graphs: 
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NZ CHICKEN CONSUMPTION 
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10. 
'Ibis illustrates that the New Zealand consumer is follCMIDg the same 
consumption patterns seen in similar overseas countries. It has been said 
that we are one 7-year cycle behind Australia and 2-3 behind the USA in 
chicken IOOat consumption. 
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Figure 10. 
INTERNATIONAL MEAT CHICKEN CONSUMPTION 
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11. 
'!his clearly illustrates New Zealand's present per capita consumption in 
relation to Australia and the USA and also the fresh/frozen product mix 
tren::ls. 
'!he follCMIDg two figures illustrate further poultry potential in the New 
Zealarrl market in the areas of turkey particularly, and duck consumption. We 
will probably see over the next 5 years rapid development in turkey production 
arrl turkey products similar to what was seen in chicken 10-15 years ago. 
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Figure 11. 
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12. 
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Between 1975 arrl 1985 in New Zealarrl, chicken aJnst.m1ption has increased 117 
per cent, which red meat aJnsumption has fallen 26 per cent; pork has 
increased 19 per cent; fish has increased 87 per cent. alicken's share of 
the total marketplace has increased from 5.6 per cent in 1975 to 14.5 per cent 
in 1985, arrl around 18 per cent in 1990 - from 1986 to 1989 chicken 
aJnsumption increased by another massive 27%. 
The reduction seen in Figure 13 in 1990 is partly due to an adjusbnent due to 
stocks in store arrl partly due to an across-the-board reduction in aJnsumer 
sperrling due to the eaJnomic aJrrlitions prevailing. 
Figure 13. 
NZ BROILER CHICKEN PRODUCTION 
LASTS YEARS 
DRESSED 
YEAR BIRDS WEIGHT 
(lonnes) 
1986 37,709,000 46,027 
1987 38,925,000 47,777 
1988 42,146,000 52,835 
1989 45,583,000 58,732 
1990 43,469,000 55,379 
EST. 1991 45,500,000 
PRODUCTION CLOSELY REFLECTS 
CONSUMPTION 
Source: Poultry Industry Assn NZ (Inc) 
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Figures 14 arrl 15 further illustrate the changing consumer consumption 
patterns for meat products arrl their potential for poultJ:y production in New 
Zea1arrl. 
Figure 14. 
Figure 15. 
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15. 
'Ihere has also been a trend fram frozen to fresh chicken. In 1985 frozen 
chicken a=ted for 55 per cent of consumption arrl 45 per cent was fresh. 
It is expected that the fresh product will be 75 per cent of total consumption 
within 5 years. 
Figure 16. 
PRODUCT MIX TREND 
TOTAL MARKET 
YEAR 
~ FRESH iliilIlIl FROZEN 
Source: Poultry Industry Assn (Inc); NZ Dept Stats Quarterly Prod. Survey 
A major factor in the growth of the irrlustry has been the advent of new 
products. In the 1960 IS IOC>St of the chicken meat was marketed as the whole 
bird, whereas today the consumer can purchase from an extensive ran::re of ruts 
arrl variety products. 'Ihere has been a continuous prcgrarnme of fresh and 
frozen product develcpnent arrl a number of further processed products have 
been launched on to the market in recent years offering convenience and 
labour-saving qualities, whilst also providing for the ever-increasing number 
of hea1th-conscious consumers. A far wider range of poultry products is 
available than that fourrl in the sheepmeat. beef or oork irrlustries. 
Appendix I - Product Range 
'Ibis range is illustrated in Appendix I. 
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One of the largest influencin;J factors on the chicken meat industry has been 
the fast food an:i takeaway business. Since the introduction of Kentucky Fried 
Chicken into New Zealan:i in the early 1970's, chicken has become increasin;Jly 
popular an:i many other fast food COncen1S - McD:>nald's, Wendy's, Homestead, 
Georgie Pie an:i Chicken Spot have become established with new outlets bein;J 
established all the time. Kentucky Fried Chicken this year annoill1Ced plans 
for outlet expansion in New Zealan:i over the next two years of an estimated 
value of $153 million. '!he overall ~ in chicken meat sales can be 
closely associated with the ~ of fast food outlets in New Zealan:i. 
Restaurants have also emphasised chicken on many of their menus. '!his market 
is likely to continue g:t'CMin;J due to our chan::Jin;J lifestyl~ where in many 
families both parents are workin;J an:i more New Zealan:iers are eatin;J a greater 
rn.nnber of meals away from home, together with the increasin;J demand from 
overseas visitors. 
Figure 17 illustrates the current market segment breakdCMllS of broiler chicken 
consumer outlets/consumption. 
Figure 17. 
MARKETING OF BROILER PRODUCTION (1990 ESTIMATE) 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PRODUCTION 
DISTRIBunON FRESH FROZEN TOTAL 
Supermarkets 28". 34% 62% 
Retail Butchers 10% 3,". 13% 
& Specialty Pooltry 
ShOps 
Fast Food Industry 13% 4· .• 17% 
HOlels, Restaurants 5% 3% 6~\' 
and Inslltutlons 
TOTAL 56% 44~\' 100% 
'991 60% 40% 100% 
Source: Poultry Industry Assn NZ (Inc) 
SUccess has also been influenced somewhat by the introduction of the microwave 
oven into New Zealan:i. It is estimated that 60 per cent of households nCM own 
one. '!hey offer speed an:i convenience for reheatin;J many pre-cooked items as 
well as rapid cooking of the more traditional chicken products. 
Today's constnner wants products that can be quickly prepared an:i are willin;J, 
within reason, to pay more for convenience so as to experience the luxury of 
spending less time in the kitchen. 
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Greater health awareness may well be the most important reason for today's 
changin;J attitudes t:cMards food. In the 1960's nutrition was only associated 
with the health fanatics an:i earnest vegetarians. Today, market research 
shows that nutrition is considered a top priority for most consumers. 
'!he general public have become increasin;Jly aware of the link between good 
nutrition an:i health. '!he advice of most health professionals is for people 
to select wisely from the wide choice of foods available whilst recognisin;J 
differin;J personal requirements an:i food preferences. Chicken is a nutrition 
heavyweight. 
'!he industry will continue to Jl'ake improvements in the efficiency of 
processin;J an:i production an:i to target the changin;J food habits of today's 
constnner. It will continue to actively prorrote chicken as an economical an:i 
nutritious food, also emphasisin;J its versatility, convenience an:i ease-of-
preparation. Market grc;Mt:h will continue as the producers strive to meet the 
changin;J needs of COJ:JSl.lll'erS for convenience, variety an:i quality. 
In addition to this, the price relativities will continue to improve as our 
productivity an:i efficiency is further developed. In real terms (inflation 
adjusted) chicken is I1C7W half the price per kilcgrarn than what it was in 1972. 
'!his tren:l will continue an:i is clearly illustrated in Figures 18 an:i 19. 
Figure 18 is particularly interestin;J as it examines real price increases in 
chicken costs relative to the constnner price index an:i beef an:i pork an:i 
clearly illustrates that chicken will continue to make gains in price 
relativity with alternative meat proteins. '!his is reinforced when the per 
capita broiler chicken consumption in real retail prices over the period 1972-
1990 are examined. 
Figure 18. 
REAL PRICE INCREASES 
INDEX 
800, . . 
,~ .~ ~f I 600~?~~ . 
:::~~ 
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
l --o-.-CPI ~ CHICKEN --- BEEF --=- PORK I 
Source: NZ Dept Stat i s tics 
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Figure 19. 
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18. 
17.0 
1990 
The New Zealand chicken meat irrlustry is at a production level of 45.5 million 
today. 
In 10 years' tbne it =uld well be 70 million. 
August, 1991. 
APPENDIX I 
NZ FCULTRY llIDJSIY PRODJCr RANGE 
available to the NZ == - June 1988 
FRESH ro:JI.ITRY 
Whole birds 
" " - bulk vac/pac 
Pre-stuffed whole birds 
SJroke:i whole birds 
Breasts - bulk 
Drumsticks - bulk 
'lhighs - bulk 
W~.- bulk 
'lhigh quarter art: bulk 
2 piece art: bulk 
4 piece art: bulk 
6 piece art: bulk 
8 piece art: bulk 
9 piece art: bulk 
6 piece art: bulk vac/pack 
8 piece art: bulk vac/pack 
Half bird 
Special art: bulk 
Whole legs bulk 
OrlCken niJ:bles ca~ vac/pal< 
Whole legs bulk vac/pac 
9 piece art: bulk vac/pack 
Drumsticks - bulk vac/pac 
Breast ) - bulk vacjpac 
'lhighs ) 
Wfu;js ) 
Conbination Trays 
Trays breasts sml & large 
Trays d.nn!lsticks II 
Trays thighs " 
Trays wings II 
Trays dlicken nibbles 
9 piece art: vac/pac 
9 piece art: fresh 
Trays breast fillet 
Trays thighs, skin on 
tt .. fresh 
Tray terrlerloins 
Specific fillets 
Deboned ctricken 
Deboned breasts 
Ihlble breast fillets 
Deboned thighs 
Terrlerloins - bulk 
Orlcken supreme 
Skinless thighs 
Skinless breasts 
Skinless boneless breasts 
Size range 3-12 
" " 3-10 
Ran;Je of sizes 
" 
Chicken bites fresh 
vac/pac 
Breast fillet 
" "vac/pac 
Trays Tarrloori glazed 
Marinated portions 9 piece 
page 2 
" "" vac/pac 
satay 2 thighs 
satay 4 thighs 
satay 4 drum 
satay 6 drum 
satay 6 win:] 
Oriental leuon 2 thigh 
" 4 thigh 
" 4 drum 
" 6 drum 
" 6 win:] 
SWeet & sour 2 thigh 
" 4 thigh 
" 4 drum 
" 6 drum 
" 6 win:] 
Chinese Honey 2 thigh 
" 4 thigh 
It 4 drum 
" 6 drum 
" 6 win:] 
Whole i3atay chickens 
" Oriental lemon 
" Chinese honey 
" SWeet & sour 
CruniJed fillets 
Schnitzel 
O:ll:tion bleu 
Kiev 
El fuUo 1000 cut 
Chicken livers 
Gizzards 
Hearts 
Necks 00lk 
Feet 00lk 
~carcasses 
SUrrlries 
Il:Jnor stock breast meat 
.. sIGn 
Free Flow donors 
D:Jnor torsos 
Sioc>ked chicken portions 
Gou.t::ret SIlXlked chicken roll vac/pac 
Cooked chicken . roll 
Basted whole chicks 
Chicken Fin;Jers-crumbed chicken meat 
Chicken patties " 
Chicken Nuggets " 
Trays Marvlan::1 le= 
Chicken fat 
Chicken frames 
Chicken steaks-crumbed neat 
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FroZEN FOOI.lIRY 
Whole chickens 
Celebration roast chickens 
Grarrl RJulets 
Prestuffed chicken 
.Festive pack 
Golden basted 
Whole caterin;J birds 
'I'riIrarei secords 
furtions - freeflow 
Dn!nGticks - freeflow 
'lhighs - freeflow 
NiJ:bles 
W:in;Js - freeflow 
Whole le:,r-; - 00lk 
Drumsticks - 00lk 
'lhighs - 00lk 
Half birds 
" marinated win:Js 
9 pieces pack 
Deboned chicken 
Deboned breasts 
Terrlerloins, 00lk 
Breast fillets 
Chicken bites 
Whole 'J.\trkeys 
catering turkey 
Chicken satay 
Malay chicken satay 
Whole turkey breast 
Deboned turkey breast 
Deboned turkey roast 
Plain turkey roast 
Deboned turkey roll 
stuffed turkey roast 
Boneless cooked bu::key roll 
'l\u:irey sun1ry 
D.lck:s whole 
Whole Sl10WWhite duck 
Boneless duck roast 
Chardonnay duck portions 
" ducklin;J roast 
Inck sun1ry 
Size ran;re 4-14 
Cordon bleu 
Kiev 
Schnitzel. 
Crumbed. fillet 
Roast dricken 
caroliner dricken roast 
arix dricken products 
Twin pack liver 
Gizzards 
Hearts 
Necks - l:clk 
Necks - skins 
Offal petfood 
Orick fat - fu:uc 
~carcass 
Export deboned carcass 
Roasti.ngfCMls 
~ fCMl thighs 
" "breast 
" "dn.tm. 
Deboned fCMl skin 
Deboned fCMl fat 
Deboned fCMl IOOat 
SJcin arrl fat 
Precooked dricken pieces 
CrtmiJed terrlers 
atlk breast schitznel 
Oricken fin:Jers 
CrtmiJed patties 
Caterin:} patties 
Orickmate l"II.lgJets 
N'lq:Jets - l:clk 
Oricken steaks 
Orickmate steaks 
Orickmate loaf 
Orick fin:Jers 
Orickmate c:roquett.es 
Fin:Jers - l:clk 
Orickmate art:lets 
Orickmate dlickloaf 
Ga.mnet SIIDked drick roll 
Cooked drick roll 
Snoked dricken whole 
Sioc>ked dricken portions 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper is one of a project looking at the impact of embryology 
technologies (ET) on livestock production in New Zealand. The first stage 
of the project assessed the potential development of these technologies 
and described the likely commercial application of embryology 
technologies. This paper assesses the implications for serviCes, pastoral 
sector and up-take of ET given the introduction of ET technologies. 
From this point further work on likely take up rates can be analysed. It is 
intended that work continue on what ET will mean to the average dairy 
farm using a cost Benefit type approach. A simple model will be devised 
to gauge the effects of take up rates of ET on an average dairy farm. ET 
will also have an effect on processing and marketing of agricultural 
products. Forth~oming papers will explore these impacts on the agricultural 
industry. This paper represents a small slice of the economic evaluation 
being carried out on ET impacts on the New Zealand agricultural products. 
The ex ante nature of the project lends itself to the development of 
scenarios which will point towards the likely future impact of embryology 
techniques. Some idea of the likely scenarios of embryology technology's 
effects on the service sector can be gauged by the introduction and use of 
Artificial Insemination (AI). This paper relies heavily on AI comparisons. 
ET started in the 1960's in New Zealand, although it is still in its 
commercial infancy. Notable exceptions to this have been the large scale 
use of ET with goats in the mid to late 1980's and the use of ET by 
Sheepac and Lamb XL to import embryos. However use of ET is not yet 
as successful in achieving results as AI. The costs, success; rates and the 
numbers of embryos involved have meant that it is not yet commonly used 
on a large scale. 
We are assuming the likeilhood that within the next five to ten years, 
costs of ET technologies will decrease to the point where it will be a 
relatively attractive way of producing some desired characteristics in 
livestock. Having said this, some British, New Zealand and American firms 
have been offering embryo transfer services since the 1970·s. 
The major use of ET occurs in the United States where over 100,000 ET 
transfers have occurred. Over 90% of commercial transplants are 
performed on cattle with very little being done on other livestock. 
Research institutes also reflect this, with most work being done on cattle, 
however a few research projects are working on sheep, particularly in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. Tax breaks have been used, particularly in 
the United States in the 1970's when ET was first being established. Since 
then tax breaks have been scaled down but are still significant. 
In Britain more than 8,000 ET transfers took place in 1988 with another 
2,000 exported. The large number of exported embryos points to the 
potential trade in premium quality product, trade that New Zealand will 
be well situated to take part in given the good reputation of New Zealand 
stock. International ET developments may mean that New Zealand will 
only keep abreast of the competition, particularly with dairy cattle. This 
will depend on the ability of the private sector and government to respond 
to developments in ET technology. 
I. THE SERVlCE SECTOR 
The purpose of this study is to explore the effects of ET on the various 
agricultural industries based around the livestock industry. The service 
industry is divided into two areas: 1) The reproductive services. Operated 
by veterinarians and support staff, commercial embryo transfer agencies 
and laboratory service organisations. 2) Other. This group can be broadly 
classified as any other agricultural service industry not involved in 
artificial livestock reproduction service. Some of the farm business 
included in the 'other' area includes transport, farm equipment, fertiliser 
production and slaughter houses. 
1.1 Reproductive Services 
To assess the extent of the effects of various ET technologies on the 
farm service sector, different scenarios based on the type of technologies 
available will be investigated. These scenarios are based on work done in 
the previous paper) which explored the types of ET techniques being 
researched and work done on AI. 
For each livestock type, a different structure will develop, although the 
same company may be involved in different livestock industries2• The dairy 
industry for example, where the Dairy Board is the monopoly buyer of 
export milk will be in a good position to dominate dairy ET development. 
Its extensive breeding and AI operations in the form of the wholly owned 
subsidiary, the Livestock Improvement Corporation has the market 
infrastructure already in place. Its huge data base resources allow the 
Livestock Improvement Corporation to track individual cows inside each 
herd. Added to this an extension service has been developed servicing the 
dairy farming community. An extensive AI operation offers bull semen to 
dairy farmers with the aim of increasing the rate of genetic gain. 
1.11 Livestock Improvement Corporation 
The LlC, a wholly owned subsidiary of the NZ Dairy Board has 
responsibility for the Board's farm production activities. SpeCifically it 
concentrates its activities in the areas of herd testing, artificial 
insemination, research and extension. 
The herd testing involves 'measuring and recording the quantity and quality 
of milk produced by each cow in the herd at regular intervals during 
lactation'3. The herd testing service offered to farmers gives information 
on individual cows' milk, milkfat and protein yields plus milk fat and 
protein percentages. A produc'tion index is also, calculated combining date 
I. The Commercialisation of Developments in Embryology Technology for 
Livestock, A E Bollard. NZIER Working Paper '90/15. 
2. An example of this is the New Zealand Dairy Board's ownership of 
Lamb XL. 
3. MAF Policy Seminar, Herd Testing and Genetic Improvement i'n the 
New Zealand Dairy Herd, Can it be Deregulated? 
of calving, age and stage of lactation and ancestry data. The more 
frequently herd testing is done by a farmer the more reliable the 
estimates of absolute lactation yields. This allows farmers with the support 
of the LlC data base to monitor performances of individual cows within a 
herd to show which are producing and which need to be culled. 
Through a statutory license the LlC has a monopoly over all herd testing 
in New Zealand. This is now being challenged by two companies who want 
to set up rival herd testing services. They are the Hamilton based 
consultancy firm, Findlay & Co and the Queensland Department of Primary 
Industries agency, Wacol Herd Recording Services. Their applications have 
been refused by the Dairy Board for this year. 
At the heart of the herd testing system is the data base. The maintenance 
of the data base is key to a high rate of genetic improvement in the 
national herd. The herd testing data is collected by the LlC for 
comparison and evaluation of bulls and cows under the insemination service 
they offer. The Dairy Board Act forbids ' ... herd testing, except by a 
farmer within his own herd, or by an organisation licensed to do so by the 
Dairy Board.'~. If the data base and evaluation functions were separated 
out from the LIC into an independent body competition could exist without 
damaging the national herd recording system. So far the LlC has refused 
to detach these functions claiming that their operations are inter-linked 
and cannot be separated out. 
T'wo artificial insemination services are offered by the Lie. 'Premier Sires' 
provides semen from the LIC's top bulls while 'Nominated Services' allows 
the farmer to pick individual bulls. Some competition exists with the LlC 
where far!llers import embryos from the United States and Canada. Given 
the size of LlC operation, the imported embryo business is small, leaving 
the LlC with a large degree of monopoly power. As well as utilising New 
Zealand semen the LlC is importing semen and recently embryos from 
North America. 
4. ibid pI. 
The importing and exporting of embryos is governed by the requirements 
of the importing nation. The importing country sets down the criteria for 
collection and storage of embryos and semen. Embryo import quarantine 
restrictions in New Zealand differ from species to species and country of 
origin. Recently embryos have been imported from Israeli (sheep) and 
Zimbabwe (goats). In both cases the embryos have been Implanted in local 
donor animals on Somes Island. After birth they are kept in a primary 
quarantine state for sixty days and checked for diseases such as foot and 
mouth. The animals are then transferred to secondary quarantine on the 
importers farm under MAF supervision. The fully grown sheep (imported as 
an embryo) is then slaughtered after 3!-5 years and its offspring are 
released from quarantine. 
AI research undertaken by the L1C focuses primarily on dairy cattle 
breeding, sire selection and herd wastage. Some publicly funded work 
through the universities and MAF does occur. in this area but it is not as 
focused on dairy cattle as L1C research. Extension work in the form of a 
consulting officer service is provided covering the North and South Islands. 
Some private sector and MAFTech consultants operate in competition with 
the L1C using AI and ET techniques, however, as with research, their 
services are not strictly related to dairy farming. 
The specialist nature of the L1C in the dairy industry gives the Dairy 
Board great advantage over any new entrant into the dairy rearing, 
research and extension activities. Their decision to enter the ET market 
will influence the development of ET in New Zealand. 
The ET industry in dairy could take the form of either a single dominant 
operator (L1C) with a number of small companies exploiting other niches in 
the industry, eg some dairy farmers have· formed companies to bring in 
exotic beef cattle such as Belgium Blues to cross with dairy cattle. 
Alternatively, the L1C may chose to stay with the existing technology (All, 
leaving rooin for other companies to develop the ET market. Those 
companies would not only compete against each other but compete against 
an established company using existing technology. 
Taking this scenario, smaller companies would operate close to major 
dairying areas. Both New Zealand and imported embryos would be used. 
The large dominant player (Lie) would use its existing extension and AI 
networks adding embryos to the service already provided. Embryos would 
be brought from the laboratories and inserted on the farm with the help 
of a veterinarian or technician. On a small scale, examples of this already 
exist in New Zealand. Individual farmers and companies are importing 
embryos directly from Canada and the United States in competition with 
the AI services offered by the Livestock Improvement Corporation. 
Room is available for other companies to enter the market if they can 
secure premium quality dairy or beef embryos and the delivery means to 
farmers. Companies such as Premier Genetics and Wrightsons Breeding 
Services are offering limited ET services and will be in a position to 
compete with the LIe. These limited services include implantation of 
embryos rather than laboratory services however, these services are 
offered in North America and Europe. One limitation to competition is the 
need for companies to have herd testing data from the L1C so that they 
can measure performance of livestock bred through ET. Companies wanting 
performance data will have to negotiate with the L1C to obtain herd 
testing information. 
Despite this, the L1C could act as a major barrier to entry for companies 
try to break into the embryo transfer business. The dominance of the L1C 
could also act as a disincentive to enter the ET market. As the most 
efficient user of a competing technology (ie All, the L1C may be reluctant 
to forgo the investment made in AI in order to switch to ET. An 
entrenched technology such as AI, with large investments in land, labour 
and capital may hinder development of ET because of the market power 
of the Dairy Board in the dairy industry. Other barriers to entry include 
"he hire of specialised personal and equipment. ET success depends upon 
highly specialised labour and capital, attracting the right people will 
re.quire high labour. cost per person and expensive one off capital 
equipment purchase. 
Having said that, ET and AI are complementary to some degree. Table I 
shows how similar in terms of equipment, personal and types of service 
offered the two techniques are. Table 1 also highlights the advantage that 
the LlC has over competitors. It is already engaged in Al activities, they 
can be assumed as sunk costs for the LlC. The switch to ET or the use of 
ET in tandem with Al will involve minimum cost to the LlC in terms of 
experience and facilties needed to carry out an ET business. 
Table I 
ET & AI Comparison 
Technicians 
Lab Services 
Animal Stock 
Herd Test Data 
Service 
Degree of Stock 
Management 
x Needed for that technique. 
xx Used to a greater degree. 
AI 
x 
x 
Bulls 
x 
semen 
x 
ET 
x 
xx 
x 
embryos 
xx 
*No on farm livestock is required to produce embryos. They can be 
purchased from other sources. 
The ability of the LIC to branch out into the ET business because of its 
extensive practical knowledge of Al is a major advantage. This economy of 
scope considerably reduces the set up costs associated with entering a new 
industry. Rival firms, in effect, are faced with setting up a new industry 
then competing: against a firm who is entrenched in the industry. This is 
particularly important in the ET industry because of the nature of the 
business. Specialised personal and equipment is required and systems need 
to be put into practice to translate scientific method into a commercial 
framework. This is a notoriously difficult process for companies to achieve 
and also make profits. The high turnover in companies involved in ET in 
New Zealand and overseas to date illustrates the risk involved for 
companies entering this field. 
Given this, a second scenario can be constructed where small companies 
compete against another technology (AI) as well as other companies 
performing ET transfers. These companies would have more room to 
expand and develop niches in the embryo trade. A 'freer' market would 
exist for embryos locally and from overseas. 
To achieve economies of scale laboratories would not only handle dairy 
cattle but other types of animals such as sheep, goats and deer. It is 
conceivable that a laboratory would service one particular area, servicing 
a number of companies competing against each other in the embryo 
business. 
Demand for embryos would be uneven, and coupled with this the success 
rates depend largely on the skill of the operator, stock management 
programmes instituted plus high set up costs, therefore a new entrant 
would face substantial risk. Entrepreneurs would diversify the types of 
embryos stock in order to reduce the risk involved by specialising in one 
livestock type. A limiting factor to expansion of these firms would be the 
efficiency of AI conducted by the Lie. 
As with AI the major customers would be stud breeders (for all livestock 
types) concentrating on quality stock in order to on-sell to commercial 
farmers. Specialist knowledge on pre-mating activity, insemination skills 
and stock knowledge will give the stud breeder higher success rates than 
than commercial farmers looking to use embryo technologies infrequently. 
As already suggested in previous works AI and embryo technologies are 
substitutes and will be use in tandem. The proliferation of techniques 
makes the precise commercial linkage between the to technologies unclear. 
It must be remembered that one technology (AI) is an established well 
5. The Commercialisation of Developments in Embryology Technology for 
Livestock. See figure I, The Taxonomy of Embryo Technologies, for more 
detail. 
proven, cost effective and widely accepted by users, while ET is not. 
Further complicating this is that for different animal type different 
methods are used to insert embryos lie surgical ~nd non surgicail, 
therefore costs vary widely over animal type. 
The structure of the sheep breeding industry is radically different from 
the dairy industry. Unlike the dairy industry the sheepmeat and wool 
industries do not have total control over the export product. Farmers 
selling wool pay the Wool Board a levy for promotion and extension 
services (and until recently for a price stabilisation scheme). The wool is 
then auctioned to buyers at various Wool Board facilities. Sheepmeat Is 
sold by farmers to competing freezing works companies. 
Commercial farmers buy replacement stock from stud farmers, whose 
major role is to sell sufficient quality breeding stock. Most use of AI in 
the sheep breeding industry is undertaken by stud farmers to produced 
superior stock. The demand for AI is steady and does not reflect market 
fluctuations of wool or meat prices. However, Al and ET become very 
useful to a farmer when SUdden upward swing in prices occurs ego in 
1987/88 when fine wool prices were soaring, AI in fine wool Merino sheep 
increased dramatically, primarily to quickly increase numbers of Merino 
sheep. Prior to this only stud flocks were inseminated, but with the price 
rises commercial farmers entered the market. It is interesting to note that 
not only Merino ewes were used as donors. Corriedales and Perendale ewes 
were used as surrogate donors for Merino stock. 
The development of ET could produce two potential advantages over Al 
with the use of surrogate mothers. Firstly, the surrogate could be a better 
mother and secondly the natural mother may be too valuable to be 
allowed to go through the risks of carrying and giving birth. It is 
conceivable that different ewes/dairy cows have different roles to play in 
the breeding process.' Ewes/dairy cows with desired characteristics and 
therefore more valuable could provide oocytes. Other ewes/dairy cows 
which are less valuable commercially could be used as sheep/cattle donors. 
Less risk is assoc;iated with the more valued animals if they are used only 
as providers of oocytes, while other less valuable animals can be utilised 
to carry and give birth. 
In order to track superior offspring, a considerable amount of datil 
processing capability is necessary. The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries has provided a tracking service for selected breeders for sheep 
(sheep Ian) and beef (beefplan) up till the beginning of 1991. Identification 
of superior animals remains a problem. Unlike the dairy industry, no 
centralised body tracks flocks or herds in New Zealand. 
Costs for Al in sheep vary sharply, depending on the method used and 
whether or not individual farmers do it themselves (DIY in Table 2). Table 
2 draws attention to the type of costs associated with AI use in the 
sheep breeding industry. With the cost of natural mating for an average 
Romney ram at $350 (which would last 3 years), AI compares favorably. 
The more expensive Al techniques involve surgery (Intra-uterine method) 
and on average record higher conception rates while the do-it-yourself non 
surgical method (Cervical) costs less with a corrosponding drop in the 
conception rate. 
ET's introduction to the sheep industry is not as clear cut as the dairy 
industry. More firms have the ability to enter and exit the industry 
because it is not dominated by one single firm. For example when the 
exotic breeds were bought into New Zealand, the companies involved were 
Lamb XL (owned by the Dairy Board) and Sheepac (a joint venture 
between farmers and MAF). The domination of the Dairy Board through 
the LlC in the dairy industry has allowed the build up of experience in 
artificial insemination and related techniques which would give the LlC an 
advantage over competitors in terms of cost, expertise and ability to 
organise an embryo business. 
The use of ET in the sheep industry might be divided into parts. A) The 
sheep-breeders who are looking for a one step increase in genetic gain. 
This improvement will be passed on to commercial farmers in the form of 
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higher value stock. B) Commercial farmers looking to increase the numbers 
of a particular breed of animal. Embryo collection and cultivation centers 
could be established close to Freezing Works for easy collection of fresh 
embryos. Embryos sourced overseas could also be used. Inserting embryos 
will be done on-farm with either a veterinarian or technician. It is 
possible that freezing works will backward integrate to ensure quality 
supplies of meat (see section on the processing industry). Like the dairy 
industry, companies wiII be able to exploit particular market niches. 
The development of embryo transplant techniques for goats began in New 
Zealand during the 1976-86 period on a Lands and Survey block near 
Paihia. Goats are very easy and successful transplant subjects. Numbers of 
goats increased substantially during the 1985-88 period when large 
share-market based companies saw opportunities in goat farming. Most. of 
these companies have now gone out of business since the stockmarket 
crash in 1987. The importation of South African Angora and Zimbabwean 
Boer embryos has resulted in three programmes which are currently under 
quarantine restrictions. Little research and development is occurring on 
goats at present. 
In the past decade total goat numbers increased from 43,000 to a peak of 
1.3 million in 1988. AI was used extensively to increase the numbers and 
quality of goats in a short space of time. The rapid increase in goat 
numbers was motivated by the expected high return on goat fibre in the 
medium term. The development of Cashgora, a new natural fibre was 
spurred on by Al use. Cashgora is obtained by crossing Angora with feral 
goats. Feral goats made up the bulk of the New Zealand goat population 
before 1985 . 
As world prices increased because of shortages, goats were seen as a high 
value animals and a number of companies set up to surgically remove 
embryos and insert them in donors. Skilled technicians usually a 
veterinarian are used to perform these operations. However, as the value 
of the goats has declined (because of an increase in world supply) very 
little Al has been performed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The first deer embryo transplants occurred in Red deer in 1987. There are 
now three companies which routinely conduct transfer 011 Red and Wapiti 
deer breeds. Some frozen embryos have been exported and a few, 
particularly elk embryos have been imported. Currently research and 
development is aimed at understanding hormonal changes around 
superovulation. Al in the deer industry is more expensive relative to the 
dairy, beef and sheep industries. Costs can range from $100 to $450 per 
straw of semen. The reason for the expense is that all AI is done using 
surgical processes (intra-uterine) and drugs are needed to synchronise 
breeding cycles. 
1.2 Other Services. 
The introduction of different types of animals to meet different market 
demand could mean either a more diverse flock on each farm or increased 
specialisation in breeding types. 
On or off dairy farms, we may find that more beef cattle are raised as 
dairy/beef crosses are added to herds. Increases in feed requirements and 
separation of beef cattle from dairy cattle will occur. The quality of 
management of stock in an ET programme is vital to its success. The 
pre-insemination process has to be synchronised, increasing monitoring and 
stock management skills needed. Increased training of farm managers in 
this process may be a result of the more extensive use of ET. 
Farmers have to make decisions as to the type of stock they supply meat 
works. Two options present themselves: Firstly, the development of smaller 
'runs' of different types of stock. This allows greater interchange between 
less profitable and more lucrative breeds, depending on market demand. 
For example, with the liberalisation of the Japanese market beef exporters 
may find that certain breeds of beef are more lucrative than others, a 
higher premium may be put on those animals. This could also apply to 
sheep breeding', if pricf'~~ of sheepmeat and wool diverge or a particular 
breed of sheep commands higher returns. 
With diverse varieties of animals, different types of farm equipment, 
transport and veterinary care are needed. To some extent this already 
happens with sheep, deer, goats and cattle being run on the same farm. 
ET allows for a rapid transfer between different animal types or different 
breeds of the same animal type. 
Secondly, a farmer could chose to concentrate on larger numbers of one 
or two breeds, reducing overheads by standardising equipment. ET and the 
use of cloning could be useful to breed-up large numbers of 'standardised' 
stock quickly. The emphasis on response time is important. Farmers are 
given through the use of ET a quicker lead time into producing more 
lucrative animals. 
Thirdly, ET may only be used to speed up genetic gain. In this way, ET 
will be used supplement traditional farming practices. 
The use of ET could mean the speeding up of the commodity cycles if the 
world's farmers are also reacting in the same way, with last years 
'designer carcass' not in demand this year. Both options offer incremental 
gains compared with other advantages that ET will bring ie increases in 
genetic gain and multiplication of desired characteristics over livestock 
populations. 
Genetic gain through ET could also have 'spin-off' cOSt cutting 
implications for farmers in the service sector area, although the actual 
gains to the farmer are very difficult to judge. As animals are breed for 
disease resistances, a major limiting factor to productivity, a decrease in 
the amount of veterinary care may occur freeing up expenditure for other 
productive uses eg NZ suffers from the debilitating disease facial eczema 
estimated to cost sheep and beef farmers over $500 million annually6 in 
lost production. Facial eczema causes causes liver damage leading to stock 
losses, lower wool production, lower weight, lower lambing percentages and 
increased susceptibility to other diseases. ET along with better stock 
management may benefit farmers by breeding animals which are less likely 
to contract the disease. 
6. Dominion 29. J.9J. 
Other desirable characteristics such as increased growth rates, higher 
productivity (which lower overheads), more efficient conversion of feed 
into protein and leaner meat may also be sped-up under ET. In a new 
twist, has been concern expressed by 'some scientist that methan~ output 
from cows is contributing to global warming. With the Increased efficiency 
of animals through ET this could be reduced. 
2. PASTORAL INDUSTRY 
AI experience shows that good stock management plays an important part 
in successful mating. This will become an increasingly important part when 
ET technologies are introduced. Large gains, using Et can be made using 
'pre-mating management'. This entails selection of animals and· the ability 
to manage animal types through the whole mating programme. The whole 
process could take 2 or 3 months, using synchronising drugs and skilled 
management expertise. A high level of management expertise is required 
for successful use of ET techniques. 
Over the next 2-5 years some freezing works companies are considering 
paying by yield. This could well be an improvement on the grading system 
in operation at the present time', particularly as firms look to add value 
by further processing meat and other agricultural products. The grading 
system establishes a GR measure. It is measured by the total depth over 
the 12th rib at a point llcm from the midline of the carcase. Criticism 
has been leveled at this system because it does not recognise good 
conformation eg the amount of lean eye muscle which is a feature of 
some exotic sheep. ET (and cloning) could help standardise animals 
slaughtered increasing automation and throughput in slaughtering facilities. 
7. Lamb carcasses are divided into seven diferent grades depending on fat 
content. These in turn are grouped according to weight. The fat classes 
are: A (almost none), Y (light fat), P (meduim fat), T (heavy fatl, f 
(excess fat), C (incomplete or damaged) and M (outside other categories), 
A, Y and P are export quality while T ,f ,C and M are exportable in as 
processed cuts or bulk-packed meat. 
If. this can occur (and the technical difficulties are large) then companies 
will be able to identify particularly types of animals more closely with 
the.ir requirements for. marketing purposes. Farmers with consistently high 
value products will be rewarded for producing quality stock because 
individual farmers stock could be traced through to the boning room. As 
farmers see the rewards, through prices, for desired types of stock they 
could turn towards ET as a way of rapidly increasing the desired 
characteristic in their stock. 
Before farmers decide to use ET, a clear profit margin has to be visible. 
Given that farmers are conservative investors, ET may take time to gain 
acceptance in the farming community. As an example the introduction of 
new sheep breeds has seen a marked reluctance by 'some, especially in the 
breeding industry to recognise their value. ET could face similar 
acceptance problems from breeders because of its ability to breed up new 
types of animals quickly. 
It is difficult to know the effect on rural land values that ET will have. 
If for example higher value animals are bred up (on well maintained 
properties) and the products were sold at a premium, then it would be 
naturally assumed that land values would rise. Land substitution could also 
occur, where land was moved into other types of production because land 
was needed to produce the same output. However, if the use of ET only 
allowed New Zealand to keep pace with competing products on the 
international market then gains to New Zealand pastoral sector would be 
negligible, consequently land values will be relatively static. 
How ET evolves, will have an effect on the structure of each industry in 
the pastoral sector. The systems in the dairy 'products' industry are 
already in place with the wide use of AI. However, in the sheep industry 
ET is more likely to be used in the breeding industry rather than by 
commercial farmers. Commercial farmers are likely to rely on the 
breeding industry to increase genetic gain. The reputation of breeders, 
experience wir.h artificial breeding and selective breeding programmes give 
existing sheep breeders a competitive edge over competition or potential 
new entrants in the breeding industry. This has been the experience with 
the use of A I. 
In the deer and goat industries, the use of AI has been driven by market 
prices and scarcity of quality embryos. When goat and deer prices were 
high, farmers arid commercial companies were keen to Increase the 
numbers of animals on their farms. AI was' used to do this quickly in 
order to breed as many high quality animals as possible to take advantage 
of the prevailing high prices. The high prices for deer and goats were able 
to sustain the cost of AI operations. When prices decreased the cost of AI 
did not warrant its use on a latge scale. 
ET will develop more animal intensive farming .. That is, the value of the. 
animal stock on the farm will increase with the use of ET techniques. In 
the case of specialisation, concentration on genetic gain could bring. this 
change about. The higher the genetic value of the stock, the higher the 
prices these stock can command .. The diversification option allows farmers 
to multiply up high value animals through ET. The effects of this a hard 
to quantify but increased specialisation will generate demand for more 
specialised (and more expensive) equipment. Increased knowledge of 
veterinary care and more careful stock management practices wiII be 
integral part of managing animals in an ET programme. 
With more diversification of animals farmed, different types of equipment 
are required on farms. On a practical level this would work in the 
following way: If a dairy farmer breeds replacements from embryos by 
taking them from the top five or ten cows from his/her herd, the farmer 
would only need roughly 50% of the current herd to breed the necessary 
replacement heifers. (If the sex of the animal was known the figure would 
be less than 50%). Given that prices are favorable, remaining heifers could 
then have twin pure beef embryos. (from on farm or off farm sources) 
implanted for beef production.s The implication is that instead of dealing 
solely with dairy cattle, beef cattle will also be used on the farm or sold 
as bobby calves are now. ET improves the efficiency of the herd, creating 
more opportunities for farmers to increase profits within the limited 
labour, land and capital that they can utilise. 
8. Example taken from the New Zealand Farmer 13.2.91 
Farmers have already purchased the necessary capital stock in order to 
farm. This basic capital is already a sunk cost to the farmer. Only minor 
changes (relative to the amount of money invested in a property) are 
needed to farm different animal types. ET allows more flexibility at the 
farm level by speeding up the breeding of different animal types. 
Fal'mers can move from one breed to another depending on the profits 
that each breed contributes to farm revenue. The return on Investment for 
producing a product in high demand could be high, although producing a 
"designer carcass" could be a risky business. One farmer who has imported 
embryos estimates that he has used only 50% of the total embryos that he 
has imported.9 This serves to underline the changing nature of importing 
embryos. 
3. UPTAKE OF ET 
The rate and magnitude of ET uptake will depend largely on farmer 
perception and cost. Issues such as technical {dis}advantages, likely 
government incentives and financing issues are also important in farmers 
decision criteria. 
Incentives to take up ET will depend upon the type of structure an 
industry faces. Initial R&D work is being undertaken by government with 
some private sector interest. Once packages have been developed by the 
private sector, incentives for farmer uptake will depend upon how 
innovative a particular sector is and how quickly farmers see gains 
impacting on farm budgets. 
In economic theorylO the process of diffusion of technical advance or 
innovation is governed to a large degree by application of comparative 
advantage ie. 
9. 1'<ew Zealand Dairy Farmer June 1986. 
10. For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that a new product 
or new technique is described as a new innovation. 
"An innovation is first adopted by skill and experimenting entrepreneurs 
and then 'diffuses' down the skills scale." 11 
Furthermore the theory dictates that: 
"If the innovation affects supply substantially, prices may decline, profits 
eliminated, and early, skilled producers may exit from the affected line of 
production. ... The theory implies that technology change is aHected by 
the distribution as well as by the average level of skills."12 
A large volume of research on diffusion theory was conducted during the 
1960s. Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) summarise the major advances in 
diffusion theory emphasising the interaction of communication and 
innovation. 
Adaption of diffusion theory in agriculture has paralleled other examples 
of innovation literature. Vernon and Hufbauer (1966) put forward the most 
robust evidence of the effect of comparative advantage for the product 
cycle in trade theory described above. Kislev and Shchori-Bachrach (1973) 
acknowledge the role of accumulated experience and knowledge in 
increasing output, developing a model of the innovation cycle and 
illustrating this in an agricultural example. 
Stefanou (I987) examines the relationship between technical change, 
uncertainty and investment concluding that the cost of adjusting the 
capital stock influences the rate of change of investment. 
In a paper by Funk and Shaw (1990), Canadian farmers are segmented in 
terms of response time to innovation. After surveying 812 Canadian 
farmers, four segments were identified. The segments are defined as 'pole 
positioners', who represented 10% of the sample. These farmers were the 
best managers and generally the first to try new products. The 'cautious 
tailgaters' represented 30% of farmers, these farmers were similar to the 
II. Kislev Y & Shchori-Bachrach N. "The Process of an Innovation Cycle". 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Feb 1973 p28. 
12. ibid p28. 
'pole positioners' but were more cautious. The third group 'the pack' were 
strongly independent somewhat conservative and tended to be older and 
have more formal education than other groups. Of the sample 40% fell 
into this category. The 'tailenders' who represented 20% of respondents 
were poor managers and generally the last to try new products. They 
tended to be young farmers who were living on smaller farms with low 
levels of education. 
3.1 Application of AI 
AI provides an indication of how ET could increase over the next five to 
fifteen years. From its first commerical use in 1941 use of AI grew 
rapidly (see Table 3). 
The use of AI through the 1949-62 period was constrained by the limited 
number of merit sires of the required standard. Commercial development 
was organised by herd improvement associations (forerunner to the LIC) 
and veterinary clubs. 
Figure I shows the growth AI use through 1949/62 period. After 1962 AI 
use increased at a decreasing rate into the 1970's and 1980's. The gradual 
move through the development phase as early adopters take up the 
innovation is followed by the bulk of farmers with a decline as the 
technology reaches maturity. 
3.2 ET Application 
As the theory dictates, the dairy industry appears to be the most well 
coordinated to take advantage of ET developments. The LIC, as a 
monopoly is in the best position to offer farmers practical knowledge, 
surety of costs and guarantees of quality and success. The Dairy Board 
through the Livestock Improvement Corporation could disseminate 
information on genetic gain, advantages of different breeding 
characteristics and adVice on stock management using current information, 
technicians and laboratory networks. However, the dominance of the LIC 
has not stopped informed farmers buying embryos directly from the United 
States and Canada to supplement their own herds. 
Table 3 
Development of AI Commercial Operations 
Year No. of AI Pedigree % of all 
Associations· Cows Dairy cows 
Operating Inseminated 
(OOO's) 
1949 2 0.3 0.1 
1950 2 1.2 0.1 
1951 4 1.6 0.3 
1952 5 2.2 2.2 
1953 5 3.1 3.1 
1954 8 3.3 3.3 
1955 9 4.1 4.1 
1956 9 4.7 4.7 
1957 9 5.3 5.3 
1958 9 5.9 5.9 
1959 9 7.5 7.5 
1960 9 8.5 8.5 
1961 9 10.2 10.2 
1962 9 14.0 14.0 
* AI Associations were the forerunners to the LlC, operating in the same 
manner on a regional scale. 
Source: Herd Improvement in New Zealand up to 1962. 
Uptake of ET in sheep will impact first on the stud breeders. This is 
because breeders could obtain a one-off increase in genetic gain more 
quickly than they otherwise would have and are experienced in artificial 
breeding management. Farmers in stud breeding have more experience 
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with artificial breeding techniques and are more inclined to make decisions 
to use artificial breeding techniques. ET offers a vehicle for stud breeders 
to produce high quality stock quickly in order to match the market 
demand. 
For commercial farmers, the price signals received from the freezing 
companies and wool buyers will have to show significant premiums before 
they will enter the ET market. Commercial farmers are more likely to use 
existing channels through stud breeders, however, If stud breeders Ignore 
price signals from processors and keep producing traditional breeds 
commercial farmers will bypass them and deal directly with those 
companies offering ET services. 
Up take if ET in the deer and goat industries will depend on prices of 
goat hair, goat meat, velvet, and venison. At present little work is being 
done in this area because of the depressed prices. It is expected that the 
companies already performing ET transfers on sheep and cattle will also 
be involved in goat and deer transfers. 
The, take up of ET will depend on a the strength of push and pull 
factors. Pull factors include: Background environmental issues also make 
ET an attractive as a technology. It is noted' that some animals are more 
resistant to disease than others. If the desired characteristic can be spread 
over larger animal populations significant gains in productivity could be 
obtained. ET may also help by speeding up development of ani~als more 
suitable to the New Zealand environment and matching this up to 
customer needs. 
Push factors, such as the risks involved depend' upon the reliability of the 
techniques, skill of the individual performing the tasks, facilities, tradition, 
perceived risk and price. The structure of the industry also has some 
bearing on take-up rates. In the dairy industry these risks' ,could be 
minimised because farmers maybe able to formalised procedures and advice 
from the LlC (as already occurs with Ail. In comparison with the sheep, 
beef, goat and deer industries these structural links do not exist. To some 
extent this means farmers are on their own with little backing from any 
organisation. farmers in these industries are, therefore, less likely to 
embrace ET than in the dairy industry because they do not have sufficient 
knowledge or back up. Mistakes made in buying embryos that do not have 
the right characteristics could set development plans for individual farmers 
back years. 
In the final analysis it will be the price of ET weighed up against 
competing technologies and perceived gains and risk to individual farmers 
which will be of importance. If farms see that a competitive advantage 
can be gained from the introduction of ET and related technologies then 
this will nullify resistance to its acceptance. 
Conclusions and Further Development 
This paper represents work in progress and is by no means the final word 
on embryology development. What we are attempting here is a very early 
assessment of a still-developing technology; this is comparable to trying to 
assess the impact of microelectronics in industry in the 1960s. 
ET will have a major effect on the New Zealand livestock industry given 
the assumption that costs for ET will in the next five to ten years 
decrease to the point where they are comparable with competing 
technologies such as AI. The effect of ET will depend to a large extent 
on the attitudes of agricultural organisations (and industries) and whether 
or not they embrace the ET technology available. The characteristics of 
an agricult\lral industry such as the degree of vertical integration, how 
extensively data ~n breeding records have been maintained and diffusion 
rates all have a bearing on the impact of ET technology. 
Work is continuing on economic influence of ET with the likely take up 
rates, processing and marketing of ET products. Building on this work the 
next stage will incorporate more "blue sky',' technologies such as sexing, 
cloning, gene mapping and genetic manipulation techniques. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1974-75 season the New Zealand Wool Board has administered a Minimum Price Fund 
from which it has supplemented payments to wool growers through the Minimum Price Scheme. 
Amid considerable controversy the Board suspended the Minimum Price Scheme on 12 February 
1991 in the face of a sudden fall in world wool prices and the decision of the Australian Wool 
Corporation (A WC) to discontinue its own price support activities. The Minimum Price Scheme 
set minimum prices for all wool types at the start of each season. If a grower's wool sold for less 
than the published minimum price the Wool Board paid the grower the difference. The Board's 
moves meant New Zealand wool growers lost a significant product price support "insurance 
policy". As expected, wool prices have been far more volatile since the Board's decision to 
discontinue market intervention at auction. However, the massive slump in wool prices predicted 
at the time of the policy's removal has not eventuated. 
1.1 Background to the scheme and its suspension 
The Minimum Price Scheme has operated in concert with the Wool Boards's Market Support or 
price smoothing scheme. When the Board suspended the Minimum Price Scheme it also decided 
to discontinue the Market Support' Scheme. The Market Support Scheme involved the Wool 
Board setting an unpublished Market Support price for all types of wool. If the Board judged 
current auction prices to be below those prices it would bid on, and often purchase the wool 
offered. The two schemes were complementary as by increasing the price level at which the 
Board bid, and perhaps bought the offered wool, then the level of supplementation required to 
be paid from the Minimum Price Fund was reduced. Likewise, reduced intervention resulted in 
increased supplementation. During the 1989-90 season the Board bid on 67 per cent of the wool 
offered and bought 38 per cent of the offering. The purchases amounted to 512,150 bales costing 
$429 million. This compared with the II per cent of the offering bought by the Board in the 
1988-89 season. 
Up to mid-February 1991 the Wool Board had spent $129 million on market intervention and 
$107 million on price supplementation. Wool prices had fallen sharply from their 1990-91 
average of 615 cents per kilogram clean to 395 cents just prior to suspension of the Minimum 
Price Scheme. The decline in prices reflected both an increase in the world supply of wool and 
a sudden reduction in world wool demand. Most of the increase in world supply was due to 
increased production by Australian wool growers. From 1983 to 1990 Australian wool production 
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increased by 55 per cent to around 1,047 million kilograms and stocks rose to 4.7 million bales, 
or around 80 per cent of the 1990 season's production. The impact of such a large increase in 
production on world prices is emphasised by the fact that Australia accounts for approximately 
37% of total wool production and just over half of the world wool trade. Additionally, political 
and economic problems in China and the Soviet Union (USSR) saw a significant reduction in 
demand. Demand for wool by the USSR was severely curtailed by a shortage of hard currency. 
In fact the New Zealand Wool Exporters Council suspended shipments to the USSR in 1990 after 
it had defaulted on a debt of $38 million. 
In many ways the A WC's decision to suspend its Reserve Price (also known as the floor price) 
Scheme on II February appears to have been the final blow for the New Zealand Wool Board's 
Minimum Price Scheme. The floor price was an inflexible price below which the A WC was 
obliged to buy the growers' wool at auction and stockpile it In November 1990 the Australian 
Federal Government, despite considerable pressure from producers, directed the A we to reduce 
the floor price from 870 Australian cents to 700 cents. 
Given the dominance of Australia in the world wool market and the prospect of rapidly 
weakening world wool prices the New Zealand Wool Board considered it was impossible to 
continue to supplement woolgrowers' income in the 1991-92 season without depleting the 
Minimum Price Fund to levels which the Board's bankers felt were imprudent. Therefore as 
Government assistance was not forthcoming the Board elected to: 
suspend the minimum price scheme, 
suspend the market intervention at auction scheme, 
continue to cut spending by staffing cuts and reducing the levy to the International 
Wool Secretariat, 
maintain the six per cent grower levy. 
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2. Evaluating the Minimum Price Scheme 
2.1 Intuitive discussion 
Programmes such as the minimum price schemes of the New Zealand Wool Board and the 
Australian Wool Corporation reduce farmers' downside revenue risk by guaranteeing a minimum 
price for the output. Producers have the right to sell their output to the agency administering the 
programme at some fixed minimum price, and that right usually covers a specified time period. 
Suspension of the Board's Minimum Price Scheme could therefore be likened to an insurance 
company with insufficient assets to cover future contingent liabilities. There are two ways a 
hypothetical insurance fund could get itself into such a position. First, the premium charged by 
the fund to insure the risk was set too low in the past in comparison to its risk exposure. Second, 
the nature of the risk could have increased suddenly during a period while the premiums, which 
are set at the beginning of the period, were insufficient to reflect this. Viewed in this way, what 
level of "premium" should the New Zealand Wool Board have been charging to adequately cover 
its risk? Or alternatively, at what level should have the Wool Board levy been set to ensure that 
the Minimum Price Fund had sufficient funds to cover supplementary payments to growers? This 
is the issue to be addressed in this paper. 
Governments and other agencies administering price support schemes usually value them on the 
basis of fiscal cost. That is, the total value of cheques written to producers. This implies that if 
the market price exceeds the minimum price and no supplementation is paid, then the scheme 
is worth nothing to its recipients. However, this suggests that an insurance policy was worth 
nothing at the beginning of the year because no claim was made during the period. Insurance 
premiums are assessed with respect to the probability of a claim being made in the future. 
Therefore, it is argued that the value of minimum price schemes must be higher than merely the 
cash value of the assistance paid out by the authority administering the scheme. Bardsley and 
Cashin (1990) point out that the real value of such a policy should incorporate the value of the 
assistance potentially available to the recipient at the time it is announced. That is, the total 
benefit should be assessed as the value of any cash payments plus the value of the right to sell 
the produce or commodity at a fixed price, should the market value of the commodity fall below 
the minimum price in the future. 
A simple way of valuing the potential payoff to the recipients of any minimum price scheme is 
to treat it as a put option on the commodity to be sold. When each season's minimum price was 
announced, the New Zealand Wool Board were effectively conferring to wool growers the right, 
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but not the obligation, to sell their wool at the set minimum price. This right to sell can be 
valued using the put option formula derived by Black and Scholes (1973). Their model 
incorporates the probability that even if the market value of wool is higher than the announced 
minimum price at the start of the season, that may not be the case when the wool is actually sold. 
Bardsley and Cashin (1990) used this option pricing methodology to value the minimum price 
scheme operated by the Australian Wheat Board. Their results suggest that the value of the 
minimum price guarantee to wheat producers was consistently far higher than the traditional, ex 
post measure of supplement payments suggests. Although the underwriting provisions were only 
triggered once between 1979{80 and 1988/89, the implied value of the scheme, or the cost that 
growers would otherwise have had to pay for an equivalent reduction in price risk ranged 
between A$17.81 million and A$102.53 million. In this case, the implicit benefits of the 
Government guaranteed scheme were conferred on wheat growers by the Australian taxpayers 
at no cost to the recipients. The reduction in risk was granted free-of-charge. 
2.2 Application of option pricing theory to the NZWB minimum price scheme 
Black and Scholes derived their put option formula from the formula for pricing European call 
options: 
where 
and 
C, = s, 'N(d
l
) - e -'IT·X 'N(d
2
) ••..••••.••••••.• , (1) 
dl 
In(SIX) + (rt + rr/2)T 
off 
d = In (SIX) + (rt - rr/2) T 
2 off 
c. = the value of a call option 
S, = the current price of the commodity 
X = the exercise price at which the commodity may be purchased 
rr = the risk free interest rate 
T = time to maturity 
5 
a = annualised standard deviation of the log of the commodity price 
N(z) = cumulative normal distribution evaluated at z. 
Put-call parity assumes that put and call options are related as follows 
C
, 
- P, = S, - X'e -'IT ..•..•.•..••••..••..• (2) 
where, P, = the value of a put option. 
Thus, the put option value can be calculated as 
P = C - S + X'e -'IT • •••.•.•••••..•••.•.. (3) , , , 
By substituting for C. from eqn. (1) and re-arranging we obtain 
where 
P, = X'e-"T'N(-d) - S'N(-d,) ................. (4) 
-d, 
In(X/S) - (r, + a2/2) T 
a,ff 
In(X/S) + (r, + a Z/2) T 
-dz = ----;:::----
a,ff 
Equation (4) can be used to value the implicit value of the New Zealand Wool Board's Minimum 
Price Scheme to wool growers, as at the beginning of each season. A basic interpretation of the 
formula is that in eqUilibrium the first term, X.e·nr.N(-d,) , is the present value ofreceiving the 
minimum price, weighted by the probability of that minimum price being higher than the market 
price when the wool is sold. The second term, S.N(-d,) , is the present value of receiving the 
market price at expiration, again weighted by the probability of the minimum price being higher 
than the market price. If, at the start of a season, the prevailing market price was substantially 
higher than the minimum price, and there was little chance of it falling below that announced 
minimum price before the wool was sold then the second term of equation (4) would have a 
higher value than the first. That is, the value of the put option would be zero. If however, there 
was a reasonable chance that the market price would fall below the minimum price during the 
season, the ability to sell the wool at the minimum price would have a positive value to the 
grower. 
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Equation (4) was used to calculate the implicit value of the Minimum Price Scheme for the 9 
seasons between 1982/83 and 1990/91. The put option value was assessed as at August of each 
year as it was at this time that the minimum prices for the forthcoming season were announced. 
The variables required to estimate the aggregate put option value for each season, and the proxies 
chosen to represent those variables are as follows: 
(i) The market wool price, (S,), is the August market indicator price (c/kg clean) for all wool 
classes established by the Wool Board. 
(ii) The minimum wool price, (X,), is that announced by the Wool Board in August of each 
season for all wool classes. 
(iii) The term to maturity, (T), is assumed to be 1 year, as growers had the right to sell their 
wool at the announced minimum price until it was subsequently adjusted at the beginning of the 
succeeding year. We can value the put option as a European option even though it is likely to 
be exercised prior to expiration in 1 years time. Miller (1973) showed that an American option 
on a non-dividend paying asset will have a value which is at least as high as that for a European 
option. 
(iv) Accordingly, as the risk-free interest rate should have the same maturity as the option, (rr), 
is the prevailing yield on 1 year Government securities as at August of each year. 
(v) The standard deviation of the log of the wool price, (a), is the wool price volatility measured 
in season t-1. It is suggested that the fluctuation in wool prices during the previous season is an 
adequate proxy for expected volatility for the coming year. However, as the historic volatility was 
measured using the market indicator price, and as this price was influenced by Wool Board 
intervention in the market, it should be expected that the derived volatility measures are biased 
downwards. Nonetheless, wool price volatility was estimated using the following formula (as in 
Cox and Rubinstein, 1985). 
where 
C1 = [L (R.t - lrl/n]O.5 
J-I 
RJ = In(S/SI_I) 
• 
R = L R.tln 
J-I 
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(vi) Finally, in order to estimate an aggregate value of the Minimum Price Scheme, a proxy is 
needed for total expected wool sales for each season. Following Bardsley and Cashin, actual 
sales in period t-l have been used as a proxy for ex ante, or planned production. Those authors 
point out that using ex post sales volumes may distort the implicit value of the scheme to wool 
growers, depending on seasonal conditions. 
The estimates of the required variables are presented in table 1. 
Table 1. 
Variable Estimates Used in Put Option Formula 
1982/83 10.9979 11.77 339 327.08 187,107 
1983/84 15.1634 9.50 336 392.97 193,506 
1984/85 10.5191 14.28 423 479.42 194,920 
1985/86 20.0358 22.50 443 479.45 197,819 
1986/87 11.8180 17.14 443 496.18 188,786 
1987/88 10.0275 17.96 476 645.36 172,060 
1988/89 18.9553 14.35 500 634.35 182,400 
1989/90 14.3119 12.96 525 651.95 165,687 
·1990/91 11.2002 13.96 485 481.70 157,575 
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3. Results 
Estimates of the annual value of the Minimum Price Scheme, calculated using the Black and 
Scholes put option formula are presented in table 2. These values can be compared to both the 
amount of levy income paid into the Minimum Price Fund by wool growers and the actual 
amount of supplement paid to the growers in each year. 
Table 2. 
Implicit Value of the NZWB Minimum Price Scheme, 1982/83 to 1990/91 
1982/83 10.060 32.093 78.585 
1983/84 19.669 0.343 61.922 
1984/85 12.390 0.099 109.155 
1985/86 5.581 18.490 181.994 
1986/87 6.264 0.048 132.151 
1987/88 7.126 0 134.207 
1988/89 0 0 124.032 
1989/90 0 2.700 106.040 
1990/91 0 107.100 103.999 
Examination of the results reveals that the put option estimate of the scheme's value to the 
farmers is considerably higher than the total amount of funds paid into the Minimum Price 
Scheme in each of the 9 years. For example, none of the 6% levy charged to wool growers was 
diverted to the Minimum Price Fund during the 1989/90 season even though the implied value 
of the Minimum Price Scheme in that year was approximately $M 106. This is the price the 
farmers would have had to pay to secure a similar reduction in price risk by purchasing put 
options. It is also interesting to note that the calculated put option values are appreciably higher 
than the amount of supplementation paid to the growers in all but the last year of the study, 
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1990/91. A plausible explanation for this is that the market indicator price was consistently 
increasing throughout the first 8 years of the study, before the dramatic price decrease occurred 
in that last season. 
4. Summary and Policy Implications 
The New Zealand Wool Board's Minimum Price Scheme has provided wool growers with a price 
risk limit since its inception in 1974nS until the scheme was suspended in February 1991. At 
the beginning of each season, the Wool Board announced a minimum price which was guaranteed 
to the grower if the market wool price had fallen below the announced minimum when the wool 
was sold. A 6% levy was paid by farmers to the Wool Board to help fund the scheme, although 
the proportion of the levy diverted to the Minimum Price Fund has varied between 0% and 50%. 
However. the Wool Board was forced to suspend the scheme during the 1990191 season as 
market wool prices plummeted. exhausting the reserves available for price supplementation. 
The Minimum Price Scheme can be viewed as an insurance fund which. at the start of each 
season confers to the farmers an insurance policy to limit their downside revenue risk. If viewed 
in this way, the premium charged by the fund should have been assessed with respect to the 
probability of a claim being made by the policy holder during each given year. That is. the 
probability of the market wool price falling below the guaranteed minimum price between the 
beginning of a season. and the date at which the wool was actually sold. 
This paper has suggested the Black and Scholes put option pricing methodology as an appropriate 
way of incorporating the price assistance which was potentially available to growers at the start 
of each year. The aggregate put option values derived from this formula represent a fair 
'premium' that would more adequately cover the price risk exposure taken on by the Wool 
Board. As the results indicate. the implied annual value of the Minimum Price Scheme between 
1982/83 and 1990/91 is far higher than the traditional, ex post measure of actual supplement 
payments. 
But more importantly, the put option values are also consistently and appreciably higher than the 
amount of levy paid to the Minimum Price Fund by the wool growers. This suggests that the risk 
premiums charged to the scheme's recipients were consistently too low, and it can be argued that 
the only reason why the scheme could continue to operate until it did. was that the market wool 
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price tended to increase throughout the period covered in this study. This allowed the Wool 
Board to effectively 'sell' put options to the growers which did not usually need to be exercised. 
If a commodity price smoothing scheme is to be sustainable in the future, a more appropriate 
price needs to be charged for the risk reduction it affords the recipients of the scheme. In this 
case, the values derived from the put option formula are suggested as being more appropriate 
than the ad hoc, percentage based levy system. 
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UNCERTAINTY: CONCEPT, DIlHENSIONS AND MAt"lAGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1921 Frank H. Knight (K1921) introduced a distinction between insurable risk and non-
insurable uncertainty. He used this distinction in particular to analyse the phenomenon of 
profits made by entrepreneurs. As be put it in the 1957 Preface: 
The word "uncertainty" seemed best for distinguishing 
the defects of managerial knowledge.from the ordinary 
"risks" of business activity, which can feasibly be 
reduced if not eliminated by applying the insurance 
principle through some organization for grouping cases. 
(K1921, page !xii) 
Already in the second preface (1933) to his original doctor's thesis, Knight confessed to 
being puzzled about: 
... the insistence of many writers on treating the 
uncertainty of result in choice as if it were a gamble 
on a known mathematical chance; •• (KI921, page xvi) 
This confusion between uncertainty and quantifiable risk continues to the present day. A 
recent example is an article by Feinerman et al on The Economic Optimisation of Sprinkler 
Irrigation Considering Uncertainty of Spatial Water Distribution (F1989). They treat un-
certainty in terms of a probability distribution. Another example is the theory of games and 
decision-taking under risk. 
Conceptual clarity on this issue is called for in view of the pervasive nature of uncertainty in 
economic life as most economic decisions involve the future in some way. 
This paper proposes to examine, first, the concept of uncertainty from an economic point of 
view, second, the various dimensions of this concept and, finally, the implications for the 
management of uncertainty. However, before discussing the concept of uncertainty it will be 
necessary to outline what will be meant by the economic point of view. Issues of epistemol-
ogy are not considered in any depth in this paper. 
PART I: THE CONCEPT OF UNCERTAINTY 
The Economic Aspect of Reality 
The word uncertainty appears in many contexts in daily life. Its usage is not confmed to mat-
ters economic. It is, therefore, not understood as a strictly economic category in the same 
way as. for instance, price or savings. One can be uncertain about somebody's motivations or 
about the outcome of the next general elections for parliament or about when the next big 
earthquake will hit Wellington. Yet each of these events has a potential bearing upon 
economic values. 
What this indicates is that. from an economic point of view, uncertainty should be ap-
proached as an analogical concept. To elucidate this I like to draw on the theory of 
modalities and individuality structures as developed by the Dutch philosophers Dooyeweerd 
and Vollenhoven (DI955). The philosophical movement they have founded is often referred 
to as reformational philosophy as it has its roots in the RefomJation of the 16th century. A 
more technical name is the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea. It should be stressed that 
this is not an idealist philosophy. It is rather a transcendental-empirical attempt to develop a 
theory of the structure of reality. Its starting point is that this structure is given 
(transcendental) and needs to be empirically discovered and explored. In the context of this 
paper I can only provide a very brief sketch of some key concepts. 
In this philosophy aspects are fundamental modes in whicb entities (plants, animals, states, 
business corporations), facts and events function. A study of the economic aspect analyses 
how entities and events function in an economic sense. Aspects cannot be found as sucb in 
life. We encounter things, structures, organisations, events. We can ask what is this or what is 
that? Modalities, however, are indicated by qualifications such as this chair is beautiful or 
comfortable. Similarly, a business enterprise (entity) has an economic organisation, a juridi-
cal structure and a social organisation of employees. The adjectives emphasised refer to 
modalities. 
Another key concept which requires comment is that of law and norms. Every science works 
with laws. Usually things which are subject to such laws are called objects. In Dooyeweerd's 
philosophy, however, they are known as subjects i.e. subjected to laws. Without a basic order-
ing of reality it would be impossible either to distinguish the various subjects from"each other 
or to explain and predict their behaviour. Importantly, a distinction is made between laws 
valid for aspects prior to the logical and for those which follow after the logical one. The 
former are often known as laws of nature. A tree or an animal is subject to a certain ordering 
without being able to object to it. Human beings, however, are able to make logical distinc-
tions and, therefore, have differing views as to how they should go about ordering their af-
fairs. Thus there is an economic norm corresponding to the economic aspect. Generally, for 
the modalities founded upon the analytic, laws are known as norms which require human 
acts to have an ordering function in life. 
The distinction between entities and aspects is a fundamental one, inasmuch as one of them 
cannot be expressed in terms of the other. The various scientific disciplines tend to con-
centrate on studying general aspects or modes of being such as physics. biology, history, law, 
economics, ethics etc. In mathematical terms the relationship between individuality struc-
tures (entities) and modalities is orthogonal, as set out in Chart 1: 
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CHART 1 
KEY CONCEPTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA 
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By way of working hvpothesis one can posit that there is a fundamental mode of being called 
lhe economic one, with a core meaning of optimal value. In economic theory, however, the 
focus has been on sectors of reality rather than on the economic aspect, as discussed in detail 
by Kee (K1982, pp 17-23). 
Although entities function in all aspects of reality, there is usually one aspect which expresses 
their specific character. A business corporation is qualified by the economic aspect, a tree by 
the biotic one, a state by the jural aspect, a family by the ethical aspect. When we set out to 
study economic relationships, attention is most easily drawn to those entities which are 
economically qualified such as business enterprises, markets and money. The danger is that 
the economic functioning of otherwise qualified entities is ignored or that they are seen as 
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providing exogenous inputs into the economic process. This leads to category mistakes. Price 
formation is thought of as dependent on wants, but how wants are formed must be explained 
by sociologists or psychologists. 
Dooyeweerd has emphasised that the modalities on the one hand are irreducible to each 
other, but on the other hand display a very strong coherence. They are ordered in a par-
ticular way. This ordering is to be found through empirical analysis. Thus, the aspect of num-
ber precedes that of space. Without a notion of number it is impossible to discern spaces 
such as triangles. Similarly, the physico-chemical aspect precedes the biotic aspect, because 
plants and animals depend on chemical processes. Thus, the economic aspect is founded 
upon the social, being dependent upon transactions between people, traffic etc. and, in tum, 
is located prior to the juridical aspect. Property rights, for instance, depend on the existence 
of economic values. 
Chart 2 sets out the modalities (RI99I): 
Letter Code 
p 
n 
m 
d 
b 
Analogies 
CHART 2 
THE MODALITIES ARRANGED FROM HIGHER TO LOWER 
Description 
Confess i ona l leert i tudinal 
Ethical 
Jural 
Economic 
Social Intercourse 
Lingual 
Technico·cul tural 
logical 
Aesthetic 
Affective 
Percipient 
Biotic 
Physical 
Kinematic 
Spatial 
Nunerical 
The coherence of the modalities is shown by the fact that within each modality or aspect all 
the otbers are represented. Ooe can think of regional economics as a way in which the spatial 
aspect functions within the economic modality. Similarly, the concepts of economic equi-
librium and economic growth represent backward references to energy and biotic life respec-
tively. Formally, Dooyeweerd expressed these interrelationships in terms of analogies. 
Analogies whicb refer back to earlier modalities he called retrocipations and those pointing 
forward anticipations. The set of retrocipations make up tbe primary structure of the aspect. 
Forward references anticipate a deepening of the meaning of tbe primary structure. As cul-
tures develop, tbey open up the meaning of these structures. 
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The letter code used in Chart 2 allows us to designate analogies in short-hand. A numerical 
analogy in the economic aspect would be described as mao As an instance. the concept of 
unit of account could be mentioned. 
Interestingly, modality a has 15 primary anticipations (ah, ac, ad, ae, af, ag, ab, ai, aj, ak, ai, 
am, an, ao, ap), modality b bas one less, and so OD. Thus, there are in total 120 primary an-
ticipations. Clearly, there is the same Dumber of retrocipations. This gives a total of 240 
primary analogies. 
This is not the end of the story. Since every anticipation and retrocipation itself has anticipa-
tions and retrocipations (for example abc, abd, abe etc.) there is a large Dumber of other 
analogies. For modality a, the total number of aDticipations is 
15+ 14+ 13+ 12+ Ii + 10+9+8+7+6+5+4+3+2+ 1= 120. For modality b the total is 120-15= 105. Con-
sequeDtly, the total for all modalities is 680. With the same number of retrocipations, this 
gives a total of 1,360 analogies. 
The practical significance of this approach is that we can identify analogies in advance by way 
of a research programme. At this stage. it is highly doubtful whether all potential analogies 
have beeD thoroughlY researched. 
Attempts to set up multi-disciplinary research projects or policy advisory research can only 
benefit from haviDg this systematic framework. 
Economic Uncertainty as Analogy 
The modality of faith or certitude is the highest modality. It relates to that in which we find 
our ultimate certitude. The fact that all preceding modalities point forward to this modality 
supports the view that man is guided by faith rather than, for iDstance, by reason. Ideologies 
are strong driving forces in human society. Empirically, there are many types of faith and cer-
titude. A change in the predominant faith or ideology iD a particular culture can have a 
major impact on the directioD and thought patterns of that culture. The differeDces between 
Islamic cultures and those influeDced by Christianity and humanism, or by Confucianism or 
Hinduism are proDOunCed. 
My workiDg hypothesis is that uDcertainty originates in the certitudinal modality. It ex-
presses that in some way we are not sure of the orderliDess of the reality we are facing. This 
should not be equated with ignorance. We might have a rough idea that the Government's 
fiscal policies could have destabilising social effects, without being able to pinpoint the exact 
Dature, timing and size of these effects. 
In this respect, [differ from Knight (KI92I, pages 199 and following) who describes the na-
ture of uncertainty more in terms of lack of foresight and knowledge, albeit not consistently. 
When discussing, for instance, the nature of our environment (KI921, pages 206-208) he 
states a view OD the Dature of the world: 
Finite intelligence is able to deal with the 
world because a) The number of 
distinguishable properties and modes of 
behavior is limited .•. b)Bec.ause the 
properties of things remain fairly 
constant; and c) such changes in them as 
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take place occur in fairly constant and 
ascertainable ways •.. 
The first observation to which the working hypothesis gives rise is that in all modalities 
precediDg the modality of faith there will be a type of uncertainty corresponding to the na-
ture of that modality. Hence, we can talk about social, legal, economic, ethical, historic. 
biological, geological, uncertainty. When the word uncertainty is used without adjective, one 
always needs to ask what type of uncertaiDty? 
I shall discuss the analogies of uncertainty in part II of this paper. Before this can be done, 
however, we need to discuss in more detail the distinctioD betweeD risk and uncertainty. 
Probability 
In the IntroductioD I have already alluded to the distinctioD drawn hy Knight (KI92I) be-
tween risk and uncertainty. In his discussion Knight related risk in particular to the concept 
of probability and he listed three distinct cases of probability, namely: 
1. A priori probability. Absolutely homogeneous 
classification of instances completely identical 
e."cept for really indeterminate factors ... 
2. Statistical probability. Empirical evaluation 
of the frequency of association between 
predicates, not analyzable into varying 
combinations of equally probable 
altematives ... The main distinguishing 
characteristic of this type is that it rests on 
an empirical classification of instances. 
3. Estimates. The distinction here is that there 
is no valid hasis of anv kind for classifying 
instances. This form of probability is involved 
in the greatest logical difficulties of all •••• 
Knight's First Two Cases of A Priori and Statistical Probability 
Before examining Knight's third category, which iD fact is his basic definition of uDcertainty, 
we ought to inquire into the concept of probability. We should do so using the same 
framework of analysis as used for the concept of uncertainty. 
ID this respect the work of physicist/philosopher M.D. Stafleu (S 1980) is of particular inter-
est because he studies probability using the concepts of reformational philosophy. 
Discussing classical physics Stafleu (S1980, plS5 and following) Dotes that the theory of 
probability should account for two things: the spectrum of possihle properties which are 
simultaneously possible (spatial ordering) and the statistical distributioD of relative frequency 
of occurrence of these possibilities (Dumerical, i.e. a measure set). Thus, formally probability 
Can be defined as a numerical "measure" over a set of possibilities. If U is the set of pos-
sibilities or sample space, A are sub-sets of U, phi is the empty set. and P(A) is a "measure" 
or weight functioD" of the sub-set A relative to U, three cases can be considered: 
(a) Different sub-sets are assumed to have equal weights, because of some symmetry relation' 
(dices, cards). 
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(b) A theory can be devised to calculate weights which are not equal because of symmetry. 
This is fully developed in quantum physics. 
(c) If there is no theory available. probability functions must be determined byexperimeDts. 
The set U represents in fact the law side (spectrum of possible cases) while tbe probability 
function. describing their weights. defmes this set from the subject side (actual occurrences 
of the possible cases). 
In quantum physics (SI980. p. 174) probability is not so much a function over possibilities 
but rather a functional, a scalar product between the state function f and the eigenvector 
corresponding to a particular possible case, so that it becomes a relation between tbe state of 
a system and the state of some reference system. This is an improvement on classical theory 
which assumes that the initial state is completely random. 
Another way of putting the key principle of probability is to Dote that chance does not play 
any role in mathematics. because it requires an interaction betweeD two or more phvsical 
things such as a dice and a table or the molecules of a gas. In quantum physics. the iDitial 
state of a physical system indicates the probability that. given a certain iDteraction, certain 
quantum-numbers will be realised. It can be said that the initial state of the system has a 
structural (law· like) as well as an individual character. Thus, the state function of a copper 
atom differs from that of an iron atom (structural difference). The state function of a 
copper-atom, however. differs from that of other copper atoms. Atoms and electrons have 
individuality. 
One can carry out tbe same type of analysis of probability in terms of plants and animals. 
However. the variability in these areas appears to be even greater than in physics. Whilst in 
physics it is not easy to isolate systems, in the spheres of plant and animal life. this is even 
more di fficul!. In the case of animals, populations interact with both physical and organic 
(plant-type) systems. 
If we move further up the scale of modalities, the complexities increase because now buman 
discretion and judgment, based on analytical distinctions come iDto play. 
In other disciplines, the initial state often remains a problem. One needs to define a popula-
tioD or a representative sample. Stafleu (SI980. pag\> 158) makes the interesting observatioD 
that frequency hypotheses based on statistical extrapolation, such as mortality tables: 
can only be used if they are assumed to 
'represent a law. since there is no logical 
justification for the conjecture that 
frequencies "ill remain constant, and 
thereby permit e."<trapolation. Probably (without 
many e."<ceptions) all statistics in the 
non-physical sciences is of this type. 
In other words, we should be very careful when using probability calculations to examine the 
structure U and what the implications are of using frequency distributions. An implication of 
this is that relative quantities have absolute significance because they are invariant with 
respect to the measure set. 
A few examples may suffice. 
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a) Droughts 
When considering the frequency and duration of droughts in certain parts of a country. it will 
be important to know what type of initial states are instrumental in causing them and what 
sort of interactions then result in droughts. Not all droughts are brought about by swings in 
the Southern Oscillation, cycles in Sun spots etc. The analysis of drought patterns is compli-
cated by the fact that we have to consider not only physical variables sucb as tbe Southern 
Oscillation, but also biotic factors sucb as the extent and type of forests plantations, espe-
cially as they influence micro-climates. The concerns about "Greenhouse" gases and their ef-
fects on climate change relate to the influence of human activities on patterns of droughts. 
Recent findings of applying chaos theory (non-linear dynamic systems) indicate that the 
weather is very much a dYDamic system in which small initial changes somewhere can lead to 
cumulative effects. 
b) Shipwrecks 
Owners and operators of ships, as well as firms dispatching Jll'Ople and cargoes by means of 
ships are vitally interested in the chance of ships and cargoes perishing on the high seas. 
Whilst one can examine long-term historic series of ships getting wrecked and work out fre· 
quency ratios of ships wrecked in relation to the total number of ships and cargoes travelling 
through certain shipping lanes at particular times of tbe year, tbis information is always 
limited by the fact, for example, of on-going technological change. Thus. ships have become 
larger and are often carrying very dangerous cargoes (oil, gas, combustible chemicals) etc. 
Even if one had very stable frequency ratios "tending over centuries one would not neces-
sarily bejustified iD extrapolating them. 
We can conclude with regard to Knight's two first cases of probability, that he basically got it 
right, althougb his defmitions of probability can be improVed upon. 
In modem terms, these two cases of known probabilities bear a striking resemblance to ra-
tional expectations models. They assume a known world, in which stochastic processes may 
take place but iD such a way that the probability distributions are known and where actors 
can have expectatioDs which correlate well witb future developments as they unfold. 
Interestingly, even in a well understood world of rational expectations, prices may follow un-
predictable paths. When markets are efficient, all available information has been incor-
porated in prevailing market prices. Expectations cbange only on the basis of new iDforma-
tion. Since, such new information becomes available in a rather random manner, the changes 
iD prices are random, as pointed out by Goslings (GI990). 
SUbjective Probabilities 
ID game theory one assumes that decision-makers are able to specify personal SUbjective 
probabilities about possible future events. These are usually situations or events involving 
uncertainty for wbich no historical frequency data are available. I would regard such subjec. 
tive probabilities as tools used iD decision-making under uncertainty. Before they can be 
defined, some insight into the Dature of the uncertainty faciDg the decision-maker is called 
for. 
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Knight's Third Category of Estimates: Uncertainty 
It sbould also be clear that Knight's third category of probability should not be called proba-
bility. Discussing the third category (which he called estimates) Knigbt gives the example of 
making a business investment decision in circumstances where it is impossible to infer any 
real probability. Yet after the decision is made the businessman may assume that tbe out-
come itself is a certainty: 
We are so built that what seems to us 
reasonable is likely to be confinued by 
e."<perience, or we could not live in the world at 
all. (KI92!. page 227). 
Anyway. since Knigbt styles the third group (estimates) as uncertainty. it would be better to 
talk about three possibility situations. This would allow US to add a fourtb category which . 
could be described as: 
4. Situations where we can surmise. using a variety of methods. that certain events might oc-
cur. but without being able to assign any probabilities to them. This fourth category is akin io 
a situation of a-certainty. rather than the third possibility in whicb decision-makers are es-
sentially ignorant and in whicb they or others (their bankers. for example) rely on their intui-
tion or generally proven ability to make good decisions. 
If everyone. however. adopts the same rules. tben it may never shown to be wrong until a 
calamity strikes the group as a whole. One can think of bankers who. for instance. decide to 
realise the collateral of their loans during a recession and thereby deepen and prolong the 
recession. 
The important point is that uncertainties and a-certainties are not risks. They cannot be as-
sociated with probability distributions. 
Uncertainty or a-certainty is a state in which decision-makers cannot rely on probability dis-
tributions when designing decisions involving the future. They are faced with a world the or-
derliness of which they do not fully understand. 
PART II: DIMENSIONS OF UNCERTAINTY 
Uncertainty should not be equated with ignorance. Decision-makers usually realise that the 
future ",ill never be an exact replay of the past. Even the patterns of the past might not ob-
tain during the future. On the other hand. if we were completely ignorant of the future. 
making choices would be meaningless. Changes made in the past have a momentum. Human 
nature has not changed for centuries. Faced with uncertainty. it makes sense to strive for a 
prognosis. Similarly. a learuing or research programme aimed at charting changes or poten-
tial changes in the environment may be helpful. This task is facilitated by a systematic 
analysis of the dimensions of uncertainty in a particular environment or over a certain period 
of time. 
Uncertainties arise especially at times when major changes occur in the way a culture as a 
whole begins to question the premisses on which it bas relied. Changes currently taking place 
in the Soviet Union are a case in point. 
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The discoveries made in the development of chaos theory are a good example of how new in-
sights in tbe orderliness of the world may help to reduce uncertainty. By means of examining 
non-linear dynamic systems, using powerful computers, it bas been possible to discover new 
patterns. 
I propose to survey briefly the dimensions of uncertainty. 
In terms of the set of modalities and corresponding analogies set out in Chart I. using its 
code, we bave to examine the analogies as set out in Chart 3. Since an exhaustive discussion 
would go beyond the scope of this paper. I'll focus only on some salient points. 
CHART 3 
DIMENSIONS OF ECONOI\UC UNCERTAINTY 
Analogy: Economic Uncertainty wi th respect to: 
pm faith 
pmo ethics 
pm legal/political 
pm1 economics 
pml social 
pmk syrrbol jell ingual 
pmj technico-cul tural 
pmi logical 
pm aesthetic 
pmg affect ive/emot i onal 
pm! percipient 
pme biotic 
pmd physical/energy 
pnc kinematic/pers i stent 
pmb spatiat 
pma nunerical 
Belief Systems and Economic Uncertainty 
If the proportion of people in the world population who are Hindus and Muslims were to 
change dramatically over a period of time. there will be repercussions on the demand for 
meat and the demand for pig meat and non-pig based meats. The shift in ideology in Eastern 
European communism towards liberal market-type ideologies can have profound effects on 
resource allocation in the world and. in particular. on the prospects for New Zealand agricul-
ture. 
Similarly. if people generally became very careless about the future. because they believe that 
the world will end soon. their demand patterns would be materially different from. for ex-
ample. 17th century Massachusetts Puritans. 
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Uncert.~inty about Effects of Economic Decisions 
Policy-makers tend to suffer from specification errors. Policy changes may be very desirable, 
but could be carried out at the wrong time or in inappropriate doses or without any 
knowledge as to how private sector decision-makers are going to react to tbe changes. 
A company which makes an investment decision, a student who embarks upon a certain 
career or a Government tbat introduces a dellationery budget, none will ever know in ad-
vance how the environment will react to such decisions with any degree of certainty. Hen-
nipman (H1945, p.449) quotes Robbins about the problem facing economists: 
Day by day. in Sisyphus-like activity. he must 
discover his coefficients anew. 
This uncertainty notwitbstanding, important and far-reaching decisions are being made witb 
confidence, sometimes even with reckless abandon. The reason for this must be that 
decision-makers have a basic t";st in the persistence or stability of the structures of the world 
they are living in. Sbould long-term investment decisions be deferred or cancelled because 
decision-makers entertain doubts about this persistence or stability. then uncertainty in-
creases and could reacb an intensity of alarming proportions. This could well be a danger of 
the current situation in New Zealand agriculture. Capital investment bas been very sligbt for 
more than 6 years. What future is there for young farmers? 
The EthicallEconomic Aspect of Uncertainty 
Without a trust in the fairness of the economic production and distribution system, produc-
tion may decline and economic crimes increase. If for example, people are uncertain as to 
bow they would fare in the basic contingencies of life, tbey might either increase tbeir savings 
or migrate or increase tbeir rate of consumption. Efforts to make a fraudulent use of the so-
cial wei fare system could increase. If employees are uncertain about the motivations of their 
employers, their wage demands could rise. 
A key problem in New Zealand and Australia is that the bulk of export incomes is earned by 
a very small part of the total population on farms, in mines and forests located in thinly 
populated areas, while a large part of this gross export income is re-distributed to relatively 
large urban population. If neither group trusts the other, economic management faces a basic 
uncertainty. Calls for restraint in consumption may go unheeded. 
Legal/Political Economic Uncertainty 
If economic actors cannot be sure of property rights, patents etc. investment decisions could 
be adversely affected. A telling example is furnished by Barton (B1991, pp 18-24). Through 
genetic engineering, new types of animals and plants can be developed for which tbe USA 
legal system is prepared to grant patents. International trade negotiations between the EEC 
and the USA now involve intellectual property rights. A fascinating issue raised by Barton is 
the hypothetical case of somebody who inserts an artificial gene into lambs which has the ef-
fect of those lambs producing more, leaner meat from less feed. US law would permit the in-
ventor to obtain a patent which would extend his monopoly to all the lambs bearing the ar-
tificial gene. Whilst any farmer could buy such lambs and "fatten" it, it is uncertain whether 
he would be able to breed the animal and raise its offspring without the permission of the 
patent-holder. It may well be the case that the patent system is more designed for industrial 
activities than for farming. 
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It should be noted that institutions such as patent law and tbe legal forms of doing business 
such as the joint-stock company are ways of managing uncertainty. They offer some protec-
tion and security to inventors and providers of capital. 
Economic Uncertainty 
In view of the Government's belief that a reduction in net GRI incomes in the future will 
stimulate saving in the present, it is worth our while to discuss economic uncertainty in terms 
of the value of the present relative to the future. Bohm-Bawerk (Hennipman, 1945, pp 309-
312) emphasised uncertainty on the part of individuals as one of the reasons why they under-
value the future. This uncertainty has the following components: 
a) One cannot be sure that one will be able to enjoy goods and services which will be avail-
able in the future; 
b) One cannot be certain that goods and services which one expects to be available in the fu-
ture actually will be available or will be so to the extent required. 
c) Future needs are uncertain. 
d) the size of the pool of future goods and services is unknown. 
Ooe could expand upon Bohm-Bawerk's components by noting tbat people might not know 
wbether the systems will exist to produce and distribute wanted goods and services. 
As a result of these uncertainties tbe consumer is unable to organise his consumption op-
timally over hislber lifetime. 
On the basis of Bobm-Bawerk's views one should conclude that consumers would react to 
the Budget measures by enjoying the present rather than save for an uncertain future. 
Whether they will is, of course, an uncertainty. 
Whatever consumers decide to do, farmers bave apparently decided to increase their capital 
stock by investing in trees (The NZ Farmer, Vol 113,32, 14/8/91). 
In general terms, economic uncertainty as sucb relates to uncertainty about economic values. 
SociailEconomic Uncertainty 
Consumers and producers are connected via complex sets of social networks, including 
markets. The use of money and prices allows division of labour. Transport networks, money 
and credit circuits, are important aspects of sucb a division. These networks are in a state of 
on-going change. Yet, there is likely to be a reasonably coherent pattern of change. Since 
networks are inter-related cbanges in one part of the system are likely to cause changes in 
other parts. Decision-makers, however, may lack an insight into these patterns. 
As a result of growing environmental awareness, the networks for establishing economic 
values are expanding. The neoclassical economic theory, corresponding with practice, as-
sumes tbat the production/consumption system is self-contained. Pollution and waste are eX-
ternal effects borne by others than the producers. Through re-cycling, prohibitions, pricing 
systems (tradeable permits), the environmental effects are slowly but surely being inter-
nalised by the production system. 
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Uncertainties arise wben the social networks break down or do not appear to work properly 
or are not accurately described. so that unexpected consequences ocCUr. A rapid rise in un· 
employment indicates that the process of division of labour is malfunctioning. Sbould one 
bope for a tum for the better? change occupation?, move country, live on the dole? 
Queuing problems under credit-rationing systems and centrally controlled distribution sys-
tems are other instances of this type of uncertainty. 
SymboliclLinguaI Economic Uncertainty 
Prices are importanl indicalors of economic value. Processes of inflation and deflation and 
forms of Government intervention can create uncertainty as 10 the reliability of these in-
dicators. 
At the present time New Zealand agriculture faces a major uncertainty with regard to the 
rate of foreign exchange. 
Technico-Cultural Economic Uncertainty 
T ethnological cbange is very important in modem societies, but also very unpredictable. An 
investment in a new technology always runs the risk that it will be superseded by a new tech· 
nology implemented by a competitor or by the same technology perfected hy a competitor. 
Again, there are patterns of technological change. The advent of the motor-<:ar and the in-
vention of the transistor have sparked streams of innovation. The advent of bio-engineering, 
with the likelihood of a stream of applications during the first part of the 21st century 
presents an uncertainty to New Zealand agriculture. 
LogicallEconomic Uncertainty 
The need to make decisions requires the ability to make logical distinctions. Uncertainty 
arises if investment decisions have to be made without a knowledge of all the factors which 
may impinge upon it, so that the analysis cannot be pursued far enough. On the other hand, 
extensive and detailed analysis could lead to paralysis. 
Aesthetic Economic Uncertainty 
Schumpeter emphasised the importance of vision in economic analysis (History of Economic 
Analysis). Taking economic investment decisions is helped along by suggestions and allu-
sions. If one does not see the way clear, or is unable to make use of hints and suggestions. 
pictures are not formed and the ability to look forward is impaired. Organisations can be so 
bent on control that they lose the ability to inspire and to think creatively. 
Our current economic structures and institutions could create uncertainty through tbeir sti-
fling of creative efforts. 
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Psychic/Economic Uncertainty 
Perceptions and emotive energies and feelings play major roles in economic operations. 
Money market dealers who are able to perceive the reactions of other players in the markets 
or people who bargain with people whose moods they can anticipate, have major advantages 
over those who lack these abilities. Market sentiments can be widely different from those the 
Government deems appropriate. This is an uncertainty faced by policy makers. 
There are always uncertainties about how markets will perceive a company or its new 
products. 
Biotic Economic Uncertainty 
Modem agriculture represents an enormous interference with natural processes. The danger 
of highly industrialised agriculture is that it leads to monocultures and dependence on a 
limited gene-pool. The uncertainty here is that the processes could lead to major contagious 
diseases and a consequent loss of economic values. Similarly, tbere are uncertainties as to the 
long-term effects of using chemical pesticides and fertilisers on soil fertility. Presently, uncer. 
tainty is caused also by overseas consumers becoming very wary of the health hazards as. 
sociated with the us of chemicals used in agriculture. 
World-wide there is a major uncertainty as to the reduction in plant and animal diversity 
resulting from growing uniformity in agriculture as urban populations' demands for energy 
and food conflict with and encroach upon traditional farming practices, tropical forests etc. 
PhysicallEnergy Economic Uncertainty 
Energy is vital for both production and consumption. Uncertainties relate to the speed at 
which non·renewable energy resources are being depleted, the availability of substitutes, the 
price bebaviour of energy sources subject to depletion of major reserves and lagged effects 
between price increases, discoveries of new sources, reductions in prices and growth in 
demand. The release of carbon-<lioxide into the atmosphere has created a major uncertainty 
in terms of possible climatic changes. 
IGnematic Economic Uncertainty 
Individuals are born, grow up, mature and die. Their identity tends to persist. Economies go 
through similar phases. A key uncertainty about New Zealand is wbether it will be able to 
persist as an independent economic unit or whether it will be compelled to join the 
Australian economy as part of a yen-<lominated block? Currency-blocks, of course, are also 
entities with persevering identities. 
Spatial Economic Uncertainty 
Regional economies are currently under strong pressure, given their exposure to pastoral in-
dustries which are faced with a major decline in profitability. Some of these industries are 
farinl! better than others (apples, dairy). Many regions have latent or potential resources 
which are currently not being developed. Regional economic managers face uncertainties as 
to the development of their regions in relation to national economic development policies. 
The way the Resource Management Act will be implemented by various regions is another 
source of uncertainty. 
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PART III: THE MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY 
The recognition of pervasive uncertainty calls for appropriate management. 
Goslings (G 1990) who is Chief Managing Director of the largest Dutch pension fund advo-
cates the use of matching for pension funds in the face of uncertainties in financial markets. 
Matching means that the assets of a fund are composed in such a way that they react to dis-
turbances simultaneously with liabilities. An appropriate corporate strategy aims at develop-
ing processes of adaptation, so that the organisation is able to cope with unforeseen cir-
cumstances as they arise. 
Whilst different types of uncertainty will require different management strategies, what most 
have in common is an emphasis on flexibility. Another important ingredient is the collection 
of information given that we are able to surmise the existence of adverse events and hence 
are able to monitor the environment for it. 
In many cases, an adequate monitoring/information-gathering system may allow the transfor-
mation of an uncertainty into a risk, assuming, the nature of the initial state can be assessed. 
Insurance for marine cargoes sailing to areas where there is evidence of armed conflict is a 
case in point. Normally, insurance companies exclude insurance for war risks, on the ground 
that probabilities of war-inflicted disasters cannot be calculated. When there are limited or 
sporadic hostilities, however, it happens that leading experts of the major insurance com-
panies gather and pool all the information pertaining to the situation and assess the 
likelihood of cargoes being hit. They then advise insurance companies the level of premiums 
which seems commensurate with the risks involved. Historically, it is not impossible that 
Governments become involved through diplomatic channels. 
Japanese companies are known for their expertise in monitoring all technological change 
around the world on a systematic basis. This allows them to spot interesting new possibilities 
by purchase, often at low prices, of new inventions, which they can then improve upon. 
Rather then being hit by unexpected developments, they attempt to stay ahead of the field 
through superior information. 
Similarly, companies conduct expensive advertising campaigns in order to influence the tastes 
of customers and thus gain their persistent allegiance. 
Governments playa very important role in the management of uncertainty. Often Govern-
ment agencies are the only ones who are able to remove uncertainties. It is the Government 
which sets fiscal, monetary and regulatory policies. [n each of these areas there are large un-
certainties at the present time. 
Governments should also playa key role in resource management in various ways. Local 
authorities cannot manage their local resources consistently with national objectives unless 
they know what these objectives are. 
If farmers, for instance, are individually not prepared to reduce the use of phosphate fer-
tilisers, although this would be desirable to improve the water quality in a certain area, then a 
Government agency would be able to provide all the farmers with the necessary information 
to remove the uncertainty of individual farmers about their neighbour's non-<:ompliance. 
In general terms, the management of uncertainty should have three elements: 
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a) Identify uncertainties and possible effects; 
b) Gather information about the nature, development, impact.etc of these uncertainties; 
c) Define actions designed to avert the uncertainty, to reduce it, to evade it, to minimise its 
potential impact or to ignore it altogether. 
Returning to the example of droughts given above, if a certain region experiences an increase 
in the number of droughts which are not yet deemed to be of an exceptional nature, then it 
could surmise the possibility of a climate change which might make the area subject to very 
prolonged and severe droughts. This leads to an exploration of options for such a region in 
those circumstances such as introduction of drought resistant species, development of 
manufacturing, forest plantations, irrigation systems, wind-farming, photo-voltaic solar 
energy. Some of these options could be attractive also if the surmised drought were not to 
eventuate. Thus, a strategy is developed which seems able to cope with the event and would 
have favourable spin-offs in any case. [f no forward management response took place at all, 
the region would be much less able to cope with the event when it did arrive or the amount 
of Government assistance required would have to be much larger. 
[t is these types of issues which have to be faced by Regional Councils and District Councils 
if they take their tasks under the Resource Management Act seriously. 
CONCLUSION 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is of crucial importance. Uncertainties can be 
distinguished and identified. This offers a possibility for devising management strategies. 
This paper has not considered the epistemological aspects of uncertainty. This should be the 
task of a follow-up paper. A more in-<lepth study of these aspects is essential for the develop-
ment of strategies to reduce and handle uncertainty. Such a study would examine, for in-
stance, the limits to uncertainty and the knowability of dynamic networks and patterns. 
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